GILLILAND v. FIFTH THIRD MORTGAGE COMPANY et al

Filing 20

CLOSED DISMISSED - We GRANT Mr. Gilliland's motion to consolidate Cause Nos. 1:14-cv-2054-SEB-DKL and 1:14-cv-2055-SEB-DKL. Upon careful review of the record and the parties' submissions, we hold that the Bankruptcy Court did not abu se its discretion in dismissing Mr. Gilliland's Chapter 13 bankruptcy case and related adversary proceeding or in denying Mr. Gilliland's motions for relief from judgment as to those dismissals. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court's rulings are AFFIRMED. Final judgment shall issue accordingly. All other pending motions are hereby denied as moot. Cause closed and consolidated into 1-14-cv-2054-SEB-DKL. Signed by Judge Sarah Evans Barker on 9/30/2015. Copy Mailed(CKM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
MICHAEL GILLILAND,

)
)
Appellant,
)
)
vs.
)
1:14-cv-02054-SEB-DKL
)
FIFTH THIRD MORTGAGE COMPANY )
Creditor,
)
)
Appellee.
)
________________________________________________________________________
MICHAEL GILLILAND,

)
)
Appellant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
FIFTH THIRD MORTGAGE COMPANY, )
FIFTH THIRD BANK,
)
GREGORY A. PURVIS,
)
SPANGLER JENNINGS DOUGHERTY,
)
PC,
)
)
Appellees.
)

1:14-cv-02055-SEB-DKL

ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE AND
AFFIRMING THE RULINGS OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT
Appellant Michael Gilliland, proceeding pro se, filed this bankruptcy appeal
challenging the Bankruptcy Court’s December 3, 2014 order denying his motion for
relief from judgment dismissing his Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. Mr. Gilliland has also
filed a related appeal, Cause No. 1:14-cv-2055-SEB-DKL, challenging the Bankruptcy
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Court’s order, also issued on December 3, 2014, denying his motion for relief from
judgment dismissing an adversary proceeding filed in relation to his Chapter 13
bankruptcy case. On April 28, 2015, Mr. Gilliland moved to consolidate these two
appeals. Before addressing the merits of Mr. Gilliland’s appeals, we turn first to address
his motion to consolidate.
Motion to Consolidate
The Court, having considered Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate [Docket No. 21],
and being duly advised in the premises, now finds that the motion should be GRANTED.
It is therefore ORDERED that: Michael Gilliland v. Fifth Third Mortgage
Company, Gregory A. Purvis, and Spangler Jennings Dougherty PC, Cause No. 1:14-cv02055-SEB-DKL is hereby consolidated with this cause, Michael Gilliland v. Fifth Third
Mortgage Company, Cause No. 1:14-cv-02054-SEB-DKL for all purposes.
The Clerk is ordered to consolidate Case No. 1:14-cv-02055-SEB-DKL with
Cause No. 1:14-cv-02054-SEB-DKL.
The Clerk shall administratively close Case No. 1:14-cv-02055-SEB-DKL. All
future filings shall be made under Case No. 1:14-cv-02054-SEB-DKL.
Having ordered these appeals consolidated, we now turn to the merits.
Factual and Procedural Background
The Foreclosure Case

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Appellee Fifth Third Mortgage Company (“Fifth Third”) filed a foreclosure action
against Mr. Gilliland on July 18, 2011, in Union Circuit Court, Case No. 81Co1-1107MF-140 (“the Foreclosure”). On July 8, 2013, the trial court entered judgment in favor of
Fifth Third on both Fifth Third’s complaint and Mr. Gilliland’s counterclaims. Mr.
Gilliland appealed that decision to the Indiana Court of Appeals in Case No. 81A011307-MF-00314 (“the Foreclosure Appeal”). The Indiana Court of Appeals ruled in Fifth
Third’s favor in the Foreclosure Appeal, entering an order affirming the trial court on
March 20, 2014.
The Bankruptcy Case and Adversary Proceedings
After a sheriff’s sale was scheduled in the Foreclosure, Mr. Gilliland filed a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, pro se, on July 31, 2014. He subsequently filed two
adversary proceedings in connection with his bankruptcy. In the first adversary
proceeding, Mr. Gilliland named Fifth Third and its attorneys, Gregory A. Purvis and the
law firm of Spangler, Jennings & Dougherty, P.C., as defendants, alleging, inter alia,
claims for fraud, unlawful foreclosure, breach of contract, and violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act. In the second adversary proceeding, Mr. Gilliland sought to
remove the Foreclosure from Union Circuit Court to the Bankruptcy Court. It is the
Chapter 13 case and the first adversary proceeding that are the subjects of this appeal.1

