PRIME HEALTHCARE SERVICES- MONROE, LLC v. INDIANA UNIVERSITY HEALTH BLOOMINGTON, INC.

Filing 51

ORDER denying 37 Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Denise K. LaRue on 12/8/2016. (CBU)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
PRIME HEALTHCARE SERVICES—
MONROE, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDIANA UNIVERSITY HEALTH
BLOOMINGTON, INC.,
Defendant.

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No. 1:16-cv-0003-RLY-DKL

Entry on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint [doc. 37]
District Judge Richard L. Young granted the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant
Indiana University Health Bloomington, Inc. (“IU Health Bloomington”) and dismissed
Count I of the Complaint, which alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws, with
prejudice. [Doc. 35.] Concluding that the State of Indiana through its Emergency Medical
Services Commission (“EMS Commission”) actively supervises emergency medical
transportation services, Judge Young held that IU Health Bloomington was exempt from
federal antitrust liability under the state-action doctrine. [Entry Def’s Mot. Dismiss, doc.
35 at 17-20.]
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, seeking to allege
additional facts relating to the lack of active supervision by the EMS Commission.
Defendant opposes the motion, which has been referred to the undersigned for ruling by

Judge Young. Plaintiff also moved the Court to reconsider its dismissal of Count I; that
motion, however, is before Judge Young.
In seeking leave to amend, Plaintiff asserts that the proposed complaint alleges
facts it learned after the filing of the original Complaint. Plaintiff argues that it has
satisfied the liberal standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). That rule
provides that leave to amend shall be freely granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
However, Plaintiff ignores Rule 16(b)(4), which requires a showing of “good
cause” for modifying scheduling orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); see Arrigo v. Link, 836
F.3d 787, 797 (7th Cir. 2016) (“’To amend a pleading after the expiration of the trial court’s
scheduling order deadline to amend pleadings, the moving party must show ‘good
cause.’”) (quoting CMFG Life Ins. Co. v. RBS Secs., Inc., 799 F.3d 729, 749 (7th Cir. 2015)).
When a party seeks leave to amend after the deadline for amendments has expired, the
district court may “‘apply the heightened good-cause standard of Rule 16(b)(4) before
considering whether the requirements of Rule 15(a)(2) [are] satisfied.’” Bell v. Taylor, 827
F.3d 699, 706 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 734 (7th
Cir. 2014)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B) (requiring “good cause” and “excusable
neglect” to extend a deadline after it expires).
Under the Court’s scheduling order, all motions for leave to amend the pleadings
were due to be filed by June 6, 2016. [Case Management Plan approved as amended, doc. 20,
page 4, section III.D.] Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend was filed on October 28, 2016,
almost five months after the deadline had expired.

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Yet Plaintiff had received the information on which its “new” allegations are based
in March, April, and, at the latest, May 24, 2016. [See Decl. Ryan M. Hurley, doc. 45 at 1-2,
¶¶ 2, 5-6 (stating that Monroe County and Indiana Department of Homeland Security
provided documents in response to Monroe Hospital’s Access to Public Records Act
requests on March 8 and 31, 2016, and April 14, 2016); id. at 3, ¶ 9 (stating that IU Health
Bloomington’s NEMSIS ambulance and run report data was produced to Monroe
Hospital on May 24, 2016); see also Decl. Michael W. McBride, doc. 48 at 2, ¶ 5 (indicating
that IU Hospital produced discovery responses for ambulance runs and other documents
between May 23 and July 8, 2016).] Plaintiff did not seek leave to amend at that time or
shortly thereafter. Nor did Plaintiff seek an enlargement of the deadline for amendments
in order to allow it additional time to review the information provided to determine
whether an amendment was appropriate.
In addition, Defendant had filed its motion to dismiss on February 26, 2016;
Plaintiff filed its response on April 4, 2016; and a reply was filed April 26, 2016. The
motion was pending until September 30, 2016, but Plaintiff did not seek leave to amend
its complaint during the intervening five months. The pendency of the motion to dismiss
did not preclude Plaintiff from seeking leave to amend; nor did it justify waiting until
after a ruling. See, e.g., Arcelormittal Ind. Harbor LLC v. Amex Nooter, LLC, No. 2:15-CV195-PRC, 2016 WL 4884195, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 15, 2016).
Generally a plaintiff is given an opportunity to amend a complaint that has been
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw.
Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015), but Plaintiff has not shown good cause for allowing
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the amendment after the deadline for amendments has expired and several months after
Plaintiff had received the information on which its “new” allegations are based.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint [doc. 37] is denied.
SO ORDERED: 12/08/2016

Electronic Distribution to All Counsel of Record

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