KINSELLA v. INDIANA UNIVERSITY HEALTH, INC.
Filing
126
ENTRY - Dr. Kinsella clearly disagrees with the Magistrate Judges evaluation of the proceedings, conclusion that she should not be granted leave to amend her Complaint to add a new claim against new defendants, and decision regarding case management deadlines in this years-old case. But Dr. Kinsellas disagreement does not equate to clear or legal error, and the Magistrate Judge amply justified his decisions with discussions of relevant law and observations from the previous proceedings in this m atter. Therefore, the Court: OVERRULES Dr. Kinsellas Objections to United States Magistrate Judge Brookmans Order Denying Her Motion for Leave to File Third Amended and Supplemental Complaint, 107 ; and OVERRULES Dr. Kinsellas Objections to United States Magistrate Judge Brookmans Order on Second Amended Case Management Plan, 114 . (See Entry). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 1/7/2020. (JDH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
SANDRA KINSELLA, M.D.,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
INDIANA UNIVERSITY HEALTH C ARE
ASSOCIATES, INC., d/b/a INDIANA UNIVERSITY
HEALTH PHYSICIANS,
Defendant.
No. 1:16-cv-02252-JMS-MPB
ENTRY
Plaintiff Sandra Kinsella, M.D. brought this action against Indiana University Health Care
Associates, Inc. d/b/a Indiana University Health Physicians (“IU Health”) alleging gender
discrimination, illegal retaliation, and wrongful discharge. [Filing No. 26 at 3-5.] The case was
closed on December 4, 2017 by agreement of the parties following a settlement. [Filing No. 68.]
The case was later reopened, and Dr. Kinsella sought leave to amend her Complaint to add new
defendants and a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). [Filing No. 79.] Magistrate
Judge Matthew P. Brookman denied Dr. Kinsella’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint,
[Filing No. 106], and had the parties file proposed case management plans, [Filing No. 103]. Judge
Brookman adopted IU Health’s proposed case management plan and entered an Order on Second
Amended Case Management Plan. [Filing No. 112.] Dr. Kinsella filed objections to Judge
Brookman’s Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and his Order on Second
Amended Case Management Plan. [Filing No. 107; Filing No. 114.] For the reasons set forth
below, the Court OVERRULES both of Dr. Kinsella’s Objections.
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I.
BACKGROUND
On August 9, 2016, Dr. Kinsella filed this lawsuit in state court against IU Health, and on
August 24, 2016, IU Health removed the action to this Court. [Filing No. 1.] On December 22,
2016, Dr. Kinsella filed a Second Amended Complaint, asserting the following claims: (1) Gender
Discrimination in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (2) Retaliation; and, (3)
Wrongful Termination. [Filing No. 26 at 3-5.] However, in her Statement of Claims filed on
November 10, 2017, Dr. Kinsella only listed her Title VII gender discrimination claim. [Filing
No. 64.]
The parties participated in a settlement conference on November 29, 2017 and they reached
a resolution. [Filing No. 66.] The Settlement Agreement stated, in relevant part:
Dr. Kinsella may ask the Court to re-open the Action to allow the
Action to proceed if Drs. Allison, Hardacher, Johnson, Kritzmire or
Lathan do not receive a contract renewal during the relevant period,
or Dr. Kinsella receives evidence of what she believes to be
unlawful gender discrimination against female [IU Health]
anesthesiologists by Dr. Presson on the [IU Health] Anesthesiology
Division leaders.
[Filing No. 106 at 2.]1 Following settlement, the parties jointly moved for this action to be
administratively closed, [Filing No. 67], which motion the Court granted on December 4, 2017,
[Filing No. 68].
On March 9, 2019, Dr. Kinsella filed her Notice of Reopening Case, [Filing No. 69], which
IU Health opposed, [Filing No. 70]. Judge Brookman held a Status Conference with the parties
on March 20, 2019 and ordered that, “[t]o the extent [Dr. Kinsella’s] Notice of Reopening (Docket
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Although the Settlement Agreement is confidential, the parties agreed that this portion of the
Settlement Agreement could be made part of the public record. [Filing No. 106 at 2, n. 1.]
