HILL v. BAYSIDE WOODS, HOA INC. et al

Filing 53

ORDER - The Court grants Bayside Woods' and EMP's motions regarding Ms. Hill's FDCPA claims against them pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. [Filing No. 22 ; Filing No. 26 .] Thus, Ms. Hill's FDCPA claims against Bayside Woods and EMP are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Because FDCPA claims against two other Defendants are still pending in this action, final judgment will not issue at this time. (See Order.) Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 10/4/2016. Copy sent to Plaintiff via US Mail. (GSO)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
KRISTIN S. HILL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BAYSIDE WOODS, HOA INC.,
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION SERVICES
OF INDIANA,
PAYLEASE WEB,
EADS, MURRAY AND PUGH PC,
Defendants.

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No. 1:16-cv-00916-JMS-DKL

ORDER
Presently pending before the Court are Defendant Bayside Woods, HOA Inc.’s (“Bayside”)
Motion to Dismiss, [Filing No. 22], and Defendant Eads, Murray and Pugh, PC’s (“EMP”) Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings, [Filing No. 26], on pro se Plaintiff Kristin S. Hill’s Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims, [Filing No. 4]. Ms. Hill opposes both motions.
[Filing No. 34; Filing No. 45.] For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the pending motions.
[Filing No. 22; Filing No. 26.]
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2)). “Specific facts are not necessary, the statement need only ‘give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson,
551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) “is governed by the same
standards as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Adams v. City
of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2014). A motion to dismiss asks whether the
complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pled facts as
true and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Active Disposal, Inc. v. City
of Darien, 635 F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court will not accept legal conclusions or
conclusory allegations as sufficient to state a claim for relief. See McCauley v. City of Chicago,
671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011). Factual allegations must plausibly state an entitlement to relief
“to a degree that rises above the speculative level.” Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir.
2012). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

When a plaintiff “pleads [herself]

out of court by making allegations sufficient to defeat the suit,” dismissal under Rule 12 is
appropriate. Vincent v. City Colleges of Chicago, 485 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 2007).
II.
RELEVANT B ACKGROUND
The following background is set forth pursuant to the applicable standards, accepting all
well-pled factual allegations against Bayside Woods and EMP from Ms. Hill’s Amended
Complaint as true. Ms. Hill did not attached any exhibits to her Complaint or Amended Complaint.
[Filing No. 1; Filing No. 4.] Thus, all representations regarding the contents of the Bayside Woods
homeowners’ covenants and Ms. Hill’s correspondence with various individuals are based
exclusively on Ms. Hill’s allegations and accepted as true for these motions.

