LONGFELLOW v. COLVIN

Filing 19

ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW: For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Entry ***SEE ENTRY FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION***. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 12/3/2015.(DW) Modified on 12/4/2015 (DW).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
ERIK S. LONGFELLOW,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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Cause No. 1:14-cv-1645-WTL-TAB

ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
Plaintiff Erik S. Longfellow requests judicial review of the final decision of Defendant
Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”), denying his application for Supplemental Social Security Income (“SSI”) and
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”). The Court rules as follows.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Longfellow filed an application for SSI and DIB on November 17, 2011, alleging
disability beginning December 31, 2008, due to uncontrolled diabetes, neuropathy in his legs,
depression, social anxiety disorder, migraines, nerve damage in his back and legs, ketoacidosis,
sleep disorder, and a recurring cyst in his tailbone. Longfellow’s application was initially denied
on February 7, 2012, and again upon reconsideration on April 9, 2012. Thereafter, Longfellow
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A pre-hearing conference was
held on March 5, 2013, before ALJ James R. Norris. Longfellow subsequently appeared at an
administrative hearing held on April 5, 2013, before ALJ Norris. During that hearing, Mark

Farber, M.D., and Jack Thomas, Ph.D., testified as medical experts, and Constance Brown
testified as a vocational expert (“VE”). At that hearing it was determined that additional medical
development was needed, and the hearing was continued until this information was received. A
supplemental hearing was then held on June 12, 2013, before ALJ Norris. During that hearing,
Paul Boyce, M.D., and Don Olive, Ph.D., testified as medical experts, and George Parsons
testified as a VE. On June 26, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision denying Longfellow’s application
for benefits. The Appeals Council denied Longfellow’s request for review, and this action for
judicial review ensued.
II.

EVIDENCE OF RECORD

The relevant medical evidence of record follows.
A. Ball Memorial Hospital
On September 14, 2009, Longfellow was admitted to Ball Memorial Hospital with
complaints of severe nausea and vomiting, dehydration, fatigue, and exhaustion. Longfellow was
found to have blood sugar levels of 600 with acute acidosis. He was placed on an insulin drip
and later switched to insulin sliding scale therapy. His condition improved and he remained
stable. Longfellow also underwent psychological evaluation at this time, where “the impression
was that the claimant had adjustment disorder with mixed features with a Global Assessment of
Functioning (GAF) score of 70.” Tr. at 20. Longfellow was provided diabetic education and was
discharged on September 18, 2009, with a diagnosis of type I diabetes mellitus, severe
dehydration, severe general debility, migraine headaches, depression, and anxiety.
On September 25, 2010, Longfellow returned to Ball Memorial Hospital’s emergency
room with complaints of abdominal pain, nausea, and weight loss. He was found to have a
glucose level of 465 with ketonuria and an elevated anion gap. Longfellow was admitted for
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diabetic ketoacidosis and started on an insulin drip. Longfellow was then given a full diabetic
diet with subcutaneous insulin and his blood sugars ranged from 130 to 200. He was discharged
on September 27, 2010, with a diagnosis of diabetic ketoacidosis, hyponatremia secondary to
diabetic ketoacidosis, abdominal pain and nausea, and weight loss.
On November 19, 2010, Longfellow returned to Ball Memorial’s emergency room with
complaints of abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. Longfellow initially claimed to be
compliant with his insulin regimen, but admitted to taking nearly three times his prescribed
dosage earlier that day. Testing of Longfellow’s blood sugar showed it was 936. He also had
positive ketones that were high in his serum. He was placed on diabetic ketoacidosis protocol
and was provided further education regarding his diabetes.
On March 8, 2011, Longfellow returned to Ball Memorial’s emergency room with
complaints of nausea and vomiting. His blood sugars were at 377, he had an anion gap, as well
as ketoacidosis. Longfellow was put on an insulin drip and given IV fluids. Further education
was provided to Longfellow regarding his condition, and he was discharged on March 10, 2011,
with a diagnosis of diabetic ketoacidosis, type I diabetes, and asthma.
B. Family Medicine Residency Center
On April 22, 2011, Longfellow began treatment at Family Medicine Residency Center.
At that time, Longfellow reported a two-year history of diabetes and inquired about insulin pump
placement. He stated that his blood sugars averaged 200. Longfellow was assessed with
uncontrolled type I diabetes mellitus and his insulin was increased. Further diabetes education
was provided to Longfellow, and he was informed that an insulin pump was not recommended at
that time.

