CAIN v. COLVIN

Filing 21

ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION. The Court VACATES the ALJ's decision denying Mr. Cain's benefits and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence four). SEE ENTRY. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 10/8/2015. (BGT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
TIMOTHY W. CAIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Defendant.

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No. 1:15-cv-00068-JMS-MJD

ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
Plaintiff Timothy W. Cain applied for disability and disability insurance benefits from the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) in November 8, 2011, alleging an onset date of October
31, 2008. [Filing No. 11-5 at 2.] His applications were denied initially on January 17, 2012,
[Filing No. 11-4 at 1-9], and upon reconsideration on April 2, 2012, [Filing No. 11-4 at 13].
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) David H. Welch held a hearing on April 16, 2013, [Filing No.
11-4 at 44], and a supplemental hearing on September 26, 2013, [Filing No. 11-4 at 81], whereupon
he issued a decision on October 25, 2013, concluding that Mr. Cain was not entitled to receive
benefits. [Filing No. 11-2 at 9.] The Appeals Council denied review on November 24, 2014.
[Filing No. 11-2 at 2.] Mr. Cain then filed this civil action, asking the Court to review the denial
of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 28 U.S.C. § 1361, and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). [Filing
No. 1.]

1

I.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Cain was born on June 11, 1959, [Filing No. 11-2 at 59], and has a high school
education with previous work experience as a production assembler, [Filing No. 11-2 at 21]. 1 The
ALJ found that Mr. Cain met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through
December 31, 2012. [Filing No. 11-2 at 14.] Using the five-step sequential evaluation set forth
by the SSA in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), the ALJ issued an opinion on October 25, 2013,
determining that Mr. Cain was not entitled to receive disability benefits. [Filing No. 11-2 at 12.]
The ALJ found as follows:
·

At Step One of the analysis, the ALJ found that Mr. Cain had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity2 since the alleged onset date. [Filing No. 11-2 at
14.]

·

At Step Two of the analysis, the ALJ found that Mr. Cain suffered from the
severe impairment of chronic fatigue syndrome. [Filing No. 11-2 at 15.]

·

At Step Three of the analysis, the ALJ found that Mr. Cain did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
severity of one of the listed impairments. [Filing No. 11-2 at 15.]

·

After Step Three but before Step Four, the ALJ found that Mr. Cain has the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) for: “lifting up to twenty pounds

1

Mr. Cain detailed pertinent facts in his opening brief, and the Commissioner did not dispute those
facts. Because those facts implicate sensitive and otherwise confidential medical information
concerning Mr. Cain, the Court will simply incorporate those facts by reference herein. Specific
facts will be articulated as needed.
2

Substantial gainful activity is defined as work activity that is both substantial (i.e., involves
significant physical or mental activities) and gainful (i.e., work that is usually done for pay or
profit, whether or not a profit is realized). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a).
2

occasionally and lifting and carrying up to ten pounds frequently; sitting,
standing, and walking, respectively, for approximately two hours at one time,
each, and sitting, standing and walking, respectively, for approximately six
hours, each, during an eight hour work day, with normal breaks; never climbing
ladders, ropes, scaffolds, but occasionally climbing ramps, stairs, balancing,
stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling; frequently reaching, overhead
reaching, handling, i.e., gross manipulation, fingering, i.e. fine manipulation,
and feeling; never exposed to unprotected heights or operating a commercial
vehicle, but occasionally exposed to extreme cold, heat, humidity, excessive
vibrations, excessive loud noise, and occasionally using moving machinery or
exposed to pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, dust and gases.” [Filing
No. 11-2 at 16.]
·

At Step Four of the analysis, the ALJ found that Mr. Cain is capable of
performing past relevant work as a production assembler. [Filing No. 11-2 at
21.]

·

The ALJ did not reach Step Five of the analysis due to his finding at Step Four
that Mr. Cain could perform his past relevant work. [Filing No. 11-2 at 23.]

Mr. Cain sought review of the ALJ’s decision from the Appeals Council, but that request
was denied, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision subject to judicial
review. Mr. Cain then filed this action, asking that the Commissioner’s decision be reversed and
requesting an award of benefits, or in the alternative, that the case be remanded for further
proceedings. [Filing No. 1.]

