CHARLES v. HOOD et al
Filing
5
Entry Granting Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis,Dismissing Complaint, and Directing Further Proceedings - The plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [dkt. 3] is granted to the extent that the plaintiff is assessed an initial partia l filing fee of Three Dollars and Sixty- Seven Cents ($3.67). He shall have through March 11, 2016, in which to pay this sum to the clerk of the district court. Mr. Charles shall have through March 11, 2016, in which to show cause why this act ion should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. If Mr. Charles fails to show cause why this action should not be dismissed or seek leave to amend his complaint, the action will be dismissed for the reasons set forth in this Entry. (See Order). Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 2/10/2016. (JLS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JAMES MICHAEL CHARLES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
J. HOOD,
et al.
Defendants.
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No. 1:16-cv-00280-TWP-DML
Entry Granting Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis,
Dismissing Complaint, and Directing Further Proceedings
I.
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
The plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [dkt. 3] is granted to the extent that
the plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($3.67).
He shall have through March 11, 2016, in which to pay this sum to the clerk of the district court.
II.
Screening
Plaintiff James Michael Charles, an inmate confined at the Pendleton Correctional Facility,
brings this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the plaintiff is a “prisoner” as defined
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), the complaint is subject to the screening requirement of 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b). Pursuant to this statute, “[a] complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim
if the allegations, taken as true, show that plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 127 S.
Ct. 910, 921 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. . . . A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (quotations omitted).
The complaint names four defendants: 1) J. Hood; 2) Duanne Alsip; 3) Lt. Shaver; and 4)
C. Meyers. Mr. Charles seeks compensatory damages of $40,000.00 and injunctive relief (in the
form of reassigning Mr. Alsip to a different position, lowering Lt. Shaver’s rank, reducing the
amount of money Mr. Charles is obligated to pay for the destruction of property, and releasing Mr.
Charles from prison or moving him to a state hospital).
Mr. Charles alleges that on September 24, 2015, Lt. Shaver and another officer escorted
him from one range to a cell in another range. When his cell was searched by maintenance they
did not fill out an inspection sheet. He further alleges that he did not have a fair hearing.
Specifically, he asserts that J. Hood lied in a witness statement he provided and C. Meyers lied in
a write up. Mr. Charles was ordered to pay money for property that he admittedly destroyed and
his November 2015 state pay was not given to him. Mr. Charles was moved to a different cell so
that he could no longer destroy property. He alleges that “other people are still breaking stuff and
they are not fixing a room for them.” Complaint, dkt. 2, pg. 4. Mr. Charles states that “Central
Office has this write-up. Look it over please and thank you. Case # IRT 15-09-0038.” Complaint,
dkt. 2, p. 4.
Although it is difficult to discern his claims, it appears that Mr. Charles is challenging
events surrounding a disciplinary proceeding. If Mr. Charles suffered a grievous loss in a
disciplinary proceeding, his claims that any defendant participated in writing or enforcing a false
conduct report in a disciplinary proceeding are barred unless and until they are overturned. “Heck
[v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)], bars any suit for damages premised on a violation of civil
rights if the basis for the suit is inconsistent with or would undermine the constitutionality of a
conviction or sentence.” Wiley v. City of Chicago, 361 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2004). This same
rule applies to “convictions” incurred in prison disciplinary proceedings. See Edwards v. Balisok,
520 U.S. 641 (1997) (a claim for damages that would call into question the validity of a prison
disciplinary finding is barred); Walker v. Taylorville Correctional Ctr., 129 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir.
1997); Lusz v. Scott, 126 F.3d 1018, 1021 (7th Cir. 1997). Mr. Charles has not alleged that his
disciplinary conviction was overturned or otherwise invalidated and so any due process claims
against the defendants based on the conviction must be dismissed without prejudice as
premature.
If Mr. Charles was not sanctioned with a grievous loss (a loss of earned credit time or
demotion in credit class), in order to state a due process claim, he must allege the existence of a
protected liberty interest. Mr. Charles alleges that he was sanctioned with a restitution order and
moved to a different cell. These types of sanction do not create an “atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Therefore, any due process claims against the defendants based on the
disciplinary conviction are dismissed without prejudice on this basis as well.
As part of his claim for relief, Mr. Charles seeks release from prison. He cannot obtain that
relief through a civil rights action. A civil rights action can be the appropriate vehicle to seek
monetary damages, but a writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to challenge the fact or
duration of confinement and the Court is not at liberty to convert any portion of an action to a
claim for habeas corpus relief. Moore v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22 (7th Cir. 1997); Copus v. City of
Edgerton, 96 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, to the extent that Mr. Charles seeks release
from prison, such a claim must be dismissed without prejudice.
“[A] plaintiff can plead himself out of court by alleging facts that show there is no viable
claim.” Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 699 (7th Cir. 2008). For the above reasons, the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as a matter of law and is therefore
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A.
IV. Further Proceedings
Mr. Charles shall have through March 11, 2016, in which to show cause why this action
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Luevano v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th Cir. 2013) (plaintiffs should be given at least an
opportunity to amend or to respond to an order to show cause before a case is “tossed out of court
without giving the applicant any timely notice or opportunity to be heard to clarify, contest, or
simply request leave to amend.”).
If Mr. Charles fails to show cause why this action should not be dismissed or seek leave to
amend his complaint, the action will be dismissed for the reasons set forth in this Entry.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 2/10/2016
Distribution:
JAMES MICHAEL CHARLES
179240
PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
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