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On May 24, 2011, Longfellow reported to Family Medicine Residency Center that he
was unable to fill his prescription for an emergency kit due to the cost. He also reported having
back and leg pain that was interfering with his work. He was diagnosed with type I uncontrolled
diabetes mellitus and his insulin was increased.
Subsequent visits resulted in Longfellow’s insulin being changed and him being
prescribed with medication for his back and leg pain. Further diabetic education was also
provided.
On August 17, 2011, Longfellow reported using a friend’s insulin when not at home. He
reported having blood sugar levels over 600 some days, while other days were 200. At this time
his pain was controlled with his medication.
On November 9, 2011, it was noted that Longfellow was doing well with his medication,
although his blood sugars were still at 200. He was also noted to have variable compliance, as he
utilized portions of his recommended dose in an attempt to save money.
On January 27, 2012, it was noted that Longfellow was not using or refilling his
medication as prescribed, despite the repeated attempts at improving his education and
compliance.
On February 24, 2012, Longfellow was prescribed a cane by his treating physician, Dr.
Brown.
On March 26, 2012, it was noted that Longfellow’s blood sugars had been averaging in
the 200s for the past few months. Although still high, this was said to be a two hundred percent
improvement.
On July 2, 2012, Longfellow reported worsening pain and that he occasionally could not
get up and walk. He also stated he was out of pain medication. He was found to have continued

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diabetes mellitus with neurological manifestations. It was recommended that Longfellow
undergo an MRI and an EMG, but he declined to do so for financial reasons.
On August 13, 2012, it was noted that Longfellow’s blood sugars typically ranged from
300 to 600, but were sometimes as low as 125. Longfellow admitted to using insulin belonging
to a friend that was different from his prescription both in type and dose. It was also noted that
Longfellow was using an unprescribed cane; however, Longfellow had been prescribed a cane by
Dr. Brown. Longfellow was warned that his continued cavalier attitude toward his medications
could ultimately end in his death or disability.
On January 7, 2013, Longfellow was discharged from care at Family Medicine Residency
Center after his drug screen came back negative despite the fact that he had been prescribed pain
medication. Longfellow denied selling the medication, but could not provide a reason as to the
lack of prescription drugs in his system.
C. Consultative Examinations
On January 25, 2012, at the request of the State Agency, Longfellow underwent a
consultative examination by Kevin Schopmeyer, M.D. Dr. Schopmeyer reported Longfellow’s
history of uncontrolled diabetes with blood sugar levels consistently over 500, neuropathy in his
legs with mild improvement on medication, migraines, a bad nerve in his back, nerve damage in
his legs, daily symptoms of ketoacidosis, a sleep disorder, and a recurring cyst near his tailbone.
Physical examination showed that Longfellow had difficulty getting on and off the examination
table. When walking, Longfellow leaned forward and to the left, watched his feet, and had a slow
gait and a limp to the left. Longfellow also had “+1 pedal edema and there was pain to palpation
of T4, T10, L1-S1, and bilateral sacroiliac joints.” Tr. at 18. Furthermore, Longfellow had
positive findings of the right shoulder, limited upper extremity reflexes, no lower extremity

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reflexes, and decreased touch sensation. Longfellow had full range of motion in all areas. Dr.
Schopmeyer’s assessment was that Longfellow had uncontrolled diabetes, neuropathy secondary
to diabetes, migraines, undiagnosed low back pain, nerve damage in his legs, ketoacidosis
secondary to diabetes, sleep disorder, and a resolved recurring cyst in his tailbone.
On April 22, 2013, at the request of ALJ Norris, Longfellow underwent a consultative
examination by Doshandra Nelson, M.D. Physical examination showed that Longfellow had a
wide-based gait with slow speed and sustainability and stability using a four-pronged cane.
Longfellow used his cane for assistance in getting on and off the examination table. He was able
to walk ten feet without the assistance of his cane. He was unable to walk on his heels or toes or
tandem walk without the use of his cane. He was able to squat with effort and straight leg testing
was negative. He had reduced range of motion of the cervical spine and bilateral hips. The
assessment was that Longfellow had diabetes, neuropathy in his legs, migraines, nerve damage in
his back and legs due to diabetes, ketoacidosis, a sleep disorder, and recurring cysts in his
tailbone, all of which were also reported by Longfellow. Dr. Nelson also completed a Medical
Source Statement of Ability to Do Work Related Activities, on which Dr. Nelson noted
Longfellow’s use of a cane and opined that it was medically necessary.
In addition to these physical examinations, Longfellow underwent a consultative mental
examination on January 24, 2012. Longfellow reported that he had depression, anxiety, and
bipolar disorders. As a result of his depression, Longfellow reported to be restricted to his bed.
Additionally, Longfellow reported that he was having panic attacks and that stress and social
situations involving more than four or five people triggered his attacks. He also reported anxiety
about being in large groups due to his fear of being judged by others. The “diagnostic impression

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was that [Longfellow had] panic disorder with agoraphobia and major depressive disorder,
recurrent, with a GAF score of 58.” Tr. at 20.
III.

