MYERS v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION et al

Filing 19

ENTRY Discussing Response to Show Cause Order and Amended Complaint, Dismissing Action, and Directing Entry of Judgment. For the reasons explained in this Entry and in the Entry of May 6, 2015, the plaintiff's amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Judgment consistent with this Entry and with the Entry of May 6, 2015, shall now issue. Copy to Plaintiff via U.S. Mail. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 8/11/2015.(MAC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JASON TYE MYERS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,
et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 1:15-cv-00471-TWP-MJD

Entry Discussing Response to Show Cause Order and Amended Complaint,
Dismissing Action, and Directing Entry of Final Judgment
The plaintiff has responded to the order to show cause by presenting arguments against
each ruling in the Court’s screening Entry of May 6, 2015. He has also filed an amended complaint
which in all substantive respects is identical to the original complaint with the exception that
plaintiff has now attached copies of grievances and responses thereto showing that the prison
worked on resolving the laundry complaint. Part VII, Relief section on page 16 of the amended
complaint appears to be a typographical error because it repeats the relief sought for the first claim
rather than for the second claim. Accordingly, the Court shall treat Part VII relief section as relief
sought for the second claim.
Although the plaintiff argues that the denial of access claim should be allowed to proceed,
it remains true that he alleges that someone at the Correctional Industrial Facility (“CIF”) failed to
review, enforce, and comply with CIF procedures which led to the failure to return to him in a
timely manner a copy of an appendix from a state court appellate case. Whether this was the result
of negligence or gross negligence, these allegations do not support a claim of denial of access to
the courts. The plaintiff’s claim of denial of access to the courts fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted because he has not alleged any resulting injury, meaning that “some action

by the prison has frustrated or is impeding an attempt to bring a nonfrivolous legal claim.” In re
Maxy, 674 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2012). See also Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th
Cir.2006) (“[T]he mere denial of access to a prison law library or to other legal materials is not
itself a violation of a prisoner's rights ….”). The plaintiff asserts that he had attempted to appeal
the denial of a civil claim in which he sought damages for wrongful incarceration after the claim
was dismissed based on a two year statute of limitations. “The holding of Lewis [v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343 (1996)] that a claim based on deprivation of access to the courts requires proof of concrete
injury, combined with the holding of Heck [v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)] means that a
prisoner in [the plaintiff’s] position must have the judgment annulled before damages are available
for wrongful imprisonment.” Burd v. Sessler, 702 F3d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
omitted). An inmate bringing a denial of access claim “cannot demonstrate the requisite injury
without demonstrating that there is merit to his claim” which in the plaintiff’s case, means not only
that he was unlawfully confined but that a five year statute of limitations period applied. Id. at 435.
Plaintiff has not made that demonstration here, therefore, his denial of access claim was properly
dismissed.
The plaintiff’s second claim, is that Russell Hiatt and two grievance officers, Officer
Stafford and Officer Vanatta, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by not ensuring that he be
provided clean clothing by the prison laundry service. This claim was also properly dismissed.
Having clothes returned to him sometimes dirty and smelling of sweat, though unpleasant, is not
a deprivation serious enough to support an Eighth Amendment claim. See, e.g., Moss v. DeTella,
No. 96 C 5398, 1997 WL 24745, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Jan.16, 1997) (holding that lack of clean clothes
and bedding for 111 days did “not rise to the level of a constitutional violation”); Coughlin v.
Sheahan, No. 94 C 2863, 1995 WL 12255, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Jan.12, 1995) (allegation that inmate

was provided only one change of clothing in a three-month period did not support Eighth
Amendment claim). Of even greater significance is that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) bars this claim
because it provides: “No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.” No physical injury
or commission of a sexual act has been alleged.
For the reasons explained above and in the Entry of May 6, 2015, the plaintiff’s amended
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and must be dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Judgment consistent with this Entry and with the Entry of May 6, 2015,
shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 8/11/2015

Distribution:
JASON T. MYERS 154417
PLAINFIELD CORRECTION FACILITY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
727 Moon Road
Plainfield, IN 46168