PRECISE MATERIAL SERVICES, INC. et al v. TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 135
ORDER granting 38 Motion for Summary Judgment - The Court GRANTS Defendant Teamsters Local 135's Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiffs', Precise Materials Services, Inc. and Nancy Anderson, claims against it. The Court will enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 1/25/2017. Copy sent to Plaintiffs via US Mail. (LDH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
PRECISE MATERIAL SERVICES, INC.,
and ANDERSON NANCY,
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 135,
ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant Teamsters Local Union No. 135 (“Local 135”) has moved for summary
judgment on all the claims in Plaintiffs’, Precise Material Services, Inc. (“Precise”), and
Nancy Anderson (“Anderson”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), Amended Complaint. Dkt. No.
For the reasons stated herein, Local 135’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see also United Ass’n of Black Landscapers
v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267–68 (7th Cir. 1990). Motions for summary
judgment are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), which provides in
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the
opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit
evidentiary materials showing that a fact either is or cannot be genuinely disputed. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever “there is sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The nonmoving party bears
the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986);
Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc.. 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). It is not the duty
of the Court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary
judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying applicable
evidence. See Goodman, 621 F.3d at 654; Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc.,
92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996).
II. UNDISPUTED FACTS
The Complaint and Amended Complaint in this case were filed by an attorney. See
Dkt. Nos. 1 & 5. On October 10, 2016, Local 135 filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.
Dkt. No. 38. On the same date, Plaintiffs’ counsel moved to withdraw. Dkt. No. 37. On
October 13, 2016, the Court held a hearing on the motion and granted it, notified
Anderson that Precise could not proceed without counsel, and ordered Precise to obtain
counsel on or before November 28, 2016. Dkt. No. 42. Precise and Anderson did not
cause counsel to appear by that date and at the Status Conference held on November
29, 2016, Anderson reported that she had not yet retained counsel. Dkt. No. 43. At that
Conference, the Court also reminded Anderson that Precise could not proceed pro se,
and reminded Anderson of the December 19, 2016, deadline to file a response to Local
135’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. To date, Anderson has not filed a response
and no attorney has appeared for Precise; therefore, the Court must conclude that there
is no genuine issue of material fact as to Local 135’s Statement of Material Facts Not In
Dispute. See Steward v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1034 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1121 (1994); S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(f)(1). However, summary judgment in favor of Local
135 is not automatic; rather, the Court must determine that given the undisputed facts,
summary judgment is proper as a matter of law. See Wienco, Inc. v. Katahn Assocs.,
Inc., 965 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1992).
The material facts not in dispute are:
Local 135 is an unincorporated labor association headquartered in Indianapolis,
Indiana. Dkt. No. 18, Local 135’s Ans. to Am. Compl. ¶ 9. Precise is a trucking and
hauling company headquartered in Lebanon, Indiana. Anderson Dep. at 15 & Exh. 1.
Anderson is the owner and President of Precise. Anderson Dep. at 10, 15; & Anderson
Dep. Exh. 1.
Precise was incorporated on May 20, 2009. Anderson Dep. at 10; & Anderson
Dep. Exh. 1. Precise began performing hauling services on road construction projects
in 2012. Anderson Dep. at 10-12, 14. Precise went out of business in November 2013.
Id. at 13.
Prior to 2012, Precise was solely engaged in leasing trucks to a trucking company
called Circle City Hauling, which is owned by Anderson’s husband, Rick Anderson
(“Rick”). Anderson Dep. at 10-12.
Precise was party to a collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) with Teamsters
Joint Council 69, which is comprised of five Teamster local unions in the state of Indiana,
including Local 135. Anderson Dep. Exh. 2 (“CBA”). The CBA was signed on Precise’s
behalf by Anderson as “Owner/President” on May 7, 2012. Id. The CBA covers, among
other things, “the hauling of construction materials to, from and on the job site by the
Employer . . . .” Id. at 5.
Article 15 of the CBA contains a grievance procedure culminating in final and
binding arbitration before an arbitrator from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Id. at 20-21. Anderson was aware of the grievance procedure
contained in the CBA, but she did not file a grievance before filing this lawsuit, nor was
she prevented from doing so. Anderson Dep. at 24, 40.
Article 22 of the CBA requires signatory employers to make health and welfare
contributions on behalf of their employees to the Indiana Teamsters Health Benefits Fund
for their employees’ health and welfare benefits. CBA at 24-26.
Article 23 of the CBA requires signatory employers to make contributions on behalf
of their employees to the Indiana Teamsters Pension Fund or the Central States Pension
Fund for their employees’ retirement benefits. Id. at 28-31. Precise agreed to contribute
to the Indiana Teamsters Pension Fund. Anderson Dep. at 29; Anderson Dep. Exh. 4.