1

Mr. Gilliland also filed an appeal in this Court related to the second adversary proceeding,
Cause No. 1:14-cv-2056-SEB-DKL. However, that appeal has since been dismissed for failure
to prosecute.

3

On September 30, 2014, the Trustee, Robert Brothers, moved to dismiss Mr.
Gilliland’s Chapter 13 case on the grounds that Gilliland had failed to timely maintain
plan payments to the Trustee. A few days later, on October 3, 2014, Fifth Third filed its
motion to dismiss the Chapter 13 case, arguing, among other things, that Mr. Gilliland
was not eligible to be a debtor in Chapter 13 because he had no income.2 The
Bankruptcy Court set the motions to dismiss for hearing on November 18, 2014.
On November 17, 2014, the day before the hearing on the motions to dismiss, Mr.
Gilliland filed a Motion for Mandatory Withdrawal of Reference in the Bankruptcy
Court, seeking to have his entire bankruptcy case removed to the United States District
Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), because, inter alia, the proceedings “consist of
core and non-core causes of action[] which require the consideration of both Title 11 and
other laws of the United States which require this court to Withdraw the Reference for
resolution of the causes of action under federal law, and the Constitution of the United
States.” Dkt. No. 16 at 139. Mr. Gilliland did not file a motion to stay the proceedings in
the Bankruptcy Court pending a ruling on his motion to withdraw nor did he file similar
motions to withdraw or motions to stay in either of the adversary proceedings.
The next day, on November 18, 2014, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the Chapter
13 case from the bench during its hearing on the motions to dismiss, and barred Mr.
Gilliland from refiling his case for 180 days, on the grounds that Mr. Gilliland was down

2

11 U.S.C. § 109(e) provides in relevant part: “Only an individual with regular income … may
be a debtor under chapter 13 of this title.”

