WESTBROOK v. BRIDGES COMMUNITY SERVICES et al

Filing 91

ORDER - DENYING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGES ORDER (Dkt. 48 ) AND MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL (Dkt. 49 ). Westbrook seeks reversal of the Magistrate Judge's November 29, 2017 Order, which denied Westbrook's Motion for Default Judgment as a discovery sanction (Filing No. 44 ). He seeks reversal by the District Judge through his Rule 72 Objection or, alternatively by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, through his Motion for Interlocutory Appeal. The Court OVERRULES Westbrook's Rule 72 Objection (Filing No. 48 ) and DENIES his Motion for Interlocutory Appeal (Filing No. 49 ). (See Order.) Copy to Plaintiff via US Mail Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 7/10/2018. (NAD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
CURTIS L. WESTBROOK,

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Plaintiff,
v.
BRIDGES COMMUNITY SERVICES,
Defendant.

Case No. 1:16-cv-02913-TWP-DML

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGES
ORDER (Dkt. 48) AND MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL (Dkt. 49)
This matter is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Curtis L. Westbrook’s (“Westbrook”)
Objection to this Court’s Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment, filed pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, (Filing No. 48), and Westbrook’s Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (Filing No. 49). Westbrook seeks reversal of the
Magistrate Judge’s November 29, 2017 Order, which denied Westbrook’s Motion for Default
Judgment as a discovery sanction (Filing No. 44). He seeks reversal by the District Judge through
his Rule 72 Objection or, alternatively by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, through his Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal. For the reasons set forth below, the Court overrules the Objection and
denies the Motion for Interlocutory Appeal.
I.

BACKGROUND

On October 26, 2016, Westbrook filed his Complaint against Defendant Bridges
Community Services (“Bridges”), asserting claims of employment discrimination (Filing No. 1).
By its May 15, 2017 Order, the Court set deadlines for initial disclosures, (Filing No. 18), and
subsequently, extensions of time were granted to September 29, 2017, for the parties to serve their

initial disclosures (Filing No. 29; Filing No. 36). Bridges failed to timely serve its initial
disclosures on Westbrook.
On October 12, 2017, without first meeting and conferring with Bridges’ counsel,
Westbrook filed a Motion for Default Judgment because Bridges had failed to serve its initial
disclosures (Filing No. 37). Bridges received notice of the Motion on October 13, 2017, and filed
a response, opposing the motion for default judgment (Filing No. 39). Bridges explained that it
inadvertently overlooked serving its initial disclosures by the September deadline, and when
counsel realized his oversight, he promptly mailed the initial disclosures to Westbrook on October
11, 2017, the day before Westbrook’s Motion for Default Judgment was filed (Filing No. 39 at 1–
2). Bridges’ counsel also pointed out that Westbrook had never contacted him about discovery
issues prior to filing the Motion for Default Judgment. Id. at 2.
On November 29, 2017, the Magistrate Judge denied Westbrook’s Motion for Default
Judgment (Filing No. 44). In the Order denying default judgment, the Magistrate Judge explained,
“Default is an extreme sanction and would be wholly disproportionate to Bridges’s offense of
belatedly serving its initial disclosures. Default is not warranted. See, e.g., Maynard v. Nygren,
372 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2004) (the guiding principle for sanctions is that they must be
proportionate to the offense).” Id. at 1–2. Unhappy with the Magistrate Judge’s Order denying
default judgment, Westbrook filed a Rule 72 Objection and a Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
December 6, 2017, requesting reversal of the Magistrate Judge’s Order (Filing No. 48; Filing No.
49).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A district court may refer for decision a non-dispositive pretrial motion to a magistrate
judge under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). Rule 72(a) provides:

