TILLISON v. SHELBY COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER

Filing 40

ORDER denying Plaintiff's 39 Motion for Reconsideration and Reopen Case. The defendant first sought dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute on June 13, 2017. For the next four months, the Court gave the plaintiff several opportunit ies to comply with the Pretrial Schedule or explain why he could not. Although the plaintiff clearly received these orders and communicated with the Court, he did not comply with the Court's orders or heed the warning that his case was subjec t to dismissal. The plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion is insufficient to establish that, nearly two months after Final Judgment was entered, the plaintiff's circumstances were exceptional such that Rule 60(b) relief is warranted. (Copy to Plaintiff via U.S. Mail) Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 12/21/2017. (JDC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
TROY M. TILLISON,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHELBY COUNTY SHERIFF,
Defendant.

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No. 1:16-cv-03029-WTL-MPB

Entry Denying Motion to Reconsider and Reopen Case
The Court dismissed this action with prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule
41(b) and entered Final Judgment on October 26, 2017. The Court did this after the plaintiff
repeatedly failed to comply with the pretrial schedule and respond to the Court’s orders. The
plaintiff was given several opportunities to come into compliance with the pretrial schedule or
explain why he could not, yet he failed to do so. The plaintiff was also warned multiple times that
the failure to follow the Court’s orders could lead to the dismissal of his case.
Nearly two months after Final Judgment was entered, the plaintiff filed the presently
pending motion for reconsideration and to reopen this case. He states that he was medically
incapable of complying with the Court’s orders and that he did not receive any mail after October
2, 2017. The substance of this motion is that of a motion brought pursuant to Rule 60(b), and will
be treated as such. See Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493-94 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hether
a motion . . . should be analyzed under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) depends on the substance of the
motion, not on the timing or label affixed to it.”).
Rule 60(b) provides that “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . .

. .”

“Relief under Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy granted only in exceptional

circumstances.” Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 589 (7th Cir. 2011).
The plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is entitled to the extraordinary remedy of
vacating the Final Judgment and re-opening this case. First, as to the plaintiff’s assertion that
medical conditions prevented him from complying with the Court’s orders, these allegations are
at best vague. He does not set forth what medical conditions he had or how they prevented him
from communicating with the Court. Moreover, after the Court denied the defendant’s first motion
to dismiss for failure to prosecute without prejudice in order to given the plaintiff time to comply
with the Pretrial Schedule, the plaintiff requested an extension of time to do so. This request
demonstrates that, despite the plaintiff’s ongoing medical issues, he was able to communicate with
the Court. Nevertheless, the plaintiff failed to respond to the defendant’s renewed motion to
dismiss, which was filed after the plaintiff missed the extended deadline. The plaintiff could have,
but did not, file a very brief motion with the Court explaining that he needed a further extension
of time due to his medical conditions. In short, “[a]lthough severe illness could cause excusable
neglect, [the plaintiff] failed to show that his illness was of such a magnitude that he could not, at
a minimum, request another extension of time.” Williams v. Shinseki, 373 Fed. Appx. 611, 615
(7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
Second, to the extent the plaintiff states he did not receive any mail after October 2, 2017,
this means he still received several of the Court’s earlier warnings as well as the defendant’s second
motion to dismiss. Thus even though “[l]ost mail is one of the circumstances that [the Seventh
Circuit] ha[s] identified as constituting excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b), Brown v. Hertz, 437
Fed. Appx. 496, 499 (7th Cir. 2011), it lacks force here because the plaintiff received several
notices that he had to comply with the Pretrial Schedule. Nevertheless, he did not comply with

the Court’s order or respond to the defendant’s second motion to dismiss. Thus this too does not
establish excusable neglect or constitute an extraordinary circumstance that warrants Rule 60(b)
relief. Cf. Buchanan v. Weaver, 657 Fed. Appx. 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2016).
The defendant first sought dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute on June 13, 2017.
For the next four months, the Court gave the plaintiff several opportunities to comply with the
Pretrial Schedule or explain why he could not. Although the plaintiff clearly received these orders
and communicated with the Court, he did not comply with the Court’s orders or heed the warning
that his case was subject to dismissal. The plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion is insufficient to establish
that, nearly two months after Final Judgment was entered, the plaintiff’s circumstances were
exceptional such that Rule 60(b) relief is warranted. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion is denied.
Dkt. No. 39.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

_______________________________
Date: 12/21/17

Distribution:
TROY M. TILLISON
6249 South 500 West
Shelbyville, IN 46176
Caren L. Pollack
POLLACK LAW FIRM, P.C.
[e-mail]

Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana