ARREOLA-CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Filing 21

ENTRY Discussing Selected Matters. The United States' argument that the action must be dismissed in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction is rejected. The United States shall have through March 24, 2016 in which to further address the petitio ner's challenge to the § 851 sentence enhancement discussed in Part I of this Entry. In essence, this is the challenge presented in the petitioner's amended motion filed on July 13, 2015. The dismissed claims are all of the § 2 255 claims asserted in filings other than the amended motion filed on July 13, 2015. The above ruling does not fully resolve the motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 and partial final judgment shall not issue at this time as to the claims dismissed in this Entry. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 2/23/2016. Copy sent to Petitioner via U.S. Mail. (BGT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

JESUS ARREOLA-CASTILLO,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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Case No. 1:14-cv-02118-LJM-DML

Entry Discussing Selected Matters
I.
“After a three-day trial, a jury convicted Jesus Arreola-Castillo of participating in a
conspiracy to distribute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana. See 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), 846. Because he had already been convicted of three previous felony drug
offenses, Arreola-Castillo received a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment
pursuant to the recidivism provisions of § 841(b)(1)(A).” United States v. Arreola-Castillo,
539 F.3d 700, 701 (7th Cir. 2008).
The United States argues that the present action for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255 is an unauthorized second or successive such motion relative to the underlying
criminal matter in No. 1:05-cr-00064-LJM-DKL-7 and thus must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(“Before a second or successive application
. . . is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals
for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”). It is true that the

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petitioner previously filed a motion of this nature, that the prior action was docketed as
No. 1:09-cv-01476-SEB-DML and that the prior action was dismissed with prejudice. It is
also true, however, that the phrase “second or successive” does not simply “refe[r] to all
§ 2254 applications filed second or successively in time.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S.
930, 944 (2007). Thus, the proper § 2244 analysis may require a more nuanced analysis
than that which is offered by the United States.
In this instance, the petitioner challenges his enhanced sentence and specifically
argues that his prior New Mexico conviction in No. D-412-CR-11995-0049 was vacated
on June 29, 2015, that other felony New Mexico drug convictions had been vacated on
November 19, 2014, and that these facts make his sentence enhanced to mandatory life
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 invalid.
The United States does not challenge the factual predicates of this argument.
Persuasive authority holds that a § 2255 motion based on a claim that is not a second or
successive § 2255 motion and hence does not trigger the prior authorization requirement
of § 2244. See United States v. Hairston, 754 F.3d 258, 262 (4th Cir. 2014) (stating that
Hairston's numerically second § 2255 motion was not a “second or successive” motion
for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) when a state court vacated a conviction after the
district court denied his first § 2255 motion, because “Hairston's claim was unripe at the
time his numerically first motion was adjudicated”)(citing In re Weathersby, 717 F.3d
1108, 1111 (10th Cir. 2013); and Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 863–65 (11th
Cir. 2011)). The Seventh Circuit has joined the wave. See United States v. Obeid, 707
F.3d 898, 903 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Seeing no reason to part ways with our sister circuits,
however, we join them in concluding that a petition or motion based on a claim that did

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not become ripe any earlier than until after the adjudication of the petitioner's first petition
or motion is not ‘second or successive’ within the meaning of Sections 2244 and
2255(h).”). “[W]hat makes a claim unripe” in this setting “is that the factual predicate has
not matured, not that the law was unsettled” or has changed. U.S. v. Claycomb, 577
Fed.Appx. 804, 805 (10th Cir. 2014).
The Court in this instance follows the foregoing authority. The United States’
argument that the action must be dismissed in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction is
rejected.
II.
The United States shall have through March 24, 2016 in which to further address
the petitioner’s challenge to the § 851 sentence enhancement discussed in Part I of this
Entry. In essence, this is the challenge presented in the petitioner’s amended motion filed
on July 13, 2015.
III.
The petitioner’s grounds for relief include a further discussion of the evidence at
trial and his representation by counsel. These grounds are quite plainly barred by the
“second or successive” barrier of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) in the absence of authorization
from the Court of Appeals--and there is no indication that such authorization has been
granted--the action docketed as No. 1:14-cv-2118-LJM-DML is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Consistent with the rulings in Parts I and II of this Entry, the dismissed claims
are all of the § 2255 claims asserted in filings other than the amended motion filed on
July 13, 2015.

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The above ruling does not fully resolve the motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 and partial final judgment shall not issue at this time as to the claims dismissed in
this Entry.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

February 23, 2016
Date: _________________

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LARRY J. McKINNEY, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
Electronically Registered Counsel
Jesus Arreola Castillo
31810-051
Victorville USP
Inmate Mail/Parcels
P.O. Box 3900
Adelanto, CA 92301

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