BERLINSKY v. ELI LILLY AND COMPANY et al

Filing 23

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - For the foregoing reasons, Lilly and Martin's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (Filing No. 18) is GRANTED. Berlinsky's Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Final judgment will issue under separate order. **SEE ORDER** Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 9/19/2016.(JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
LEEANNE BERLINSKY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY,
LILLY USA LLC, and
JULIE MARTIN, in her individual capacity,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:15-cv-01029-TWP-DML

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by Defendants Eli Lilly and Company, Lilly USA LLC (collectively
“Lilly”), and Julie Martin (“Martin”) (collectively “the Defendants”) (Filing No. 18). Plaintiff
LeeAnne Berlinsky’s (“Berlinsky”) employment with Lilly ended on September 10, 2014, with a
“Release Agreement” between Berlinsky and Lilly. The Release Agreement included a
confidentiality provision. After Lilly responded to a subpoena from Berlinsky’s ex-husband and
produced the Release Agreement and other documents, Berlinsky filed this lawsuit for claims of
breach of contract against Lilly and defamation against Martin, a member of Lilly’s law
department. The Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, asserting that there is an absolute
privilege against liability for responding to a subpoena and there was no breach of the Release
Agreement under the contract’s provisions. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the
Motion to Dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND
Lilly is a publically owned pharmaceutical corporation headquartered in Indianapolis,
Indiana. Berlinsky was employed by Lilly for almost thirteen years. She has a PhD in healthcare
administration, and she was a senior director of sales with Lilly before her employment ended on
September 10, 2014. She resides in South Carolina. Defendant Martin is employed by Lilly as an
assistant consultant in the legal operations department. (Filing No. 13 at 1–2.)
Berlinsky’s separation of employment from Lilly was by mutual agreement of the parties
as documented in a signed “Release Agreement,” executed on October 3, 2014 (Filing No. 19-1).
In the Release Agreement, Berlinsky and Lilly agreed that Berlinsky’s last day of employment at
Lilly was September 10, 2014. The parties agreed that the “Agreement is motivated solely by the
desire to part ways on amicable terms. By carrying out the terms of this Agreement, neither admits
any wrongful action or any liability to the other.” Id. at 1.
The Release Agreement provided for a severance payment to Berlinsky and a release of all
claims or potential claims against Lilly. It also contained a confidentiality clause that stated,
“[t]hese promises of confidentiality are material terms of this Agreement.” (Filing No. 19-1 at 6.)
The Release Agreement noted that the parties were entering into an agreement “[i]n consideration
of the mutual covenants and conditions set forth in this Agreement.” Id. at 1.
In the Release Agreement, Berlinsky agreed to cooperate with Lilly in the future should
her testimony be necessary for any legal proceedings. The Release Agreement also provided for
a smooth transfer of Berlinsky’s job responsibilities and the return of Lilly’s property. It also
stated that the “Agreement contains the entire understanding between the parties relating to the
subject matter hereof and may not be amended, supplemented or otherwise modified except by an
instrument in writing signed by both parties.” (Filing No. 19-1 at 8.)

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In September 2015, when she filed her Amended Complaint, Berlinsky had been divorced
from her ex-husband for more than four years. Her ex-husband is an attorney in South Carolina.
During the four years, Berlinsky’s ex-husband repeatedly threatened Berlinsky with family court
proceedings to limit her custodial rights of their minor child, increase his visitation rights, and
decrease his child support obligations. (Filing No. 13 at 3). Berlinsky has spent more than
$200,000.00 in attorney fees defending herself against her ex-husband in family court. Id.
In December 2014, Berlinsky’s ex-husband learned that she was no longer working for
Lilly, so he initiated another proceeding in a South Carolina family court and alleged that Berlinsky
had failed to maintain adequate insurance coverage for their minor child. Id. In connection with
the family court proceeding, Berlinsky’s ex-husband served a subpoena on Lilly, requesting
Berlinsky’s personal employment information.

