RONDEAU v. ZATECKY

Filing 14

ENTRY Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability: His petition for a writ of habeas corpus is therefore denied without a decision being made as to the merits of his claims. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. The court therefore denies a certificate of appealability ***SEE ENTRY FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION***. Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 8/2/2016. (DW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER RONDEAU,
Petitioner,
v.
DUSHAN ZATECKY,
Respondent.

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No: 1:16-cv-762-WTL-DKL

Entry Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability
For the reasons explained in this Entry, the petition of Christopher Rondeau for a writ of
habeas corpus must be denied. In addition, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability should
not issue.
I. Background
The pleadings and expanded record show the following: Rondeau is serving the executed
portion of his 55-year sentence imposed following his 2010 conviction in an Indiana state court of
the murder of Adolph Stegbauer, his great-uncle. Rondeau and Stegbauer lived with Rondeau’s
grandmother, Franziska Stegbauer. During the evening of April 9, 2009, a sword fight erupted
between Adolph Stegbauer and Rondeau. During the fight, Stegbauer was stabbed at least ten
times. Also during the fight, Franziska was stabbed in her left armpit while trying to intervene in
the combat.

Rondeau called 911 at 12:58 a.m. Police arrived. Paramedics arrived. Franziska Stegbauer
arrived at the hospital at 2:03 a.m. and was pronounced dead at 2:04 a.m. Adolph was hospitalized
and died on April 15, 2009. The cause of death of Adolph Stegbauer was sharp force injury to the
abdomen that caused bacteria in his stomach to be released into his peritoneal and abdominal
cavities and led to septic shock. Rondeau was treated at the hospital for a wound inflicted by
Adolph Stegbauer and while at the hospital gave a voluntary statement to police.
Rondeau was charged with the murder of Adolph Stegbauer and with reckless homicide
relating to the death of Franziska Stegbauer. Rejecting his claim of self-defense, the jury found
Rondeau guilty of the murder of Adolph Stegbauer. Rondeau was found not guilty of reckless
homicide in the death of Franziska Stegbauer.
Rondeau’s conviction was affirmed in Rondeau v. State, 2011 WL 977075 (Ind.Ct.App.
March 21, 2011)(Rondeau I). The Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer. The denial of Rondeau’s
petition for post-conviction relief was affirmed in Rondeau v. State, 48 N.E.3d 907 (Ind.Ct.App.
2016) (Rondeau II). The Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer.
II. Applicable Law
“Federal habeas corpus happens to be one of the most complex areas of American law.”
Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2007). It is therefore no surprise that “when examining
a habeas corpus petition, the first duty of a district court . . . is to examine the procedural status of
the cause of action." United States ex rel. Simmons v. Gramley, 915 F.2d 1128, 1132 (7th Cir.
1990). That examination should entail two inquiries: "whether the petitioner exhausted all
available state remedies and whether the petitioner raised all his claims during the course of the
state proceedings." Henderson v. Thieret, 859 F.2d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1648 (1989). "If the answer to either . . . inquir[y] is `no,' the petition is barred either for

failure to exhaust state remedies or for procedural default." Id. The inquiry in this case concerns
procedural default.
“It is the rule in this country that assertions of error in criminal proceedings must first be
raised in state court in order to form the basis for relief in habeas. Claims not so raised are
considered defaulted.” Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977)). “[I]t would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal
district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct
a constitutional violation[.]” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). “[F]ederal courts
will not review a habeas petition unless the prisoner has fairly presented his claims ‘throughout at
least one complete round of state-court review, whether on direct appeal of his conviction or in
post-conviction proceedings.’” Johnson v. Foster, 786 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 2015)(quoting
Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 268 (7th Cir. 2014), and citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)). “[T]he
burden is on the petitioner to raise his federal claim in the state court at a time when state procedural
law permits its consideration on the merits. . . .” Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 451 n.3 (2005). Thus,
“[a] federal claim that was not raised in the state courts is procedurally barred and must be
dismissed.” Henderson v. Cohn, 919 F.2d 1270, 1272 (7th Cir. 1990)(citing United States ex rel.
Simmons v. Gramley, 915 F.2d 1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 1990)).
Insofar as pertinent here, procedural default “occurs when a claim could have been but was
not presented to the state court and cannot, at the time that the federal court reviews the habeas
petition, be presented to the state court.” Resnover v. Pearson, 965 F.2d 1453, 1458 (7th Cir. 1992);
see also Hogan v. McBride, 74 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Forfeiture under § 2254 is a
question of a state's internal law: failure to present a claim at the time, and in the way, required by
the state is an independent state ground of decision, barring review in federal court.”).

“A federal court may excuse a procedural default if the habeas petitioner establishes that
(1) there was good cause for the default and consequent prejudice, or (2) a fundamental miscarriage
of justice would result if the defaulted claim is not heard.” Johnson v. Foster, 786 F.3d 501, 504
(7th Cir. 2015)(internal citations omitted). “Under this cause-and-prejudice test, a cause is defined
as, ‘an objective factor, external to the defense, that impeded the defendant's efforts to raise the
claim in an earlier proceeding.’ Prejudice means, ‘an error which so infected the entire trial that
the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 382 (7th Cir. 2010)
(internal citation omitted). The second exception, known as the fundamental miscarriage of justice
exception, requires a petitioner to show that he is actually innocent. Actual innocence means
factual innocence, not legal insufficiency. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998).
III. Discussion
Rondeau asserts the following claims in his petition for writ of habeas corpus:
(1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate or discuss defenses with
Rondeau;
(2) trial counsel was ineffective for not sufficiently preparing for trial;
(3) trial counsel failed to object to Detective Patterson’s testimony regarding Rondeau’s
injuries;
(4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to tender an instruction regarding the defense
of a third person;
(5) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise ineffective assistance of
trial counsel on direct appeal for failing to tender instructions;
(6) evidence was insufficient to support his conviction;
(7) trial court failed to instruct the jury that it was the judge of the law and the facts;
(8) denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial; and
(9) the State violated his rights when it seized a computer tower during a search when the
search warrant did not specify a computer tower could be seized.

