SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. VEROS PARTNERS, INC et al
Filing
298
ORDER denying Movants' 256 Motion to Quash. See Order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore on 11/9/2016. (SWM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
MATTHEW HAAB,
JEFFERY B. RISINGER,
VEROS FARM LOAN HOLDING LLC,
TOBIN J. SENEFELD,
FARMGROWCAP LLC,
VEROS PARTNERS INC.,
PINCAP LLC,
PIN FINANCIAL LLC,
Defendants.
No. 1:15-cv-00659-JMS-MJD
ORDER ON MOTION TO QUASH
This matter is before the Court on the Objection and Motion to Quash Receiver’s NonParty Request for Production, filed by Broyles & Co. CPA’S, Inc., Nicole Broyles, Cherry
Farms, LLC, Cherry Family Land, LLC, Chris A. Cherry, Cristi K. Cherry, and Jeffrey A.
Cherry (collectively the “Movants”). [Dkt. 256.] The Receiver in this case issued subpoenas to
Broyles & Co. and Nicole Broyles, a certified public accountant, seeking financial documents
relating to the Cherry entities. The Movants request the Court quash the subpoenas because the
documents it seeks are protected by Indiana’s accountant-client privilege. In the alternative, the
Movants argue the subpoenas constitute an undue burden and are not relevant to the underlying
federal litigation. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the Movants’ Motion.
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I.
Background
This is a securities fraud action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) against an Indianapolis investment advisory firm and related entities. The SEC alleges
Defendants fraudulently raised at least $15 million from investors to fund short-term operating
loans for farms then misused the proceeds in violation of federal securities law. On May 1,
2015, the Court appointed a Receiver to marshal and preserve the assets of Defendants Veros
Farm Holding LLC, FarmGrowCap LLC, PinCap LLC, Veros Partners, Inc. and Relief
Defendant Pin Financial LLC. [Dkt. 34.]
On July 18, 2016, the Receiver issued subpoenas to Broyles & Co. CPA’S, LLC and
Nicole Broyles. Both requests sought, in .pdf format, “any and all records including but not
limited to reports, tax returns, profit and loss statements, balance sheets, check registers, bank
account statements, invoices, and any and all other records pertaining to Cherry Farms, LLC;
Cherry Family Land, LLC; Cherry Ag Services, LLC; High Voltage Painting, LLC; James E.
Cherry; Susan L. Cherry; Chris A. Cherry; Cristi K. Cherry; Jeffrey A. Cherry and Cherry
Investor Group, LLC.” [Dkt. 256-2.]
The Receiver contends the subpoenaed documents are necessary to assess the finances of
Cherry Farms LLC and its outstanding loan obligations to Defendant Veros Partners. The
Movants argue the documents are not relevant to the federal claims in this case and seek to quash
the subpoenas on the basis of Indiana’s accountant-client privilege.
II.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governs the issuance of subpoenas. The breadth of
discoverable material via subpoena parallels the liberal scope permitted under Rule 26(b) so long
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as the material sought is relevant, not privileged, and at least leads to admissible evidence.
Graham v. Casey's Gen. Stores, 206 F.R.D. 251, 253–54 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (citations omitted). A
court must grant a motion to quash or modify a subpoena that “requires disclosure of privileged
or other protected matter ... or subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)
(iii)-(iv). The party seeking to quash subpoenas bears the burden of establishing its objections.
Jackson v. Brinker, 147 F.R.D. 189, 194 (S.D. Ind.1993) (citing Holifield v. United States, 909
F.2d 201, 2014 (7th Cir.1990)).
When, as here, third-party discovery is at issue, the Court has the responsibility to
determine whether a subpoena imposes an undue burden, and if so it must quash the subpoena.
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 45(c) (3)(A)(iv). Non-parties “are not treated exactly like parties in the
discovery context, and the possibility of mere relevance may not be enough; rather, non-parties
are entitled to somewhat greater protection.” Patterson v. Burge, No. 03 C 4433, 2005 WL
43240, *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2005). When determining whether to enforce a discovery request, the
court must weigh the need for the information, the breadth of the request, the time period the
discovery covers, the particularity of the documents, and the burden imposed. Charles v. Quality
Carriers, Inc., 2010 WL 396356 at *1 (S.D. Ind. 2010). “[R]elevance alone may not be enough
to justify a subpoena, particularly given that the undue burden calculus is more protective of
nonparties than it is for parties.” Id.
III.
Discussion
The Movants contend the subpoenas, directed to an accounting firm and an accountant,
violate Indiana’s accountant-client privilege. However, while this statutory privilege might apply
in a state suit, there is no accountant-client privilege under the federal common law. In Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), the Supreme Court stated that “no confidential accountant-
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client privilege exists under federal law, and no state-created privilege has been recognized in
federal cases.” Id. at 335. Therefore, the threshold issue here is whether the Court must apply
federal law or state law to the Movants’ Motion.
The Receiver argues that because this is a federal question case (in fact, there are no
pending state law claims), the federal common law must apply. This is the correct result;
however, not quite the correct argument. While federal law governs the Plaintiff’s claims in this
lawsuit, the work of the Receiver herein is entirely separate and distinct from the prosecution and
defense of those claims. Consequently, to answer the question, the Court must examine the legal
basis upon which the Receiver is operating.