The subpoena directed Lilly to produce

Berlinsky’s personnel file and answer the following questions:
[W]hether she resigned or was terminated, the reason for the resignation or
termination, any prior disciplinary actions or warnings, and a copy of her severance
package. . . . All notes, handwritten or electronic, intercompany e-mails, regular emails, memos and/or any and all forms of communication regarding why LeeAnne
Berlinsky is no longer employed by Eli Lilly whether for misconduct, alleged
misconduct, breach of company policy, breach of industry standards, criminal
concerns, if there has been any drug use and/or arrests which may in any way affect
cessation of LeeAnne Berlinsky’s employment with Eli Lilly regardless of whether
she quit or was forced to resign, resigned or was fired.
(Filing No. 13 at 3.) Berlinsky filed a motion to quash the subpoena served on Lilly, and she sent
a copy of the motion to quash on January 29, 2015, to Martin in Lilly’s legal department.
In response to the subpoena, on behalf of Lilly, Martin asserted objections on the bases that
the subpoena sought documents protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and
sought information that was not sufficiently tailored to the issues as Lilly understood them and
because Lilly was not subject to the subpoena power of an out-of-state court. Along with the

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objections, Martin produced Berlinsky’s “personal history” folder, which contained the Release
Agreement. Martin provided the subpoena response and folder, on behalf of Lilly, to Berlinsky’s
ex-husband on February 23, 2015. Id. at 4.
After Berlinsky’s ex-husband received Lilly’s subpoena response from Martin, he sent a
follow-up letter to Martin on February 24, 2015, asserting that there were several documents
missing from Lilly’s response to the subpoena, specifically he requested any documents that led
to the formation of the Release Agreement, documentation of the reason for Berlinsky’s
termination, and documents indicating why Berlinsky was no longer working for Lilly. Because
Berlinsky’s counsel determined that these additional documents were not relevant to the family
court proceeding, her counsel notified Martin on February 25, 2015, that if any additional personal
and confidential information about Berlinsky was released to Berlinsky’s ex-husband as a result
of the follow-up letter, Berlinsky would consider the confidentiality provision of the Release
Agreement breached.
On March 6, 2015, Lilly asserted that the subpoena sought “confidential personal
information that is not sufficiently tailored to the issues Lilly understands to be at issue” (Filing
No. 13 at 5); however, Martin produced additional employment documents regarding Berlinsky
through outside counsel. Id.
While the Release Agreement signed by Lilly on October 3, 2014, stated that it contained
the entire understanding of the parties and that Berlinsky’s employment ended through mutual
agreement, Lilly produced a letter pre-dating the Release Agreement that indicated Berlinsky was
being separated for “misconduct as a member of management.” This letter, which pre-dated the
Release Agreement, contained information that contradicted the parties’ agreement that
Berlinsky’s termination was by mutual agreement. Id. Berlinsky’s ex-husband is using this earlier

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letter produced by Martin against Berlinsky in the family court in South Carolina to try to alter the
existing child custody arrangements and support order as well as to injure Berlinsky’s professional
reputation. Id.
Berlinsky contends that Lilly and Martin were or should have been aware that her exhusband had previously tried to accumulate confidential information about her as Berlinsky’s exhusband previously served Lilly with twelve separate subpoenas and then withdrew the subpoenas
after Berlinsky’s former attorney challenged the subpoenas’ legality and relevance. Berlinsky also
contends that Martin acted outside the scope of her authority and contrary to Lilly’s standard
protocols when she produced the additional documents to Berlinsky’s ex-husband, which included
the letter that pre-dated the Release Agreement and that contradicted the terms of the Release
Agreement. (Filing No. 13 at 5–6.)
By letter dated March 12, 2015, Berlinsky informed Lilly that she considered its conduct a
breach of the Release Agreement, and she never received a response from Lilly. Id. at 6. On
September 3, 2015, Berlinsky filed her Amended Complaint asserting a breach of contract claim
against Lilly and a defamation claim against Martin in her individual capacity. On September 28,
2015, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, asserting among other arguments that Berlinsky’s
claims must be dismissed because Lilly and Martin enjoy an absolute privilege against liability
when responding to a subpoena.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint
that has failed to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When
deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all factual allegations
in the complaint and draws all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Bielanski v. County of Kane,

