CHAPEL v. COLVIN

Filing 26

ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION - Plaintiff Teresa Kay Chapel filed for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits on April 8, 2013, alleging a disability onset date of September 28, 2012. [Filing No. 7 -5 at 2.] Her applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, [Filing No. 7 -4 at 4; Filing No. 7 -4 at 14], and Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Terry Miller held a hearing on December 4, 2014, [Filing No. 7 -2 at 49]. On Febr uary 3, 2015, the ALJ issued an opinion concluding that Ms. Chapel was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. [Filing No. 7 -2 at 19-36.] The Appeals Council denied review on May 12, 2016, [Filing No. 7 -2 at 2], making the ALJ' ;s decision the Commissioner's final decision subject to judicial review, [Filing No. 7 -2 at 19-36]. Ms. Chapel filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), asking this Court to review her denial of benefits. [Filing No. 1 .] "The standard for disability claims under the Social Security Act is stringent." Williams-Overstreet v. Astrue, 364 F. App'x 271, 274 (7th Cir. 2010). "The Act does not contemplate degrees of disability or allow for an award based on partial disability." Id. (citing Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 285 (7th Cir. 1985)). "Even claimants with substantial impairments are not necessarily entitled to benefits, which are paid for by taxes, including taxes paid b y those who work despite serious physical or mental impairments and for whom working is difficult and painful." Williams-Overstreet, 364 F. App'x at 274. Taken together, the Court can find no legal basis presented by Ms. Chapel to reverse the ALJ's decision that he was not disabled during the relevant time period. Therefore, the decision below is AFFIRMED. Final judgment shall issue accordingly. (See Entry). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 6/13/2017.(APD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
TERESA KAY CHAPEL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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No. 1:16-cv-01862-JMS-DKL

ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
Plaintiff Teresa Kay Chapel filed for supplemental security income and disability insurance
benefits on April 8, 2013, alleging a disability onset date of September 28, 2012. [Filing No. 7-5
at 2.] Her applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, [Filing No. 7-4 at 4; Filing
No. 7-4 at 14], and Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Terry Miller held a hearing on December
4, 2014, [Filing No. 7-2 at 49]. On February 3, 2015, the ALJ issued an opinion concluding that
Ms. Chapel was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. [Filing No. 7-2 at 19-36.] The
Appeals Council denied review on May 12, 2016, [Filing No. 7-2 at 2], making the ALJ’s decision
the Commissioner’s final decision subject to judicial review, [Filing No. 7-2 at 19-36]. Ms. Chapel
filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), asking this Court to review her denial of
benefits. [Filing No. 1.]
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The Social Security Act authorizes payment of disability insurance benefits and
Supplemental Security Income to individuals with disabilities.” Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,
214 (2002). “The statutory definition of ‘disability’ has two parts. First, it requires a certain kind
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of inability, namely, an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity. Second it requires
an impairment, namely, a physical or mental impairment, which provides reason for the inability.
The statute adds that the impairment must be one that has lasted or can be expected to last . . . not
less than 12 months.” Id. at 217.
When an applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, this Court’s role is limited to
ensuring that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence exists to
support the ALJ’s decision. Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted). For the purpose of judicial review, “[s]ubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Because the ALJ “is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses,” Craft v. Astrue,
539 F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008), this Court must afford the ALJ’s credibility determination
“considerable deference,” overturning it only if it is “patently wrong,” Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454
F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).
The ALJ must apply the five-step inquiry set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v),
evaluating the following, in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the claimant has a
severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of
the impairments listed by the [Commissioner]; (4) whether the claimant can
perform [her] past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing
work in the national economy.
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). “If
a claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, [she] will automatically be found disabled. If a
claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then [she] must satisfy step four. Once step
four is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing
work in the national economy.” Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).

