UTLEY v. COLVIN

Filing 24

ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION - Plaintiff Latrice Utley filed for supplemental security income on April 27, 2012 and disability insurance benefits on May 3, 2012, alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2012. [Filing No. 16 -2 at 20.] Her applications were denied initially, [Filing No. 16-4 at 4; Filing No. 16 -4 at 8], and upon reconsideration, [Filing No. 16 - 4 at 13; Filing No. 16 -4 at 20]. Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") D. Lyndell Pickett held a hearing on September 17, 2014. [Filing No. 16 -2 at 38.] On October 21, 2014, the ALJ issued an opinion concluding that Ms. Utley was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. [Filing No. 16 -2 at 20-31.] The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision subject to judicial review. [Filing No. 16 -2 at 20-31.] Ms. Utley filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), asking this Court to review her denial o f benefits. [Filing No. 1 .] For the reasons detailed herein, the Court VACATES the ALJ's decision denying Ms. Utley's benefits and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence 4) as detailed above. Final Judgment will issue accordingly. (See Entry). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 8/24/2017.(APD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
LATRICE UTLEY,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner )
of Social Security Administration,
)
)
Defendant.
)

No. 1:16-cv-01450-JMS-MJD

ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
Plaintiff Latrice Utley filed for supplemental security income on April 27, 2012 and
disability insurance benefits on May 3, 2012, alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2012.
[Filing No. 16-2 at 20.] Her applications were denied initially, [Filing No. 16-4 at 4; Filing No.
16-4 at 8], and upon reconsideration, [Filing No. 16-4 at 13; Filing No. 16-4 at 20]. Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) D. Lyndell Pickett held a hearing on September 17, 2014. [Filing No. 16-2 at
38.] On October 21, 2014, the ALJ issued an opinion concluding that Ms. Utley was not disabled
as defined by the Social Security Act. [Filing No. 16-2 at 20-31.] The Appeals Council denied
review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision subject to judicial review.
[Filing No. 16-2 at 20-31.] Ms. Utley filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), asking
this Court to review her denial of benefits. [Filing No. 1.]
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The Social Security Act authorizes payment of disability insurance benefits and
Supplemental Security Income to individuals with disabilities.” Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,
214 (2002). “The statutory definition of ‘disability’ has two parts. First, it requires a certain kind
of inability, namely, an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity. Second it requires
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an impairment, namely, a physical or mental impairment, which provides reason for the inability.
The statute adds that the impairment must be one that has lasted or can be expected to last . . . not
less than 12 months.” Id. at 217.
When an applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, this Court’s role is limited to
ensuring that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence exists to
support the ALJ’s decision. Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted). For the purpose of judicial review, “[s]ubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Because the ALJ “is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses,” Craft v. Astrue,
539 F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008), this Court must afford the ALJ’s credibility determination
“considerable deference,” overturning it only if it is “patently wrong,” Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454
F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).
The ALJ must apply the five-step inquiry set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v),
evaluating the following, in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the claimant has a
severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of
the impairments listed by the [Commissioner]; (4) whether the claimant can
perform [her] past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing
work in the national economy.
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). “If
a claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, [she] will automatically be found disabled. If a
claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then [she] must satisfy step four. Once step
four is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing
work in the national economy.” Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).

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After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) by evaluating “all limitations that arise from medically determinable
impairments, even those that are not severe.” Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).
In doing so, the ALJ “may not dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling.” Id. The ALJ
uses the RFC at Step Four to determine whether the claimant can perform her own past relevant
work and if not, at Step Five to determine whether the claimant can perform other work. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(e), (g). The burden of proof is on the claimant for Steps One through Four; only
at Step Five does the burden shift to the Commissioner. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.
If the ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s
decision, the Court must affirm the denial of benefits. Barnett, 381 F.3d at 668. When an ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence, a remand for further proceedings is typically the
appropriate remedy. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). An
award of benefits “is appropriate only where all factual issues have been resolved and the record
can yield but one supportable conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).
II.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Utley was thirty-seven years old at the time she applied for social security benefits.
[Filing No. 16-3 at 2.] She has obtained a GED and performed past relevant work as a baker,
laborer, lead coordinator, and machinist. [Filing No. 16-6 at 6.] 1

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Both parties provided a detailed description of Ms. Utley’s medical history and treatment in their
briefs. [Filing No. 18; Filing No. 23.] Because that discussion implicates sensitive and otherwise
confidential medical information concerning Ms. Utley, the Court will simply incorporate those
facts by reference herein and only detail specific facts as necessary to address the parties’
arguments.
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The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation set forth by the Social Security
Administration in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) and ultimately concluded that Ms. Utley is not
disabled. [Filing No. 16-2 at 20-31.] The ALJ found as follows:
•

At Step One, the ALJ found that Ms. Utley has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since January 1, 2012, the date of her application for benefits. [Filing No. 162 at 22.]

