LESER v. INDIANAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS et al
Filing
121
ORDER-The Court overrules in part and sustains in part Defendants' objections to the Magistrate Judge's decision 109 . Under Rule 72(a), the Court MODIFIES the Magistrate Judge's Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, a s to Dabney only. Leser's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 66 is GRANTED as to adding Defendants Dr. Ferebee, Dr. Legrand, Hester, and Boler and it is DENIED as to Dabney, and she is dismissed from the lawsuit with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to terminate Dabney as a defendant. The order grants 110 Motion for Extension of Time to File a responsive pleading within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 8/8/2018. (CBU)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
DEBORAH L. LESER,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
) Case No. 1:16-cv-02044-TWP-DLP
)
INDIANAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, BOARD )
OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS FOR THE
)
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, MARY SULLIVAN, )
individually and in her official capacity, SAM
)
ODLE, individually and in his official capacity,
)
LANIER ECHOLS, individually and in her official )
capacity, MICHAEL O’CONNOR, individually
)
and in his official capacity, GAYLE COSBY,
)
individually and in her official capacity, KELLY )
BENTLEY, individually and in her official capacity,)
DIANE ARNOLD, individually and in her official )
capacity, LEWIS D. FEREBEE, WANDA
)
LEGRAND, LE BOLER, SHALON DABNEY,
)
and LELA TINA HESTER,
)
)
Defendants.
)
ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS’ RULE 72(A) OBJECTION TO
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Indianapolis Public School (“IPS”), Board
of School Commissioners for the City of Indianapolis (“the Board”), Mary Ann Sullivan
(“Sullivan”), Sam Odle (“Odle”), Lanier Echols (“Echols”), Michael O’Connor (“O’Connor”),
Gayle Cosby (“Cosby”), Kelly Bentley (“Bentley”), Diane Arnold (“Arnold”), Dr. Lewis D.
Ferebee (“Dr. Ferebee”), Le Boler (“Boler”), Dr. Wanda Legrand (“ Dr. Legrand”), Shalon Dabney
(“Dabney”), and Lela Tina Hester’s (“Hester”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Rule 72(a) Objection
to Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint. (Filing No. 109.) Plaintiff Deborah L. Leser
(“Leser”) seeks the Court’s leave to add additional Defendants, Dr. Ferebee, Dr. Legrand, Dabney,
Hester, and Boler, (collectively, “Newly Added Defendants”), to her Complaint. 1 Also before the
Court is Defendants Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint, (Filing No. 110). For the reasons that follow, the Court overrules in part and sustains
in part Defendants’ Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s decision.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may refer for decision a non-dispositive pretrial motion to a magistrate judge under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). Rule 72(a) provides:
When a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party’s claim or defense is referred to a
magistrate judge to hear and decide, the magistrate judge must promptly conduct
the required proceedings and, when appropriate, issue a written order stating the
decision. A party may serve and file objections to the order within 14 days after
being served with a copy. A party may not assign as error a defect in the order not
timely objected to. The district judge in the case must consider timely objections
and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary
to law.
After reviewing objections to a magistrate judge’s order, the district court will modify or
set aside the order only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The clear error standard is
highly deferential, permitting reversal only when the district court “is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126
F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) allows a party to amend its pleading once as a
matter of course within twenty-one days after serving it, or “if the pleading is one to which a
responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after
service of a motion under Rule 12(b).” After a responsive pleading has been filed and twenty-one
days have passed, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent
1
IPS, the Board, Sullivan, Odle, Echols, O’Connor, Cosby, Bentley, and Arnold will be referred to as “Original
Defendants.”
2
or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 15(a)(2). The rule, however, “do[es] not mandate that leave be granted in every case. In
particular, a district court may deny a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint if there is undue delay,
bad faith[,] or dilatory motive . . . [, or] undue prejudice . . . , [or] futility of amendment.” Park v.
City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
A proposed amendment is futile if it “fails to cure the deficiencies in the original pleading, or could
not survive a [] motion to dismiss.” Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 472 (7th Cir. 1991).
“Whether to grant or deny leave to amend is within the district court’s discretion.” Campbell v.
Ingersoll Milling Machine Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir. 1990).
II.
BACKGROUND
Leser instituted this lawsuit following her termination from IPS, alleging violations of
procedural and substantive due process rights under both federal and state law. (Filing No. 1.)