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After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) by evaluating “all limitations that arise from medically determinable
impairments, even those that are not severe.” Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).
In doing so, the ALJ “may not dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling.” Id. The ALJ
uses the RFC at Step Four to determine whether the claimant can perform her own past relevant
work and if not, at Step Five to determine whether the claimant can perform other work. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(e), (g). The burden of proof is on the claimant for Steps One through Four; only
at Step Five does the burden shift to the Commissioner. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.
If the ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s
decision, the Court must affirm the denial of benefits. Barnett, 381 F.3d at 668. When an ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence, a remand for further proceedings is typically the
appropriate remedy. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). An
award of benefits “is appropriate only where all factual issues have been resolved and the record
can yield but one supportable conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).
II.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Chapel was fifty-one years old at the time she applied for social security benefits.
[Filing No. 7-5 at 2.] She has a high school diploma and completed some college, [Filing No. 7-2
at 57], and has performed past relevant work as an automotive assembler, [Filing No. 7-2 at 34]. 1

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Ms. Chapel provided a detailed description of her medical history and treatment in her opening
brief, and the Commissioner did not dispute those facts. [Filing No. 19; Filing No. 25.] Because
that discussion implicates sensitive and otherwise confidential medical information concerning
Ms. Chapel, the Court will simply incorporate those facts by reference herein and only detail
specific facts as necessary to address the parties’ arguments.
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The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation set forth by the Social Security
Administration in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) and ultimately concluded that Ms. Chapel is not
disabled. [Filing No. 7-2 at 19-36.] The ALJ found as follows:
•

At Step One, the ALJ found that Ms. Chapel has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since September 28, 2012, the date of her application for benefits. [Filing No.
7-2 at 21.]

•

At Step Two, the ALJ found that Ms. Chapel has the following severe impairments:
neck/lower back pain due to degenerative disc disease/spondylosis/myalgia and
myositis; obstructive sleep apnea; history of migraine headaches; asthma/chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease; mild to moderate obesity; and adjustment
disorder/depressed mood. [Filing No. 7-2 at 21.]

•

At Step Three, the ALJ found that Ms. Chapel does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the
listed impairments. [Filing No. 7-2 at 22.]

•

At Step Three but before Step Four, the ALJ found that Ms. Chapel has the RFC to
perform light work, which includes “lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling up to 20
pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sitting up to at least six out of eight
hours in an eight-hour workday. Further limitation involves only occasional climbing
of ramps/stairs, occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling, but
never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She also needs to avoid concentrated
exposure to wetness, loud noise, bright flashing lights, pulmonary irritants (i.e. fumes,
odors, dust, gases, poorly ventilated areas, and chemicals), and hazards (i.e. operational
control of dangerous moving machinery and unprotected heights). Mentally, the

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claimant cannot understand, remember, or carry out detailed or complex job
instructions, but remains capable of performing simple, repetitive tasks on a sustained
basis (i.e. eight hours a day/five days a week, or equivalent work schedule), with no
fast-paced work or work requiring a regimented pace of production.” [Filing No. 7-2
at 24-25.]
•

At Step Four, the ALJ found that Ms. Chapel is not capable of performing any past
relevant work. [Filing No. 7-2 at 34.]

•

At Step Five, the ALJ concluded that considering Ms. Chapel’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, and relying on the testimony of the vocational expert (“VE”),
Ms. Chapel is capable of working as a price marker, mail sorter, and information clerk.
[Filing No. 7-2 at 34-35.]

Ms. Chapel asked the Appeals Council to review the ALJ’s decision, but that request was
denied on May 12, 2016, [Filing No. 7-2 at 2], making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s
final decision subject to judicial review, [Filing No. 7-2 at 19-36]. Ms. Chapel filed this civil
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 405(g), asking this Court to review her denial of benefits. [Filing
No. 1.]
III.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Chapel raises three issues on appeal, and the Court will address them as follows: (1)
whether the ALJ erred when he failed to request a consultative examination based on the results
of Ms. Chapel’s October 2014 magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) report; (2) whether the ALJ
improperly evaluated Ms. Chapel’s migraine headaches; and (3) whether the ALJ erred in his
credibility analysis. [Filing No. 19 at 5.] The Court will address the issues accordingly.