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In March 2012, Robert Ritter purchased a Bayside Woods condominium in Carmel. [Filing
No. 4 at 2.] Prior to closing, Mr. Ritter was provided a copy of the Declaration of the Covenants,
Conditions & Restrictions at Bayside Woods (the “Covenants”). [Filing No. 4 at 2.] Mr. Ritter’s
daughter—Ms. Hill—moved her belongings into the condominium shortly thereafter, but she did
not live in it until late May 2012. [Filing No. 4 at 2.] On April 23, 2012, Bayside Woods “sent
Ritter a letter stating that their BBQ grill had damaged the siding of the building around the patio
area and therefor it was their responsibility to have it repaired.” [Filing No. 4 at 2.] Ms. Hill
contacted Meredith Reese, the community manager, “to inform her that the BBQ grill on the patio
was not theirs; it was left by the prior owner . . . .” [Filing No. 4 at 2.] Ms. Reese asked Ms. Hill
to put her dispute in writing, and she did. [Filing No. 4 at 2-3.] Specifically, Ms. Hill stated that
the BBQ grill belonged to the previous owner, she did not use it, and no one lived in the
condominium until after Bayside Woods sent the first letter about it. [Filing No. 4 at 3.] Ms. Hill
concludes that “[t]herefore, we are not responsible for the upkeep of the outside of the building
and we did not cause the damage.” [Filing No. 4 at 3.]
On September 8, 2012, Ms. Hill found that the damaged siding had been repaired. [Filing
No. 4 at 3.] She contacted Ms. Reese, who responded, “Sorry for the delay in responding. The
Board determined the repair would still be your responsibility. We will be sending you a letter
shortly with the information; if you are in disagreement you are certainly welcome to petition
again.” [Filing No. 4 at 3.] In a subsequent communication, Ms. Reese told Ms. Hill that the
Board vote had been unanimous and that “[t]he damage is the owner’s responsibility.” [Filing No.
4 at 3.]
On October 24, 2012, Bayside Woods “sent Ritter an invoice for $355.48” and a letter
stating:
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Enclosed is Invoice 94967 for a CASI maintenance service call to replace the siding
damaged by the heat of a BBQ grill. Since the issue was deemed an “owner
responsibility” the Association is not responsible for payment of this service. The
total amount due is $355.48. This charge [h]as been applied to your homeowner
account.
[Filing No. 4 at 4.] Ms. Hill petitioned, citing the Covenants, which provide as follows:
[T]he Association shall provide exterior maintenance upon each lot which is subject
to assessment hereunder, as follows: . . . exterior building surfaces and other
exterior improvements. . . . In the event that the need for maintenance or repair is
caused through the willful or negligent act of the owner, his family, guests, or
invitees, the cost of such maintenance or repairs shall be added to and become a
part of the assessment of which such Lot is subject.
[Filing No. 4 at 4.] Ms. Hill’s letter to Bayside Woods states that it “has not provided any
reasonable basis for its conclusion that we are responsible for the costs of repairing the damage
regardless of whether we caused the damage or even that the damage was caused by a grill. If the
Association believes that the prior owners did cause the damage the Association had the
opportunity to notify them of the damage and repair it at their expense if they didn’t challenge that
. . . .” [Filing No. 4 at 4.] On November 27, 2012, Ms. Hill sent a notarized affidavit to Ms. Reese
stating that “at no time had I, the owner, a family member, guest or invitee even used the grill”
before Bayside Woods sent the April 2012 letter. [Filing No. 4 at 5.]
Bayside Woods responded, standing by its initial decision and stating “this decision is final
and the charges stand as originally submitted. Please make check payable to Bayside Woods HOA
. . . no later than December 14, 2012.” [Filing No. 4 at 5.] After that time, Bayside Woods sent
“numerous letters reminding her and Ritter that the Account History had a past due balance.”
[Filing No. 4 at 5.]
Sometime after March 11, 2016, Ms. Hill received or took possession of a letter from
EMP—Bayside Woods’ attorney—that it “sent Ritter notifying him of their intent to file a lawsuit

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unless he either pays the total amount specified in the letter or makes payment arrangements
satisfactory to their client which would include the disputed charge for the repair of the damaged
siding and late fees for nonpayment of it.” [Filing No. 4 at 15.] Within thirty days, Ms. Hill sent
EMP a letter disputing various portions of the Account History Report included with EMP’s letter,
including the “October 24, 2012 assessment in the amount of $355.06 special assessment” and the
“late fees assessed for the non-payment” of the special assessment. [Filing No. 4 at 16.]
EMP responded that “because Hill is not the owner of the Condo and her brother has power
of attorney over her father she has been informed by the law firm of the attorneys that the dispute
notice and request for verification (or proof of debt) she sent the attorneys will not be considered
and therefore she will not be receiving proof of the debt as requested.” [Filing No. 4 at 16.] The
person Ms. Hill spoke with at EMP “acknowledged that she had been living at the condo and
responding to the issues until this point but because her brother—not she—has power of attorney
they will be communicating with him only.” [Filing No. 4 at 16.] Ms. Hill acknowledges that on
April 12, 2016, EMP received the full payment for the disputed amount of debt from Mr. Ritter’s
power of attorney. [Filing No. 45 at 6.]
On April 22, 2016, Ms. Hill filed a Complaint in this Court, alleging FDCPA claims against
various parties. 1 [Filing No. 1.] Bayside and EMP have now filed motions asking that Ms. Hill’s
claims against them be dismissed. [Filing No. 22; Filing No. 26.] Those motions are now fully
briefed and ready for the Court’s review.