•

At Step Two, the ALJ found that Ms. Utley has the following severe impairments:
morbid obesity, degenerative disc disease in the cervical and lumbar spine, left hip
disease, and headaches. [Filing No. 16-2 at 22.]

•

At Step Three, the ALJ found that Ms. Utley does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the
listed impairments. [Filing No. 16-2 at 24.]

•

At Step Three but before Step Four, the ALJ found that Ms. Utley has the RFC to
“perform medium work . . . except she can occasionally crawl and climb ladders, ropes,
or scaffolds; frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and climb ramps or stairs; can
perform simple, routine and repetitive tasks; and can have occasional interaction with
the general public.” [Filing No. 16-2 at 25.]

•

At Step Five, the ALJ concluded that considering Ms. Utley’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, and relying on the testimony of the vocational expert (“VE”),
Ms. Utley is capable of performing past relevant work as a warehouse worker and
warehouse checker. [Filing No. 16-2 at 29.] In addition, the ALJ found that there are
other jobs existing in the national economy that Ms. Utley can perform, including meat
clerk, machine packager, and laundry worker. [Filing No. 16-2 at 29-30.]

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Ms. Utley asked the Appeals Council to review the ALJ’s decision, but that request was
denied, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision subject to judicial review.
[Filing No. 16-2 at 20-31.] Ms. Utley filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 405(g), asking
this Court to review her denial of benefits. [Filing No. 1.]
III.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Utley raises several issues on appeal, and the Court will address them as follows: (1)
whether the ALJ erred in his analysis of Ms. Utley’s credibility; (2) whether the ALJ adequately
considered Ms. Utley’s magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) findings of her spine; (3) whether
the ALJ erred when he found that Ms. Utley’s depression and anxiety are not severe; and (4)
whether the ALJ failed to describe the specific functions of Ms. Utley’s past relevant work in
accordance with Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 82-62. [Filing No. 19 at 5.] The Court will
address the issues accordingly.
A. Credibility Analysis
Ms. Utley argues that the ALJ failed to take into account the fact that she experienced side
effects from taking medication, and that he erroneously noted that Ms. Utley did not engage in
pain management. [Filing No. 18 at 12.] Ms. Utley further claims that the ALJ misconstrued and
placed a heavy emphasis on Ms. Utley’s activities of daily living. The Court will address her
arguments in the subsections below.
Because the ALJ “is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses,” Craft,
539 F.3d at 678, this Court must afford the ALJ’s credibility determination “considerable
deference,” overturning it only if it is “patently wrong,” Prochaska, 454 F.3d at 738. The absence
of objective evidence cannot, standing alone, discredit the presence of substantive complaints,
Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 922-23 (7th Cir. 2010), but when faced with evidence both
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supporting and detracting from a claimant’s allegations, “the resolution of competing arguments
based on the record is for the ALJ, not the court[,]” Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 444 (7th
Cir. 2002). In “determining the credibility of the individual’s statements, the adjudicator must
consider the entire case record,” and a credibility determination “must contain specific reasons for
the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record.” Prochaska, 454 F.3d at
738.
1. Side Effects & Pain Relief
Ms. Utley claims that the ALJ erroneously found that Ms. Utley did not experience side
effects from medication. [Filing No. 18 at 12-13.] She claims that the record shows Ms. Utley
experienced drowsiness, diarrhea, anxiety, equilibrium problems, melancholy, and sadness.
[Filing No. 18 at 12-13.] She further points out that the ALJ wrongfully stated that she “has not
engaged in pain management or other moda1ities for pain relief,” when she claims the record
shows that she has sought various forms of medical treatment for pain relief. [Filing No. 18 at 13.]
In response, the Commissioner agrees that Ms. Utley complained of side effects from the
medication to her providers, but argues that “[t]here are no apparent reports of such symptoms to
[her] providers.” [Filing No. 23 at 13.] The Commissioner further claims that the ALJ did consider
Ms. Utley’s pain and treatment by pointing out that she controlled it with medication. [Filing No.
23 at 14.]
Ms. Utley did not file a reply brief.
“Although [the Court] afford[s] an ALJ’s credibility finding ‘considerable deference’ and
will overturn it only if ‘patently wrong,’ the ALJ must consider the claimant’s level of pain,
medication, treatment, daily activities, and limitations, and must justify the credibility finding with
specific reasons supported by the record.” Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2009)

