MOTON v. I.U. METHODIST HOSPITAL et al
Filing
5
ENTRY Discussing Pending Motions and Dismissing Complaint - The plaintiff's 2 request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The assessment of even an initial partial filing fee is not feasible at this time. The 4 motion to change venu e is denied. The complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mr. Moton shall have through October 26, 2016, in which to show cause why Judgment consistent with this Entry should not issue. (See Entry.) Signed by Judge Larry J. McKinney on 10/11/2016. Copy sent to Plaintiff via US Mail. (GSO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
ALASTAIR DOMINIC MOTON,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
I.U. METHODIST HOSPITAL,
HILARY D.,
HEAD NURSE SHELBY,
Defendants.
No. 1:16-cv-02618-LJM-MJD
Entry Discussing Pending Motions and Dismissing Complaint
I.
The plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis [dkt. 2] is granted. The assessment
of even an initial partial filing fee is not feasible at this time.
II.
The plaintiff’s motion for change of venue states: “I have been having too many problems
in Indianapolis with my civil rights violations.” The plaintiff’s motion does not state what would
be a better venue for this action and it appears that the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis
Division, is the most appropriate venue. The motion to change venue [dkt. 4] is denied.
III.
The complaint is now subject to the screening requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). District
courts have an obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints before service on
the defendants, and must dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Dismissal
under the in forma pauperis statute is an exercise of the Court’s discretion. Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the
same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). See Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal
under federal pleading standards,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few
words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has
happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403
(7th Cir.2010) (emphasis in original).
As presented, Alastair Dominic Moton’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Mr. Moton alleges that on August 14, 2016, he presented himself to I.U. Methodist
for treatment of what he believed to be chlamydia, but that defendant Nurse Hilary assessed that
he did not have chlamydia and therefore did not treat him. Based on these allegations, Mr. Moton
brings the following claims:
He also alleges “cruel and unusual punishment, due process of law” based on these allegations. He
seeks between $180,000,000 to $360,000,000 in damages.
Mr. Moton’s complaint is frivolous. He asserts simply that the nurse determined that he
did not have a disease and therefore did not give him “a shot” as he requested. These allegations
provide no plausible basis to conclude that Nurse Hilary violated any of Mr. Moton’s federally
secured rights. While Mr. Moton states conclusory allegations of “discrimination” and “cruel and
unusual punishment,” and “hate crime” among other things, he does not provide any factual basis
for these claims. He also does not allege that he suffered any injury.
For these reasons, the complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
IV.
Mr. Moton shall have through October 26, 2016, in which to show cause why Judgment
consistent with this Entry should not issue. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014,
1022 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Without at least an opportunity to amend or to respond to an order to show
cause, an IFP applicant’s case could be tossed out of court without giving the applicant any timely
notice or opportunity to be heard to clarify, contest, or simply request leave to amend.”)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
10/11/2016
Date: __________________
Distribution:
ALASTAIR DOMINIC MOTON
302 N. Hamilton
Indianapolis, IN 46201
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LARRY J. McKINNEY, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
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