Articles 22 and 23, respectively, provide that if a signatory employer fails to make
its health and welfare or pension contributions on behalf of its employees, the employees
and their local union “shall have the right to take such action as they deem necessary,
including, but not limited to, the following: (1) refraining from work, strike and picketing
until such delinquent payments are made, and/or (2) commencing a lawsuit to collect the
delinquencies.” CBA at 25, 30.
The CBA also contains a “Protection of Rights” provision that provides, in part, “it
shall not be a violation of this Agreement, and it shall not be cause of discharge or
discipline, if any employee or employees refuse to go through the primary picket line of
any Local Union or any other union, nor shall the exercise of any rights permitted by law
be a violation of this Agreement.” Id. at 21.
In addition to the CBA, Precise also signed participation agreements with the
Indiana Teamsters Health Benefits Fund and the Indiana Teamsters Pension Fund.
Anderson Dep. Exhs. 3 & 4. The Health Fund Participation Agreement required Precise
to make contributions to the health fund for its employees’ health insurance of $7.76 per
hour worked up to fifty hours per week beginning on May 7, 2012, until April 1, 2013
(when the rate was open for change). Anderson Dep. Exh. 3. The Pension Fund
Participation Agreement required Precise to make contributions to the pension fund for
its employees’ retirement benefits of $2.50 per hour beginning on May 7, 2012. Anderson
Dep. Exh. 4.
Precise became delinquent on its health and welfare and pension contributions in
September 2012. Anderson Dep. at 32; Anderson Dep. Exh. 5. The check that Precise
wrote for its September 2012 contributions bounced. Anderson Dep. at 32-33. Precise
also failed to make any contributions for its employees’ health and welfare and pension
benefits in October, November, and December 2012. Anderson Dep. at 33-34; Anderson
Dep. Exh. 6.
Local 135 did not strike or picket Precise for failing to make its contributions even
though it had the right to do so under the CBA. Anderson Dep. at 43; CBA at 25, 30. In
fact, Local 135 did not strike or picket Precise at any time. Anderson Dep. at 34.
The Indiana Teamsters Health Benefits Fund and the Indiana Teamsters Pension
Fund filed suit against Precise in August 2013 to recover the unpaid contributions, and
obtained a judgment in October 2014 in the amount of $22,646.25. Anderson Dep. Exhs.
7 & 10. 1 Precise has made no effort to satisfy this judgment because, in Anderson’s
“opinion,” “the judgment is wrong.” Anderson Dep. at 39.
As previously stated, 2013 was the last year that Precise was in business.
Anderson Dep. at 13. Precise did not make a profit in any of the years that it was in
business. Anderson Dep. Exhs. 18-20; Anderson Dep. at 78-79, 101. Specifically, in
2010, Precise lost $39,845.00, with total receipts of $117,410.00 and expenses of
$157,255.00. Anderson Dep. Exh. 18. In 2011, Precise lost $5,878.00, with total receipts
of $179,681.00 and expenses of $185,559.00. Anderson Dep. Exh. 19. In 2012, Precise
lost $9,177.00, with total receipts of $1,002,904.00 and expenses of $1,012,081.00.
Anderson Dep. Exh. 20.
Although Plaintiffs did not provide Precise’s 2013 tax returns in discovery,
Anderson testified that Precise did not make a profit in 2013, and that it lost more money
in 2013 than it did in 2012. Anderson Dep. at 78-79, 101.
Anderson testified in her deposition that Precise was not represented by an attorney in
unpaid contributions litigation. Anderson Dep. at 37. That is not true. Attorneys Daniel
Michael Drewry and Christopher Steven Drewry filed appearances and an Answer on
Precise’s behalf, but later withdrew their appearances. See Case No. 1:13-cv-01225WTL-DML, Dkt. Nos. 6, 7, 11, 14, & 15.
Anderson maintained Precise’s only business account at Farmers Bank.
Anderson Dep. at 79-80.
Precise’s banking records for 2010 through 2013 were
exchanged during discovery. Anderson Dep. Exhs. 14-17. These banking records show
numerous withdrawals at casinos, including, but not limited to, Seminole Hard Rock
Tampa (see, e.g., Anderson Dep. Exh. 14 at 512 2; Anderson Dep. Exh. 15 at 551;
Anderson Dep. Exh. 16 at 597); Hoosier Park Casino in Anderson (see, e.g., Anderson
Dep. Exh. 14 at 520); Hollywood Casino in Lawrenceburg (see, e.g., Anderson Dep. Exh.