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No. 69) could be construed as a motion, the Court DENIES the motion without prejudice and with
leave to refile the motion requesting administrative reopening. . . .” [Filing No. 75.]
Dr. Kinsella filed a Motion to Reopen Case on April 29, 2019, [Filing No. 79], and an
Amended Motion to Reopen Case on May 20, 2017, [Filing No. 87], alleging that she learned the
five female anesthesiologists she previously deposed in this case were retaliated against after they
testified in this action. [Filing No. 87 at 2.] The case was reopened on July 19, 2019. [Filing No.
97.]
Three days later, Dr. Kinsella filed a Motion for Leave to File Third Amended and
Supplemental Complaint (“Motion for Leave to Amend”), seeking to add additional defendants—
Robert G. Presson, M.D., Indiana University Medical School, and Senthil Sadhasivam, M.D.—
and a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). [Filing No. 99.] IU Health opposed the
motion, [Filing No. 104], and Dr. Kinsella filed a Reply. [Filing No. 105].
On September 27, 2019, Judge Brookman denied Dr. Kinsella’s Motion for Leave to
Amend, holding that Dr. Kinsella’s allegations in her proposed Third Amended Complaint “do not
support a claim of conspiracy as there is no coordination between the two proposed defendants,”
and fail to support the four elements of a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. 1985(2). [Filing No.
106 at 5-6.]
Judge Brookman further found that the “intra-corporate immunity doctrine” barred any
conspiracy claim because the two proposed defendants are part of the same entity. [Filing No. 106
at 6.] Although Dr. Kinsella argued that the proposed defendants were employed by different
entities, Judge Brookman pointed to the affidavit of one of the female anesthesiologists, Dr.
Kritzmire, wherein she stated that her “direct supervisor is Dr. Senthil Sadhasivam, who then
reports to Dr. Robert Presson of [IU Health],” [Filing No. 87-4 at 1], and described “joint action
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by the two proposed defendants to reprimand [her],” [Filing No. 106 at 6 (emphasis in original).]
Judge Brookman reasoned that, “even accepting Dr. Kinsella’s allegations of discrimination and
retaliation as true, the intra-corporate immunity doctrine prevents managers of the same
organization from becoming conspirators.” [Filing No. 106 at 6.]
Finally, Judge Brookman found that, most significantly, an amendment adding a new claim
and new defendants would cause undue delay and prejudice to IU Health and to the Court. [Filing
No. 106 at 6.] Accordingly, Judge Brookman found that although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “[t]he Court should freely give leave when justice so requires,” the
undue delay and prejudice that would result from Dr. Kinsella’s proposed amendments were valid
reasons to depart from the usual freedom to amend provided in Rule 15(a)(2). [Filing No. 106 at
6-8 (citing Murphy v. White Hen Pantry Co., 691 F.2d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirming district
court’s denial of leave to amend because amendment would “inject[] an entirely new theory of
liability into the lawsuit, . . . requir[ing] reopening discovery and further delay[ing] the trial.”)).]
Judge Brookman reasoned that “though Dr. Kinsella was diligent in filing the amended complaint
after the Court reopened the case, considerable delay to the litigation process would likely stem
from adding this new claim and these new defendants.” [Filing No. 106 at 7.]
On October 1, 2019, Dr. Kinsella filed her Objections to United States Magistrate Judge
Brookman’s Order Denying Her Motion for Leave to File Third Amended and Supplemental
Complaint (“Amendment Objection”). [Filing No. 107.]