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550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008). However, courts “are not obliged to accept as true legal
conclusions or unsupported conclusions of fact.” Hickey v. O’Bannon, 287 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir.
2002).
The complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the
Supreme Court explained that the complaint must allege facts that are “enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although “detailed factual
allegations” are not required, mere “labels,” “conclusions,” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the
elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. Id.; see also Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581
F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2009) (“it is not enough to give a threadbare recitation of the elements of
a claim without factual support”). The allegations must “give the defendant fair notice of what the
. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Stated differently,
the complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
To be facially plausible, the complaint must allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
[T]he record under 12(b)(6) is limited to the language of the complaint and to those
matters of which the court may take judicial notice. The complaint cannot be
amended by the briefs filed by the plaintiff in opposition to a motion to dismiss. By
the same token, the defendant cannot, in presenting its 12(b)(6) challenge, attempt
to refute the complaint or to present a different set of allegations. The attack is on
the sufficiency of the complaint, and the defendant cannot set or alter the terms of
the dispute, but must demonstrate that the plaintiff’s claim, as set forth by the
complaint, is without legal consequence.
Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Education, 811 F.2d 1030, 1039 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
However, “[courts] consider documents attached to the complaint as part of the complaint itself.
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Such documents may permit the court to determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment.”
Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
Additionally, the court may consider documents that are referred to in the complaint and that are
concededly authentic and central to the plaintiff’s claim. Santana v. Cook County Bd. of Review,
679 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2012). When a party attaches exhibits to its complaint and incorporates
the exhibits into the pleadings, if there are contradictions between the exhibits and the complaint,
the exhibits generally will control. Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 2013).
III. DISCUSSION
Lilly and Martin ask the Court to dismiss with prejudice both the defamation claim against
Martin and the breach of contract claim against Lilly. The Court will address each claim in turn.
A.

Defamation Claim against Martin
The Defendants assert that Berlinsky’s defamation claim fails as a matter of law because

there is an absolute privilege against defamation liability when responding to a subpoena. They
explain that Martin is a member of Lilly’s legal department, and all of her conduct as alleged in
the Amended Complaint was in connection with responding to the subpoena directing the
production of documents. Martin did not create new documents, but rather, only produced alreadyexisting documents from Lilly’s files. She did not provide “new” information to Berlinsky’s exhusband. In support of their argument for an absolute privilege, the Defendants point to case law
from the Indiana Supreme Court.
Indiana law has long recognized an absolute privilege that protects all relevant
statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding, regardless of the truth or
motive behind the statements. The reason upon which the rule is founded is the
necessity of preserving the due administration of justice, by providing actors in
judicial proceedings with the freedom to participate without fear of future
defamation claims.

