SEALS v. COLVIN

Filing 22

ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION - Plaintiff Eddie Seals applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income from the Social Security Administration ("SSA") on May 16, 2011, alleging an onset date o f July 15, 2010. [Filing No. 10 -5 at 2-14.] His applications were initially denied on July 5, 2011, [Filing No. 10 -4 at 2-9], and upon reconsideration on September 8, 2011, [Filing No. 10 -4 at 15-28]. Administrative Law Judge Ronald T. Jorda n (the "ALJ") held a hearing on August 29, 2012, [Filing No. 10 -2 at 28-63], and issued a decision on September 25, 2012, concluding that Mr. Seals was not entitled to receive disability insurance benefits or supplemental security inco me, [Filing No. 10 -2 at 11-23]. The Appeals Council denied review on February 20, 2014. [Filing No. 10 -2 at 2-4.] Mr. Seals then filed a civil action, asking the Court to review the denial of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c). [Filing No. 10 -16 at 3.] On November 14, 2015, the Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and reversed and remanded the Commissioner's Decision. [Filing No. 10 -16 at 2-13.] The ALJ held a second hearing on February 25, 2016, [Filing No. 10 -15 at 33-71], and issued a decision on March 25, 2016, once again concluding that Mr. Seals was not entitled to receive disability insurance benefits or supplemental security income, [Filing No. 10 -15 at 2-23]. On July 25, 2016, Mr. Seals timely filed this civil action, asking the Court to review the denial of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c). [Filing No. 1 .]. For the reasons detailed herei n, the Court VACATES the ALJ's decision denying Mr. Seals benefits and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence four). Judgment shall issue accordingly. (See Entry). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 6/5/2017.(APD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
EDDIE SEALS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY BERRYHILL, 1 Acting Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration,
Defendant.

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No. 1:16-cv-01975-JMS-MJD

ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
Plaintiff Eddie Seals applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) on May 16, 2011, alleging an onset date
of July 15, 2010. [Filing No. 10-5 at 2-14.] His applications were initially denied on July 5, 2011,
[Filing No. 10-4 at 2-9], and upon reconsideration on September 8, 2011, [Filing No. 10-4 at 1528]. Administrative Law Judge Ronald T. Jordan (the “ALJ”) held a hearing on August 29, 2012,
[Filing No. 10-2 at 28-63], and issued a decision on September 25, 2012, concluding that Mr. Seals
was not entitled to receive disability insurance benefits or supplemental security income, [Filing
No. 10-2 at 11-23]. The Appeals Council denied review on February 20, 2014. [Filing No. 10-2
at 2-4.] Mr. Seals then filed a civil action, asking the Court to review the denial of benefits pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c). [Filing No. 10-16 at 3.] On November 14, 2015,
the Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and reversed and remanded
the Commissioner’s Decision. [Filing No. 10-16 at 2-13.] The ALJ held a second hearing on

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The Court has substituted Nancy Berryhill as the proper Defendant in this action, given that she
became the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on January 23, 2017. See
“Meet Our New Acting Commissioner,” Social Security Administration Blog, available at
http://blog.ssa.gov/meet-our-new-acting-commissioner (last visited June 5, 2017).
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February 25, 2016, [Filing No. 10-15 at 33-71], and issued a decision on March 25, 2016, once
again concluding that Mr. Seals was not entitled to receive disability insurance benefits or
supplemental security income, [Filing No. 10-15 at 2-23]. On July 25, 2016, Mr. Seals timely filed
this civil action, asking the Court to review the denial of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c). [Filing No. 1.]
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The Social Security Act authorizes payment of disability insurance benefits and
Supplemental Security Income to individuals with disabilities.” Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,
214 (2002). “The statutory definition of ‘disability’ has two parts. First, it requires a certain kind
of inability, namely, an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity. Second, it requires
an impairment, namely, a physical or mental impairment, which provides reason for the inability.
The statute adds that the impairment must be one that has lasted or can be expected to last . . . not
less than 12 months.” Id. at 217.
When an applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, this Court’s role is limited to
ensuring that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence exists for
the ALJ’s decision. Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). For
the purpose of judicial review, “[s]ubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). Because the
ALJ “is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses,” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d
668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008), this Court must afford the ALJ’s credibility determination “considerable
deference,” overturning it only if it is “patently wrong,” Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738
(7th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).

