DIXON v. COLVIN

Filing 23

ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW: For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Entry ***SEE ENTRY FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION***. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 9/6/2016.(DW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
DIANE DEBRA JEAN DIXON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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) Cause No. 1:15-cv-682-WTL-MJD
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ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
Plaintiff Diane Debra Jean Dixon requests judicial review of the final decision of the
Defendant, Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”), denying Dixon’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)
under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”) and Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act. The Court, having reviewed the record and the briefs of
the parties, rules as follows.
I.

APPLICABLE STANDARD

Disability is defined as “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of a medically determinable mental or physical impairment which can be expected to
result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at
least twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In order to be found disabled, a claimant
must demonstrate that her physical or mental limitations prevent her from doing not only her
previous work, but any other kind of gainful employment which exists in the national
economy, considering her age, education, and work experience. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner employs a five-step
sequential analysis. At step one, if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, she
is not disabled, despite her medical condition and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 1 At
step two, if the claimant does not have a “severe” impairment (i.e., one that significantly
limits his ability to perform basic work activities), she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(c). At step three, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant’s impairment
or combination of impairments meets or medically equals any impairment that appears in the
Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1, and whether the impairment
meets the twelve-month duration requirement; if so, the claimant is deemed disabled. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). At step four, if the claimant is able to perform her past relevant work,
she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). At step five, if the claimant can perform any
other work in the national economy, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g).
In reviewing the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)’s decision, the ALJ’s findings of
fact are conclusive and must be upheld by this court “so long as substantial evidence supports
them and no error of law occurred.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001).
“Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion,” id., and this Court may not reweigh the evidence or
substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.
1997). The ALJ is required to articulate only a minimal, but legitimate, justification for his
acceptance or rejection of specific evidence of disability. Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697,
700 (7th Cir. 2004). In order to be affirmed, the ALJ must articulate his analysis of the

1

The Code of Federal Regulations contains separate sections relating to DIB and SSI
that are identical in all respects relevant to this case. For the sake of simplicity, this Entry
contains citations to DIB sections only.
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evidence in his decision; while he “is not required to address every piece of evidence or
testimony,” he must “provide some glimpse into [his] reasoning . . . [and] build an accurate
and logical bridge from the evidence to [his] conclusion.” Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176.
II.

BACKGROUND

Dixon protectively filed for DIB and SSI on April 20, 2012, alleging that she became
disabled on May 21, 2011, due to peroneal palsy, right knee pain, obesity, and spondylitic
changes in the cervical spine. Dixon was born on February 7, 1960, and she was fifty-one
years old on the alleged disability onset date. Dixon has a high school education and has past
relevant work experience as a personnel technician, assistant teacher, and call center team
lead.
Dixon’s application was denied initially on September 10, 2012, and upon
reconsideration on December 17, 2012. Thereafter, Dixon requested and received a hearing in
front of an ALJ. A video hearing, during which Dixon was represented by counsel, was held
by ALJ William M. Manico on September 17, 2013. The ALJ issued his decision denying
Dixon’s claim on December 23, 2013; the Appeals Council denied Dixon’s request for review
on March 9, 2015. Dixon then filed this timely appeal.
III.

THE ALJ’S DECISION

The ALJ determined that Dixon will meet the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2016. The ALJ determined at step one that Dixon had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 21, 2011, the alleged onset date. At steps
two and three, the ALJ concluded that Dixon had the severe impairments of “Peroneal Palsy,
right knee pain, and Spondylitic changes in the cervical spine, obesity (20 CFR 404.1520(c)),”
Record at 20, but that her impairments, singly or in combination, did not meet or medically

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equal a listed impairment. At step four, the ALJ determined that Dixon had the following
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”):
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) but may only occasionally climb ramps or stairs,
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl. Claimant should never climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds. Claimant should avoid exposure to hazards.
Id. at 22. Given this RFC, the ALJ determined that Dixon was able to perform her past
relevant work as a personnel technician. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Dixon was not
disabled as defined by the Act.
IV.

EVIDENCE OF RECORD

The medical evidence of record is aptly set forth in Dixon’s brief (Dkt. No. 15) and
need not be recited here. Specific facts are set forth in the discussion section below where
relevant.
V.

DISCUSSION

In her brief in support of her complaint, Dixon advances several objections to the
ALJ’s decision; each is addressed below.
A. ALJ’s Failure to Resolve Inconsistencies
Dixon first argues that the ALJ relied on unreliable and inconsistent reports. Dr.
Wallace Gasiewicz, a Social Security examiner, found that Dixon was “able to perform
normal movements like walking, sitting, squatting, bending, hand movements, manipulative
movement with hands and feet, able to grasp objects and able to get on/off the table without
assistance.” R. at 342. The range of motion chart, however, indicated that he was unable to
evaluate her lumbar spine and hips. R. at 339. Moreover, the report notes that the examination
was performed while Dixon was in her wheelchair, R. at 341, although “we did get her to
stand with support and she did take a few steps of a few inches each,” R. at 342.
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Dr. Sands, a Social Security record reviewer, completed a physical residual functional
capacity (PRFC) assessment. He determined Dixon is able to sit, stand and/or walk about six
hours in an eight hour workday, and can lift and/or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten
pounds frequently. R. at 345. Dr. Sands also checked the box that Dixon is limited in the
lower extremities, yet he provided no explanation as to how and to what degree she is limited.
Id.
The ALJ’s decision assigns “significant weight” to these doctors’ findings (along with
Dr. Hasanadka, who merely checked a box that he agrees with Dr. Sands’ assessment). R. at
26. The decision summarizes Dr. Sands’ PRFC but fails to address the fact that Dr. Sands
found Dixon to be limited in the lower extremities but did not define or explain this finding.
The ALJ’s duty is to resolve inconsistencies in the evidence. See SSR 96–8p. The
ALJ’s failure to resolve the glaring inconsistencies in Drs. Gasiewicz’s and Sands’ findings
concerning a critical issue – Dixon’s ability to stand, walk, and otherwise ambulate – results
in a failure to build the logical bridge that is required and renders a RFC finding that is fatally
flawed. The ALJ should have sought clarification. Remand is required.
B. Step 2 Error
Dixon also argues that the ALJ erred at Step 2:
Only medical experts can reach conclusions regarding meeting or equaling
one of the Listing impairments. The ALJ erroneously made a blanket
statement that listing 1.02 and 1.04 are not met without any discussion of the
evidence as it relates to the requirements of the listing criteria. . . . . The ALJ
errs by failing to properly analyze the evidence in the listing discussion and
by failing to utilize readily available expertise as mandated by Social
Security rules.
Dkt. No. 15 at 7.
In his decision, the ALJ states that “the claimant does not have an impairment or

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combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525,
and 404.1526).” R. at 21. However, the ALJ failed to provide sufficient analysis or
discussion of the evidence. This error should be corrected on remand.
C. Failure to Address Dixon’s Need of Walker or Wheelchair to Ambulate
Dixon also argues that the ALJ erred in failing to take her need for a wheelchair for all
mobility into consideration in the RFC. While she was not given a prescription, Dixon was
sent home from the hospital with a rolling walker. On remand, the ALJ should address and
assess the evidence regarding Dixon’s use of a wheelchair or walker.
D. Credibility
Finally, Dixon argues that the ALJ discredited her credibility based on lack of
treatment history. The ALJ did not explore Dixon’s reasons for lack of medical care. On
remand, he should address this issue. See Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir.
2014) (remanding to agency where ALJ made no attempt to determine reason for conservative
treatment).
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED
AND REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Entry.
SO ORDERED: 9/6/16

_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Copies to all counsel of record via electronic communication.
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