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Hartman v. Keri, 883 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Ind. 2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted). See
also Rain v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 626 F.3d 372, 376–77 (7th Cir. 2010) (Indiana courts favor a
liberal rule regarding this absolute privilege). The Defendants also quote Seventh Circuit case law
specifically on point regarding subpoenas; “Defamation based on material contained in a response
to a subpoena, as in other statements made in a judicial proceeding, is absolutely privileged.”
United States Dep’t of Educ. v. NCAA, 481 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
Responding to Defendants’ argument for an absolute privilege, Berlinsky acknowledges
that responses to a subpoena are privileged and that she did not allege that Lilly should not have
responded to the subpoena. She asserts, however, that the focus of her Amended Complaint was
on the actions taken by Martin after the initial subpoena response. She asserts that Martin’s
wrongful conduct giving rise to the defamation claim occurred when Martin responded to
Berlinsky’s ex-husband’s follow-up letter, demanding additional documents. Berlinsky explains,
The crux of Plaintiff’s complaint is that when Defendant Lilly voluntarily
responded to a subsequent letter from the attorney who had issued the subpoena
and provided a letter that indicated Plaintiff had been terminated for misconduct,
Defendant Lilly breached the Release Agreement and Defendant Martin defamed
Plaintiff by providing false information which had been superseded by the Release
Agreement.
(Filing No. 20 at 2.)
Berlinsky portrays her defamation claim against Martin as arising from a discretionary,
separate response by Martin to a third-party letter. Berlinsky then goes on to explain the process
for challenging the adequacy of a response to a subpoena and infers that Lilly and Martin should
have required Berlinsky’s ex-husband to initiate contempt proceedings before they cooperated
with further document production in response to the subpoena.
The Defendants reply to Berlinsky’s response by pointing out that Berlinsky admitted Lilly
acted appropriately when it responded to the subpoena. Then they assert that Berlinsky’s argument
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about liability for actions after the initial subpoena response is unavailing because “Lilly’s
‘voluntary response to a subsequent letter’ was undeniably part of Lilly’s response to the
subpoena.” (Filing No. 21 at 2.)
Lilly provided initial objections and responses to the subpoena with a production of
documents. The subpoena discovery process continued when the issuing party challenged Lilly’s
initial response and objections, and the opponents resolved their issues through discussion and
additional document production. “All of that was a part of the subpoena response. It was not some
independent response to a separate third-party inquiry as [Berlinsky] now tries to cast it.” Id.
Defendants then describe the litigation and discovery process: the issuing party issues a
subpoena or discovery request, the receiving party responds and objects initially, the issuing party
then challenges the response and objections, and the parties subsequently resolve those issues.
Contempt proceedings are a last resort that parties have a duty to try to avoid. A party’s duty is to
respond to the subpoena with appropriate objections and then work in good faith with the party
issuing the subpoena to address any issues raised regarding the response and objections.
Upon review of the allegations in the Amended Complaint, it is clear that all of the conduct
undertaken by Martin and Lilly was in direct response to the subpoena served on Lilly by
Berlinsky’s ex-husband. Lilly had to respond to the subpoena. The subsequent, additional
document production was part of the subpoena response process. Defendants were simply
fulfilling Lilly’s duty to try to resolve a discovery dispute before seeking the court’s intervention
or forcing a motion to compel or contempt proceedings. Because Martin’s actions were in response
to a subpoena and because there is an absolute privilege for Martin’s subpoena response, the
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to the claim for defamation against Martin.
B.