Ms. Hill’s Amended Complaint also asserts FDCPA claims against Defendants Community
Association Services of Indiana (“CASI”) and Paylease Web (“Paylease”). [Filing No. 4.] CASI
is now represented by counsel and will respond to Ms. Hill’s complaint by October 16, 2016.
[Filing No. 51.] The Court designated the Clerk to issue process to Paylease, and a Return of
Service was filed on September 27, 2016. [Filing No. 52.] The Court will address Ms. Hill’s
claims against CASI and Paylease at the appropriate time.
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III.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Hill alleges that Bayside Woods and EMP violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) of the
FDCPA by misrepresenting the debt at issue. [Filing No. 4 at 17-21.] She challenges the merits
of Bayside Woods’ decision regarding the debt, contending that “[a]bsolutely no basis was given
to support this decision.” [Filing No. 4 at 17-18.] She contends that Bayside Woods utilized
misleading and deceptive techniques by attempting to collect a past due balance that she never
agreed was valid, without providing a basis for doing so, and without pursuing a lawsuit regarding
its allegation that the Covenants were breached. [Filing No. 4 at 18-19.] Ms. Hill argues that EMP
threatened to sue if the total amount specified was not paid, which was improper because “[t]here
has been no proof of debt established.” [Filing No. 4 at 20.] She contends that the Covenants do
not support Bayside Woods’ allegedly “random decision that they can assess the cost to Ritter
regardless of whether Ritter or his friends, family, etc. caused the damage because they failed to
assess it to the owners of record when the damage occurred.” [Filing No. 4 at 21.]
In moving to dismiss her FDCPA claim against it, Bayside Woods argues that Ms. Hill
lacks standing to pursue such a claim. [Filing No. 23 at 1.] It emphasizes that it was Mr. Ritter’s
obligation to satisfy the debt at issue, not Ms. Hill’s, and that the FDCPA does not provide relief
for parties that are not obligated to pay the amount that is due. [Filing No. 23 at 10.] Bayside
Woods emphasizes that all fees and charges were billed to Mr. Ritter’s account and that although
Ms. Hill made some payments on Mr. Ritter’s behalf, she had no obligation to do so and her brother
actually has power of attorney over Mr. Ritter. [Filing No. 23 at 7-10.] Because Mr. Ritter is not
a party to this action and Bayside Woods argues that Ms. Hill cannot pursue an FDCPA claim on
his behalf, it asks the Court to dismiss Ms. Hill’s FDCPA claim against it. [Filing No. 23 at 6-10.]

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EMP makes similar arguments to Bayside Woods in its motion. [Filing No. 26; Filing No.
27.] It emphasizes that it had no involvement with the disputed debt until March 2016, “when it
was retained to collect the disputed assessments from Robert Ritter.” [Filing No. 27 at 1.] EMP
points out that its notice was not directed to Ms. Hill, that she was not the owner of the property at
issue, and that her brother had power of attorney for Mr. Ritter. 2 [Filing No. 27 at 1-2.]
In response to the pending motions, Ms. Hill argues that she has standing to pursue FDCPA
claims against Bayside Woods and EMP. [Filing No. 34; Filing No. 45.] She contends that
because Bayside Woods invoked the provision of the Covenants that held Mr. Ritter responsible
for the damage based on his family or guests causing the damage, she has standing to challenge
their attempts to collect the debt at issue. [Filing No. 34 at 6-7.] She claims that the “decision to
assess the charges to Ritter’s account was baseless and nothing more than its opinion as to who it
thought should pay the costs to repair the damaged siding and not who was obligated to pay the
costs to repair it under the Declaration. [Bayside Woods] was obviously not qualified to make that
legal decision.” [Filing No. 45 at 14 (original emphasis).] Ms. Hill also claims that Mr. Ritter
“was not injured by the attempted collections” and that “[o]nly she was” because she was making
certain payments and allegedly incurred banking fees as a result.3 [Filing No. 34 at 8-9.] Ms. Hill
relies on Seventh Circuit precedent holding that people other than those owing the debt at issue

EMP also contends that to the extent Ms. Hill’s FDCPA claim is based on EMP’s refusal to
validate the debt at issue to Ms. Hill, only a consumer can request verification or validation of a
debt and Ms. Hill was neither the consumer nor Mr. Ritter’s power of attorney. [Filing No. 27 at
4-5 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692g).] In response, Ms. Hill emphasizes that she is pursuing a claim
against EMP because it “misrepresented the debt under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2).” [Filing No. 45 at
12 (original emphasis).] Because Ms. Hill is not pursuing an FDCPA claim against EMP pursuant
to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, the Court will not address that provision further.
2