APPLICABLE STANDARD

Disability is defined as “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of a medically determinable mental or physical impairment which can be expected to
result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least
twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In order to be found disabled, a claimant must
demonstrate that his physical or mental limitations prevent him from doing not only his previous
work, but any other kind of gainful employment that exists in the national economy, considering
his age, education, and work experience. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner employs a five-step
sequential analysis. At step one, if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, he is
not disabled, despite his medical condition and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). 1 At
step two, if the claimant does not have a “severe” impairment (i.e., one that significantly limits
his ability to perform basic work activities), he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At
step three, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of
impairments meets or medically equals any impairment that appears in the Listing of
Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1, and whether the impairment meets the twelvemonth duration requirement; if so, the claimant is deemed disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)(iii). At step four, if the claimant is able to perform his past relevant work, he is

1

The Code of Federal Regulations contains separate sections relating to DIB and SSI that
are identical in all respects relevant to this case. For the sake of simplicity, this Entry contains
citations to SSI sections only.
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not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At step five, if the claimant can perform any other
work in the national economy, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).
On review, the ALJ’s findings of fact are conclusive and must be upheld by the court “so
long as substantial evidence supports them and no error of law occurred.” Dixon v. Massanari,
270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” id., and the court may not
reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Overman v. Astrue, 546 F.3d
456, 462 (7th Cir. 2008). The ALJ is required to articulate only a minimal, but legitimate,
justification for his acceptance or rejection of specific evidence of disability. Scheck v.
Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 2004). In order to be affirmed, the ALJ must articulate his
analysis of the evidence in his decision; while “[he] is not required to address every piece of
evidence or testimony,” he must “provide some glimpse into [his] reasoning . . . [and] build an
accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [his] conclusion.” Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1177.
IV.

THE ALJ’S DECISION

At step one, the ALJ found that Longfellow had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since December 31, 2008, his alleged onset date. At step two, the ALJ concluded that
Longfellow suffered from the following severe impairments: insulin dependent diabetes mellitus
with peripheral neuropathy, major depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder. At step three, the
ALJ determined that Longfellow’s severe impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed
impairment. Before considering step four, the ALJ concluded that Longfellow had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform:
light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)
except he can lift, carry, push, and pull 20 pounds occasionally and
10 pounds frequently; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
crawl, and climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, or
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scaffolds; never be exposed to heights or machinery; never operate
automotive equipment; limited to no more than semi-skilled work;
have limited contact with coworkers; and have no contact with the
general public.
Tr. at 23. Based on this RFC, the ALJ found at step four that Longfellow could not perform any
of his past relevant work. At step five, the ALJ determined that Longfellow could perform jobs
existing in significant numbers in the national economy such as a semi-skilled stock clerk order
filler, semi-skilled shipping and receiving clerk, semi-skilled photo machine operator, unskilled
general office clerk, and unskilled bookkeeping audit clerk. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that
Longfellow was not disabled as defined by the Act from December 31, 2008, through the date of
his decision.
V.