On October 7, 2019, Dr. Kinsella and IU Health filed competing proposed Case
Management Plans. [Filing No. 109; Filing No. 111.] Judge Brookman adopted IU Health’s
proposed Case Management Plan and rejected the one filed by Dr. Kinsella. [Filing No. 111;
Filing No. 112.] On October 17, 2019, Dr. Kinsella filed her Objections to United States
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Magistrate Judge Brookman’s Order on Second Amended Case Management Plan (“Case
Management Objection”). [Filing No. 114.]
IU Health opposes both the Amendment Objection and the Case Management Objection
filed by Dr. Kinsella, and the Objections are fully briefed and ripe for review. The Court addresses
each Objection in turn.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Review of a magistrate judge’s decision on a nondispositive matter 2 is deferential, and the
Court may sustain an objection to such an order only where it is “clearly erroneous or is contrary
to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). An order is clearly erroneous “only if
the district court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Weeks
v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997). “An order is contrary to
law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Pain
Center of SE Ind., LLC v. Origin Healthcare Solutions, LLC, 2014 WL 6674757, *2 (S.D. Ind.
2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Amendment Objection
Dr. Kinsella argues that Judge Brookman’s Order denying her Motion for Leave to Amend
was “clearly erroneous” because she has good cause for filing a Third Amended Complaint.
[Filing No. 107 at 2.] Dr. Kinsella argues that once she learned of the retaliation against the five
Although denying leave to amend may foreclose a plaintiff’s opportunity to bring a new claim,
“[t]he Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a magistrate judge’s denial of a motion to
amend is not dispositive and is subject to review only for clear error.” Dugdale, Inc. v. AlcatelLucent USA, Inc., 2011 WL 1100249, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 23, 2011) (citing Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry.
Co., 469 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2006)).
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female anesthesiologists she deposed, she was diligent in filing a request to reopen the case and
amend her complaint. [Filing No. 107 at 3.] Dr. Kinsella further argues that she adequately alleged
all of the elements of a § 1985(2) conspiracy claim, [Filing No. 107 at 4-5], and such claim would
not be barred by the intra-corporate immunity doctrine because, she argues, Dr. Presson and Dr.
Sahasivam are employed by separated entities, as Dr. Sadhasivam is a professor at the Indiana
University School of Medicine in addition to being employed by IU Health. [Filing No. 107 at 6.]
Further, Dr. Kinsella argues that the situation here falls into one of the exceptions of the intracorporate doctrine—where “the conspiracy was part of some broader discriminatory pattern . . . ,
or . . . permeated the ranks of the organization’s employees”—because her proposed Third
Amended Complaint alleges that the conspiracy was part of a broad pattern of discrimination at
IU Health. [Filing No. 107 at 6 (quoting Hartman v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. 508, 4 F.3d
465, 470-71 (7th Cir. 1993)).] Dr. Kinsella also cites three cases from the Northern District of
Illinois, arguing that the intra-corporate immunity doctrine does not apply where an alleged
conspiracy involves retaliation against another person in the same organization. [Filing No. 107
at 7.] Finally, Dr. Kinsella argues that Judge Brookman erred when he found that there would be
undue delay and prejudice to defendants if Dr. Kinsella was permitted to amend her complaint,
because she did not delay in seeking leave to amend her complaint and the nature of the litigation
will not be greatly altered with the addition of the conspiracy claim against the additional
defendants. [Filing No. 107 at 7.]
IU Health argues that Judge Brookman’s decision was correct because Dr. Kinsella’s
proposed Third Amended Complaint failed to state a claim for conspiracy, [Filing No. 113 at 4],
and, in any event, such an amendment would be futile because “in the context of § 1985 claims,
‘managers of a corporation jointly pursuing its lawful business do not become ‘conspirators’ when
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acts within the scope of their employment are said to be discriminatory or retaliatory.’” [Filing
No. 113 at 6 (quoting Travis v. Gary Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 921 F.2d 108, 110 (7 th Cir.
1990))]. IU Health points out that Dr. Kinsella does not cite to any authority to support her
argument that the intra-corporate immunity doctrine does not apply here because at least one of
the additional defendants is employed by two entities. [Filing No. 113 at 6.]
