LEWIS v. MELLINGER et al

Filing 43

Entry Granting Motion for Summary Judgment and Directing Entry of Final Judgment - Plaintiff Joseph Lewis brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against multiple defendants, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights whil e he was incarcerated at the Madison County Jail. The defendants moved to dismiss several of Mr. Lewis's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and the Court granted their motion. What remains in this action is Mr. Lewis's claim against defen dant Madison County Sheriff Scott Mellinger in his official capacity. Mr. Lewis contends that Sheriff Mellinger maintains an unconstitutional policy or practice of detaining inmates in the Madison County Jail longer than forty-eight hours without a probable cause determination. Sheriff Mellinger moves for summary judgment on that claim. Mr. Lewis has not responded, and the time to do so has long passed. For the reasons explained, Sheriff Mellinger's motion for summary judgment is gran ted. Filing No. 40 . For the reasons discussed in this Entry, Mr. Lewis has failed to establish that a reasonable jury could find in his favor on his policy or practice claim against Sheriff Mellinger. Sheriff Mellinger's motion for summary judgment is thus granted. Filing No. 40 Final Judgment in accordance with this decision shall now issue. (See Entry). Copy to plaintiff via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 11/15/2017. (APD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

JOSEPH D. LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT MELLINGER,
Defendant.

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Case No. 1:16-cv-03057-JMS-MJD

Entry Granting Motion for Summary Judgment and Directing Entry of Final Judgment
Plaintiff Joseph Lewis brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against multiple
defendants, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated at the
Madison County Jail. The defendants moved to dismiss several of Mr. Lewis’s claims pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), and the Court granted their motion. What remains in this action is Mr. Lewis’s
claim against defendant Madison County Sheriff Scott Mellinger in his official capacity. Mr.
Lewis contends that Sheriff Mellinger maintains an unconstitutional policy or practice of detaining
inmates in the Madison County Jail longer than forty-eight hours without a probable cause
determination. Sheriff Mellinger moves for summary judgment on that claim. Mr. Lewis has not
responded, and the time to do so has long passed. For the reasons explained, Sheriff Mellinger’s
motion for summary judgment is granted. Filing No. 40.
I.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A “material fact” is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Ault v.
Speicher, 634 F.3d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 2011).
II.
Background
As noted, Mr. Lewis failed to respond to Sheriff Mellinger’s motion for summary
judgment, and the deadline to do so has long passed. The consequence is that Mr. Lewis has
conceded Sheriff Mellinger’s version of the events. See Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th
Cir. 2003) (“[F]ailure to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by the local rules results in an
admission.”); see S.D. Ind. Local Rule 56-1 (“A party opposing a summary judgment motion must
. . . file and serve a response brief and any evidence . . . that the party relies on to oppose the
motion. The response must . . . identif[y] the potentially determinative facts and factual disputes
that the party contends demonstrate a dispute of fact precluding summary judgment.”). This does
not alter the standard for assessing a Rule 56 motion, but it does “reduc[e] the pool” from which
the facts and inferences relative to such a motion may be drawn. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419,
426 (7th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, the following facts, unopposed by Mr. Lewis and supported by admissible
evidence, are accepted as true. Mr. Lewis was arrested by Elwood police officers on two occasions
relevant to his claim. First, Mr. Lewis was arrested on September 12, 2015 at 9:22 p.m. and
charged with four offenses. See Filing No. 40-1 at 1. Less than twenty-four hours later, a Madison
County Magistrate Judge determined that probable cause existed for Mr. Lewis’s arrest. See Filing
No. 40-1 at 3.
Second, Mr. Lewis was arrested by Elwood police officers on February 29, 2016 at 11:30
p.m. and again charged with four offenses. See Filing No. 40-2 at 1. Less than forty-eight hours

later, a Madison County Magistrate Judge determined that probable cause existed for Mr. Lewis’s
arrest. See Filing No. 40-2 at 3.
III.
Discussion
Mr. Lewis’s sole claim is that Sheriff Mellinger maintains an unconstitutional policy or
practice of not providing inmates at the Madison County Jail a prompt probable cause
determination. “[T]he Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable
cause as a prerequisite for detention.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). “Probable cause
determinations made within 48 hours of arrest are presumptively prompt.” Matz v. Klotka, 769
F.3d 517, 527 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991)).
The undisputed facts set forth above demonstrate that Mr. Lewis received a presumptively
prompt probable cause determination following his arrests on September 12, 2015, and February
29, 2016, in that both occurred less than forty-eight hours after his arrest. Mr. Lewis cannot
therefore established that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
If Mr. Lewis cannot establish a constitutional violation, he cannot establish a policy or
practice claim against Sheriff Mellinger in his official capacity. A suit against Sheriff Mellinger
in his official capacity is treated like a suit against a municipality under Monell v. Department of
Social Service of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). See, e.g., Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d
617, 636 (7th Cir. 2014). “To establish municipal liability and prevail on his Monell claim, . . .
[the plaintiff] must establish (1) that he suffered a constitutional injury, and (2) that the [Sheriff]
authorized or maintained a custom of approving the unconstitutional conduct.” Petty v. City of
Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 424 (7th Cir. 2014). Mr. Lewis cannot establish the first element—
namely, that he suffered a constitutional injury—because, as noted above, his probable cause
determinations were made within forty-eight hours of his arrest and thus complied with the Fourth

Amendment. See Matz, 769 F.3d at 527. “[I]f no constitutional violation occurred in the first
place, a Monell claim cannot be supported.” Petty, 754 F.3d at 424. Because the first element is
lacking, the Court need not discuss Sheriff Mellinger’s policy or practice regarding probable cause
determinations.
For these reasons, Mr. Lewis has failed to establish that a reasonable jury could find in his
favor on his policy or practice claim against Sheriff Mellinger. Sheriff Mellinger’s motion for
summary judgment is thus granted. Filing No. [40] Final Judgment in accordance with this
decision shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 11/15/2017

Distribution:
JOSEPH D. LEWIS
119 Jackson Street
Anderson, IN 46016
Matthew L. Hinkle
COOTS HENKE & WHEELER
[e-mail]
John Vincent Maurovich
COOTS, HENKE & WHEELER
[e-mail]