Leser began working for IPS in 1995. During her tenure with IPS, she held several positions,
including: teacher, counselor, vice principal, and principal. Leser’s most recent IPS title was
Director of Student Services. As Director of Student Services, she was tasked with supervising the
principal of Longfellow Alternative School (“Longfellow”). On February 17, 2016, William
Jensen (“Jensen”), then-principal of Longfellow, contacted Leser regarding a parent’s report of an
inappropriate sexual relationship (“the Taylor Relationship”) between a student and a Longfellow
employee named Shana Taylor (“Taylor”). Leser directed Jensen to contact Hester, the Assistant
Superintendent of Human Resources. Id. at 9. The very same day, Dr. Ferebee, the Superintendent
of IPS, also learned of at least an inappropriate relationship between Taylor and the student. Id. at
10. Hester advised Jensen not to contact the police, and assigned Dabney to investigate.
3
Meanwhile, Leser made several calls to other IPS employees, including: Dr. Legrand;
Human Resources officer Sandra Bombic; and IPS Chief Strategist Boler. After informing each
of them of the inappropriate relationship at Longfellow, Leser asked Dr. Legrand if there was
anything else she needed to do. Dr. Legrand stated: “sounds like you have it handled.” Id. at 14.
Boler also assured Leser that she would inform Dr. Ferebee. None of the employees contacted the
police.
On February 23, 2016, Dabney told Mark Cosand (“Cosand”) to report the relationship to
Child Protective Services (“CPS”), which Cosand reported the very same day. Id. at 10. On March
2, 2016, the “Shana Taylor story” became public. Thereafter, IPS attorney David Given (“Given”)
interviewed Leser, as well as others including: Jensen, Cosand, Dabney and Hester. Given
explained that his goal was to gather facts regarding the complaint made against Taylor. Dr.
Ferebee also conducted interviews. Leser was suspended on March 15, 2016. Id. at 19. Hester
and Dabney were criminally charged with failure to make a report on April 12, 2016. Hester and
Dabney were permitted to resign from their employment on June 30, 2016. No criminal charges
were filed against Leser. On June 1, 2016, however, Leser received a letter notifying her of a
preliminary decision to cancel her employment contracts for failure to report the incident to CPS.
Id. at 19-20. On June 27, 2016, a hearing was held before the Board and, on June 30, 2016, the
Board unanimously voted to cancel Leser’s employment contracts based on insubordination and
neglect of duty.
Leser initiated this action on July 29, 2016 alleging the Defendants denied her due process.
Specifically, Leser alleges: 1) Count I-Defendants failed to provide proper notice regarding the
hearing; 2) Count II-Attorney Given and Dr. Ferebee failed to advise her of her Garrity rights prior
to interviewing her; 3) Count III-Defendants’ decision to terminate her was arbitrary and
4
capricious; and 5) Count IV-the Court should review the decision to terminate Leser and grant her
relief pursuant to Indiana Code § 4-21.5-5-14. (Filing No. 1.) On July 28, 2017, this Court
dismissed Count II of Leser’s Complaint, regarding deprivation of her Garrity rights. (Filing No.
49.) The Court further determined that, at this early stage in the litigation, Defendants’ qualified
immunity claim was not yet ripe, due to a lack of information before the Court. 2 On December
28, 2017, the deadline by which to amend the pleadings and/or join additional parties, Leser filed
a Motion to Amend/Correct the Complaint, on the basis of newly discovered information that
implicated the proposed Newly Added Defendants. (Filing No. 66 at 2.) Leser’s Motion to Amend
her initial Complaint sought to add Jonathan Mayes (“Mayes”), Given, Dr. Ferebee, Boler, Dr.
Legrand, Hester, and Dabney. On June 4, 2018, Magistrate Judge Doris L. Pryor (“the Magistrate
Judge”) granted that Motion as to Defendants Boler, Dr. Legrand, Hester, Dabney, and Dr.
Ferebee. Although Leser’s Motion to Amend sought to add the Newly Added Defendants to
multiple Counts, the Magistrate Judge granted the Motion to add Defendants Boler, Dr. Legrand,
Hester, Dabney, and Dr. Ferebee to only Counts III and IV of Complaint; counts that allege under
federal and state law that the Defendants arbitrarily and capriciously made the decision to terminate
her teaching and administrative assignments. (Filing No. 104 at 7, 9; Filing No. 105 at 23-25.)
On June 18, 2018, Defendants filed their objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order. (Filing No.
109.)
III. DISCUSSION
A.
The Magistrate Judge’s Order
2
In the Magistrate’s Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint, the Magistrate Judge correctly denied
Defendants’ arguments that leave to amend should be denied on the basis of qualified immunity. (“Since this Court
has already considered the issue of qualified immunity at length and no additional information has been offered, the
Court will not consider the Defendants’ arguments related to qualified immunity here.”) (Filing No. 104 at 2, n.1.)