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A. October 2014 MRI
Ms. Chapel argues that “[t]he ALJ fail[ed] to consult any medical opinion as to the
degeneration of [Ms.] Chapel’s back by October 2014, and the effect of that degeneration on her
functioning.” [Filing No. 19 at 12.] She claims that the October 2014 MRI showed significant
degeneration from prior MRI reports, including the March 2014 MRI. [Filing No. 19 at 12.]
According to Ms. Chapel, instead of ordering a consultative examination to determine the
functional limitations, the ALJ simply concluded “without a medical opinion, that it did not
support significant limitations.” [Filing No. 19 at 12.]
In response, the Commissioner argues that Ms. Chapel is impermissibly asking this Court
to reweigh the evidence. [Filing No. 25 at 3.] The Commissioner contends that the ALJ considered
all the MRI reports. [Filing No. 25 at 3.] She further argues that Ms. Chapel failed to submit
additional documentation in support of her assertion that she was prescribed a cane in October
2014, and that other evidence questioned the reliability of this assertion. [Filing No. 25 at 3-4.]
The Commissioner also claims that the ALJ thoroughly reviewed various medical evidence that
discussed Ms. Chapel’s functional limitations with respect to her back. [Filing No. 25 at 4.] The
Commissioner argues that Ms. Chapel’s request to obtain an additional medical opinion is
unwarranted. [Filing No. 25 at 5.]
Ms. Chapel did not file a reply.
The Court “will uphold the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, that
is, ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’” Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2011); Scott v.
Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011); Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 361-62 (7th Cir. 2013)).

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The Court will not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ, but it
will examine the ALJ’s decision to determine whether it reflects a logical bridge from the evidence
to the conclusions sufficient to allow the Court to assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate
findings and afford meaningful judicial review. Moore, 743 F.3d at 1121 (citing Young v.
Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004)); Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013);
Pepper, 712 F.3d at 362; Villano, 556 F.3d at 562. A decision that lacks adequate discussion of
the issues will be remanded. Moore, 743 F.3d at 1121.
The ALJ built a logical bridge from the evidence to the conclusion in discussing Ms.
Chapel’s functional limitations related to her back. Ms. Chapel claims that the ALJ played doctor
when he compared the MRI results, and claims that there were significant differences from the
March 2014 MRI report and October 2014 MRI report. First, the ALJ did exactly as he was
required to do – evaluate the evidence. The ALJ discussed the results of the March 2014 and
October 2014 MRI reports, as well as prior MRI reports, noting that the most significant MRI
findings for mild to moderate deficit were from February 2012, which were unchanged from
August 2011, and that the MRI reports from 2014 demonstrated improvement. [Filing No. 7-2 at
26.] Second, Ms. Chapel claims that the October 2014 MRI results indicate that she had “broadbased disc bulge” at L2-3 and “[f]acet hypertrophy at all levels,” but that the March 2014 MRI
report indicated no disc protrusion or bulge whatsoever. [Filing No. 19 at 12 (original emphasis).]
While the evidence demonstrates that Ms. Chapel had broad based disc bulge in the October 2014
MRI results, the report also indicates – and the ALJ noted – that the findings show mild facet
hypertrophy at several levels, either mild or no significant narrowing of central canal, and no
significant narrowing of neural foramen. [Filing No. 7-2 at 26; Filing No. 7-14 at 55 (October
2014 MRI report).] In addition, as outlined in the Commissioner’s response brief, the ALJ

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considered numerous other medical records regarding treatment, pain, and limitations associated
with Ms. Chapel’s back. Given the ALJ’s proper analysis of the evidence, Ms. Chapel has set
forth no basis to support the contention that the ALJ should have ordered an additional consultative
examination. The Court finds no error with the ALJ’s analysis.
B. Migraine Headaches
Ms. Chapel argues that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of her migraine headaches by
“indicating that no evidence supports the headaches occurring more frequently than once a week,
and generally fails to interface with the record . . . in assessing the RFC.” [Filing No. 19 at 1314.] She also indicates that “the ALJ erred by not including limitations related to [Ms.] Chapel’s
upper extremity and lower extremity challenges” in the RFC and “not considering all impairments
in combination.” [Filing No. 19 at 14.]
In response, the Commissioner points out that Ms. Chapel’s arguments are underdeveloped
and waived. [Filing No. 25 at 6.] She argues that even considering Ms. Chapel’s position, her
argument fails because the ALJ sufficiently and appropriately considered Ms. Chapel’s headaches,
and discussed all the evidence that the ALJ considered from the record. [Filing No. 25 at 6-7.]
The Commissioner also cites to evidence that the ALJ considered in discussing upper and lower
extremity challenges, and argues that Ms. Chapel does not point to any evidence that the ALJ failed
to consider. [Filing No. 25 at 7-8.]
The Court is uncertain as to how the ALJ’s assessment of Ms. Chapel’s migraines was
inaccurate given that she cites to no evidence that the ALJ failed to consider. Ms. Chapel merely
states that the ALJ failed to include limitations with respect to her upper and lower extremity
challenges in her RFC, but again fails to discuss what evidence the ALJ failed to consider. The
Court will not scour through the record to locate evidence and determine whether and to what