Even if her
contention were true, IU Health argues, Dr. Kinsella’s proposed amendment would still fail
because she did not allege a single fact that would allow an inference that Dr. Sadhasivam was
acting on behalf of the medical school while Dr. Presson was acting on behalf of IU Health in this
alleged conspiracy. [Filing No. 113 at 6.]
IU Health also challenges Dr. Kinsella’s argument that this case falls within an exception
to the intra-corporate immunity doctrine—an argument that IU Health suggests was raised for the
first time in Dr. Kinsella’s Amendment Objection, and therefore, has been waived. [Filing No.
113 at 6.] According to IU Health, the Third Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations:
demonstrating there was a conspiracy to obstruct justice to Dr. Kinsella, [Filing No. 113 at 8], that
that any witness was precluded from testifying or attending Court proceedings, or that Dr. Kinsella
has been injured by any alleged conspiracy. [Filing No. 113 at 4, n.3.] Finally, IU Health argues
that Judge Brookman correctly found that the Court and the Defendants would be prejudiced by
the addition of a new claim and new defendants at this late stage of the litigation. [Filing No. 113
at 9.] IU Health posits that Dr. Kinsella’s diligence is not at issue here; rather, the problem is that
permitting Dr. Kinsella to pursue a conspiracy claim at this stage would result in “considerable
delay to the litigation process.” [Filing No. 113 at 9 (quoting Filing No. 106 at 7 (internal
quotations omitted).] IU Health argues that Judge Brookman accurately addressed this problem
when he noted that, if Dr. Kinsella’s new claim was added to the case, the Court would have to
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reopen discovery and the claim “would significantly alter the factual inquiry of the case long after
discovery had closed and would require a significant extension of the case management plan.”
[Filing No. 113 at 9 (quoting Filing No. 106 at 7) (internal quotations omitted).]
In her reply, Dr. Kinsella responds to IU Health’s specific arguments raised in its response.
[Filing No. 115.] Regarding IU Health’s argument that Dr. Kinsella has failed to allege any injury,
Dr. Kinsella cites a case from the Sixth Circuit and a case from the Ninth Circuit to support her
argument that she need only allege that the conspiracy hampered her ability to effectively litigate
the case, which she argues she has done. [Filing No. 115 at 3-4, n. 1.] She also argues that she
has not waived her argument regarding her conspiracy claim falling within one of the exceptions
to the intra-corporate immunity doctrine because, although she did not specifically cite Hartman
v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. 508, 4 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 1993), in the proceedings before Judge
Brookman, all of her briefs submitted up to this point can be read to have put forth the argument
that IU Health “has maintained a discriminatory pattern.” [Filing No. 115 at 4.] Dr. Kinsella also
argues that IU Health is asking this Court to hold her to a heightened pleading standard. [Filing
No. 115 at 5.]
Rule 15(a)(2) permits a party to amend its pleading “only with the opposing party’s written
consent or the court’s leave,” and “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). That said, “the right to amend is not absolute.” Jafree v. Barber, 689
F.2d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1982). Leave to amend may be inappropriate where there exists “undue
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies
by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance
of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
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In support of his decision to deny Dr. Kinsella leave to amend her Complaint, Judge
Brookman cited several cases from the Seventh Circuit, including: Sanders v. Venture Stores, Inc.,
56 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1995); Murphy v. White Hen Pantry Co., 691 F.2d 350, 353 (7th Cir.
