LAUDERDALE v. LAYTON et al
Filing
49
ENTRY Granting Motion to Amend and Directing Further Proceedings: Plaintiff Lamone Lauderdale's initial complaint was screened in the Entry of November 22, 2016. The claims that are curre ntly proceeding are the claims that Deputies William Russell, Devon Clark, Thomas Williams, and Shultz exercised excessive force against him or failed to protect him from the use of force and exhibited deliberate indifference to his need for medical attention. Lauderdale has filed a motion to amend his complaint seeking to add a number of new claims against a n umber of new defendants. Lauderdale's motion to amend, dkt. 47 , is granted. The clerk shall re-docket the proposed amended complaint [dkt 47-1] as the Amended Complaint. The claims against Talley-Sanders shall proceed as a claim for negligent supervision under Indiana law and a claim that Talley-Sanders was deliberately indifferent to Lauderdale's need for medical attention. Lauderdale also asserts that Marion County Sheriff John Layton was negligent and deliberately indi fferent by failing to supervise his employees and provide a safe and secure jail and this resulted in the Lauderdale's injuries. These claims shall proceed. Because Laude rdale has named Duncan and Propst as defendants, the claims against them will be severed. To effectuate this ruling, a new civil action from the Indianapolis Division shall be opened, consistent with t he following (SEE ENTRY). The clerk shall add Colonel Eva Talley-Sanders and Sherriff John Layton as defendants. The clerk is designated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process to defendants Talle y-Sanders and Layton in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process shall consist of the amended complaint, applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service of Summons), and this Entry. Copy to Eva Talley-Sanders and Sheriff John Layton via US Mail. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 6/22/2017. (SWM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
LAMONE LAUDERDALE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM RUSSELL Deputy,
SCHULTZ Deputy,
DEVON CLARK Deputy,
THOMAS WILLIAMS Corporal,
Defendants.
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No. 1:16-cv-02684-TWP-TAB
Entry Granting Motion to Amend and Directing Further Proceedings
Plaintiff Lamone Lauderdale’s initial complaint was screened in the Entry of November
22, 2016. The claims that are currently proceeding are the claims that Deputies William Russell,
Devon Clark, Thomas Williams, and Shultz exercised excessive force against him or failed to
protect him from the use of force and exhibited deliberate indifference to his need for medical
attention. Lauderdale has filed a motion to amend his complaint seeking to add a number of new
claims against a number of new defendants. Lauderdale’s motion to amend, dkt. [47], is granted.
The clerk shall re-docket the proposed amended complaint [dkt 47-1] as the Amended
Complaint.
I. Screening of the Amended Complaint
Because Lauderdale is a “prisoner” as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), the amended
complaint is subject to the screening requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Pursuant to this
statute, “[a] complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken
as true, show that plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 921 (2007). To
survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. . . . A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(quotations omitted). Pro se complaints such as that filed by Lauderdale, are construed liberally
and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94; Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008).
A. Claims which Shall Proceed
In the proposed amended complaint, Lauderdale first alleges that Officer William Russell
exercised excessive force against him and Deputy Shultz, Deputy Corporal Thomas Williams,
Deputy Devon Clark, and Deputies Lt. John Doe, and Deputy John Doe 1 failed to protect him
from this force. He also alleges that Russell, Shultz, Clark, Williams, Deputy Street, and a
number of John Doe defendants were deliberately indifferent to his need for medical attention
after the alleged use of force. These claims, except the claims against the John Doe defendants,
shall proceed. The claims against the John Doe defendants are dismissed because “it is pointless
to include [an] anonymous defendant [ ] in federal court; this type of placeholder does not open
the door to relation back under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, nor can it otherwise help the plaintiff.” Wudtke
v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). Bringing suit against
unnamed, or “John Doe,” defendants in federal court is generally disfavored by the Seventh
Circuit. If through discovery, Lauderdale is able to learn the name of the unknown defendants, he
may seek leave to add a claim against them.
Lauderdale also alleges that Colonel Eva Talley-Sanders was deliberately indifferent to a
risk to his safety when she provided inadequate supervision, was made aware of the force against
him and the need for medical attention, and failed to take action. He states that he told her about
the incident and she told him to file a grievance and provided him with a grievance form. He
concludes that she was aware of the defendants’ actions and therefore was deliberately
indifferent by failing to supervise the defendants. The claims against Talley-Sanders shall
proceed as a claim for negligent supervision under Indiana law and a claim that Talley-Sanders
was deliberately indifferent to Lauderdale’s need for medical attention.
Lauderdale also asserts that Marion County Sheriff John Layton was negligent and
deliberately indifferent by failing to supervise his employees and provide a safe and secure jail
and this resulted in the Lauderdale’s injuries. These claims shall proceed.