16 at 637); and Indiana Grand in Shelbyville (see, e.g., Anderson Dep. Exh. 17 at 648).
Anderson testified that each of the casino withdrawals reflected in Precise’s bank
account statements represent times that she used that money for gambling. Anderson
Dep. at 96.
The Precise bank account statements that were exchanged during discovery
reflect casino withdrawals in each of the months that Precise failed to pay its employees’
health and welfare contributions. See Anderson Dep. Exh. 17 at 659 (withdrawals at
Horseshoe and Bally’s casinos in Tunica, MS in September 2012); 669-70 (withdrawals
at Hoosier Park Casino in Anderson in October 2012); 679-81 (withdrawals at Hoosier
Park Casino in Anderson in November 2012). The bank statements for December 2012
were not provided during discovery, despite the fact that they were requested and
Anderson assured Local 135’s counsel during her deposition that “I will get you
December’s bank statements.” Anderson Dep. at 96.
The page numbers cited here reference the Bates Stamp on the bottom right of each
Precise’s bank statements for 2012 and 2013 reflect a total of $79,998.02 in
withdrawals and payments relating to casino gaming, including $31,248.24 during the
period from September 2012 forward when Precise had stopped making its health and
pension contributions for employees. Anderson Dep. Exhs. 16 & 17.
There are also numerous instances in the bank statements of transfers to
“Business Checking ****0439.” See, e.g., Anderson Dep. Exh. 16 at 670; Anderson Dep.
at 87. These reflect non-business related transfers to her husband’s business’s account,
Rick Anderson, Inc. Anderson Dep. at 88. Anderson does not recall exactly what these
transfers are for, although she testified that they “could have” been for the mortgage on
their home, because the mortgage came out of Rick’s business account, or it “could have”
been to pay back money that Anderson borrowed from her husband. Anderson Dep. at
Precise’s bank statements for 2012 and 2013 reflect a total of $142,313.10 in
unexplained transfers to Rick Anderson, Inc., including $91,843.10 during the period from
September 2012 forward when Precise had stopped making its health and pension
contributions for employees. Anderson Dep. Exhs. 16 & 17.
The Andersons’ joint personal tax returns in 2012 and 2013 show no income or
wages from Precise. Anderson Dep. Exhs. 23 & 24. The 2012 tax return shows
$82,523.00 in gambling winnings. Anderson Dep. Exh. 23. It also shows $18,202.00 in
unemployment compensation. Id.
The Amended Complaint alleges that in March 2013, Local 135’s Business Agent
Mike Berry (“Berry”) called Anderson and “told [her] that if he sees me on any jobs, he
will run me off of them.” Anderson Dep. at 50; Am. Compl. ¶ 21. According to Anderson,
Berry said this directly to her in a phone conversation that lasted ten minutes. Anderson
Dep. at 51 & 55.
The Amended Complaint further alleges that representatives of Local 135 made
“numerous threats . . . to companies to terminate their business relationships with
Precise.” Comp. ¶ 33. These companies include: Fox Hauling & Construction (“Fox”);
AJ’s Tool Rental (“AJ’s”); Mr. Mark Smith (“Smith”); and CMG Trucking (“CMG”). Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 22-32; Anderson Dep. at 75.
More specifically, in March 2013, Plaintiffs allege that Fox stopped doing business
with Precise. Am. Compl. ¶ 23. Anderson alleges that this was because Berry told “Mel,”
an employee of Fox, that if Fox used Precise, there would be ‘“hell to pay’ in the form of
picketing and/or forcing [Fox] to pay amounts claimed to be owed to the Teamsters Union
by Circle City and Precise.” Am. Compl. ¶ 22. Anderson has no personal knowledge of
this allegation, but rather claims to have been informed of it by Mel “about a week after”
it allegedly occurred. Anderson Dep. at 57. Anderson does not know if Berry threatened
to picket Precise or Fox. Id. Anderson stated that Mel told her that Berry told Mel “he
would picket any jobs that I was on.” Anderson Dep. at 58.
Plaintiffs allege that in May 2013 Precise began to do business with AJ’s that
consisted of one truck. Am. Compl. ¶ 24. Plaintiffs allege that on June 24, 2013, Berry
and an unknown person from Teamsters Local 716 in Indianapolis called “Kimmy” at AJ’s
and “threatened to picket the job if AJ’s continued to use Precise.” Id.; Anderson Dep. at
64. According to Anderson, the threat to picket the job was because Precise was on the
job site. Anderson Dep. at 64. Anderson claims to have learned this information through
a conversation with Kimmy. Id. Anderson claims to have a recording of Kimmy, although
she did not say what is on it. Id. Anderson admits she has nothing in writing from Kimmy
regarding this allegation. Id.