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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The Social Security Act authorizes payment of disability insurance benefits and
Supplemental Security Income to individuals with disabilities.” Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,
214 (2002). “The statutory definition of ‘disability’ has two parts. First, it requires a certain kind
of inability, namely, an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity. Second it requires
an impairment, namely, a physical or mental impairment, which provides reason for the inability.
The statute adds that the impairment must be one that has lasted or can be expected to last . . . not
less than 12 months.” Id. at 217.
When an applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, this Court’s role is limited to
ensuring that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence exists for
the ALJ’s decision. Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). For
the purpose of judicial review, “[s]ubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). Because the
ALJ “is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses,” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d
668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008), this Court must afford the ALJ’s credibility determination “considerable
deference,” overturning it only if it is “patently wrong,” Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738
(7th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).
The ALJ must apply the five-step inquiry set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v),
evaluating the following, in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the claimant has
a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one
of the impairments listed by the [Commissioner]; (4) whether the claimant can
perform [his] past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing
work in the national economy.

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Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). “If
a claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, [he] will automatically be found disabled. If a
claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then [he] must satisfy step four. Once step four
is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing
work in the national economy.” Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by
evaluating “all limitations that arise from medically determinable impairments, even those that are
not severe.” Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). In doing so, the ALJ “may not
dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling.” Id. The ALJ uses the RFC at Step Four to
determine whether the claimant can perform his own past relevant work and if not, at Step Five to
determine whether the claimant can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e), (g). The
burden of proof is on the claimant for Steps One through Four; only at Step Five does the burden
shift to the Commissioner. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.
If the ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s
decision, the Court must affirm the denial of benefits. Barnett, 381 F.3d at 668. When an ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence, a remand for further proceedings is typically the
appropriate remedy. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). An
award of benefits “is appropriate only where all factual issues have been resolved and the record
can yield but one supportable conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Colvin makes three arguments in support of his appeal: (1) the ALJ erred at Step Two
of the analysis in determining that Mr. Cain’s impairments were not severe; (2) the ALJ failed to
address the medical expert’s testimony that Mr. Cain met or equaled listings 7.02 and 7.06 at Step
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Three of the analysis; and (3) the ALJ used the wrong legal standard to weigh the treating
physicians’ opinion evidence and his decision on this issue was not supported by substantial
evidence. The Court will address the issues in turn.
A. Step Two
Mr. Cain argues that the ALJ erred at Step Two when he determined that Mr. Cain did not
suffer from severe impairments other than chronic fatigue syndrome, which he claims was not
mentioned in the record. [Filing No. 13 at 7-8.] Mr. Cain alleges that the record clearly establishes
that his physical impairments have more than a minimal effect on his ability to work and cites the
opinions of treating physicians Purnendu Datta, M.D., (“Dr. Datta”) and Marwan Ghabril, M.D.,
(“Dr. Ghabril”) to support this contention. [Filing No. 13 at 9.] Mr. Cain states that Dr. Datta’s
opinion describes Mr. Cain’s physical impairments and restrictions, and Dr. Ghabril’s opinion
describes Mr. Cain’s diagnosis of peptic ulcer disease and gastric outlet obstruction, which is
associated with blood loss and chronic anemia. [Filing No. 13 at 9.] In addition, Mr. Cain states
that Lee A. Fischer, M.D., (“Dr. Fischer”), a non-treating physician, testified in the initial hearing
that Mr. Cain met or equaled the listings for chronic anemia and thrombocytopenia, but not until
February 2013. [Filing No. 13 at 9.] Mr. Cain argues that the ALJ’s findings are not supported
by substantial evidence and that this Court should find that Mr. Cain satisfied his burden to prove
that he suffers from peptic ulcer disease, chronic anemia, thrombocytopenia, and migraine
headaches. 3 [Filing No. 13 at 10.]
In response, the Commissioner argues that the fact that the ALJ determined Mr. Cain to
suffer only from a severe impairment of chronic fatigue syndrome is of no consequence to the