DISCUSSION

Longfellow advances several objections to the ALJ’s decision; each is addressed below.
A. Longfellow’s Use of a Cane
Longfellow argues that the ALJ erred by failing to evaluate the evidence regarding
Longfellow’s cane usage and either incorporate his need to use a cane into his residual functional
capacity finding or articulate his reason for rejecting treating physician Dr. Brown’s prescription
of a cane and examining physician Dr. Nelson’s opinion that Longfellow needed a cane.
The Court agrees that the ALJ failed adequately to evaluate Longfellow’s use of a cane.
The record reflects that Longfellow was prescribed a cane by Dr. Brown, his treating physician,
on February, 24, 2012. On August 13, 2012, staff at the Family Medicine Residency Center
noted that Longfellow was using an unprescribed cane, although this classification seems
erroneous in light of the prescription by Dr. Brown. On April 22, 2013, Dr. Nelson conducted a
consultative physical examination of Longfellow, during which she noted his wide-based gait
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with slow speed and sustainability and stability when he used a four-pronged cane. Longfellow
needed his cane to get on and off the examination table. He was able to walk ten feet without the
cane, but was unable to walk on his heels, toes, or tandem walk without the cane. Dr. Nelson
opined that Longfellow’s use of the cane was medically necessary.
In his decision, the ALJ recognized that Longfellow was prescribed a cane by Dr. Brown.
Tr. at 26. However, the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Brown’s testimony focused solely on a “Medical
Statement Regarding Peripheral Neuropathy for Social Security Disability Claim,” and did not
address the need for a cane. See id. at 28. Further, the ALJ gave Dr. Brown’s opinion “some
weight,” and noted that, “Dr. Brown said that the claimant could never perform fine or gross
manipulation with his bilateral hands however, in the comment section he stated that the
claimant has ‘diabetic neuropathy which is affecting his lower extremities.’ He does not mention
the claimant’s upper extremities.” Id. In evaluating Dr. Nelson’s opinions, the ALJ
acknowledged without comment Dr. Nelson’s opinion that the cane was medically necessary. He
determined generally that Dr. Nelson’s opinion was only entitled to “some weight” because “the
majority of her opinion appears to be based on what the claimant reported he could and could not
do, rather than a medical opinion based on the totality of the findings of the examination.” Id. at
29.
“An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of evidence, but must provide a
‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions. Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813
(7th Cir. 2015). Furthermore, Dr. Brown’s status as Longfellow’s treating physician requires
that his opinion be given a level of analysis above that of a non-treating source.
A treating physician’s opinion that is consistent with the record is
generally entitled to “controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2); Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir.
2010). An ALJ who rejects a treating physician’s opinion must
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provide a sound explanation for the rejection. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2); Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir.
2010); Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 842 (7th Cir. 2007).
Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2011). Moreover, “‘[i]f an ALJ does not give a
treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, the regulations require the ALJ to consider the
length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, frequency of the examination, the
physician’s specialty, the types of tests performed, and the consistency and supportability of the
physician’s opinion.’” Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Moss v. Astrue,
555 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).
The ALJ erred in his failure to either account for Longfellow’s use of a cane in his RFC
determination or sufficiently explain his reasoning for rejecting the physicians’ opinions that the
cane was necessary. Furthermore, given the ALJ’s conclusion that the opinion of treating
physician Dr. Brown was not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ was required to articulate
the analysis, including his consideration of the factors mentioned above, that led to that
determination. The ALJ erred in failing to engage in this analysis. Further, the blanket
justification provided by the ALJ for not fully crediting Dr. Nelson’s opinion is insufficient. 2 The
ALJ should have mentioned explicitly the opinion regarding the medical necessity of the cane

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The ALJ’s reason for giving Dr. Nelson’s opinion only “some weight” is that Dr.
Nelson’s opinion was based on Longfellow’s subjective reports. This, of course, means that the
ALJ did not find Longfellow to be credible. In assessing the credibility of the claimant, the ALJ
must articulate the reasons for his decision in such a way as to “make clear to the individual and
to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and
the reasons for that weight.” Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 783, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing
SSR 96-7p). In other words, the ALJ is required to “build an accurate and logical bridge
between the evidence and the result.” Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 2000). In
reviewing the ALJ’s decision, it is not entirely clear why the ALJ felt that Longfellow’s
subjective reports to Dr. Nelson were not credible. This should be corrected on remand.
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and then explain the rationale behind why that opinion was rejected if, in fact, it was. 3 If it was
not rejected, then Longfellow’s need for a cane should have been accounted for in the ALJ’s
RFC and the hypothetical questions he posed to the VE. Therefore, the Commissioner’s decision
must be reversed and remanded to correct these errors.
B. Transferable Skills and SSR 82-41 Compliance
Longfellow argues that ALJ Norris failed to comply with SSR 82-41. Specifically, he
argues that because the ALJ determined he was not disabled given his ability to perform semiskilled occupations other than his past relevant work, the ALJ violated SSR 82-41 by failing to
identify his transferable skills.
Based on Longfellow’s RFC and VE Parsons’ testimony, at step five the ALJ determined
that Longfellow could work as a light, semi-skilled stock clerk order filler; a light, semi-skilled
shipping and receiving clerk; and a light, semi-skilled photo machine operator. Therefore,
Longfellow was found not disabled given the existence of jobs in sufficient quantity in the
national economy. As it pertains to transferable skills, the ALJ stated that “[t]ransferability of job
skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational
Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is ‘not disabled’ whether or not the
claimant has transferable job skills.” Tr. at 31.
SSR 82-41 provides that, “[w]hen a finding is made that claimant has transferable skills,
the acquired work skills must be identified, and specific occupations to which the acquired work