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in plan payments, was currently unemployed, and thus, had no income. Two days later,
on November 20, 2014, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed without prejudice both of Mr.
Gilliland’s adversary proceedings, based on the fact that the underlying bankruptcy case
had been dismissed.
On November 26, 2014, Mr. Gilliland sought relief from the Bankruptcy Court’s
orders of dismissal of the Chapter 13 case, arguing that his Motion to Withdraw was not
explicitly ruled upon before his case was dismissed. On December 1, 2014, Mr. Gililland
filed essentially identical motions for relief from judgment as to the dismissals of both
adversary proceedings. On December 3, 2014, the Bankruptcy Court denied Mr.
Gilliland’s motion in the Chapter 13 case, on the grounds that: (1) the Motion to
Withdraw was not filed in compliance with B-5011-1; (2) Mr. Gilliland did not seek a
stay pending a decision on the Motion to Withdraw; and (3) the bankruptcy case was
already dismissed so there was nothing from which the District Court could withdraw its
reference to the Bankruptcy Court.
That same day, the Bankruptcy Court issued similar orders denying Mr.
Gilliland’s motions for relief from the dismissal of his adversary proceedings, on the
grounds that he had not filed a motion to withdraw in the adversary proceedings and,
even if he had, he failed to request a stay of proceedings pending disposition of any such
motion. Because the bankruptcy case and the adversary proceedings had been dismissed,
the Bankruptcy Court concluded that there was nothing from which the District Court
could withdraw its reference and accordingly denied Mr. Gilliland’s motion.
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The Instant Litigation
On December 16, 2015, Mr. Gilliland has filed separate appeals in this Court
directed toward the Bankruptcy Court’s December 3, 2014 Orders denying his motion for
relief from judgment in the Chapter 13 case and in the first adversary proceeding. Since
these appeals were filed, this case has become a procedural thicket, marked by numerous,
intertwining issues and difficulties, including Mr. Gilliland’s apparent failure to receive
notification of various filings on the docket and his failure to timely file – or even to file
at all – his appellant’s briefs. Because Mr. Gilliland is proceeding pro se, however, we
have exercised patience in giving him the benefit of the doubt regarding his various
procedural bobbles and fits and starts, as recounted below.
On February 19, 2015, Mr. Gilliland moved in both of his appeals for a 28-day
extension of time within which to file his initial Appellant’s brief and appendix. In his
appeal of the underlying Chapter 13 case, the Court denied Mr. Gilliland’s motion on
March 12, 2015, in part because no notice of the transmission or availability of the
bankruptcy court record had been docketed at the time Mr. Gilliland filed his motion,
which meant that he did not then have a deadline to extend, given that Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 8018(a)(1) provides that an appellant’s opening brief is due
“within 30 days after the docketing of notice that the record has been transmitted or is
available electronically.”
In the appeal of the adversary proceeding, the Court granted Mr. Gilliland’s
motion for extension of time on April 17, 2015, ordering him to file his appellant’s brief
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no later than April 27, 2015. The Court further stated that, in light of the additional days
he was being afforded beyond the original deadline he had requested, he should not
expect any further extensions of time.
The bankruptcy record was docketed in the Chapter 13 appeal on March 11, 2015,
one day before the Court’s order denying Mr. Gilliland’s extension of time was docketed
and while it was in process. Accordingly, Mr. Gilliland’s appellant’s brief was due on
April 10, 2015. Mr. Gilliland did not file a brief on that date. On April 17, 2015, the
Court ordered Mr. Gilliland to show cause no later than April 29, 2015 why the case
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. As discussed above, on April 28, 2015,
Mr. Gilliland filed in both causes a Motion to Consolidate his Chapter 13 appeal with his
appeal related to the adversary proceeding.
That same day (April 28th), in the Chapter 13 appeal, Mr. Gilliland filed a return to
the show cause order as well as his appellant’s brief. However, he did not file an
appellant’s brief in the adversary proceeding appeal. In the Chapter 13 appeal, Fifth
Third filed its appellee’s brief on May 27, 2015, and Mr. Gilliland filed his reply brief
(with leave from the Court) on August 5, 2015.
In the adversary proceeding appeal, on May 22, 2015, Appellees Gregory A.
Purvis and Spangler Jennings Dougherty, PC filed their Motion to Dismiss Bankruptcy
Appeal, which was joined by Appellee Fifth Third on July 6, 2015. In their motion to
dismiss, Appellees argue that Mr. Gilliland’s appeal should be dismissed because: (1) he
failed to file a notice of appeal that conformed with the Official Form within the 14-day
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time period to do so pursuant to Rule 8002(a)(1), Fed. R. Bankr. P.; (2) he failed to
timely pay the filing fee within the 14-day period provided under Rule 8002(a)(1); and
(3) he failed to file his appellant’s brief.
Mr. Gilliland responded to the motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding appeal
on June 4, 2015, claiming that he complied fully with the Bankruptcy Court’s January 6,
2015 order instructing him to file separate notices of appeal and filing fees for the
dismissed bankruptcy case and attached adversary proceedings. He further argued that,
on April 27, 2015, he filed via Federal Express his motion to consolidate this appeal with
Cause No. 1:14-cv-2054-SEB-DKL, and that same day, filed his appellant’s brief for
both cases. Apparently, Mr. Gilliland intended that the same appellant’s brief be
docketed in both appeals. It is undisputed, however, that the appellant’s brief Mr.
Gilliland filed in the Chapter 13 appeal does not contain the cause number of the
adversary proceeding appeal, and thus, was not docketed in Cause No. 1:14-cv-2055SEB-DKL. Accordingly, while Fifth Third had an opportunity to respond to Mr.
Gilliland’s appellant’s brief in the Chapter 13 case, Appellees Gregory A. Purvis and
Spangler Jennings Dougherty, PC have had no opportunity to respond to the merits of
Mr. Gilliland’s appeal.
Upon careful review of the record, we believe that, despite all of the procedural
confusion, the issues presented in Mr. Gilliland’s appeals can be collectively and fairly
addressed and ruled upon without requiring further briefing on the merits.
Legal Analysis
8

I.

