SHAFFER v. PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION et al

Filing 10

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS: For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED and the Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ***SEE ENTRY FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION***. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 9/2/2015. Copy sent via US Mail.(DW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
REALTHEA SHAFFER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
et al.
Defendants.

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) Cause No. 1:15-cv-0355-WTL-MJD
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ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
This cause is before the Court on Defendants’ PNC, f/k/a National City Bank and
National City Mortgage Company (“PNC”) and Feiwell & Hannoy’s motions to dismiss. (Dkt.
Nos. 7, 9.) 1 The Plaintiff has not filed a response to either motion, and the time for doing so has
passed. The Court, being duly advised, GRANTS the motions for the reasons set forth below.
I.

STANDARD

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court “must
accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff.” St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir.
2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2

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PNC filed a substantive motion to dismiss in which Feiwell & Hannoy joins.
The Defendants also move to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court need not reach that argument.
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II.

BACKGROUND

The subject of this complaint previously was litigated in a Marion Superier Court
foreclosure action, Kessler Greene Community Association, Inc. v. Shaffer et al., Case No.
49D03-1209-MF-35748 (the “State Court Action.”) In September 2012, Kessler Greene
Community Association, Inc., a homeowners’ association, sought to foreclose on the Plaintiff’s
property located at 3751 W. 46th Street, Indianapolis, Indiana (the “Property”), for nonpayment
of homeowners’ association dues. PNC (then National City Mortgage), which held a first priority
mortgage on the property, was also named as a defendant in that action. PNC brought a crossclaim against the Plaintiff to foreclose on the Property because of her default on the promissory
note secured by the mortgage, and the Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel throughout the
State Court Action, filed an answer to the cross-claim.
After briefing by both sides and a hearing, the Marion Superior Court entered summary
judgment in favor of PNC and determined that PNC was entitled to enforce its promissory note.
The court also found that PNC’s mortgage was a first priority lien against the Property, entered a
decree of foreclosure, and ordered the subject property be sold at action by the Sheriff. PNC later
moved for and obtained an order for writ of assistance, which again made clear that PNC was the
owner of the Property and entitled to immediate possession. The Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal
to the Indiana Court of Appeals. However, the Plaintiff failed to timely file her brief, and her
appeal was dismissed with prejudice. No petition to transfer the case to the Indiana Supreme
Court was filed.
On March 2, 2015, the Plaintiff filed her complaint in this matter, asserting four claims:
demand for chain of title; statutory violations; a Fourteenth Amendment violation; and a
clarification as to the individual status of each party under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,

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15 U.S.C. § 1692a. 3 The Plaintiff alleges the “the Defendants have procured their positions
through the application of Deception and Fraud.” Dkt. No. 1 at 3. The Plaintiff labels the
Defendants’ “claims to clear title” as “egregious acts committed in state court.” Id. at 4.
III.

DISCUSSION

The Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this matter. Accordingly, the Court is required to
liberally construe her Complaint. Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2006);
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (“[A] pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.”). The Defendants move to dismiss all counts for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, there are two categories of federal claims that are
jurisdictionally barred: (1) instances where “a plaintiff[] request[s] . . . a federal district court to
overturn an adverse state court judgment”; or (2) instances where federal claims were not raised
in state court or do not require review of a state court’s decision but yet are “inextricably
intertwined” with a state court judgment. Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “deprives federal district and circuit courts of
jurisdiction to hear ‘cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Commonwealth Plaza Condo. Ass’n v. City of
Chi., 693 F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Importantly, the purpose of the doctrine is to “preclude[] lower

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The Plaintiff has not attempted to assert a claim under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, but rather appears to ask the Court to help her ascertain whether such a claim
might exist. This is not a proper use of a complaint and does not state a cause of action.
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federal court jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state court judgments . . . [because] no
matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be, the Supreme Court of
the United States is the only federal court that could have jurisdiction to review a state court
judgment.” Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added).
Here, the Plaintiff seeks review and reversal of the Indiana state-court judgment. The
thrust of her complaint is that PNC cannot enforce its note and mortgage. In essence, the Plaintiff
is asking the Court to overturn the state court’s judgment. Even had the state court erred in its
judgment, the Court could do nothing to remedy that error, because as noted above, the United
States Supreme Court has exclusive federal appellate jurisdiction over review of the state court’s
judgment. See Commonwealth Plaza Condo. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 745. In other words, the
Plaintiff’s claims are precisely the type of claims the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was designed to
prevent the Court from reviewing.
Nor do the Plaintiff’s allegations of deception and fraud allow the Court to retain
jurisdiction. “[F]raud (no matter how described) does not permit a federal district court to set
aside a state court's judgment in a civil suit.” Iqbal v. Patel, 780 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2015).
And while “federal courts retain jurisdiction to award damages for fraud that imposes
extrajudicial injury,” id., the Plaintiff’s complaint alleges no extrajudicial injury. Thus, no
exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies. The Court simply has no jurisdiction to
review the state court’s actions.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED and
the Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED: 9/2/15

_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Copy by United States Mail to:
Realthea A. Shaffer
3751 W. 46th Street
Indianapolis, IN 46228-6792
Copies to all counsel of record via electronic communication.

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