The following table identifies the claims which Rondeau presented at various points in the
Indiana state courts:
Rondeau I

Rondeau I

Rondeau II

Petition to Transfer
Denial of motion for
continuance

Denial of motion
for continuance

Rondeau II
Petition to Transfer

Error in postconviction process

Admission of
Rondeau’s statement
to police

Denial of right to
speedy trial

Sufficiency of the
Evidence

Error in postconviction process

Ineffective
assistance of
counsel at trial
Ineffective
assistance of
counsel in
Rondeau I

It is therefore evident, as is argued by the respondent, that Rondeau failed to present any of his
habeas claims to the Indiana Supreme Court. He failed to do so in Rondeau I. He failed to do so in
Rondeau II. This failure constitutes procedural default. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
848 (1999)(“a prisoner who fails to present his claims in a petition for discretionary review to a
state court of last resort” has not properly exhausted the claims for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1); the habeas petitioner’s failure to present her “claims to the Illinois Supreme Court in
a timely fashion has resulted in a procedural default of those claims”); Hough v. Anderson, 272
F.3d 878, 892-93 (7th Cir. 2001)(petitioner's failure to present issue to Indiana Supreme Court
constituted procedural default).

Rondeau concedes as much in his reply to the respondent’s return to order to show cause.
As to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, however, he argues that he has established cause
for and prejudice from his procedural default. As already noted, to establish “cause” a petitioner
must establish that “some objective factor external to the defense” impeded his ability to raise the
claim in state court. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). But the Indiana Court of Appeals
fully addressed the circumstances whereby the ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not
addressed by the post-conviction court to the extent sought by Rondeau.
Rondeau's requested subpoenas, though framed as relevant to his claim that
trial counsel was ineffective, were either not specific enough to establish the
relevance of the proposed witness's testimony to the question of ineffectiveness, or
were relevant only to matters available at trial or direct appeal. . . . Because none
of these matters properly pertained to Rondeau's claimed bases for post-conviction
relief, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the issuance of
Rondeau's requested subpoenas.
Rondeau II, 48 N.E.3d at 915-16. It is undisputed, moreover, that Rondeau did not include his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Rondeau II. His decision to proceed in that fashion
waived his right to claim error in a federal habeas proceeding. See Kirk v. State, 632 N.E.2d 776
(Ind.Ct.App. 1994) ("In seeking post-conviction relief, a petitioner must assert all available
grounds for relief in his original post-conviction petition. P.C.R. 1(8)"). Under Indiana procedural
rules, all grounds for post-conviction relief which were available at the time of trial, direct appeal,
or prior petition but were not raised in those proceedings are deemed waived. See Lane v. Richards,
957 F.2d 363, 366 (7th Cir.) (issues were not presented on direct appeal and relief would be barred
by procedural default), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 127 (1992).
Nor can Rondeau argue that he is entitled to habeas relief based on the state post-conviction
proceedings. Quince v. Crosby, 360 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004)(“[W]hile habeas relief is
available to address defects in a criminal defendant’s conviction and sentence, an alleged defect in

a collateral proceeding does not state a basis for habeas relief.”); see also Montgomery v. Meloy,
90 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir.)("[u]nless state collateral review violates some independent
constitutional right, such as the Equal Protection Clause, . . . errors in state collateral review cannot
form the basis for federal habeas corpus relief"), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 907 (1996); Williams v.
State, 640 F.2d 140, 143-44 (8th Cir.) ("Infirmities in the state's post-conviction remedy procedure
cannot serve as a basis for setting aside a valid original conviction. . . . Errors or defects in the state
post-conviction proceeding do not, ipso facto, render a prisoner's detention unlawful or raise
constitutional questions cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 990
(1981). This is the gist of the argument in Rondeau’s reply to the return to order to show cause.
Each of Rondeau’s habeas claims, therefore, is barred from consideration here because of
Rondeau’s unexcused procedural default consisting of his failure to fully and fairly present them
the Indiana Supreme Court. That failure deprived the Indiana state courts of the opportunity to
examine and evaluate the claims he has asserted in his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
IV. Conclusion
“[H]abeas corpus has its own peculiar set of hurdles a petitioner must clear before his
claim is properly presented to the district court.” Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 14 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). In the present case, Rondeau has
encountered the hurdle produced by the doctrine of procedural default. He has not shown the
existence of circumstances permitting him to overcome this hurdle and hence is not entitled to the
relief he seeks. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus is therefore denied without a decision being
made as to the merits of his claims. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
V. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing

' 2254 Proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. ' 2253(c), the court finds that Rondeau has failed to show that

reasonable jurists would find it Adebatable whether [this court] was correct in its procedural ruling.@
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The court therefore denies a certificate of
appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 8/2/16

_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
Electronically Registered Counsel
CHRISTOPHER RONDEAU
198058
PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
4490 West Reformatory Road
PENDLETON, IN 46064