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Mr. Cain states that the ALJ found the following impairments to be non-severe: “anemia, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disorder, peptic ulcer, carpal tunnel syndrome, migraine headaches, and
substance addiction disorder, alcohol, in remission for many years.” [Filing No. 13 at 8.]
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outcome of the case. [Filing No. 18 at 9-10.] The Commissioner states that the severity assessment
is a “threshold inquiry” that is undertaken to screen out groundless claims. [Filing No. 18 at 10
(citing Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 2010)]. Thus, since the ALJ found Mr. Cain
to suffer from at least one severe impairment, the Commissioner argues that this allowed the ALJ
to proceed to the third step of the evaluation process. Additionally, the Commissioner argues that
Mr. Cain does not explain how the ALJ’s determination that Mr. Cain’s only impairment was
chronic fatigue syndrome affected the outcome of the decision. [Filing No. 18 at 11.]
Mr. Cain does not address this issue on reply.
A severe impairment is an impairment or combination of impairments that “significantly
limits [one’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c).
The ALJ is required to determine at Step Two whether the claimant in fact has an impairment or
combination of impairments that is severe. Castile, 617 F.3d at 926-27 (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii)). The burden is on the claimant to prove that the impairment is severe. Id. at
926. As long as the ALJ determines that the claimant has one severe impairment, the ALJ will
proceed to the next step of the evaluation process. Id. at 927 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523). If an
ALJ finds one or more of a claimant’s impairments to be severe, he needs to “consider the
aggregate effect of the entire constellation of ailments—including those impairments that in
isolation are not severe.”

Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003).

“Therefore, the step two determination of severity is merely a threshold requirement.” Castile,
617 F.3d at 927.
The Court rejects Mr. Cain’s Step Two challenge. The ALJ found Mr. Cain to have the
severe impairment of chronic fatigue syndrome, [Filing No. 11-2 at 15], and after making that
determination, the ALJ proceeded beyond Step Two in making his ultimate disability decision

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regarding Mr. Cain, [Filing No. 11-2 at 15-23]. The Step Two determination is “merely a threshold
requirement,” Castile, 617 F.3d at 927, and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523 requires the ALJ to consider
“the combined effect of all of your impairments without regard to whether any such impairment,
if considered separately, would be of sufficient severity.” Thus, even if it were error for the ALJ
to not consider certain impairments to be severe at Step Two, that “particular determination is of
no consequence” because the ALJ proceeded through the remaining steps of the sequential
analysis. Castile, 617 F.3d at 927. A remand on this issue is not warranted.
B. Listings 7.02 and 7.06
Mr. Cain argues that the ALJ erroneously decided that Mr. Cain did not meet Listing 7.02
(chronic anemia) or 7.06 (chronic thrombocytopenia) at Step Three of the analysis. Mr. Cain
alleges that during the initial hearing, medical expert Dr. Fischer testified that Mr. Cain met those
listings. [Filing No. 13 at 11.] Further, Mr. Cain argues that he was unable to obtain medical
treatment regularly due to his financial situation, and that it was evident from Dr. Datta’s
examination that he suffered anemia and that his condition was dire. [Filing No. 13 at 11.] He
further states that the ALJ implied that he would issue a favorable decision if Mr. Cain agreed to
amend his onset date to February 2013, but Mr. Cain ultimately chose not to amend. [Filing No.
13 at 11.] Additionally, Mr. Cain states that the ALJ admitted that Mr. Cain’s condition was
ongoing for years and that he was concerned that Mr. Cain’s financial circumstances prevented
him from seeking treatment. [Filing No. 13 at 11 (citing Filing No. 11-2 at 97).] He further claims
that Dr. Fischer admitted that Mr. Cain’s “really low” level of hemoglobin in February 2013 could
have reflected a chronic blood loss that occurred over a period of time. [Filing No. 13 at 11.]
In response, the Commissioner argues that Mr. Cain’s argument is misleading because it
does not address the full context of Dr. Fischer’s testimony at the initial hearing, his subsequent
interrogatory responses, and his testimony at the supplemental hearing. [Filing No. 18 at 11.] The
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Commissioner states that during the initial hearing, Dr. Fischer did not have copies of Mr. Cain’s
February 2013 medical records, and that after Mr. Cain and his attorney recited the contents of
those records, Dr. Fischer determined that Mr. Cain “met the listing for chronic anemia and
possibly chronic thrombocytopenia” since his 2013 hospitalization. [Filing No. 18 at 11.] The
Commissioner states that after the hearing, Dr. Fischer reviewed the additional medical records
and exhibits and completed interrogatory responses, determining Mr. Cain did not meet any listing.
[Filing No. 18 at 12.] Further, the Commissioner argues that during the supplemental hearing, Dr.
Fischer discussed Mr. Cain’s functional abilities again and Mr. Cain’s attorney did not ask Dr.
Fischer any questions. [Filing No. 18 at 12.]
In reply, Mr. Cain does not address this issue.
The ALJ is responsible for deciding whether a listing is met or equaled. SSR 96-6p.
Whether a claimant’s condition equals a listed impairment is “strictly a medical determination”
and “the focus must be on medical evidence.” Florence v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3724806, at *9 (S.D.
Ind. 2013) (citing Hickman v. Apfel, 187 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir.1999)). “[L]ongstanding policy
requires that the judgment of a physician . . . designated by the Commissioner on the issue of
equivalence . . . must be received into the record as expert opinion evidence and given appropriate
weight.” SSR 96-6p. Thus, an ALJ may rely on a state agency physician’s opinion to determine
medical equivalence. See Buckhanon ex rel. J.H. v. Astrue, 368 F. App’x 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2010);
see also Scott v. Sullivan, 898 F.2d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1990) (the ALJ relied on the disability
examination by a state agency physician, which was conducted two months after the claimant filed
for benefits and resulted in a finding that the claimant failed to meet any of the listings).
The Court finds that there was enough evidence in the record for the ALJ to conclude that
Mr. Cain did not meet or equal Listings 7.02 or 7.06. Dr. Fischer participated at the initial hearing

