WHITE v. POORE

Filing 15

ORDER granting 9 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and denying as moot 11 , 13 and 14 Motions. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 1/4/2016 (dist made) (CBU)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

DONYALL WHITE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VICKI POORE,
Defendant.

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No. 1:15-cv-01347-TWP-DKL

Entry Granting Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings and Directing Entry of Final Judgment
Plaintiff Donyall White, and Indiana prisoner, brought this action in Madison Circuit Court
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant Vicki Poore (“Poore”) violated his Eighth
Amendment rights when she ignored his serious medical needs. Poore removed the case to this
Court and has moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing that White’s claims are barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. For the following reasons, the motion for judgment on the pleadings [dkt
9] is granted and this action is dismissed.
I. Background
Defendant Poore is the Health Services Administrator at Correctional Industrial Facility
(“CIF”), a penal facility within the Indiana Department of Corrections. White, an inmate at CIF,
alleges in his complaint that several for months, he complained about pain in his feet, ankles, legs,
hips, and neck following a fall from his top bunk. He also alleges that he has been denied medical
care for his conditions and that he submitted a grievance appeal to Poore, but she ignored his
requests and failed to ensure that he received treatment.

White previously filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, based on the same facts asserted in this case. See White-Bey v. Cockrell et al.,
No. 1:13-cv-1932-LJM-DML. (“White-Bey”) 1 In White-Bey, White sued a number of defendants,
including Poore, alleging that he fell from his top bunk and injured his ankles, right knee, hip, and
back. He alleged in that case that he sent grievances to Poore, but that his injuries were not treated.
A district court judge screened the White-Bey complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
and dismissed several defendants and claims. See White-Bey, No. 1:13-cv-1932-LJM-DML at Dkt.
10. The judge dismissed Poore as a defendant because White did not allege that she personally
participated in denying him medical care or unlawfully denied him a bottom bunk. White-Bey at
Dkt. 10 p. 3. However, the claims against defendants Dr. Cockrell and Nurse Huse proceeded.
White-Bey at Dkt. 10 at p. 4. Ultimately, the district court judge granted summary judgment in
favor of those defendants finding that White failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See
White-Bey, Dkt. 38. The Court specifically dismissed White’s claims against Defendant Poore with
prejudice. See White-Bey, Dkt. 39.
II. Discussion
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move for judgment
on the pleadings “after the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” In
considering a motion under 12(c), the Court treats all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as
true and draws all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Harrison v. Deere & Co., 533 F. App’x 644,
647 (7th Cir. 2013).

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Although White used the last name White-Bey in the previous case and White in this case, the defendant points out
that he is the same person, as reflected by his Offender Number, 980181. White does not deny that he is the same
person.

Poore argues that she is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because the same claims
raised in this case against her were dismissed in White-Bey. Poore therefore concludes that this
action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and must be dismissed. The doctrine of res judicata
precludes parties from “relitigating issues that were or could have been raised” in a previous action
that was resolved on its merits. Highway J Citizens Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 456 F.3d 734,
741 (7th Cir. 2006). In order for res judicata to apply, three factors must be present: (1) identity
of parties or their privies; (2) identity of the cause of action; and (3) a final judgment on the merits
in the earlier action. Id. Res judicata prevents a party from filing a second lawsuit where a single
core of operative facts formed the basis of both lawsuits. Prochotsky v. Baker & McKenzie, 966
F.2d 333, 335 (7th Cir. 1992).
Here, all three requirements for the application of res judicata are present. First, there is a
common identity of parties in this case and in White-Bey. In both complaints, White is the plaintiff
and Vicki Poore is a defendant. Second, there is a common cause of action. White raises claims
under the same legal theory in this case as in White-Bey: deliberate indifferent to serious medical
needs. Further, a single core of operative facts formed the basis of both lawsuits. In both
complaints, Whites alleges that: (1) he fell from a top bunk and suffered various injuries; (2) he
did not receive adequate medical care following the fall; (3) he wrote grievances to Poore
requesting medical treatment; (4) Poore failed to ensure that he received medical treatment for his
injuries; and (5) Poore did not ensure that he received a bottom bunk. (Compare Doc. 1-1 with
White-Bey, Doc. 1). Finally, the third requirement is also satisfied because the Court dismissed the
claims against Poore in White-Bey for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See
White-Bey, Doc. 10, 39. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981)
(the dismissal for failure to state a claim is a judgment on the merits).

White does not dispute that the factors of res judicata are met here. Instead argues that the
motion for judgment on the pleadings is a “stall tactic” and that the defendant “already tried to use
res judicata as part of their exhaustion defense.” But exhaustion of administrative remedies and
res judicata are separate affirmative defenses and a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant
to Rule 12(c) is an appropriate means for addressing the affirmative defense of res judicata. See
Forty One News, Inc. v. Cnty. of Lake, 491 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Poore has
shown that she is entitled to judgment on the pleadings and this action must be dismissed.
III. Conclusion
Poore’s motion for judgment on the pleadings [dkt 9] is granted. White’s motion for
summary judgment [dkt 11] is denied as moot. The motion to hold in abeyance the motion for
summary judgment [dkt 13] and the motion to deny the defendant’s motion [dkt 14] are each
denied as moot.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED
1/4/2016
Date: _________________

Distribution:
All electronically registered counsel
DONYALL WHITE
980181
PENDLETON - CIF
CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIAL FACILITY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
5124 West Reformatory Road
PENDLETON, IN 46064