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The ALJ must apply the five-step inquiry set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v),
evaluating the following, in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the claimant has
a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one
of the impairments listed by the [Commissioner]; (4) whether the claimant can
perform [his] past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing
work in the national economy.
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). “If
a claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, [he] will automatically be found disabled. If a
claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then [he] must satisfy step four. Once step four
is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing
work in the national economy.” Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) by evaluating “all limitations that arise from medically determinable
impairments, even those that are not severe.” Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).
In doing so, the ALJ “may not dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling.” Id. The ALJ
uses the RFC at Step Four to determine whether the claimant can perform his own past relevant
work and if not, at Step Five to determine whether the claimant can perform other work. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(e), (g). The burden of proof is on the claimant for Steps One through Four; only
at Step Five does the burden shift to the Commissioner. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.
If the ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s
decision, the Court must affirm the denial of benefits. Barnett, 381 F.3d at 668. When an ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence, a remand for further proceedings is typically the
appropriate remedy. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). An

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award of benefits “is appropriate only where all factual issues have been resolved and the record
can yield but one supportable conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).
III.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Seals was twenty seven years old when he filed for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income. [Filing No. 10-5 at 2-14.] He has previous work experience as a
fast food manager and a cashier. [Filing No. 10-2 at 33-38.] 2 Using the five-step sequential
evaluation set forth by the SSA in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), the ALJ issued an opinion on March
25, 2016, determining that Mr. Seals was not entitled to receive disability insurance benefits or
supplemental security income. [Filing No. 10-15 at 2-23.] The ALJ found as follows:
•

At Step One of the analysis, the ALJ found that Mr. Seals had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity 3 since July 15, 2010, the alleged onset date. [Filing
No. 10-15 at 7.]

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At Step Two of the analysis, the ALJ found that Mr. Seals suffers from the
following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, carpal tunnel
syndrome, urinary frequency, schizoaffective disorder, and anxiety. [Filing No.
10-15 at 7.]

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At Step Three of the analysis, the ALJ found that Mr. Seals did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
severity of one of the listed impairments. [Filing No. 10-15 at 8.]

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After Step Three but before Step Four, the ALJ found that Mr. Seals has the
RFC to perform work at the light exertional level as defined in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1567(b) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b), with the following limitations: “[H]e
can lift, carry, push, or pull 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently.

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Both Mr. Seals and the Commissioner detailed pertinent facts in their briefs, and the opposing
party did not dispute those facts. [Filing No. 16; Filing No. 20.] Because those facts implicate
sensitive and otherwise confidential medical information concerning Mr. Seals, the Court will
simply incorporate those facts by reference herein. Specific facts will be articulated as needed.
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Substantial gainful activity is defined as work activity that is both substantial (i.e., involves
significant physical or mental activities) and gainful (i.e., work that is usually done for pay or
profit, whether or not a profit is realized). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a).
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He can stand and walk 6 hours in an 8-hour day. He can occasionally stoop,
balance, crouch, kneel, crawl and climb ramps or stairs. He should never climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He should never work at unprotected heights or
unguarded moving machinery . . . . He should have ready access to a restroom.
He is limited to work involving simple, repetitive tasks requiring minimal
independent judgment regarding basic work processes and work goals from day
to day should be static and predicable. He should have only occasional,
superficial contact with coworkers, but no contact with the general public. He
should never be required to travel away from the work place.” [Filing No. 1015 at 11.]
•

At Step Four of the analysis, the ALJ found that Mr. Seals is unable to perform
any past relevant work. [Filing No. 10-15 at 21.]