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through a conference call. [Filing No. 11-2 at 84.] He had copies of Mr. Cain’s medical records,
but was missing exhibits from Mr. Cain’s 2013 hospitalization. [Filing No. 11-2 at 85.] Mr. Cain
and his attorney proceeded to describe the contents of those records to Dr. Fischer, and based on
that testimony, Dr. Fischer stated that he thought Mr. Cain met the listing of chronic anemia and
possibly a listing for chronic thrombocytopenia as of the 2013 hospitalization. [Filing No. 11-2 at
95.] However, after the initial hearing, Dr. Fischer had the opportunity to review Mr. Cain’s
complete record, including the missing exhibits, and opined that Mr. Cain did not meet or equal
any listed impairments. [Filing No. 11-9 at 71.] Whether a claimant meets a listing is strictly a
medical determination and, therefore, the Court finds the ALJ properly relied on Dr. Fischer’s
opinion that Mr. Cain did not meet any listings.
C. Opinion Evidence
Mr. Cain argues that the ALJ used the wrong legal standard in weighing the treating
physicians’ opinions and his decision was not supported by substantial evidence. [Filing No. 13
at 12.] Mr. Cain alleges that the ALJ gave insufficient reasons to discount the treating physicians’
opinions; for example, the ALJ stated that both treating physicians lacked Social Security
knowledge and lacked objectivity to the extent of independent medical experts. [Filing No. 13 at
13.] Mr. Cain argues that these assertions would disqualify many treating physicians since most
are unfamiliar with the Social Security rules and regulations. [Filing No. 13 at 13.] Further, Mr.
Cain argues that there is no evidence in the record that the treating physicians are, in fact,
unfamiliar with evaluating cases for Social Security purposes. [Filing No. 13 at 13.] Mr. Cain
argues that, per his treating physicians’ opinions, this Court should find his RFC is less than
sedentary. [Filing No. 13 at 14.]

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In his response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly assessed the opinions of
Dr. Datta and Dr. Ghabril. [Filing No. 18 at 13.] First, the Commissioner states that the ALJ
acknowledged Dr. Datta as the treating physician, and properly found that Dr. Datta’s opinion was
entitled to little weight because it was inconsistent with and unsupported by other evidence in the
record. [Filing No. 18 at 14.] The Commissioner states that Dr. Fischer claimed that Mr. Cain’s
anemia was easily treated with iron and folic acid supplements, and that Dr. Datta’s opinion was
overly restrictive and inconsistent with Mr. Cain’s history of quick recovery from his
hospitalizations. [Filing No. 18 at 14.] The Commissioner further states that Dr. Datta’s opinion
might not be fully objective because in identifying reports of problems, he deferred to Mr. Cain’s
statements. [Filing No. 18 at 14.] The Commissioner argues that Dr. Ghabril’s opinion reflected
uncertainty pertaining to Mr. Cain’s functional limitations, stating that he could not tell whether
Mr. Cain had the ability to handle work stress.

[Filing No. 18 at 14-15.]

Further, the

Commissioner alleges that Dr. Ghabril responded with “not sure” to questions regarding Mr.
Cain’s functional limitations; thus, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ had the right to question
Dr. Ghabril’s objectivity. [Filing No. 18 at 15 (citing Filing No. 11-9 at 80).]
In reply, Mr. Cain argues that the recitation of facts in the Commissioner’s response cherrypicks evidence that supports the denial of benefits and ignores evidence that supports Mr. Cain’s
claim. [Filing No. 19 at 3.] Mr. Cain states that the ALJ failed to consider other information, such
as that Mr. Cain suffered from pernicious anemia, not anemia, that he required blood transfusions,
that he had no health insurance, and that he was unable to see the doctor regularly. [Filing No. 19
at 4.] Further, Mr. Cain argues that his visit to see Dr. Datta to obtain the medical source statement
prior to the hearing resulted in a finding that his hemoglobin level was dangerously low and he
had to undergo a blood transfusion. [Filing No. 19 at 4.] Mr. Cain states that the ALJ improperly

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relied on Dr. Fischer’s statement that Dr. Datta’s opinion was overly restrictive because other
medical records demonstrate that Mr. Cain suffered from various symptoms consistent with Dr.
Datta’s opinion.