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To the extent that Ms. Hill makes allegations against CASI and Paylease regarding the online
web payments and banking fees she alleges she incurred as a result, those allegations are not at
issue in the pending motions filed by Bayside Woods and EMP and will not be addressed.
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may pursue FDCPA claims. [Filing No. 34 at 10 (relying on Todd v. Collecto, Inc., 731 F.3d 734
(7th Cir. 2013)).] She contends that she had implied authority to act on Mr. Ritter’s behalf and
that because she was “necessarily involved in resolving the issue because she was the only person
who lived in the condo,” she has standing to pursue her FDCPA claims. [Filing No. 34 at 10-12.]
In reply, Bayside Woods maintains that Ms. Hill does not have standing to pursue an
FDCPA claim against it because, among other things, Ms. Hill is not a “consumer” as defined by
the FDCPA. 4 [Filing No. 46 at 2-3.] It emphasizes that “[s]he has failed to assert her own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest any claim for relief on that of a third-party, i.e., Mr. Ritter.”
[Filing No. 46 at 3 (original emphasis).] To the extent Ms. Hill relies on her familial relationship
with Mr. Ritter to support her ability and implied authority to interact with Bayside Woods on the
debt at issue, Bayside Woods emphasizes that Ms. Hill’s FDCPA claim is brought on her own
behalf. [Filing No. 46 at 4.] In its reply, EMP emphasizes the limited scope of its involvement
with collecting the debt at issue, that there is no dispute that its notice was directed at Mr. Ritter,
and that there is no dispute that the debt at issue was owed by Mr. Ritter. [Filing No. 47 at 2-3.]
One purpose of the FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt
collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). The provision of the FDCPA on which Ms. Hill relies for her
claims against Bayside Woods and EMP—15 U.S.C. § 1692e—“forbids a debt collector to ‘use

Bayside Woods argues for the first time on reply that Ms. Hill’s claim fails because Bayside
Woods is allegedly not a “debt collector” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). [Filing No. 46 at 3.] The
Court will not address this argument because Bayside Woods did not present it in its opening brief.
See Darif v. Holder, 739 F.3d 329, 336-37 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time
in a reply brief are waived.”). Bayside Woods also waived this argument by not adequately
developing it, given that it cites nothing other than the statute defining “debt collector” and does
not quote or apply the language of that statute to Ms. Hill’s allegations. See Long-Gang Lin v.
Holder, 630 F.3d 536, 543 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The failure to adequately develop and support these
arguments results in waiver.”).
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any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of
any debt.’” Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 1692e). This includes the false representation of “the character, amount, or legal status
of any debt” or “any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any
debt collector for the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2). The term “debt” means “any
obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which
the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to
judgment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).
Construing the same FDCPA provision on which Ms. Hill relies for her claims against
Bayside Woods and EMP, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that “when read in light
of the Act’s purpose and numerous provisions, the prohibitions are clearly limited to
communications directed to the consumer.” O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 635
F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (“The Act is meant ‘to protect consumers
against debt collection abuses.’”)). The term “consumer” means “any natural person obligated or
allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). The Seventh Circuit emphasized that
because the purpose of the FDCPA is to protect consumers, “[n]aturally we have used that
understanding of the Act to interpret § 1692e, holding that to be actionable a misleading statement
must have the ability to influence a consumer’s decision.” O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 942 (original
emphasis). The Seventh Circuit concluded that § 1692e “does not extend its protection beyond
the consumer; there is no reference to anyone else in the process who may have a consequential,
let alone extremely consequential role in the debt-collection process.” Id. at 943. “Thus, the Act
is limited to protecting consumers and those who have a special relationship with the consumer—
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such that the Act is still protecting the consumer—from statements that would mislead these
consumers. The Act is not similarly interested in protecting third parties.” Id.
Based on the applicable language in O’Rourke, the Court must conclude that Ms. Hill’s
FDCPA claim against Bayside Woods and EMP based on 15 U.S.C. § 1692e fails as a matter of
law because there is no dispute that Ms. Hill was not the “consumer” for purposes of the debt at
issue. Ms. Hill’s own allegations confirm that Mr. Ritter was the owner of the condominium, that
the communications from Bayside Woods and EMP were directed at him, and that the debt at issue
was his obligation. Thus, Mr. Ritter was the “consumer” for purposes of the portion of the FDCPA
at issue. To the extent that Ms. Hill interacted with Bayside Woods or EMP about the debt, it is
beyond dispute that she did so voluntarily. Although 15 U.S.C. § 1692e may protect “those who
have a special relationship with the consumer,” O’Rourke, 635 F.3d at 943, Ms. Hill’s complaint
confirms that her brother was Mr. Ritter’s power of attorney, [Filing No. 4 at 16]. Thus, to the
extent anyone other than Mr. Ritter had the type of special relationship needed to bring an FDCPA
claim pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e on Mr. Ritter’s behalf, under these circumstances it would be
Mr. Ritter’s power of attorney, not Ms. Hill.5
The Court acknowledges that after O’Rourke, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the
“broad language” of that decision, “if taken out of context, could be read to say that only a
‘consumer’ (i.e., a debtor or alleged debtor) can have a claim for relief” under the FDCPA. Todd,