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Longfellow advances a similar argument regarding Dr. Nelson’s opinions regarding his
limitations on “handling and fingering,” as these opinions were not explicitly evaluated by the
ALJ and were cast aside under the ALJ’s sweeping conclusion that Dr. Nelson’s opinions were
based on Longfellow’s own, non-credible reports. The Court agrees that the ALJ should have
explicitly analyzed this opinion and provided specific reasoning as to why Dr. Nelson’s opinion
that Longfellow suffers from neuropathy in his hands was rejected.
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skills are transferable must be cited in the State agency’s determination or ALJ’s decision.” SSR
82-41. Longfellow cites this requirement as support for the proposition that, “[i]f an ALJ
decision determines that a claimant is not disabled based on the claimant’s ability to perform
semi-skilled or skilled work, the ALJ must make an express finding identifying the claimant’s
transferable skills.” Pl. Br. at 12. Longfellow’s position misinterprets the language of the ruling.
SSR 82-41 does not create an affirmative duty on the ALJ to make an express finding identifying
transferable skills when it finds a claimant is not disabled because of an ability to perform skilled
or semi-skilled work; rather, SSR 82-41 only imposes a duty to identify acquired work skills
once a finding is made that a claimant has transferable skills and those skills are material to the
determination of whether the claimant is disabled. No such finding was made, either explicitly or
implicitly, 4 in the instant case. Nor is any authority cited suggesting that an ALJ must make a
transferable skills finding for a situation comparable to the instant case. 5
Instead, whether an ALJ must make a determination regarding transferable skills is
dependent upon the Medical-Vocational Guidelines and where a claimant falls on the various
“grids.” In situations in which transferability of skills could be dispositive in the determination of
disabled or not disabled, SSR 82-41 requires the ALJ to identify what transferable skills the
claimant has that render him not disabled. That is not the situation here. As the ALJ stated, the

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The ALJ explicitly found that transferability was not material, and Longfellow himself
points out “this is . . . not a case in which an ALJ implicitly adopted . . . testimony that a claimant
had specific transferable skills.” Pl. Br. at 12.
5
Longfellow cites several cases applying SSR 82-41 to support his position. In each case,
the ALJ made a finding that the claimant had transferable job skills, most often because the
claimant was of an age or education level where the Medical-Vocational Guidelines framework
for determining disability hinged on whether the claimant had transferable job skills. See Key v.
Sullivan, 925 F. 2d 1056 (7th Cir. 1991); Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219 (9th
Cir. 2009); Draegert v. Barnhart, 311 F.3d 468 (2nd Cir. 2002); Dikeman v. Halter, 245 F.3d
1182 (10th Cir. 2001).
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Medical-Vocational Guidelines, when used as a framework, would not direct a finding of
disabled absent a finding of relevant transferable skills, given Longfellow’s status as a younger
individual with an ability to communicate in English and a high school education. Therefore, the
ALJ correctly found that the transferability of skills was immaterial to his analysis.
C. VE Testimony
VE Parsons
Longfellow argues that VE Parsons’ testimony was unreasonable and reflected a lack of
understanding of the hypothetical question posed to him by the ALJ. Longfellow takes issue with
VE Parsons’ testimony that Longfellow would be able to perform the functions of order filler,
shipping and receiving clerk, and photocopy machine operator despite the limitation that
Longfellow never have contact with the public and limited contact with his co-workers.
However, VE Parsons testified that these jobs “do not require contact with the public or peers”;
in other words, someone would be able to perform the jobs in a manner that would avoid contact
with the public and co-workers. While Longfellow argues that it is unreasonable to suggest these
kinds of jobs never require contact with the public or co-workers, there is no evidence in the
record that contradicts VE Parsons’ testimony on this issue.
VE Brown
As it pertains to VE Brown’s testimony, Longfellow argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical
question posed to VE Brown was defective. The ALJ stated that, “Ms. Brown was posed a
hypothetical assuming an individual with the claimant’s age, education, and past work
experience who is capable of performing only sedentary level work that is unskilled with no fast
paced work requirements and only occasional contact with the general public . . . .” Tr. at 32.
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This hypothetical does not comport with the ALJ’s RFC determination, which provided that
Longfellow was to have “no contact with the general public.” However, because the ALJ’s step
five decision is supported by VE Parsons, the fact that the ALJ also mentioned VE Brown’s
opinion in his decision is harmless.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this
cause is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Entry.
SO ORDERED: 12/3/15
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Copies to all counsel of record via electronic notification

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