Show Cause Order
As discussed above, on April 17, 2015, the Court ordered Mr. Gilliland to show

cause by April 29, 2015 why his Chapter 13 appeal should not be dismissed for lack of
prosecution. Mr. Gilliland responded to the show cause order on April 28, 2015, stating
that he never received notice of the entry of the bankruptcy record, so he was not aware
of his deadline. On that same day, Mr. Gilliland filed his motion to consolidate, as well
as his appellant’s brief. Although Mr. Gilliland is proceeding pro se, it is nonetheless
still his responsibility to regularly check the docket. However, because we have
previously found in this case that Mr. Gilliland likely did not receive service of at least
one other document, and there is nothing on the docket – either an entry or receipt – to
show that notice of the bankruptcy record filing was sent to him, we find that Mr.
Gilliland has provided a reasonable excuse for missing his deadline. Moreover, Fifth
Third has not filed any opposition to Mr. Gilliland’s return to the show cause order.
Accordingly, there is insufficient reason to dismiss his appeal on the grounds that he
failed to file his appellant’s brief by the deadline, and the show cause order is therefore
hereby DISCHARGED. We construe Mr. Gilliland’s return to the show cause order as a
request to accept his appellant’s brief out-of-time, which we grant.
II.

Standard of Review
We review the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Mr. Gilliland’s adversary

proceeding and denial of his motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion.
See In re United Airlines, Inc., 318 Fed. App’x 429, 431 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations
9

omitted); In re Dye, 448 Fed. App’x 625 (7th Cir. 2011). An abuse of discretion occurs
when a decision is “premised on an incorrect legal principle or a clearly erroneous factual
finding, or when the record contains no evidence on which the court rationally could have
relied.” Wiese v. Community Bank of Cent. Wis., 552 F.3d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
III.

Bankruptcy Court’s Orders Related to Chapter 13 Case
We turn next to address the Bankruptcy Court’s December 3, 2014 order denying

Mr. Gilliland’s motion for relief from judgment dismissing his Chapter 13 case. Mr.
Gilliland argues that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion by dismissing his
Chapter 13 case while his Motion to Withdraw was pending because the Bankruptcy
Court “was required to wait on instructions from the District [C]ourt rather than hastily
dismiss the case.” Dkt. No. 23 at 18. However, as the Bankruptcy Court recognized,
Rule B-5011-1, which addresses withdrawals of reference, explicitly provides that: “The
filing of a motion to withdraw the reference … does not stay the proceedings in the
Bankruptcy Court. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8005 governs requests for a stay pending decision on
withdrawal of reference.” Local Rule B-5011-1(c). Mr. Gilliland did not file a motion
pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8005 to stay the Chapter 13 proceedings pending a ruling on
his motion to withdraw. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion
by ruling on Fifth Third’s motion to dismiss while Mr. Gilliland’s motion to withdraw
was pending. As the Bankruptcy Court correctly noted in denying Mr. Gilliland’s motion
for relief from judgment, once the Chapter 13 case was dismissed, there was nothing
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from which we, the District Court, could have withdrawn our reference. Thus, there were
no valid grounds to grant Mr. Gilliland’s motion for relief from judgment. For these
reasons, we hold that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in denying that
motion.
Nor has Mr. Gilliland established any other basis for concluding that the
Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in dismissing his Chapter 13 case. Before
addressing the parties’ arguments as to the propriety of the dismissal itself, we note that,
based on Mr. Gilliland’s notice of appeal and record designation in this case, it appears
that he has placed only the Bankruptcy Court’s December 3, 2014 denial of his motion
for relief from dismissal, and not the November 18, 2014 Order actually dismissing the
Chapter 13 case, before this Court on appeal.3 However, even assuming that Mr.
Gilliland properly challenged the November 18, 2014 Order, he has failed to establish an
abuse of discretion. The Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of the Chapter 13 case, premised
as it was on Mr. Gilliland’s failure to make the required payments and lacking funds to
make future payments, as reflected in the Trustee’s and Fifth Third’s motions to dismiss,
was well-founded.
Mr. Gilliland contends that the Bankruptcy Court erred in failing to immediately
remove his entire bankruptcy case to the District Court after he had filed his Motion to