The Amended Complaint also alleges that Precise was able to “find work with Mr.
Mark Smith on non-union jobs,” and that on or about June 24, 2013, the “Teamsters
Union . . . contacted Mr. Smith and demanded that he stop using Precise.” Am. Compl.
¶ 29. Anderson claimed in her deposition that the Teamsters agent who contacted Smith
was Berry. Anderson Dep. at 68. According to Anderson, Precise worked for Smith on a
“sporadic basis”—“maybe once or twice a week.” Id. Anderson testified that Smith told
her that Berry called him and “asked” him to stop using Precise. Anderson Dep. at 69.
Neither in the Amended Complaint nor in her deposition did Anderson allege or testify
that Berry threatened Smith in any way. Am. Compl. ¶ 29; Anderson Dep. at 69. Further,
the Amended Complaint does not allege that Smith stopped doing business with Precise
after this alleged conversation, Am. Compl. ¶ 29, and in her deposition Anderson testified
that Smith continued to use Precise after this alleged conversation between him and
Berry. Anderson Dep. at 69.
Anderson also claims that in late June 2013, Precise had a leasing relationship
with CMG whereby CMG agreed to lease Precise’s trucks, and that an unknown person
from Teamsters Local 716 called “Summer” from CMG and demanded that CMG remove
its signs from the Precise trucks and informed her that the Teamsters could terminate
CMG’s contract. Anderson Dep. at 72-73.
Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on May 29, 2015, Dkt. No. 1; and Amended
Complaint on June 26, 2015, Dkt. No. 5.
Precise is without a lawyer and the Seventh Circuit has confirmed that a
corporation must appear by counsel or not at all. See Strong Delivery Ministry Assoc. v.
Bd. of Appeals of Cook Cty., 543 F.2d 32, 34 (7th Cir. 1976). As outlined above, the Court
ordered Precise to obtain counsel on or before November 28, 2016. Dkt. No. 42. No
counsel made his or her appearance and on November 29, 2016, Anderson was warned
that the Court would not further extend the deadline to file a response to Local 135’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and that she could not file a response on Precise’s behalf.
Dkt. No. 43. Since November 29, 2016, no attorney has filed an appearance for Precise.
Therefore, dismissal of Precise’s claims against Local 135 is warranted.
A. COUNTS II & III
With respect to Anderson’s claims, Local 135 asserts that Count II, alleging
Intentional Interference with Business Relationships; and Count III, alleging Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress; are pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”), § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (addressing where suits against a union for violation of
contracts may be brought) & § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (making unfair union
attempts to threaten, coerce or restrain an entity from doing business with another); and
the Labor-Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (prohibiting unfair
labor practices by a union). 3 Dkt. No. 39 at 13-15. The Court agrees that Counts II and
The relevant part of NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), states: “It shall be an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents--- . . . (4) . . . (ii) to threaten, coerce,
or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in any industry affecting commerce,
where . . . an object thereof is---(B) forcing or requiring any person . . . to cease doing
business with any other person . . . .”
The relevant part of LMRA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187, states: “It shall be unlawful . .
. for any labor organization to engage in any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor
III are preempted by the NLRA and LMRA. Specifically, in San Diego Trades Council v.
Garmon, the Supreme Court concluded “that . . . activities . . . protected by § 7 of the
[NLRA], or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8,” are preempted by federal law.
359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). See also Kolentus v. Avco Corp., 798 F.2d 949, 961 (7th
Cir. 1986) (stating that “[a] state law claim is presumptively preempted where the unlawful
activity charged actually or arguably constitutes an unfair labor practice under the NLRA”)
Further, in Smart v. Local 702 IBEW, the Seventh Circuit addressed whether an
electrician’s state law claims of unfair business practices based on a union’s threats to
have its members withhold work if a company used the electrician’s services were
preempted by either the NLRA or the LMRA. 562 F.3d 798, 804-09 (7th Cir. 2009). The
Smart court concluded that LMRA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187(b), “completely preempts statelaw claims related to secondary boycott activities” such as threats to withhold work and
the like, which are described in NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). Id. at 808
(emphasis in orginal). The actions complained of by Anderson in Count II mirror the
prohibitions found in NLRA § 8(b)(4), and by reference, LMRA § 303; therefore, it is
Moreover, in Filippo v. Northern Indiana Public Service Corp., the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was
preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. 141 F.3d 744, 750-51 (7th Cir. 1998). The Filippo court
stated that “[t]he LMRA displaces a state-law claim if resolution of the claim ‘requires the
practice in [29 U.S.C. §] 158(b)(4) . . . .” In other words, NLRA § 8(b)(4) is incorporated
into LMRA § 303.
interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.’” Id. at 750 (quoting Lingle v. Norge
Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988)). In this case, Anderson’s allegations
that Local 135’s actions regarding purported threats of strikes and/or picketing were
“extreme and outrageous” necessarily requires interpretation of the CBA, which
specifically allows for the unions to strike or picket employers in certain situations. CBA
at 25, 30. Therefore, Count III is preempted by the LMRA.