[Filing No. 19 at 5.]

Further, Mr. Cain argues that, contrary to the

Commissioner’s argument, Dr. Ghabril was objective when he opined honestly that he could not
assess Mr. Cain’s functional limitations, but affirmed that the pain would interfere with his
attention and concentration frequently and constantly. [Filing No. 19 at 5.]
Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, the ALJ generally must give more weight to opinions from a
claimant’s treating sources, and will give the opinion controlling weight if the physician’s opinion
on the nature and severity of the impairment is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in
[the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). If the ALJ opts not to give a treating physician’s
opinion controlling weight, he must apply a number of factors to determine what weight to give
the opinion, including: 1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of the
examination; 2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; 3) support by relevant evidence;
4) consistency with the record as a whole; 5) the physician’s area of specialization; and 6) other
factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6). The
Seventh Circuit has it made clear that an ALJ need not explicitly weigh every relevant factor to
conclude that a treating physician’s opinion should be discounted, as long as the ALJ articulates
why it is inconsistent with the record. See Schreiber v. Colvin, 519 Fed. App’x. 951, 959 (7th Cir.
2013).
The Court agrees with Mr. Cain that the ALJ improperly weighed the treating physicians’
opinions. The ALJ acknowledged that both Dr. Datta and Dr. Ghabril had treating medical
relationships with Mr. Cain. [Filing No. 11-2 at 21.] A treating doctor’s opinion receives

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controlling weight if it is “well-supported” and “not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence” in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir.
2011); see Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2011). The ALJ gave little weight to both
treating physicians’ opinions because, in the ALJ’s opinion, they lacked knowledge and experience
evaluating social security cases.

This is inconsistent with the Social Security regulations’

preference to afford greater weight to treating physicians:
[W]e give more weight to opinions from [the claimant’s] treating sources, since
these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a
detailed, longitudinal picture of [their] medical impairment(s) and may bring a
unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the
objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such
as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
Additionally, the ALJ failed to address any of the factors under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)
when discrediting both of the treating physicians’ opinions. Rather, the ALJ stated that Dr. Datta
lacked objectivity, and that his opinion was overly restrictive because Mr. Cain only had “one
inpatient hospitalization (in 2011).” [Filing No. 11-2 at 21.] The ALJ discredited Dr. Ghabril’s
opinion because he also lacked the same degree of objectivity as the independent medical expert
and because he was uncertain about the Mr. Cain’s functional limitations. [Filing No. 11-2 at 21.]
The ALJ’s explanations are insufficient. First, the ALJ failed to identify what other
medical evidence in the record was inconsistent with or contradicted the treating physicians’
opinions. In fact, evidence in the record shows that Mr. Cain suffered from debilitating symptoms,
such as “chronic recurrent peptic ulcer disease with resulting gastric outlet obstruction” associated
with blood loss and chronic anemia, [Filing No. 11-9 at 79], and the ALJ failed to address this
evidence when discrediting the treating physicians’ opinions. Second, the ALJ failed to address
whether Mr. Cain’s financial circumstances prevented him from obtaining proper medical care.
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Seventh Circuit precedent instructs ALJs not to draw any inferences about a claimant’s condition
from their failure to obtain consistent medical treatment unless the ALJ has explored the claimant’s
explanations as to the lack of medical care, such as their inability to pay. See Beardsley v. Colvin,
758 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2014); see Craft, 539 F.3d at 679. Mr. Cain provided testimony to this
effect, and the ALJ failed to address it in his decision.
The Court finds that the ALJ’s failure to properly weigh the treating physicians’ opinions
requires remand.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed herein, the Court VACATES the ALJ’s decision denying Mr.
Cain’s benefits and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(sentence four).
_______________________________
October 8, 2015
Date: _____________

Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
Sherry R. Deatrick
DEATRICK LAW FIRM
[e-mail]
Thomas E. Kieper
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
[e-mail]

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