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At Step Five of the analysis, the ALJ found that considering Mr. Seals’ age,
education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that Mr. Seals can perform – specifically,
janitorial cleaner, protective clothing issuer, and equipment cleaner. [Filing No.
10-15 at 21-22.]
IV.
DISCUSSION

Mr. Seals challenges the ALJ’s decision on three grounds: (1) the ALJ did not account for
all of Mr. Seals’ impairments in conducting the RFC analysis or in apprising the vocational expert
(“VE”) of Mr. Seals’ impairments, [Filing No. 15 at 19-24]; (2) the ALJ erroneously discounted
the opinion of Mr Seals’ treating mental health specialists and improperly weighed other opinion
evidence, [Filing No. 15 at 24-32]; and (3) the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility in regard
to the intensity and severity of his impairments was “patently wrong.” [Filing No. 15 at 32-35.]
The Court will address the issues in turn.
A. Failure to Fully Account for Mr. Seals’ Impairments
Mr. Seals argues that the ALJ failed for account for two impairments in assessing his RFC
and in presenting hypothetical questions to the VE—dementia and urinary frequency. With regard
to dementia, Mr. Seals argues that “the ALJ did not mention an abnormal EEG
[electroencephalogram] which indicated [Mr. Seals] had ‘dementia syndrome’ in his decision.”
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[Filing No. 16 at 20.] Mr. Seals argues that this omission: (1) caused the ALJ “to make adverse
findings at nearly every step of his decision that he might not have made had he considered the
EEG evidence of dementia syndrome” and (2) resulted in “incomplete questioning of the
vocational expert.” [Filing No. 16 at 21-22.] In addition, Mr. Seals argues that “the ALJ did not
adequately account for [Mr. Seals’] urinary frequency” by merely stipulating that Mr. Seals “would
need a job which allowed for him to be near a restroom” rather than accounting for how often Mr.
Seals “would be off task to use the restroom, and how that might affect the availability of ‘other
jobs’ to him at Step Five.” [Filing No. 16 at 23.]
In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s failure to mention evidence related
to the EEG showing dementia syndrome was “at most a harmless error.” [Filing No. 20 at 9.] The
Commissioner further argues that Mr. Seals “has not established this condition required any
treatment or limited him to any significant degree, and has not identified any medical source
opinions that the ALJ failed to consider related to this impairment.” [Filing No. 20 at 10.] With
regard to Mr. Seals’ urinary frequency, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ considered Mr.
Seals’ allegation that he needed to urinate every two hours, “but explained that this frequency was
not supported by his record of successful treatment that resulted in decreased voiding throughout
the day.” [Filing No. 20 at 10.]
On reply, Mr. Seals counters that the ALJ’s failure to consider the EEG showing dementia
syndrome harmed his case “at nearly every step of the ALJ’s decision” by affecting “the credibility
of every allegation and every medical opinion in a negative way.” [Filing No. 21 at 3-4.]

Mr.

Seals further contends that the ALJ’s failure to consider “how often or for what portion of the
workday [Mr. Seals] would need to use the restroom” resulted in vocational testimony that failed
to meet the ALJ’s burden of demonstrating that Mr. Seals could perform other work. Further, Mr.