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(internal citations omitted). In addition, the ALJ must consider “the type, dosage, effectiveness,
and side effects of any medication the individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other
symptoms.” SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996).
The ALJ’s decision notes that Ms. Utley “has been prescribed several medications for back
pain, particularly Cymbalta, Lyrica, and Oxycodone,” and that she “reported to Dr. Sadafi that
prescribed medications helped reduce her pain, and the treatment notes show good response from
medical management.” [Filing No. 16-2 at 27.] The ALJ then erroneously noted that Ms. Utley
“did not report side effects from medication, and the record fails to demonstrate adverse effects
from medication.” [Filing No. 16-2 at 27.] In fact, Ms. Utley points to several parts of the record
that demonstrate that she experienced side effects from medication. In one of the disability reports,
Ms. Utley noted that she experienced drowsiness from different medications. [Filing No. 16-6 at
35.] She also points to the medical records from Midtown Community Mental Health Center
(“Midtown”), which note that Lyrica caused her diarrhea, anxiety, and equilibrium problems.
[Filing No. 16-10 at 6.] During her hearing, Ms. Utley testified that at the time, she was only
taking Cymbalta and that Lyrica caused her to experience melancholy and sadness. [Filing No.
16-2 at 50.] Even the Commissioner concedes that the record demonstrates that Lyrica caused Ms.
Utley to experience side effects. [Filing No. 23 at 13.] Because the ALJ expressly stated that the
record fails to demonstrate adverse effects from mediation, the Court cannot discern whether the
ALJ accurately accounted for all of Ms. Utley’s symptoms and limitations. See, e.g., Robben-Cyl
v. Colvin, 2013 WL 1087556, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2013) (noting that the issue of side effects
from medication could be a central issue to the disability analysis). Remand is required on this
issue.

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Moreover, the Court finds that the ALJ’s statement that Ms. Utley has not engaged in pain
management or other modalities for pain relief contradicts his previous findings. [Filing No. 162 at 27.] Throughout the decision, the ALJ acknowledges that Ms. Utley experiences pain due to
her impairments, particularly with her back and legs, and that she took medication and underwent
other medical management procedures to alleviate the pain. Accordingly, the ALJ on remand
should clarify this statement, or characterize it in a manner that accurately reflects the record.
2. Activities of Daily Living
Ms. Utley argues that the ALJ has “entirely skewed” her activities of daily living, and cites
to various parts of the record that she claims describe greater limitations when she engages in those
activities. [Filing No. 18 at 14-15.] She contends that her ability to engage in certain activities of
daily living does not equate to her ability to work. [Filing No. 18 at 14-15.]
In response, the Commissioner argues that although the ALJ “did not specifically mention
every qualification in how [Ms. Utley] performed her activities, he did mention that she did several
activities at a slower pace” and that “there is no indication that the ALJ placed an undue weight on
[Ms. Utley’s] activities of daily living, or that he equated [them] with an ability to perform fulltime work.” [Filing No. 23 at 15.]
One of the many factors that the ALJ considers in the credibility analysis is the claimant’s
activities of daily living. SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996). The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals cautions however, that the claimant’s “ability to struggle through the activities of daily
living does not mean that she can manage the requirements of a modern workplace.” Punzio v.
Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir. 2011).
In considering Ms. Utley’s activities of daily living, the ALJ found that “[d]espite physical
pain, [she] continues to engage in activities that are not supportive of disabling limitations. Albeit