B. COUNT I
In Count I of the Amended Complaint Anderson alleges that Local 135
threatening/pressuring behavior violates the NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), and
LMRA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187(b). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-38 (citing NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4); and LMRA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187). First, with respect to Anderson’s
allegations as to Fox, Local 135 asserts that Count I was filed too late because it was
filed after the two-year statute of limitations expired. Dkt. No. 39 at 16. The Court agrees.
Local 135 correctly states that a two-year statute of limitations applies to Anderson’s
NLRA § 8(b)(4) and LMRA § 303 claims. Id. (citing, inter alia, Int’l Union of Elevator
Constructors v. Home Elevator Co., 798 F.2d 222, 230 (7th Cir. 1986)). Berry’s alleged
conversation with Fox occurred on or around mid or late March 2013. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2122; Anderson Dep. at 56-57. Therefore, the Complaint, filed on May 29, 2015, was filed
two months after the statute of limitations expired.
As to Anderson’s claims regarding Local 135’s alleged threats directed to AJ’s,
Smith and CMG, Local 135 contends that none are actionable because it did not engage
in unlawful secondary activity. Dkt. No. 39 at 17-27. To establish a secondary coercion
claim under the NLRA, Anderson must prove that Local 135 “threatened, coerced or
restrained [the companies] to cease doing business” with her; and that the “object was to
force [the companies] to cease doing business” with her, rather than just attempting to
persuade the companies to refrain from using Precise.
Printpack, Inc. v. Graphic
Commc’ns Int’l Union Local 761-S, 988 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (S.D. In. 1997) (emphasis
added). See also 520 Mich. Ave. Assocs., Ltd. v. Unite Here Local 1, 760 F.3d 708, 720
(7th Cir. 2014); Milwaukee Plywood Co. v. NLRB, 285 F.2d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 1960). As
to the first element, the Seventh Circuit has concluded that the coercive conduct “must
threaten neutral parties with substantial loss or ruin.” 520 Mich. Ave. Assocs., 760 F.3d
at 719. In other words, “a union may be liable under § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) for unlawfully
coercing a secondary to cease doing business with the struck employer if the union’s
conduct amounts to harassment or involves repeated trespass or both.” Id. at 722.
With respect to allegations that Berry, Union 135’s agent, threatened Anderson
directly, none of the allegations are actionable under NLRA § 8(b)(4) or LMRA § 303
because they did not involve a third party.
With respect to the Anderson’s allegation that Berry called “Kimmy” at AJ’s, what
“Kimmy” told Anderson is hearsay and is inadmissible. Therefore, Anderson’s claims
regarding any statements made by Local 135 to AJ’s are unsubstantiated and must be
Similarly, Smith’s statement to Anderson that Berry demanded that Smith
discontinue his association with her, Am. Compl. ¶ 29, Anderson Dep. at 69, is hearsay.
Further, a demand by Local 135 that Smith refrain from using Anderson’s services without
more is not a threat or coercive in any way and, therefore, is not actionable under either
NLRA § 8(b)(4) or LMRA § 303.
Lastly, Anderson’s allegations regarding statements made to CMG fail because
they are hearsay as well. Even if they were not hearsay, Anderson testified that a different
union, 716, called CMG and said that if it “didn’t cease the relationship with [her] that there
would be repercussions from that.” Anderson Dep. at 73. There is no evidence that Local
135 had anything to do with this alleged conversation with CMG; therefore, Local 135 is
entitled to summary judgment on those claims as well.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant Teamsters Local
135’s Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiffs’, Precise Materials Services, Inc.
and Nancy Anderson, claims against it. The Court will enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of January, 2017.
LARRY J. McKINNEY, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
PRECISE MATERIAL SERVICES, INC.
1955 John Bart Road
Lebanon, IN 46052-1213
Geoffrey S. Lohman
FILLENWARTH DENNERLINE GROTH &
1955 John Bart Road
Lebanon, IN 46052-1213
William R. Groth
FILLENWARTH DENNERLINE GROTH &
David T. Vlink
FILLENWARTH DENNERLINE GROTH &
Fred O. Towe
FILLENWARTH DENNERLINE GROTH &
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