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Seals contends that the ALJ failed to consider that Mr. Seals’ “frequent consumption of liquids
was a result of frequent dry mouth and excessive thirst caused by his medication, particularly
lithium.” [Filing No. 21 at 5.]
1. Urinary Frequency
The Court will first examine Mr. Seals’ argument regarding urinary frequency, which was
at issue in his initial appeal to Federal District Court. [Filing No. 10-16 at 2-13.] At that time,
the Court reversed and remanded the Commissioner’s decision due to the ALJ’s failure to mention
urinary frequency at any point in his opinion, despite clear evidence in the record supporting Mr.
Seals’ allegations of this impairment. [Filing No. 10-16 at 7.] On remand, the ALJ discussed Mr.
Seals’ urinary frequency in his decision, but made a credibility determination that Mr. Seals
exaggerated his symptoms. [Filing No. 10-15 at 71.]
When an ALJ makes a credibility finding related to the RFC assessment, it will be upheld
“if the ALJ gives specific reasons for that finding, supported by substantial evidence.” Myles v.
Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). “An ALJ may not selectively discuss
portions of a physician’s report that support a finding of non-disability while ignoring other
portions that suggest a disability.” Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 2010). This
“sound-bite” approach to record evaluation “is an impermissible methodology for evaluating the
evidence.” Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2014). Instead, the ALJ “must
confront the evidence that does not support her conclusion and explain why that evidence was
rejected.” Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 2014).
In making the credibility determination that Mr. Seals exaggerated his symptoms, the ALJ
specifically relied upon treatment notes from Mr. Seals’ January 16, 2014 doctor’s appointment,
which provided that Mr. Seals “reported sustained marked improvement of his symptomatology.”

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[Filing No. 10-15 at 15; Filing No. 10-23 at 43]. However, the ALJ did not acknowledge that at
the same visit, Mr. Seals’ physician continued to record an impression of “[u]rinary frequency.”
[Filing No. 10-23 at 43]. By failing to confront or discuss evidence suggesting that Mr. Seals
continued to have a problem with urinary frequency at the January 16, 2014 medical visit, the ALJ
offers a selective discussion of the record that makes it impossible for this Court to conclude that
the ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence.
In addition, Seventh Circuit precedent holds that that “[i]t is important for the vocational
expert to understand the full extent of the applicant’s disability so that the expert does not declare
the applicant capable of undertaking work in the national or local economy that the applicant
cannot truly perform.” Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1003 (7th Cir. 2004). Therefore, “both
the hypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ’s RFC assessment must incorporate all of the
claimant’s limitations supported by the medical record.” Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th
Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). In this case, the ALJ declined to include any limitation whatsoever
regarding the frequency of Mr. Seals’ restroom use in his RFC assessment or in the hypotheticals
posed to the VE at the hearing. Curiously, the ALJ did include ready access to a bathroom in the
RFC determination, which he determined was sufficient to account for Mr. Seals’ complaints of
voiding and accidents. Yet, access to the bathroom does not address the frequency of Mr. Seals’
bathroom use or whether he would be able to perform the jobs identified by the VE. This is
particularly concerning given that the VE testified that:
•

if Mr. Seals were off-task greater than 20% of the time, “he couldn’t sustain
employment at that rate.” [Filing No. 10-15 at 63.]

•

if Mr. Seals bathroom breaks were occurring “at a frequency probably more than
10 times per day, or something of that order, he probably would have to identify it
with his employer and get accommodations.” [Filing No. 10-15 at 65-66.]

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•

if Mr. Seals required bathroom use of just five minutes an hour, “I think it would
make it difficult for him to sustain employment at that rate.” [Filing No. 10-15 at
67.]

The issue of Mr. Seals’ urinary frequency is therefore highly relevant to the denial of benefits. See
Durr-Irving v. Colvin, 600 F. App’x 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding evidence of urinary
incontinence “highly relevant” where a vocational expert testified that a person who must use the
restroom more than once an hour would be unable to perform the few jobs that met the ALJ's
assessment of an applicant’s RFC).
However, the ALJ’s failure to confront evidence suggesting that Mr. Seals continued to
have a problem with urinary frequency in January 2014 resulted in an RFC and hypothetical
questions posed to the VE that fail to incorporate any limitation regarding the frequency of Mr.
Seals’ restroom use. Given the importance of this issue in determining whether Mr. Seals can truly
perform the jobs identified by the VE, the Court finds reversible error and remands the decision of
the ALJ. On remand, the ALJ should ensure that he considers all evidence in assessing his RFC
and in presenting hypothetical questions to the VE.
2. Dementia
The Commissioner acknowledges that the ALJ failed to reference the possibility of
dementia syndrome in assessing the RFC and in posing hypotheticals to the VE, but argues that
this is “at most a harmless error.” [Filing No. 20 at 9.] At the outset, the Court notes that the
Seventh Circuit has long held that in rendering a decision, an ALJ is not required to provide a
complete and written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence. Minnick v. Colvin, 775
F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2015).