Breach of Contract Claim against Lilly

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Berlinsky’s breach of contract claim against Lilly focusses on Lilly’s production of the
Release Agreement and subsequent production of the contradictory personnel file letter to
Berlinsky’s ex-husband. The breach of contract claim is based on paragraphs 11 and 15—what
Berlinsky calls the “confidentiality clauses”—of the Release Agreement.
Paragraph 11 of the Release Agreement states,
Lilly’s U.S. Human Resources component agrees to follow its standard practice in
responding to inquiries from a third party (other than a government entity) about
Dr. Berlinsky’s employment at Lilly regarding her dates of employment, last
position held, and, if requested by Dr. Berlinsky, her final annual base salary. Dr.
Berlinsky understands that she will need to call HR Direct at 1-877-676-4745 to
obtain the instructions to access the automated process for employment and wage
verifications. She also understands she will need to provide additional information
to the third party needing her information and to THE WORK NUMBER® in order
to authorize release by THE WORK NUMBER® to such third party. To any third
party contacting THE WORK NUMBER® for employment verification, THE
WORK NUMBER® will provide the verifier with Dr. Berlinsky’s dates of
employment, last position held, and, if appropriately authorized by Dr. Berlinsky,
her final annual base salary.
(Filing No. 19-1 at 4–5.)
Paragraph 15 of the Release Agreement provides,
Dr. Berlinsky agrees that the terms of this Agreement are confidential, although
any letter to be delivered in the form set forth in paragraph 6 of this Agreement is
not confidential. Dr. Berlinsky agrees that she has not disclosed and will not
disclose, directly or indirectly, the existence or contents of this Agreement,
including the fact of or the amount of payment, or any and all terms contained in
this Agreement, except to (a) her attorney, financial advisor, and/or
spouse/domestic partner (in each case, if any); (b) any person as may be necessary
to effect the terms of this Agreement; (c) any person as may be required by law or
legal process, but no more than is necessary for the limited purposes determined to
be required by the Court having jurisdiction or no more than is required by state or
federal taxing authorities; (d) a governmental agency referenced in paragraph 6 of
this Agreement, in connection with a potential or actual charge filed against Lilly
or (e) as may be necessary in a proceeding to enforce the terms of the Agreement.
Nothing in this Agreement shall prohibit or restrict Dr. Berlinsky from
participating, cooperating, or testifying in any action, investigation, or proceeding
with, or providing relevant and truthful information to, any court, governmental
agency or legislative body, including but not limited to the IRS, any self-regulatory
organization and/or pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; provided that, to the extent
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permitted by law, upon receipt of any subpoena, court order or other legal process
compelling the disclosure of any such information or documents, including this
Agreement, Dr. Berlinsky gives ten (10) days’ written notice to Lilly prior to
responding to such subpoena, court order or other legal process so as to permit Lilly
to protect its interests in confidentiality to the fullest extent possible. This notice
requirement does not, however, apply to Dr. Berlinsky’s non-waived rights related
to her filing of or cooperation in the investigation of any charge of the type
referenced in paragraph 6 of this Agreement. Dr. Berlinsky agrees that in any
communication she has other than with her attorney(s), financial advisor(s) and
spouse/domestic partner (if any) regarding her departure from Lilly, she shall state
only that she left Lilly employment by mutual agreement of the parties unless that
communication is in connection with her participation, cooperation, or testimony
in any action, investigation, or proceeding with, or her provision of relevant and
truthful information to any court, governmental agency or legislative body. These
promises of confidentiality are material terms of this Agreement.
(Filing No. 19-1 at 6 (emphasis in original).)
Lilly argues that paragraph 11 of the Release Agreement does not specify anything Lilly
could or could not do in response to a subpoena. It merely indicates that Lilly’s human resources
department would follow its standard practice in responding to third-party employment reference
inquiries it received about Berlinsky. Paragraph 11 contains no confidentiality obligations for
Lilly. Rather, it states what information Lilly will provide in response to any third-party inquiries
about Berlinsky’s employment at Lilly. The differences between a subpoena and an employment
reference inquiry are clear and significant. Lilly had a legal obligation to respond to a subpoena;
on the other hand, unlike a subpoena, an employment reference inquiry calls for a discretionary
response. A paragraph 11 third-party inquiry is not the same as a court order subpoena requiring
production of documents to which Lilly had a legal obligation to respond. Furthermore, paragraph
11 pertains to employment inquiries made to Lilly’s human resources department, not to subpoenas
directed to Lilly’s legal department. Thus, Lilly argues that it would be impossible to breach the
Release Agreement under paragraph 11 by simply responding to a subpoena.