B. Claim which is Dismissed
Lauderdale next alleges that defendant John Doe grievance coordinator failed to properly
file and process his grievances. In addition to suffering from the same deficiency as the
previously-dismissed claims against John Doe defendants, this claim must be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the Seventh Circuit has
“specifically denounc[ed] a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due-process right to an inmate
grievance procedure.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 2008). As explained
in Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430-31 (7th Cir. 1996), “any right to a grievance
procedure is a procedural right, not a substantive one. Accordingly, a state’s inmate grievance
procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Id. at
1430-31(internal citations omitted). Because Lauderdale had no expectation of a particular
outcome of his grievances or complaints there is no viable claim which can be vindicated
through ' 1983. Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 349 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992) (without a predicate
constitutional violation one cannot make out a prima facie case under ' 1983).
C. Claims which are Improperly Joined
Lauderdale further alleges that defendant Doctor John Doe was negligent and deliberately
indifferent to Lauderdale’s serious medical needs. This claim must be dismissed because, as
explained above, Lauderdale cannot sue John Doe defendants. Further, even if he had properly
identified this defendant, this claim would have to be dismissed as improperly joined to the
claims that are proceedings. In George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007), the Court of
Appeals explained that “[u]nrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits.”
Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows joinder of multiple parties only when the
allegations against them involve the same conduct or transaction and common questions of fact
and law as to all defendants. Rule 20(a) allows defendants to be joined in one action if a right to
relief is asserted against them jointly with respect to the same transaction or occurrence, and a
question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. In such a situation,
“[t]he court may . . . add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 21. Lauderdale’s claims against medical providers regarding the medical care he
received are not sufficiently related to the claims of excessive force and failure to protect for
them to proceed in the same case.
A few days after the alleged use of force, Lauderdale was transferred to the Marion
County Jail II. He alleges that at that time medical providers there, including Eric Duncan, Neil
Propst, and a number of Jane Doe nurses were negligent and deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs. For the same reason that the claims against medical providers at the Marion
County Jail are improperly joined, these claims are also improperly joined and are therefore
dismissed without prejudice as filed in this case. Because Lauderdale has named Duncan and
Propst as defendants, the claims against them will be severed.
To effectuate this ruling, a new civil action from the Indianapolis Division shall be
opened, consistent with the following:
a.
Lamone Lauderdale shall be the plaintiff in the newly opened action.
b.
The defendants in the newly opened action shall be Eric Duncan and Neil Propst.
c.
The Nature of Suit in the newly opened action shall be 555.
d.
The Cause of Action the newly opened action shall be 42:1983pr.
e.
The Amended Complaint in this action shall be filed and re-docketed as the
complaint in the newly opened action.
f.
A copy of this Entry shall be docketed in the newly opened action.
g.
This action and the newly-opened actions shall be shown as linked actions.
h.
The defendant in the newly opened action shall be Eric Duncan and Neil Propst.
i.
The assignment of judicial officers shall be by random draw.
III. Further Proceedings
As discussed above, the following claims alleged in the Amended Complaint shall
proceed: (1) The claim that Officer William Russell exercised excessive force against
Lauderdale and Deputy Shultz, Deputy Corporal Thomas Williams, and Deputy Devon Clark,
failed to protect him from this force; (2) The claim that Russell, Shultz, Clark, Williams, and
Deputy Street were deliberately indifferent to Lauderdale’s need for medical attention after the
alleged use of force; (3)
The claims against Colonel Eva Talley-Sanders for negligent
supervision under Indiana law and for deliberate indifference to Lauderdale’s need for medical
attention; and (4) The claim that Marion County Sheriff John Layton was negligent and
deliberately indifferent by failing to supervise his employees and provide a safe and secure jail
and this resulted in the Lauderdale’s injuries. All other claims are dismissed and the claims
against defendants Eric Duncan and Neil Propst are severed into a new civil action as provided
above. If Lauderdale believes he has raised a claim that was not addressed in this ruling, he shall
have through July 10, 2017, to notify the Court.
Defendants Russell, Shultz, Clark, and Williams have already appeared in this action. They
shall have twenty-one days to answer the amended complaint.
The clerk shall add Colonel Eva Talley-Sanders and Sherriff John Layton as defendants.
The clerk is designated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process to defendants TalleySanders and Layton in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process shall consist of the amended
complaint, applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons
and Waiver of Service of Summons), and this Entry.
The previously-requested Pavey hearing will be scheduled after defendants TalleySanders and Layton have appeared and answered the complaint.
SO ORDERED
Date: 6/22/2017
Distribution:
Lamone Lauderdale
132421
Pendleton Correctional Facility
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
All electronically registered counsel
Eva Talley-Sanders
Marion County Jail
40 S. Alabama St.
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Sheriff John Layton
Marion County Jail
40 S. Alabama St.
Indianapolis, IN 46204
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