Federal law governs the appointment of receivers. See Tcherepnin v. Franz, 485 F.2d
1251, 1255-1256 (7th Cir. 1973). Rule 66 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a
court to appoint a receiver and requires the receiver to “accord with the historical practice in
federal courts or with a local rule.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 66. The appointment of a receiver in equity is
not a substantive right; rather, it is an ancillary remedy which does not affect the ultimate
outcome of the action. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491, 497 (1923). The conclusion
that federal law governs the appointment of a receiver thus does not conflict with the Erie
doctrine's requirement that state law apply to matters of substance. See Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (stating that the equity power of a federal court exercising
diversity jurisdiction cannot be equated with state law under the Erie doctrine). Thus, a receiver
appointed by a federal court would be governed by federal law even if the matter in which the
receiver was appointed was governed by state law under the Erie doctrine.
Additionally, the district court has ancillary jurisdiction over any claims asserted by a
receiver in the exercise of his or her duties. The Seventh Circuit explained: “The ancillary
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jurisdiction of federal courts over actions incident to a receivership established by a federal court
has long been recognized. So long as an action commenced by a court appointed receiver seeks
‘to accomplish the ends sought and directed by the suit in which the appointment was made, such
action or suit is regarded as ancillary so far as the jurisdiction of the ... court of the United States
is concerned.’ ” Tcherepnin, 485 F.2d at 1255–56, quoting Pope v. Louisville, New Albany &
Chicago Railroad Co., 173 U.S. 573, 577 (1899) (internal citations omitted); see also Marwil v.
Grubbs, 2004 WL 2278751, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2004) (finding ancillary jurisdiction of the
federal court exists over state law claims brought by a court-appointed receiver).
The Receiver asserts the subpoenaed documents are necessary to “properly assess the
finances of Cherry Farms, LLC and its outstanding loan obligations to Veros Partners, Inc.”
[Dkt. 263 at 8.] The Receiver further explains that the financial documents are needed to
investigate whether there has been any improper transfer of funds from Cherry Farms to avoid
satisfaction of its outstanding loan obligations to Veros Partners and verify deposit records that
may have been forged. [Dkt. 263 at 8.] The Court agrees that the documents are relevant to the
Receiver’s duty to “marshal and preserve” Defendants’ assets. Such an investigation could lead
to future claims against the Cherry entities, and based on the above this Court would have
ancillary jurisdiction over those claims. Because receiverships are governed by federal law and
the Court would have ancillary jurisdiction over any claims arising from the receivership, the
Court finds federal law must apply to this Motion. Therefore, Indiana’s accountant-client
privilege is not applicable.
The Movants minimally argue the subpoenas present an undue burden on them as
nonparties to this litigation. Undue burden or expense, actual or potential, must be shown by “a
particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory
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statements.” Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n. 16 (1981). Claims of undue burden are
not exempt from the basic principle that unsupported statements of counsel are not evidence. See
United States v. Adriatico-Fernandez, 2012 WL 6200276 (7th Cir. 2012). The Movants’
conclusory argument here does not establish undue burden. To the extent the Movants argue
undue burden because the subpoenas seek documents that may contain personal identifiers such
as social security numbers and bank account information, these concerns can be alleviated by
redaction of such information if the Receiver agrees, or by the issuance of a protective order
limiting access to such information once produced, which the Court will issue upon request.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES the Movants’ Objection and Motion
to Quash Receiver’s Non-Party Request for Production [Dkt. 256]. Broyles & Co. and Nicole
Broyles are ordered to produce the documents responsive to the Receiver’s request on or before
November 18, 2016. Any issues regarding reimbursement of Broyles & Co. and Nicole Broyles
for the reasonable expenses of such production may be raised following the completion of the
production.
Dated: 09 NOV 2016
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Distribution:
Anne Hensley Poindexter
apoindexter@apwlawyer.com
Fred Anthony Paganelli
tony@tonypaganelli.com
Jeanine R. Kerridge
BARNES & THORNBURG LLP (Indianapolis)
jeanine.kerridge@btlaw.com
J. Richard Kiefer
BINGHAM GREENEBAUM DOLL LLP
jrkiefer@bgdlegal.com
John F. McCauley
BINGHAM GREENEBAUM DOLL LLP
jmccauley@bgdlegal.com
Jeffrey B. Bailey
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
jbbailey@boselaw.com
Ronald E. Elberger
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
relberger@boselaw.com
William Edwin Wendling, Jr.
COHEN GARELICK & GLAZIER
wwendling@cgglawfirm.com
Frank Garrett
MCNEELY STEPHENSON - Shelbyville
frank.d.garrett@msth.com
Cynthia A. Bedrick
MCNEELY STEPHENSON THOPY & HARROLD
cabedrick@msth.com
J. Lee McNeely
MCNEELY STEPHENSON THOPY & HARROLD
jlmcneely@msth.com
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Joshua W. Casselman
RUBIN & LEVIN, P.C. - Penn. St.
jcasselman@rubin-levin.net
James E. Rossow, Jr.
RUBIN & LEVIN, PC
jim@rubin-levin.net
Robert M. Moye
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
moyer@sec.gov
Doressia L. Hutton
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION - Chicago
huttond@sec.gov
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