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Lilly asserts that the plain language of paragraph 15 of the Release Agreement established
confidentiality obligations for Berlinsky only. It did not set confidentiality obligations for Lilly.
Paragraph 15 also provided some exceptions to the confidentiality of the Release Agreement,
listing circumstances where Berlinsky could disclose the contract. One such circumstance where
Berlinsky could disclose the Release Agreement was in the context of a legal proceeding. Lilly
explains that under the plain language of the contract, Lilly was not bound by the same
confidentiality limitations, but even if it were, the exception to confidentiality in a legal proceeding
would have protected Lilly. Paragraph 15 unequivocally allows compliance with legal obligations
to disclose information about the Release Agreement, and it does not prohibit a party from
responding to a subpoena. Therefore, Lilly argues, it would be impossible to breach the Release
Agreement under paragraph 15 by responding to a subpoena, and thus, dismissal is appropriate.
Berlinsky responds that Lilly should not have responded to the follow-up letter from her
ex-husband and should have forced him to initiate contempt proceedings against Lilly. She asserts
that “standard practices” should have been followed (noted in paragraph 11) when responding to
a third-party request for information. She also argues that the Release Agreement stated that it
contained the “entire understanding between the parties” and it could not be amended,
supplemented, or modified except by a written agreement, but Lilly modified the Release
Agreement when it produced the personnel file letter that contradicted the contract.
The Defendants reply that paragraph 11 and its “standard practices” language do not apply
because the conduct at issue was a response to a subpoena, not a response to a third-party
employment reference inquiry. Everything that Lilly and Martin did was a direct result of the
subpoena.

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Regarding Berlinsky’s argument about impermissibly modifying the Release Agreement
by producing an earlier-existing letter, the Defendants assert that the Release Agreement did not
require Lilly to block the production of documents that were responsive to a subpoena, and it did
not require Lilly to destroy or alter documents that existed before the Release Agreement was
created and signed.

No provision in the Release Agreement required the destruction or

modification of documents already in Berlinsky’s personnel file, and no provision prohibited their
production. Therefore, Lilly argues, it was not in breach of the Release Agreement when it retained
documents that existed at the time of the agreement even to the extent that such documents were
inconsistent with the way the parties agreed to portray the ending of Berlinsky’s employment with
Lilly in the Release Agreement. Thus, when Lilly received the subpoena to produce documents
and such documents were in existence and responsive, Lilly was not in breach when it complied
with its legal obligation to produce responsive documents.
The Defendants’ arguments regarding the breach of contract claim are well taken. A
reading of the plain language of the Release Agreement does not impose upon Lilly the duties that
Berlinsky now asserts. The terms of the parties’ contract provided obligations specific to Lilly
and other obligations specific to Berlinsky as well as some obligations applicable to both Lilly and
Berlinsky. If the Court were to follow Berlinsky’s logic regarding the mutuality of the terms of
the Release Agreement where all obligations apply to both parties, Berlinsky would be required to
pay Lilly a severance package, Lilly could not seek future employment with Lilly, Lilly would
receive Berlinsky’s vested retirement benefits, and Lilly could not solicit Lilly employees to work
for its competitors for a period of twelve months. Of course, this is not an accurate interpretation
of the Release Agreement. Some of the provisions of the Release Agreement applied to Berlinsky
alone; others applied to Lilly.

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Unfortunately for Berlinsky, the contract did not provide provisions that prohibited Lilly
from responding to the subpoena in question. No provisions required Lilly to force an opponent
to initiate contempt proceedings before cooperating in discovery. And nothing in the Release
Agreement required Lilly to destroy or modify the documents that existed in Berlinsky’s personnel
file. The conduct complained of is not actionable; Lilly simply fulfilled its legal obligation to
respond to a subpoena by producing responsive documents. A breach of contract claim cannot
arise under these circumstances. Thus, dismissal is appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Lilly and Martin’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint
(Filing No. 18) is GRANTED. Berlinsky’s Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
Final judgment will issue under separate order.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 9/19/2016
DISTRIBUTION:
Tae K. Sture
STURE LEGAL SERVICES LLC
[e-mail]

Craig M. Borowski
FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP
[e-mail]

Nancy Bloodgood
FOSTER LAW FIRM LLC
[e-mail]

Ellen E. Boshkoff
FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP
[e-mail]

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