5
The Magistrate Judge’s order granted in part and denied in part Leser’s Motion to amend
the Complaint. It was denied as to the addition of Given, Mayes, as well as Dr. Ferebee (as to
Counts I and II only). No party objects to this portion of the Order. As noted previously, the
Magistrate Judge granted Leser’s Motion to Amend with regards to adding Boler, Dr. Legrand,
Hester, Dabney, and Dr. Ferebee to Counts III and IV. As to Boler, Dr. Legrand, Hester, and
Dabney, the Order explains that the Proposed Amended Complaint lays out at length the role each
of these four Defendants played in the events that brought about Leser’s termination. (Filing No.
104 at 7.) With regards to Dr. Ferebee, the Order held that there were “enough facts alleged to
plausibly state a claim and withstand the test of futility,” based on the alleged facts that Dr. Ferebee
was involved in the initial decision to terminate Leser and made the recommendation to the Board
that Leser’s contract be terminated. Id. at 9.
B.
Defendants’ Objections
Defendants assert three bases for objecting to the Magistrate Judge’s Order: 1) as a matter
of law, the Newly Added Defendants’ involvement with Leser’s termination does not establish
potential liability i.e. adding them would be futile; 2) the Newly Added Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity; and 3) the Newly Added Defendants are not parties from whom relief may be
obtained. Leser responds that the Newly Added Defendants were fundamental to the investigation
and eventual termination of her employment, and that any delay in adding these defendants was
because the Original Defendants withheld documents and continue to withhold documents. (Filing
No. 114 at 2.) Additionally, Leser responds that the Newly Added Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity, and they are proper parties from whom relief can be granted. The Court will
address each objection in turn.
6
1.
Futility of Amendment
Defendants cite extensive factual allegations from the Proposed Amended Complaint
regarding Boler’s, Dr. Legrand’s, Hester’s, and Dabney’s involvement in the investigation of the
Taylor Relationship, including subsequent events related to Leser’s termination and directions
given to Leser on how to proceed. (Filing No. 109 at 6-7) (citing Filing No. 66-1 at 11-15). Yet,
Defendants then summarize these extensive factual allegations as merely awareness of the Taylor
Relationship from which Leser concludes the Newly Added Defendants were somehow
responsible for her termination. Specifically, based on Defendants’ citations to the Proposed
Amended Complaint, the factual allegations included directions from Hester, Boler, and Dr.
Legrand, at a minimum, which is more than awareness. Defendants concede that Dr. Ferebee
recommended termination of Leser’s employment, but that the Board’s hearing and resulting
findings overrode any alleged involvement by the Newly Added Defendants. In contrast to
Defendants’ summary of the factual allegations, the Magistrate Judge’s accurate summary of the
factual allegations was stated as follows:
In her Motion to Amend and the Proposed Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff lays
out at length the involvement of these four Defendants in the events that brought
about her termination. Leser maintains that she complied with IPS protocol in
reporting the Shana Taylor incident. When Leser questioned whether there was
anything else that she needed to do with regarding to reporting, Dr. LeGrand stated
that “it sounded like [Leser] had it covered.” (Dkt. 66-1 at 17). Leser argues that Le
Boler was responsible for orchestrating her termination because Le Boler “was one
of the first to learn of the Shana Taylor matter, but did not report it.” (Dkt. 66 at 3).
Instead, Ms. Boler indicated that she would inform Dr. Ferebee of the incident.
(Filing No. 104 at 7.) Additionally, the Magistrate Judge noted that Hester and Dabney “were
criminally charged with failing to report the Shala Taylor incident to CPS after learning about it
from Leser.” Id. at 8.
7
Defendants contend that the Magistrate Judge’s decision was in error because even if the
Newly Added Defendants were part of the causal chain that resulted in her termination, only
decision-makers can be held liable under § 1983. (Filing No. 109 at 7-8.) The Newly Added
Defendants have been added to this lawsuit in their individual and official capacities. To state a
claim under § 1983 for an “arbitrary and capricious” termination, the Seventh Circuit has held that:
it has long been our precedent that a plaintiff who challenges the substance of a
government decision on substantive due process grounds (as opposed to
challenging the process the decision-makers used on procedural due process
grounds) must show (1) that the decision was arbitrary and irrational, and (2) that
the decision-makers either committed another substantive constitutional violation
or that state remedies are inadequate.
Strasburger v. Bd. of Educ., Hardin Cty. Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1, 143 F.3d 351, 357 (7th Cir.