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When a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party’s claim or defense is referred to a
magistrate judge to hear and decide, the magistrate judge must promptly conduct
the required proceedings and, when appropriate, issue a written order stating the
decision. A party may serve and file objections to the order within 14 days after
being served with a copy. A party may not assign as error a defect in the order not
timely objected to. The district judge in the case must consider timely objections
and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary
to law.
After reviewing objections to a magistrate judge’s order, the district court will modify or set aside
the order only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The clear error standard is highly
differential, permitting reversal only when the district court “is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d
926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997). “An order is contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant
statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Coley v. Landrum, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13377, at *3
(S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The legal standard for certifying an order for interlocutory appeal is set out in statute:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
There are four statutory criteria for the grant of a section 1292(b) petition to guide
the district court: there must be a question of law, it must be controlling, it must be
contestable, and its resolution must promise to speed up the litigation. There is also
a nonstatutory requirement: the petition must be filed in the district court within a
reasonable time after the order sought to be appealed.
Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs., 219 F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 2000).
III. DISCUSSION
In his Objection and Motion, which are essentially identical and seek the same relief via
different procedural mechanisms, Westbrook initially asserts that Bridges’ counsel’s failure to
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timely serve the initial disclosures amounts to “extraordinarily poor judgment” and “gross
negligence” that warrants the sanction of default judgment (Filing No. 48 at 1). The remainder of
Westbrook’s Objection and Motion allege assertions that the Magistrate Judge is biased against
him. Westbrook then concludes by asserting his general disagreement with the Magistrate Judge’s
Order denying default judgment and asking for the reversal of the Order. Westbrook fails to point
to any clear error or misapplication of relevant law or rule in the Magistrate Judge’s Order.
Westbrook also fails to discuss any of the four statutory criteria for an interlocutory appeal.
In response to Westbrook’s Objection, Bridges asserts that there is nothing clearly
erroneous or contrary to law in the Magistrate Judge’s Order. Bridges points out that the
Magistrate Judge’s ruling is consistent with controlling case law, which favors trial on the merits
over default judgment and states discovery sanctions must be proportionate to the offense. Sun v.
Bd. Of Trs. Of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2007); Maynard, 372 F.3d at 893. Bridges
asserts that the facts and the law clearly and easily support the Magistrate Judge’s Order denying
default judgment. Bridges argues that a single incident of a belated discovery disclosure that was
quickly corrected without any resulting prejudice to Westbrook does not warrant default judgment.
Upon review of the history of the discovery process in this case, the Court determines that
Bridges’ argument is well-taken and supported by law, and Westbrook has failed to meet his
burden to obtain a reversal of the Magistrate Judge’s Order or an interlocutory appeal.
Indeed, discovery sanctions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Maynard, 372 F.3d at
893, and “[t]he sanctions of dismissal and entry of default judgment are strong medicine, so before
a court imposes such a sanction it must find by clear and convincing evidence that the party against
whom the sanction is imposed displayed willfulness, bad faith, or fault.” Wellness Int’l Network,
Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 779 (7th Cir. 2013). Bridges has not exhibited bad faith or a pattern

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of discovery violations that would warrant a severe discovery sanction such as default judgment.
Upon discovering that it had failed to serve the disclosures by the September deadline, Bridges
promptly served its initial disclosures. Bridges, however, is cautioned that it should not be dilatory
or evasive in responding to discovery and should meet all deadlines during the remainder of this
case.
While Westbrook’s disappointment in the denial of default judgment is understandable, his
disappointment does not amount to a showing of clear error or misapplication of relevant law in
the Magistrate Judge’s Order. There is no error in the Magistrate Judge’s Order that would warrant
reversal or modification. Additionally, Westbrook has not shown that the four statutory criteria
for an interlocutory appeal are satisfied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Westbrook’s Rule 72 Objection
(Filing No. 48) and DENIES his Motion for Interlocutory Appeal (Filing No. 49).
SO ORDERED.
Date: 7/10/2018

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DISTRIBUTION:
Curtis L. Westbrook
1113 East 6th Street
Muncie, Indiana 47302
Samuel J Beasley
DENNIS WENGER & ABRELL
[e-mail]
Theodore J. Blanford
HUME SMITH GEDDES GREEN & SIMMONS
[e-mail]
Christopher Douglas Cody
HUME SMITH GEDDES GREEN & SIMMONS
[e-mail]

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