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at a slower pace, [she] can cook, mnage (sic) self-care, do light cleaning, care for her children,
drive, go to the store as needed, go to the park, and attend appointments.” [Filing No. 16-2 at 28.]
This explanation, however, is vague given Ms. Utley’s citations to the record that describe that she
can engage in those activities, but with certain limitations. For instance, she claims that she goes
to the grocery store twice a month and that she uses the “in store scooter.” [Filing No. 16-6 at 17;
Filing No. 16-6 at 26.] Ms. Utley asserts that although she cares for her children, she receives
assistance from her thirteen year-old son and her sister, who spends the night when Ms. Utley’s
children are with her. [Filing No. 16-2 at 52-53; Filing No. 16-2 at 56.] She also claims that her
family members keep her children on the weekends. [Filing No. 16-6 at 22.] Ms. Utley further
contends that she sometimes receives assistance in bathing, dressing, and fixing meals. [Filing
No. 16-6 at 43.] She claims that she can no longer take her son to the park, although it used to be
one of her hobbies. [Filing No. 16-6 at 18.] The Court is not indicating that the ALJ is required
to accept Ms. Utley’s statements and incorporate greater limitations in the RFC, given that it is the
ALJ’s duty to determine whether she is credible. Rather, the Court points out that the ALJ gave a
vague characterization of her daily activities without citing to the record, and should on remand
consider all of the evidence. Accordingly, this issue requires remand.
B. MRI Findings
Ms. Utley claims that the ALJ minimized “the full findings of the cervical and lumbar
MRIs.” [Filing No. 18 at 12.] She claims that the ALJ did not address the full findings from her
MRIs, particularly related to the following: disk bulging, mild central canal stenosis, and minimal
cord flattening at C5-C6; degenerated discs with diffuse disc protrusions at L4-L5 and L5-S1; and
central canal stenosis and cord flattening at C5-C6; and bilateral neural foramen narrowing at L4L5 and L5-S1. [Filing No. 18 at 12 (citing Filing No. 16-2 at 26; Filing No. 16-7 at 9).]

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In response, the Commissioner argues that in regards to Ms. Utley’s cervical and lumbar
MRIs, the ALJ is not required to summarize every finding in every individual medical record and
that the ALJ discussed most of the findings. [Filing No. 23 at 13.] In addition, the Commissioner
claims that the records that Ms. Utley points to indicate “mild,” “minimal,” or “not significant”
findings. [Filing No. 23 at 13.]
The ALJ must determine an individual’s RFC, or “what an individual can still do despite
his or her limitations,” based upon medical evidence as well as “other evidence, such as testimony
by the claimant or his friends and family.” Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2014)
(citing SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996); Craft, 539 F.3d at 676). “In making a proper
RFC determination, the ALJ must consider all of the relevant evidence in the record, ‘even
[limitations] that are not severe, and may not dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling.’”
Murphy, 759 F.3d at 817 (quoting Villano, 556 F.3d at 563).
The Court finds no issue with the ALJ’s characterization of the evidence. In his decision,
the ALJ acknowledged that Ms. Utley “exacerbated the pain in her back, which prompted a referral
for MRIs” and pointed out that the MRIs of the cervical and lumbar spine revealed “disc bulge at
C5-C6, L4-L5, and L5-S1 with disc disease, but without significant central canal stenosis or spinal
cord compression.” [Filing No. 16-2 at 26.] The ALJ cites to the same records that Ms. Utley
points to, so it is clear that the ALJ considered those findings. Moreover, the ALJ used the
language that the physician used in describing the MRI findings. The RFC determination does not
need to “‘contain a complete written evaluation of every piece of evidence,’” Murphy, 759 F.3d at
817-18; McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 891 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395
F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005)), but it must provide an “‘accurate and logical bridge’ between the
evidence to the conclusion that the claimant is not disabled,” Craft, 539 F.3d at 673. Moreover,