1998). Defendants are correct that only decision-makers may be held liable for an arbitrary and
capricious termination on substantive due process grounds. 3 However, the Proposed Amended
Complaint alleges Boler, Hester, Dabney, Legrand, and Dr. Ferebee were decision-makers acting
under color of state law. (Filing No. 105 at 23-24). For purposes of § 1983 liability, the decision
maker for any given action depends on who is “at the apex of authority for the action in question.”
Perry v. City of Indianapolis, 1:11-cv-172-RLY-TAB, 2013 WL 1750747 at *6 (S.D. Ind. April
23, 2013) (quoting Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir.
2001). “State law determines who legally constitutes a final policymaker.” Darchak v. City of
Chicago Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2009). Defendants’ contend that under Indiana
law the decision to terminate employment is placed with the Board of School Commissioners. The
Indiana Court of Appeals has recognized that the city board of education and its superintendent
may act in concert in deciding whether to cancel a teacher’s contract. Myers v. Greater Clark Cty.
3
Although not at issue in the pending matter, Leser’s Complaint includes a procedural due process violation count.
(Filing No. 105 at 22.)
8
Sch. Corp., 464 N.E.2d 1323, 1329 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). Moreover, in §1983 actions, the Seventh
Circuit recognizes de facto decision-makers when a school board, with express authority over
personnel decisions, delegate or ratify termination actions. Darchak, 580 F.3d at 630.
It is important to note the liberal standard to “freely give leave [to amend a complaint]
when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a)(2). Moreover, the clear error standard on the
Magistrate Judge’s ruling is highly deferential, permitting reversal only when the district court “is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Weeks v. Samsung Heavy
Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997). Dr. Ferebee, as superintendent of IPS, is alleged
to be involved in the initial decision to terminate Leser and made the recommendation to the Board
to terminate Leser. Defendants concede Dr. Ferebee made the recommendation to the Board to
terminate Leser’s employment. (Filing No. 109 at 9). Hester, the then-Human Resources
Operation Officer, is alleged to have been the first person contacted regarding the Taylor
Relationship, and told Jensen not to involve the police. (Filing No. 105 at 10-11.) Additionally,
Leser points the Court to emails between Hester and Dr. Ferebee regarding pre-termination
communications on orchestrating Leser’s termination. (Filing No. 114 at 3; Filing No. 114-4.)
Boler, Chief Strategist at IPS, is alleged to be another person Leser contacted about the Taylor
Relationship, and Leser asked Boler if there was anything else she needed to do. (Filing No. 105
at 16.) Dr. Legrand, Deputy Superintendent of IPS, is alleged to have also been contacted
regarding the Taylor Relationship. (Filing No. 105 at 15.) When Leser asked Dr. Legrand “if
there was anything else she needed to do, Dr. Legrand indicated there was not, saying ‘sounds like
you have it handled.’” Id. at 15-16. Dabney, Human Resources Case Manager at IPS, was
assigned by Hester to investigate the Taylor Relationship. There are no allegations that Leser dealt
directly with Dabney, or that Dabney gave any directions to Leser. See id. at 16.
9
The Court finds that Dabney is the only Newly Added Defendant that it would be futile to
add to the Proposed Amended Complaint, as she was not in a decision-making role (as evidenced
by her title-case manager). Nor is Dabney alleged to have been an active participant in Leser’s
termination decision, other than investigating the Taylor Relationship, which is insufficient under
both Indiana and federal law. According to the Proposed Amended Complaint, Dabney is the only
Newly Added Defendant alleged to have only mere awareness regarding Leser’s termination. The
Magistrate Judge erred in allowing Dabney to be added to the lawsuit. Accordingly, Dabney is
dismissed from the lawsuit with prejudice.
As for Dr. Ferebee, Dr. Legrand, Hester, and Boler, there are sufficient plausible
allegations, at this juncture, regarding their concerted involvement with Leser’s termination.
2.
Qualified Immunity
As noted previously, relying on this Court’s Order on the issue of qualified immunity
applied to the Original Defendants on a Motion to Dismiss, the Magistrate Judge did not consider
the issue of qualified immunity.
Since this Court has already considered the issue of qualified immunity at length
and no additional information has been offered, the Court will not consider the
Defendants’ arguments related to qualified immunity here. Accordingly, any
request by the Defendants that leave to amend should be denied on the basis of
qualified immunity should be considered denied.
(Filing No. 104 at 2 n.1.) This Court held as to the Original Defendants:
As discussed above, Leser has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for arbitrary
termination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Leser’s Complaint alleges
that despite obeying the rules outlined in IPS Procedure 3213.01, the
Commissioners terminated her. This fact, as well as the fact that the Commissioners
did not terminate others who had knowledge of the inappropriate relationship,
would make it clear to a reasonable Commissioner that Leser’s substantive due
process rights were violated. Accordingly, at this early stage of this litigation, the
Defendants’ qualified immunity claim[] is denied.