However, the Seventh Circuit has also admonished the

Government’s frequent and overbroad use of the “harmless error” concept in defense of ALJ
determinations. Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). In

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determining whether an error was harmless, courts must consider whether the ALJ would reach
the same result but for the error. Hill v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 862, 869 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing McKinzey
v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2011)) (“An error is harmless only if court is ‘convinced’
that ALJ would reach same result on remand.”).
Because this case is being remanded on different grounds, the Court will not perform a
harmless error analysis on the ALJ’s failure to reference evidence suggesting dementia syndrome.
However, on remand, the ALJ should give due consideration to the possibility of dementia
syndrome in assessing the RFC and in posing hypotheticals to the VE.
B.

Other Issues

Given that the Court finds remand is required based on the first issue Mr. Seals raised –
that the ALJ did not account for all of his impairments in assessing his RFC or posing hypotheticals
to the VE – the Court will not discuss the other issues he raised in detail. As to the second issue,
Mr. Seals argues that the Commissioner erred by erroneously discounting the opinion of his
treating mental health specialists and improperly weighing other opinion evidence. [Filing No. 15
at 24-32.] The Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports the weight that the ALJ
gave to medical source opinion and other evidence. [Filing No. 20 at 5-11.] In his reply, Mr. Seals
reiterates his argument that the ALJ lacked “good reason” for discounting the opinions of Mr.
Seals’ two physicians and erroneously weighed opinion evidence from an unidentified source.
[Filing No. 15 at 1-3.] The Court notes that although “the ALJ must provide some explanation for
her decision to discount a treating physician’s opinion, our review is deferential.” Henke v. Astrue,
498 F. App’x 636, 639 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). The ALJ’s decision must stand as long
as he has ‘minimally articulated’ his reasons for rejecting the treating doctor’s opinion. Id. At 639.
At the same time, “an ALJ must offer ‘good reasons’ for discounting a treating physician's

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opinion.” Campbell, 627 F.3d at 306 (citations omitted). On remand, the ALJ should ensure that
he complies with this standard.
In connection with the third issue – the ALJ’s assessment of Mr. Seals’ credibility — Mr.
Seals argues that the ALJ was erroneously dismissive of his allegations regarding urinary
frequency, carpal tunnel syndrome, and limited social functioning. Of particular interest to the
Court, in light of the evidentiary importance of Mr. Seals’ urinary frequency discussed in Part
3.A.1 of this opinion, are his allegations related to increased consumption of liquids due to dry
mouth caused by his use of prescription lithium. The Court notes that an ALJ’s credibility finding
must be upheld unless patently wrong. Spies v. Colvin, 641 F. App’x 628, 633 (7th Cir. 2016)
(citing Minnick, 775 F.3d at 937). However, in making a credibility determination, an ALJ “should
consider elements such as objective medical evidence of the claimant’s impairments, the daily
activities, allegations of pain and other aggravating factors, ‘functional limitations,’ and treatment
(including medication).” Prochaska, 454 F.3d at 738 (emphasis added). Therefore, on remand,
the ALJ should ensure that he considers all evidence, including evidence related to Mr. Seals’ use
of prescription lithium, and builds a logical bridge from that evidence to his conclusion.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed herein, the Court VACATES the ALJ’s decision denying Mr.
Seals benefits and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence four). Judgment shall issue accordingly.

Date: June 5, 2017

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Distribution via ECF only to all counsel of record

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