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extent the ALJ properly considered Ms. Chapel’s legal argument. See Hughes v. Astrue, 2011 WL
3881044, at *7 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (“The court ‘will not scour a record to locate evidence supporting
a party’s legal argument’”) (quoting Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 759 (7th Cir.
2005)). Because Ms. Chapel’s arguments are perfunctory and largely underdeveloped, they are
considered waived. Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 2016) (“perfunctory and
undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived”).
C.

Credibility Determination

Ms. Chapel argues that “[f]ailure to address key treating opinions underlies a faulty
credibility finding here.” [Filing No. 19 at 14.] Ms. Chapel claims that the ALJ emphasized
“Waddell signs”, but that such factors do not “hold the persuasive power it otherwise might in
light of Dr. Reed’s discussion about the role of chronic pain medications affecting [her]
experienced pain thresholds.” [Filing No. 19 at 14.] She further claims that the ALJ left out Dr.
Cervoni’s “tailored advice to not drive while sleepy in light of her sleep-related problems.” [Filing
No. 19 at 14-15.] Ms. Chapel raises other arguments related to the ALJ’s credibility finding,
including that he ignored the impact of Ms. Chapel’s “long and consistent work history and lengthy
tenure at work even after her impairments began,” and that “the ALJ’s opinion here relies on the
absence of records. . . .” [Filing No. 19 at 15.]
In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ is not required to discuss every piece
of evidence, and that in any event, not addressing Dr. Cervoni’s statement is harmless error given
that the ALJ’s RFC determination states that Ms. Chapel should avoid operational control of
moving machinery. [Filing No. 25 at 8-9.] The Commissioner argues that the ALJ “reasonably
and thoroughly considered and addressed [Ms. Chapel’s] subjective statements about her alleged
symptoms,” and noted that in many instances, they were not supported by evidence in the record.

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[Filing No. 25 at 9-10; Filing No. 25 at 12-13.] The Commissioner claims that the ALJ noted that
during the hearing, Ms. Chapel’s counsel said he had documentation regarding Ms. Chapel’s
prescribed cane and that “the ALJ left the record open so those documents could be submitted,”
but Ms. Chapel’s counsel never submitted them. [Filing No. 25 at 10.] According to the
Commissioner, the ALJ noted that the same place that prescribed Ms. Chapel with a cane had
records a month before indicating that Ms. Chapel “revealed a normal and stable gait with good
stride and equal arm swing without an assistive device,” and no other evidence in the record
supported Ms. Chapel’s statement regarding her need for a cane. [Filing No. 25 at 10.]
Because the ALJ “is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses,” Craft,
539 F.3d at 678, this Court must afford the ALJ’s credibility determination “considerable
deference,” overturning it only if it is “patently wrong,” Prochaska, 454 F.3d at 738. The absence
of objective evidence cannot, standing alone, discredit the presence of substantive complaints,
Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 922-23 (7th Cir. 2010), but when faced with evidence both
supporting and detracting from a claimant’s allegations, “the resolution of competing arguments
based on the record is for the ALJ, not the court[,]” Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 444 (7th
Cir. 2002). In “determining the credibility of the individual’s statements, the adjudicator must
consider the entire case record,” and a credibility determination “must contain specific reasons for
the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record.” Prochaska, 454 F.3d at
738.
With regard to Ms. Chapel’s argument that the ALJ failed to consider Dr. Cervoni’s
statement that Ms. Chapel should not drive while sleepy, the Court finds no error. Because Ms.
Chapel does not provide a citation to the record regarding the location of this statement, the Court
relies on the Commissioner’s citation. Dr. Cervoni was Ms. Chapel’s pulmonologist. [Filing No.