1982); and Johnson v. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Ill., 10 F.3d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1993). In each of
these cases, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend based on
undue delay and prejudice to the defendant. Sanders, 56 F.3d at 774 (“[G]ranting Plaintiffs’
motion for leave to amend clearly would result in undue delay, as well as prejudice to Venture and
the four new defendants, forcing Venture to re-litigate the dispute on new bases . . . and to incur
new rounds of additional discovery. . . .”); Murphy, 691 F.2d at 353 (“[T]he motion injected an
entirely new theory of liability into the lawsuit,” which “would have required reopening discovery
and further delayed the trial.”); Johnson, 10 F.3d at 1304 (proposed amendment introduced new
claim and new defendants that were “distinct from the allegations raised in the second amended
complaint,” meaning defendant “would have to engage in substantial additional discovery” and
“have to engage in a new contest on different issues—four years after the action was started.”).
Relying on this authority, Judge Brookman determined that Dr. Kinsella’s new conspiracy claim
against new defendants “would significantly alter the factual inquiry of the case long after
discovery has closed and would require a significant extension of the case management plan,”
which “would prejudice not only the Defendants but also the Court.” [Filing No. 106 at 7-8.]
Noting that the deadline for non-expert discovery and discovery related to liability issues had
already passed, Judge Brookman explained that “[t]he time and expense involved in additional
discovery at this point would create undue delay in the timeline of the litigation.” [Filing No. 106
at 7-8.]
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The Court agrees that permitting this new, distinct claim to proceed against new defendants
at this stage in the litigation would result in considerable delay, and therefore, prejudice. See
Murphy, 691 F.2d at 353 (“Amending the complaint at this late stage clearly would have prejudiced
the defendant, who, having successfully defended against the initial allegations, may have been
forced to duplicate its efforts if discovery were reopened.”).
The Court finds that Judge
Brookman’s Order denying Dr. Kinsella leave to amend is consistent with the undue delay and
prejudice exceptions to Rule 15(a)(2) outlined by the Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962), and is in line with other cases in this Circuit. Therefore, Judge Brookman’s
Order, [Filing No. 106], is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Accordingly, Dr. Kinsella’s
Amendment Objection, [107], is OVERRULED.3
B. Case Management Objection
Dr. Kinsella objects to the Magistrate Judge’s October 8, 2019 Order setting forth a
“truncated version of the Court’s standard case management plan,” for four reasons. [Filing No.
114 at 2-3.] First, Dr. Kinsella argues that Judge Brookman’s Case Management Plan “does not
comply with the Court’s standard or uniform case management plan used in most all civil
litigation,” as opposed to Dr. Kinsella’s proposed plan, which does comply with the Court’s
standard practice. [Filing No. 114 at 3.] Second, Dr. Kinsella argues that the Case Management
Plan makes the assumption that this Court will affirm Judge Brookman’s Order denying her
Motion for Leave to Amend, because it does not allow her time to conduct discovery for the
additional claim and defendants. [Filing No. 114 at 3.] Third, Dr. Kinsella asserts that Judge
3 Because the
exceptions to Rule 15(a)(2) are sufficient reasons, alone, for denying leave to amend,
the Court need not address the parties’ arguments regarding the sufficiency of Dr. Kinsella’s
allegations in support of her conspiracy claim, nor the futility of the conspiracy claim based on the
intra-corporate immunity doctrine.
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Brookman’s Order denying her Motion for Leave to Amend assumes that Dr. Kinsella will lose on
summary judgment, because it limits Dr. Kinsella to only conducting one deposition and not
conducting any further discovery after that. [Filing No. 114 at 3-4.] Finally, Dr. Kinsella argues
that she will be prejudiced by the limitations of Judge Brookman’s Case Management Plan. [Filing
No. 114 at 4.] Overall, Dr. Kinsella argues that the October 8, 2019 Order “hampers her ability to
reach a just resolution,” and that the reopening of the case is not due to any fault on her part, but
instead results from IU Health’s breach of the Settlement Agreement. [Filing No. 14 at 4.]