Ms. Hill argues that she had implied authority to act on Mr. Ritter’s behalf and cites “recently
discovered evidence” that Mr. Ritter designated her to act on his behalf at the annual Bayside
Woods homeowners meeting. [Filing No. 45 at 20.] As an initial matter, the Court does not
consider evidence outside the pleadings when ruling on the types of motions at issue. See Fed. R.
Civ. Pro. 12(d). Moreover, although Ms. Hill alleges that EMP did not know that her brother was
Mr. Ritter’s power of attorney until 2016, she has not alleged that her brother was not Mr. Ritter’s
power of attorney during the entire relevant time period.
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731 F.3d at 736-37. The Seventh Circuit clarified that “each provision of the FDCPA must be
analyzed individually to determine who falls within the scope of its protection and thus to decide
with respect to whom the provision can be violated.” Id. at 738. It emphasized that “[i]n O’Rourke,
this court addressed only § 1692e . . . [and t]he broad language in the opinion must be understood
in that context.” Id. at 738. The Seventh Circuit did not overrule O’Rourke, however, and the
underlying premise stands with regard to claims brought pursuant to § 1692e. See Janetos v.
Fulton Friedman & Gullace, LLP, 825 F.3d 317, 324 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that “[p]ortions of §
1692e are drafted in broad terms” and that “[f]or such claims, [the Court] must assess allegedly
false or misleading statements to determine whether they could have any practical impact on a
consumer’s rights or decision-making process”) (emphasis added). Because Ms. Hill is pursuing
her FDCPA claims against Bayside Woods and EMP pursuant to the same provision of the FDCPA
at issue in O’Rourke, the Court must conclude as a matter of law that these claims fail because she
is not the “consumer” of the debt at issue.
Although the Court has concluded that Ms. Hill’s FDCPA claims against Bayside Woods
and EMP fail as a matter of law for the reasons stated herein, it will also address two flawed
premises underlying her allegations. First, throughout her Amended Complaint and briefs, Ms.
Hill primarily challenges the merits of the underlying debt Bayside Woods and EMP sought to
collect. The FDCPA “regulates the practices used to collect a debt . . . irrespective of whether a
valid debt actually exists.” Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 895-96 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The FDCPA
regulates the practices used to collect a debt . . . [and] is designed to protect consumers from the
unscrupulous antics of debt collectors, irrespective of whether a valid debt actually exists.”)
(citations omitted). In other words, at issue in this lawsuit is the manner in which Bayside Woods
and EMP attempted to collect the debt, not the validity of the underlying debt itself. Second, it is
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apparent from Ms. Hill’s allegations that she believes that to send letters or attempt to collect the
debt at issue, Bayside Woods or EMP must have previously received a legal judgment in their
favor regarding the validity of the debt. But the FDCPA defines the term “debt” as “any obligation
or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money,
property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (emphasis added). Thus, the fact that Bayside Woods or EMP attempted to
collect the debt at issue before obtaining a legal judgment regarding its validity is inconsequential.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that Ms. Hill’s FDCPA claims against
Bayside Woods and EMP pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e fail as a matter of law. Any attempt by
Ms. Hill to amend her allegations against Bayside Woods and EMP would be futile based on her
own allegations which, accepted as true, plead her out of court in light of the binding precedent
cited herein. See Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786
F.3d 510, 520 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that “[w]here it is clear that the defect cannot be corrected
so that amendment is futile,” leave to amend may be denied). Thus, Ms. Hill’s claims against
Bayside Woods and EMP are dismissed with prejudice.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants Bayside Woods’ and EMP’s motions
regarding Ms. Hill’s FDCPA claims against them pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. [Filing No. 22;
Filing No. 26.]

Thus, Ms. Hill’s FDCPA claims against Bayside Woods and EMP are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Because FDCPA claims against two other Defendants are
still pending in this action, final judgment will not issue at this time.

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_______________________________

Date: 10/4/2016

Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution via US Mail:
KRISTIN S. HILL
6412 Bay Vista Court
Indianapolis, IN 46250
Distribution via CM/ECF:
John W. Richards
BUNGER & ROBERTSON
[e-mail]
Nicholas Ward Levi
KIGHTLINGER & GRAY
[e-mail]
Peter A. Velde
KIGHTLINGER & GRAY
[e-mail]
Thomas R. Schultz
SCHULTZ & POGUE LLP
[e-mail]
Jonathan Lawrence Bucher, Jr.
SCHULTZ & POGUE LLP
[e-mail]

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