10
(Filing No. 49 at 17.) Leser incorporates her argument contained in her Response in Opposition
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (against the Original Defendants) by reference as applied to the
Newly Added Defendants. (Filing No. 114 at 5.) Defendants correctly note that each Defendant’s
entitlement to qualified immunity should be determined on its own merits. (Filing No. 109 at 12
n.3.) Due to numerous disputes, litigation has been essentially halted in this case. Thus, the
Magistrate Judge reasonably did not consider Defendants’ arguments related to qualified
immunity, as this Court had already considered the issue of qualified immunity at length and no
additional information has been offered. Moreover, the qualified immunity issue is inextricably
connected to the constitutional issues raised against the Newly Added Defendants. Given the
trajectory of this case, Defendants’ argument for denying a motion to amend at the pleadings stage,
on the basis of qualified immunity, faces a larger hurdle than it did at the motion to dismiss stage.
Thus, the Newly Added Defendants argument for qualified immunity meets the same fate as the
Original Defendants because Leser has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for arbitrary and
capricious termination, under Twombly/Iqbal, at this early stage of this litigation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009). Unfortunately, the needle has barely moved in this case since this Court’s
July 28, 2017 Entry on Motion to Dismiss. The Newly Added Defendants’ Objection to the
Magistrate Judge’s Order on qualified immunity is overruled.
3.
Parties from Whom Relief May Be Granted
Defendants’ contend that the Magistrate Judge erred when allowing Leser to amend her
Complaint to add the Newly Added Defendants to Count IV of the Complaint (Petition for Review
Pursuant to Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14). Specifically, Defendants explain that Leser may seek
judicial review pursuant to the Teacher Tenure Act, but not pursuant to the Indiana Administrative
Orders and Procedures Act (“AOPA”), and that there is no right under Indiana law to add
11
individual parties in their individual or official capacities. (Filing No. 109 at 14; Filing No. 118 at
7.) Leser responds that Defendants failed to cite any case law or statutory authority to support
their contention, and the reason for this failure is because none exists. (Filing No. 114 at 6.) As
noted previously, the Proposed Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges a plausible theory that the
Newly Added Defendants terminated Leser’s employment. The Court agrees with Defendants’
first contention in that the Teacher Tenure Act governs judicial review of a school board’s predeprivation termination proceedings. Ind. Code 20-28-7.5-3. See Board of School Com’rs of City
of Indianapolis v. Walpole, 801 N.E.2d 622, 625 (Ind. 2004). However, Defendants’ contention
that AOPA could not apply in this case is misplaced, as Leser’s Count IV hinges on whether
various IPS procedures were violated warranting her termination. (See Filing No. 105 at 25-26.)
Additionally, Leser raises evidentiary deficiencies related to the hearing. In any event, there is a
lack of information, at this stage, as to whether the Board or the Newly Added Defendants held
the ultimate authority to terminate Leser (and if they had already done so before the Board
meeting). Accordingly, the Court overrules this objection the Magistrate Judge’s Order.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules in part and sustains in part Defendants’
objections to the Magistrate Judge’s decision. (Filing No. 109.) Under Rule 72(a), the Court
MODIFIES the Magistrate Judge’s Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint, (Filing No.
104), as to Dabney only. Leser’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Filing No. 66) is
GRANTED as to adding Defendants Dr. Ferebee, Dr. Legrand, Hester, and Boler and it is
DENIED as to Dabney, and she is dismissed from this lawsuit with prejudice. The Clerk is
directed to terminate Dabney as a defendant.
12
Defendants’ Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint, wherein they request fourteen days after the Court rules on their Rule 72(a) Objection
to file a responsive pleading (Filing No. 110), is GRANTED. Defendants shall have fourteen (14)
days from the date of this Order to file a responsive pleading.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 8/8/2018
DISTRIBUTION:
Kevin W. Betz
BETZ & BLEVINS
kbetz@betzadvocates.com
Jamie A. Maddox
BETZ & ASSOCIATES
jmaddox@betzadvocates.com
Ellen E. Boshkoff
FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP (Indianapolis)
ellen.boshkoff@faegrebd.com
Matthew K. Giffin
FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP (Indianapolis)
matt.giffin@faegrebd.com
Jonathan Lamont Mayes
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
jmayes@boselaw.com
Andrew M. McNeil
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP
amcneil@boselaw.com
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?