VALENTI v. INDIANA SECRETARY OF STATE et al

Filing 50

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS: Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 32) is DENIED ***SEE ENTRY FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION***. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 7/28/2016. (DW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

BRIAN VALENTI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDIANA SECRETARY OF STATE in her
official capacity, et al.,
Defendants.

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Cause No. 1:15-cv-1304-WTL-TAB

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
This cause is before the Court on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 32). The
motion is fully briefed, and the Court, being duly advised, DENIES the Defendants’ motion for
the reasons and to the extent set forth below.
I.

RULE 12(b)(1) STANDARD

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), challenging the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the
Plaintiff’s claims. In ruling on such a motion, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations and draws reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor. Capitol Leasing Co. v.
F.D.I.C., 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993). The Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Apex Digital, Inc. v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] court must dismiss the case
without ever reaching the merits if it concludes that it has no jurisdiction.” Capitol Leasing Co.,
999 F.2d at 191.

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II.

BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff is a registered voter, living in Hartford City, Blackford County, Indiana. He
challenges Indiana Code § 35-42-4-14, which prohibits persons meeting the definition of
“serious sex offender” from knowingly or intentionally entering school property. The Plaintiff,
who meets the definition of “serious sex offender” under the statute, contends that his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights are violated by the law because he cannot vote on an election day
at the polling place closest to his home because it is a school property, the Blackford County
High School Auxiliary Gym (“High School”). The Plaintiff may, however, vote on an election
day at Blackford County’s other polling place, the Montpelier Civic Center, which is located
nine miles farther from the Plaintiff’s home than is the High School. He does not have a vehicle
that he can drive to Montpelier, and there are no buses or taxis. The Plaintiff may also cast an
absentee ballot prior to an election day, either by mail or in person, at the Blackford County
Circuit Court Clerk’s office.
III.

DISCUSSION

The Plaintiff maintains that the law “unjustifiably burdens [his] right to vote.” Am.
Compl. ¶ 63. Specifically, he argues that “the burden here is severe: by denying [him] the
opportunity to vote with his community on election day, the [D]efendants are denying him the
associational and expressive aspects that are at the heart of the constitutionally-protected [sic]
right to vote, and which each voting alternative lacks.” Dkt. No. 34 at 2. 1 The Defendants
contend that, because he has not alleged an injury, no case or controversy exists for the Court to

The Court does not interpret the Plaintiff’s argument to mean that he asserts that he has
been denied the right of freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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exercise jurisdiction and the Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his claims. The Plaintiff responds
that any burden imposed by the state on the right to vote constitutes an injury.
The existence of a case and controversy is a prerequisite for the exercise of federal
judicial power under Article III. Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. City of Carmel, Indiana, 361 F.3d 998,
1002 (7th Cir. 2004). The prerequisite is satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing. Sprint
Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273 (2008) (citing DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006)). This Court cannot assume a plaintiff has
demonstrated standing in order to proceed to the merits of the underlying claim. Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998). To establish standing, a plaintiff must
adequately show the following:
(1) an injury in fact (i.e., a ‘concrete and particularized’ invasion of a ‘legally
protected interest’); (2) causation (i.e., a ‘fairly ... trace[able]’ connection between
the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant); and (3)
redressability (i.e., it is ‘likely’ and not ‘merely speculative” that the plaintiff's
injury will be remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing suit).
Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P., 554 U.S. at 273-74 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–561 (calling
these the “irreducible constitutional minimum” requirements)).
The Defendants challenge the Plaintiff’s ability to meet the first element. “To establish
injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected
interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560). “A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist.” Spokeo, Inc., 136
S. Ct at 1548. “For an injury to be ‘particularlized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and
individual way.’” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1). The injury in fact showing “is not
meant to be a difficult one, particularly at the pleading stage. . . .” J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,

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N.A. v. McDonald, 760 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2014). As the Plaintiff notes, “[t]he [] issue at
this juncture is not whether [the Plaintiff]’s stated burden amounts to a constitutional violation . .
. but whether he has suffered any burden at all.” Dkt. No. 34 at 8.
The Plaintiff alleges that Indiana Code § 35-42-4-14 prohibits him from voting in person
on an election day at the polling place closest to him. While it remains to be seen whether this
restriction rises to the level of a constitutional violation, the Plaintiff has met the low threshold
for pleading injury required to demonstrate that he has standing. Accordingly, the Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 32) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED:

7/28/2016

_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Copies to all counsel of record via electronic notification.

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