3

The same is true with regard to the orders issued by the Bankruptcy Court dismissing Mr.
Gilliland’s adversary proceeding and denying his motion for relief from judgment. Although he
may have properly appealed only the Bankruptcy Court’s December 3, 2014 Order denying his
motion for relief from judgment dismissing the adversary proceeding, we also address the
Bankruptcy Court’s November 20, 2014 dismissal order in our analysis below.

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Withdraw. However, as previously discussed, the Bankruptcy Court did not err by ruling
on the motions to dismiss while the motion to withdraw was pending.
Mr. Gilliland also argues that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion by
ordering dismissal without entering findings of fact. However, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52, made pertinent to bankruptcy proceedings under Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, provides that “[t]he court is not required to state findings or
conclusions when ruling on a motion under Rule 12 or 56 or, unless these rules provide
otherwise, on any other motion.” Thus, “[i]t is totally within the discretion of bankruptcy
judges as to whether they wish to make any specific findings of fact and/or conclusions
of law, or wish to issue any directive except an order unaccompanied by any explanation
whatsoever, in deciding any [m]otion except a [m]otion for voluntary dismissal.” In re
Campfire Shop, Inc., 71 B.R. 521, 524-25 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). Accordingly, the
Bankruptcy Court did not err in failing to make findings of fact in its order granting Fifth
Third’s motion to dismiss.
It was also not error for the Bankruptcy Court to have failed to make an explicit
ruling on Mr. Gilliland’s Motion to Strike Fifth Third’s Motion to Dismiss before
dismissing the case. As Fifth Third argues, when a court dismisses a case while motions
are pending as the Bankruptcy Court did here, it is deemed to implicitly overrule any
pending motions. See, e.g., Elliot v. Folino, No. 07-289, 2007 WL 1545558, at *1 (W.D.
Pa. May 29, 2007) (explaining that an order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss
without addressing the plaintiff’s pending motions operated to deny such pending
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motions). Mr. Gilliland’s motion to strike alleged that he was not served with a copy of
Fifth Third’s motion to dismiss and that it was “a sham and fraud upon the court in an
attempt to avoid illegal activity.” Motion to Strike at 2. However, Mr. Gilliland’s
motion to strike indicates that he was in fact aware of the motion to dismiss, which
negates his contention that he did not receive notice. Nor was there any other basis to
strike Fifth Third’s motion to dismiss as it merely informed the Bankruptcy Court as to
the status of the foreclosure and Mr. Gilliland’s history of bankruptcy filings, and
requested that the Chapter 13 case be dismissed because Mr. Gilliland lacked any income
and thus could not put forth a confirmable Chapter 13 plan. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy
Court’s failure to explicitly rule on Mr. Gilliland’s motion to strike was not an abuse of
discretion.
IV.

Bankruptcy Court’s Orders Related to Adversary Proceeding4
The Bankruptcy Court also did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Mr.

Gilliland’s adversary proceeding and subsequently denied his motion for relief from that
dismissal. It is well-settled that “bankruptcy judges have discretion to dismiss an
adversary proceeding after the underlying bankruptcy case has ended.” Dye, 448 Fed.
App’x at 628-29. Here, the Bankruptcy Court had dismissed Mr. Gilliland’s Chapter 13

4

As discussed above, Appellees have moved to dismiss Mr. Gilliland’s appeal related to the
adversary proceeding on procedural grounds. However, because, for the reasons detailed herein,
we affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s orders related to the adversary proceeding on the merits, we
need not address the alleged procedural reasons for dismissing Mr. Gilliland’s appeal. We also
note that, although Appellees Gregory A. Purvis and Spangler Jennings Dougherty, PC did not
have an opportunity to respond to Mr. Gilliland’s Appellant’s brief, there is no prejudice to them
as the appeal is being resolved in their favor.