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Ms. Utley has not demonstrated that the parts of the MRI findings that she points to undermine the
ALJ’s conclusion. The Court finds no error with this issue.
C. Depression & Anxiety
Ms. Utley argues that the ALJ erred at Step Two of the Analysis when he noted that Ms.
Utley’s depression and anxiety are not severe impairments. [Filing No. 18 at 18.] Ms. Utley
claims that she began treatment at Midtown for her diagnosis of “Major Depressive Disorder,
Recurrent, Moderate and Adjustment Disorder with Anxiety.” [Filing No. 18 at 18.] She claims
that the records show that she experienced various symptoms associated with her diagnosis and
she attended regular therapy for over a year. [Filing No. 18 at 18.] She further asserts that her
RFC analysis must be based on all relevant medical evidence, including evidence related to both
severe and non-severe impairments. [Filing No. 18 at 19-20.]
In response, the Commissioner claims that the ALJ described the evidence regarding Ms.
Utley’s depression and anxiety, and explained under Step Two why those diagnoses are not severe
impairments. [Filing No. 23 at 8.] The Commissioner described the evidence that the ALJ
considered, such as the findings from Dr. Schmutte’s consultative psychological examination, her
continued use of Cymbalta, and her counseling sessions at Midtown. [Filing No. 23 at 9.] The
Commissioner then points out that the ALJ considered this evidence when making his RFC
determination, and limited her to “occasional contact with the public after indicating that [she] had
some complaints about being anxious around crowds, but noting that she maintained regular
contact with her family, went out in public when needed, and interacted appropriately with her
doctors and their staff.” [Filing No. 23 at 19.]
“[I]f a plaintiff satisfies [her] burden of establishing that [she] suffers from any severe
impairment, the ALJ simply must continue to step three of the analysis.” Raines v. Astrue, 2007

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WL 1455890, at *7 (S.D. Ind. 2007). “[N]o error could result solely from [the ALJ’s] failure to
label an impairment as ‘severe’. . . . What matters is that the ALJ considers the impact of all of
the claimant’s impairments – severe and non-severe – on [her] ability to work.” Id.
The Court finds Ms. Utley’s arguments unavailing. The ALJ determined that Ms. Utley’s
depression and anxiety are not severe impairments, but did find that she had severe impairments
of morbid obesity, degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spines, left hip disease,
and headaches, and therefore continued with Step Three of the Analysis. [Filing No. 16-2 at 2223.] He noted that her depression and anxiety did not cause more than a minimal limitation in her
ability to perform mental work activities. [Filing No. 16-2 at 23.] Thereafter, the ALJ discussed
how the evidence related to Ms. Utley’s depression and anxiety were incorporated into the RFC.
In particular, he discussed the findings from the consultative examination, pointing out that Ms.
Utley appeared depressed and tearful, had minimal difficulty in tending to mental status items, and
had notable cognitive abilities. [Filing No. 16-2 at 23.] The ALJ then discussed her continued use
of Cymbalta, and that she started outpatient counseling at Midtown. [Filing No. 16-2 at 23.]
Lastly, he indicated that although her depression and anxiety are not severe impairments, he still
“implemented unskilled work and included social restrictions. . . .” [Filing No. 16-2 at 23.] In the
RFC determination, the ALJ in part noted that she can perform medium work and can have
occasional interaction with the public. [Filing 10No. 16-2 at 25.] Ms. Utley states that the ALJ
discussed only some of the records from Midtown, but she fails to explain to what extent those
records demonstrate more limitations. She even acknowledges in her brief that the records
demonstrate she had “mild to moderate impairment in concentration and with a tearful affect.”
[Filing No. 18 at 25.] Accordingly, the ALJ built a logical bridge from the evidence to the
conclusion, and the Court finds no error.

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D. Past Relevant Work
Lastly, Ms. Utley argues that the ALJ violated SSR 82-62 because he failed to discern the
specific functions of her past relevant work before concluding that she could return to work.
[Filing No. 18 at 21.] She claims that the ALJ concluded that she could perform her past relevant
work as a warehouse worker and warehouse checker, but that he failed to describe the functions
that are required for her past relevant work. [Filing No. 18 at 21.] In response, the Commissioner
argues that the ALJ sufficiently supported his findings and noted that he relied on the VE’s
testimony from the hearing.
In the decision, the ALJ merely noted that the VE’s testimony regarding Ms. Utley’s ability
to perform her past relevant work as a warehouse worker and warehouse checker is “credible,
persuasive, [and] uncontradicted.” [Filing No. 16-2 at 29.] Given that the decision is being
remanded on other grounds, the Court instructs the ALJ to describe what functions are required to
perform her past relevant work to the extent that the ALJ’s RFC determination results in the same
findings.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed herein, the Court VACATES the ALJ’s decision denying Ms.
Utley’s benefits and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) (sentence 4) as detailed above. Final Judgment will issue accordingly.

Date: 8/24/2017

Distribution via ECF only to all counsel of record

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