In response, IU Health points out that “[a]t the time this case was administratively closed
on December 4, 2017, the non-expert and liability discovery deadline had already passed, with the
parties agreeing only to take one more deposition.” [Filing No. 119 at 1.] IU Health argues that,
despite Dr. Kinsella’s contentions, the Second Amended Case Management Plan does not make
improper assumptions. [Filing No. 119 at 4.] Instead, it includes the appropriate language for the
stage at which this case currently sits. [Filing No. 119 at 3.] IU Health agrees that this Court had
not yet ruled on her Amendment Objection and that the ruling could change the relevant deadlines;
however, IU Health argues that the case must move forward in the meantime and must proceed as
it is, not as Dr. Kinsella wants it to be. [Filing No. 119 at 3.] IU Health argues that the Second
Amended Case Management Plan does not prejudice Dr. Kinsella because she previously had the
opportunity to conduct full discovery on her claims, but now she is seeking to restart the case.
[Filing No. 119 at 4.] Further, IU Health argues, it did not breach the Settlement Agreement;
rather, the Settlement Agreement included a provision that explicitly allowed the case to be
reopened upon the happening of certain events. [Filing No. 119 at 4.] IU Health also argues that
Dr. Kinsella has waived her arguments regarding the Case Management Plan because these
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arguments should have been presented when she submitted her proposed version of the Case
Management Plan. [Filing No. 119 at 3.]
In reply, Dr. Kinsella reiterates her argument that the reopening of the case resulted from
IU Health’s breach of the Settlement Agreement, and Dr. Kinsella argues that she is not the reason
for any delay. [Filing No. 120 at 2.] She also argues that she has not waived any argument because
it is not this Court’s usual practice to require a brief be filed with a proposed Case Management
Plan. [Filing No. 120 at 2-3.] Further, she argues, her proposed Case Management Plan does not
seek to restart the case, but instead simply recognizes that more discovery is needed given the
allegations of IU Health’s further discrimination and retaliation. [Filing No. 120 at 3.]
Because this Court has overruled Dr. Kinsella’s Amendment Objection, many of her
arguments regarding the Second Case Management Plan are moot. Dr. Kinsella is not permitted
to proceed with her proposed conspiracy claim, so there is no need for discovery or other deadlines
related to that claim. Moreover, there were agreements already in place regarding the remaining
deadlines and discovery. In his September 27, 2019 Order, Judge Brookman stated, “[a]s part of
the decision to re-open the case, the Court agreed to re-establish the remaining deadlines in this
matter (i.e. discovery for expert witness, damages discovery, and those related to the final pretrial
conference and trial.)” [Filing No. 106 at 7 (emphasis in original).] IU Health also states that the
parties had agreed to take only one more deposition—an assertion that Dr. Kinsella does not
dispute. See Filing No. 119 at 1; see also Filing No. 110 at 1. Non-expert discovery and discovery
related to liability has already been conducted, and, as Judge Brookman stated, “[y]ears after the
original deadlines have passed, this matter must proceed in a timely manner.” [Filing No. 106 at
7.] Based on the denial of leave to amend and the current status of the case, the Second Case
Management Plan adopted by Judge Brookman is appropriate and is not in any way clearly
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erroneous or contrary to law. Accordingly, Dr. Kinsella’s Case Management Objection, [114], is
OVERRULED.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Dr. Kinsella clearly disagrees with the Magistrate Judge’s evaluation of the proceedings,
conclusion that she should not be granted leave to amend her Complaint to add a new claim against
new defendants, and decision regarding case management deadlines in this years-old case. But
Dr. Kinsella’s disagreement does not equate to clear or legal error, and the Magistrate Judge amply
justified his decisions with discussions of relevant law and observations from the previous
proceedings in this matter. Therefore, the Court:
•
OVERRULES Dr. Kinsella’s Objections to United States Magistrate Judge Brookman’s
Order Denying Her Motion for Leave to File Third Amended and Supplemental Complaint,
[107]; and
•
OVERRULES Dr. Kinsella’s Objections to United States Magistrate Judge Brookman’s
Order on Second Amended Case Management Plan, [114].
Date: 1/7/2020
Distribution via ECF only to all counsel of record
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