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7-7 at 19 (“Patient has the following Specialists[:] Cervoni-Pulmonary”).] As the Commissioner
points out, Dr. Cervoni’s statement alone is not an opinion. Rather, this statement is part of an
August 20, 2012 medical record, where Dr. Cervoni stated that Ms. Chapel showed mild
obstructive sleep apnea, needed Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (“CPAP”), and should not
drive if sleepy. [Filing No. 7-7 at 13.] Considering the medical record as a whole, the ALJ noted
that Ms. Chapel was diagnosed with a condition of mild sleep apnea, and that although the report
“titrated CPAP controlled symptoms of mild sleep apnea, [Ms. Chapel] alleges only recent onset
for use of CPAP in July 2014, which onset of CPAP use is also uncorroborated by treatment record.
. . .” [Filing No. 7-2 at 28.] “The ALJ is not required to mention every piece of evidence but must
provide an ‘accurate and logical bridge’ between the evidence and the conclusion that the claimant
is not disabled,” and the ALJ did so here. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008).
Moreover, Ms. Chapel has not demonstrated that this statement undermines the ALJ’s conclusion.
See, e.g., Moore, 743 F.3d at 1123 (“[A]lthough an ALJ does not need to discuss every piece of
evidence in the record, the ALJ may not analyze only the evidence supporting her ultimate
conclusion while ignoring the evidence that undermines it.”).
With respect to the issue regarding missing records, Ms. Chapel’s argument also fails.
While the ALJ has the duty to develop a full and fair record, the ALJ’s burden is met when he
makes “a ‘reasonable effort’ to ensure that the claimant’s record contains, at a minimum, enough
information to assess the claimant’s RFC and to make a disability determination.” Martin v.
Astrue, 345 F. App’x 197, 201 (7th Cir. 2009). Ms. Chapel does not describe what documents are
missing from the record, but assuming that the missing records are from the Centers for Pain Relief
regarding the purported prescription of a cane, the Court finds no error. During the hearing, Ms.
Chapel’s attorney indicated that he had documentation regarding Ms. Chapel’s prescription for a

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cane from Centers for Pain Relief, [Filing No. 7-2 at 56], and the ALJ indicated that he would keep
the record open so that Ms. Chapel’s attorney could submit that documentation, [Filing No. 7-2 at
104].

The ALJ noted in the decision that Ms. Chapel’s attorney never submitted that

documentation, and reasonably concluded that all other evidence in the record did not support Ms.
Chapel’s statement that she required the use of a cane. [Filing No. 7-2 at 26.]
Ms. Chapel fails to develop any other argument challenging other aspects of the ALJ’s
credibility analysis. As the Commissioner points out, the ALJ thoroughly discussed Ms. Chapel’s
purported allegations regarding falls at work, which were not supported by the record, and
addressed other inconsistencies that affected Ms. Chapel’s credibility. [See Filing No. 7-2 at 27.]
Accordingly, the Court finds that remand is not warranted.
IV.
CONCLUSION
“The standard for disability claims under the Social Security Act is stringent.” WilliamsOverstreet v. Astrue, 364 F. App’x 271, 274 (7th Cir. 2010). “The Act does not contemplate
degrees of disability or allow for an award based on partial disability.” Id. (citing Stephens v.
Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 285 (7th Cir. 1985)). “Even claimants with substantial impairments are
not necessarily entitled to benefits, which are paid for by taxes, including taxes paid by those who
work despite serious physical or mental impairments and for whom working is difficult and
painful.” Williams-Overstreet, 364 F. App’x at 274. Taken together, the Court can find no legal
basis presented by Ms. Chapel to reverse the ALJ’s decision that he was not disabled during the
relevant time period. Therefore, the decision below is AFFIRMED. Final judgment shall issue
accordingly.

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Date: 6/13/2017

Distribution:
Jason Scott Rodman
FORBES LAW OFFICE
[e-mail]
Randal S. Forbes
FORBES LAW OFFICE
[e-mail]
Kathryn E. Olivier
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
[e-mail]

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