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case two days before dismissing the adversary proceeding at issue in this appeal. For the
reasons discussed above, we affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Mr. Gilliland’s
Chapter 13 case and denial of his motion for relief from that judgment. Accordingly, the
only question is whether the Bankruptcy Court improperly exercised its discretion in
dismissing Mr. Gilliland’s adversary proceeding once the underlying bankruptcy case
was properly dismissed.
In determining whether to dismiss an adversary proceeding after the underlying
bankruptcy case has been dismissed, “the bankruptcy court will look at whether the
adversary proceeding is closely related to the bankruptcy.” Id. at 629 (citations omitted).
Here, Mr. Gilliland’s adversary proceeding alleged a number of state law claims,
including, inter alia, fraud, breach of contract, malicious prosecution, as well as a Fair
Credit Reporting Act claim under federal law, all stemming from Appellee’s alleged
actions during the foreclosure proceedings described above.5 Once the underlying
Chapter 13 case was dismissed, there was no longer an estate or creditors with an interest
in any recovery Mr. Gilliland may have procured against Appellees. Given that Mr.
Gilliland’s dispute with Appellees “had no remaining ties to bankruptcy law,” id., the
Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the adversary proceeding
without prejudice in order to allow Mr. Gilliland to file the claims elsewhere if he so
chose.

5

We note that most of the claims alleged in Mr. Gilliland’s adversary proceeding appear to be
attempts to relitigate issues already decided and affirmed on appeal in state court.

14

Nor did the Bankruptcy Court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Gilliland’s
motion for relief from judgment while his motion to withdraw the underlying Chapter 13
case was still pending. As the Bankruptcy Court pointed out, Mr. Gilliland had not filed
a motion to withdraw in the adversary proceeding and, even if he had, he did not request
a stay of the bankruptcy proceedings until any such motion was ruled upon. As discussed
above, Rule B-5011-1, which addresses withdrawals of reference, explicitly provides
that: “The filing of a motion to withdraw the reference … does not stay the proceedings
in the Bankruptcy Court. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8005 governs requests for a stay pending
decision on withdrawal of reference.” Local Rule B-5011-1(c). Accordingly, the
Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing his adversary proceeding
without first ruling on his motion to withdraw filed in the Chapter 13 case. As the
Bankruptcy Court correctly noted in denying Mr. Gilliland’s motion for relief from
judgment, once the Chapter 13 case and the adversary proceeding were dismissed, there
was nothing from which we, the District Court, could have withdrawn our reference.
Thus, there were no valid grounds to grant Mr. Gilliland’s motion for relief from
judgment.
V.

Conclusion
For the reasons detailed above, we GRANT Mr. Gilliland’s motion to consolidate

Cause Nos. 1:14-cv-2054-SEB-DKL and 1:14-cv-2055-SEB-DKL. Upon careful review
of the record and the parties’ submissions, we hold that the Bankruptcy Court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing Mr. Gilliland’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy case and related
15

adversary proceeding or in denying Mr. Gilliland’s motions for relief from judgment as to
those dismissals. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court’s rulings are AFFIRMED. Final
judgment shall issue accordingly. All other pending motions are hereby denied as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: ___________________________
09/30/2015

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Distribution:

MICHAEL GILLILAND
3448 West Old Brownsville Road
Liberty, IN 47353
Nathan Hugh Blaske
GRAYDON HEAD & RITCHEY LLP
[e-mail]
Jeffrey Joseph Hanneken
GRAYDON HEAD RITCHEY (Cincinnati)
[e-mail]
Gregory A. Purvis
SPANGLER JENNINGS & DOUGHERTY PC
[e-mail]

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