CUMMINGS et al v. THE MARION COUNTY SHERIFF et al

Filing 75

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Defendants motion for summary judgment, dkt. 55 , is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Motions for Summary Judgment, dkt. 44 ; dkt. 47 , are DENIED. Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint, dkt. 64 , is DENIED as moot because its allegations do not affect whether Plaintiffs received credit time or what damages are sought. Final judgment will issue in a separate entry. (See Order). Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 4/30/2020. (MAC)

Case 1:17-cv-00103-JPH-MPB Document 75 Filed 04/30/20 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: 1218

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
MICHAEL CUMMINGS,
PATRICK CARIC,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE MARION COUNTY SHERIFF,
THE CONSOLIDATED CITY OF
INDIANAPOLIS AND MARION COUNTY 1,
Defendants.

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No. 1:17-cv-00103-JPH-MPB

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Michael Cummings and Patrick Caric seek monetary damages based on
allegations that they were illegally detained for over forty-eight hours without
probable cause determinations. Because the time spent in custody was
credited to the sentences imposed pursuant to their plea agreements, they do
not have a redressable injury as required for Article III standing. Accordingly,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dkt. [55], is GRANTED; Plaintiffs’
motions for summary judgment, dkt. [44], dkt. [47], are DENIED; and Plaintiffs’
motion to amend the complaint, dkt. [64], is DENIED as moot.
I.
Facts and Background
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). Because Defendants have moved for

The Consolidated City of Indianapolis and Marion County was named as a defendant for any
joint responsibility it may share with the Sheriff. Dkt. 1-2 at 19–20 (¶ 54).

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summary judgment, the Court views and recites the evidence in the light most
favorable to Plaintiffs and draws all reasonable inferences in their favor.
Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009). Since Plaintiffs have also
moved for summary judgment, the Court would normally interpret the evidence
in the light most favorable to Defendants when considering their motions. See
Family Mut. Ins. v. Williams, 832 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2016). That’s not
necessary here, however, because even when all evidence is interpreted in
Plaintiffs’ favor, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
A. Plaintiffs were arrested and charged
In the early morning hours of December 15, 2014, police officers found
Plaintiffs in the stairwell of a fraternity house on Butler University’s campus.
Dkt. 46-4 at 4; dkt. 49-4 at 4. One of the officers smelled burnt marijuana.
Dkt. 46-4 at 4; dkt. 49-4 at 4. Members of the fraternity said that Plaintiffs
were not members and did not have permission to be on the property. Dkt. 464 at 7; dkt. 49-4 at 7. At 1:55 a.m., Plaintiffs were arrested without warrants
and taken to the Marion County Jail. 2 Dkt. 46-1; dkt. 49-1.
On December 16, 2014, a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney signed an
Affidavit for Probable Cause. Dkt. 56-1. The next day, the Prosecuting
Attorney filed an Information charging Plaintiffs with criminal trespass and

Defendants argue that the motion for summary judgment should be based on judicial
admissions contained in the complaint rather than on the evidence. See dkt. 57 at 8–10.
Because Plaintiffs have not established standing, the Court does not address this argument
and recites the facts as supported by designated evidence.

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possession of marijuana and a supporting Affidavit for Probable Cause. Dkt.
56-1; dkt. 56-4; dkt. 56-8.
B. Plaintiffs were detained at the Marion County Jail
Plaintiffs arrived at the Marion County Jail early in the morning of
December 15, and on December 18, 2014, had their initial hearing before a
judge of the Marion County Superior Court. Dkt. 46-5; dkt. 49-5. The
courtroom minutes indicate that the judge informed Plaintiffs of the charges
against them, advised them of their rights, and appointed public defenders to
represent them. Dkt. 46-5; dkt. 49-5. The judge entered not guilty pleas on
Plaintiffs’ behalf, dkt. 46-5; dkt. 49-5, and stay away orders, dkt. 46-7; dkt. 497. 3
On December 22, 2014, the judge entered an order releasing Plaintiffs
from jail. Dkt. 56-3 at 2; 56-7 at 3. Mr. Caric was released that day at 11:33
p.m. Dkt. 46-9. Mr. Cummings was released the next day at 2:25 p.m. Dkt.
49-9. Plaintiffs argue that no probable cause determinations were made during
their detention. Dkt. 62 at 2–8.
C. Plaintiffs pleaded guilty and were sentenced
On April 16, 2015, Plaintiffs pleaded guilty to criminal trespass and the
state agreed to dismiss the possession of marijuana charges. Dkt. 56-5; dkt.
56-9. The court sentenced both Plaintiffs to 365 days in jail, with 349 days

Plaintiffs contend that the Marion County judge ordered their release at the initial hearing,
but they were not released until four days later. Dkt. 62 at 3–4. It is not necessary for the
Court to resolve this issue because Plaintiffs received credit for all of the time they spent in jail
and thus cannot recover damages.
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suspended to probation for Mr. Caric and 347 days suspended for Mr.
Cummings. Dkt. 56-6; dkt. 56-10. Mr. Caric had spent eight days in custody
and was credited with those eight days. Dkt. 56-6. Mr. Cummings had spent
nine days in custody and was credited with those nine days. Dkt. 56-10.
D. Plaintiffs’ claims
Plaintiffs bring federal constitutional and state law claims. For the
federal claims under Section 1983, Plaintiffs allege that they were detained
without judicial determinations of probable cause in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Dkt. 1-2 at 16–21. For the state law claims,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were careless and negligent when they falsely
imprisoned them. Id. at 21–22.
The parties filed motions for summary judgment on all claims. Dkt. 44;
dkt. 47; dkt. 55. Plaintiffs did not respond to Defendants’ arguments for
summary judgment on the state claims. See dkt. 62. Those claims are
therefore “deemed abandoned,” Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520 F.3d 781, 788
(7th Cir. 2008); see Franklin v. Randolph Cty. Comm’rs, 1:18-cv-01340, 2019
WL 3037181, at *4 (S.D. Ind. 2019), and Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the state claims is granted.
For the federal constitutional claim, Plaintiffs allege violations of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs’ claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot proceed because “[t]he injury of wrongful pretrial detention
may be remedied under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, not
the Due Process Clause.” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir.
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2019). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment is granted.
Therefore, the sole claim for the Court to adjudicate is Plaintiffs’ federal
constitutional claim alleging that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated
when they were detained without judicial determinations of probable cause.
II.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party must
inform the court “of the basis for its motion” and specify evidence
demonstrating “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets this
burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and identify
“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324. In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence “in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor.” Zerante, 555 F.3d at 584 (citation omitted).
III.
Analysis
Plaintiffs allege that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when
they were detained for an excessive length of time without a judicial
determination of probable cause. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125
(1975) (states are required to “provide a fair and reliable determination of
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probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, . .
. made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.”); Cty. of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57–58 (1991) (delay of more than 48
hours is presumed unreasonable and must be justified by the government).
This claim is brought via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which does not create substantive
rights but “allow[s] a plaintiff to seek money damages from government officials
who have violated his [Constitutional] rights.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,
609 (1999); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to raise their claims
because they received credit at sentencing for the time they were detained, and
therefore have no damages. Dkt. 57 at 16–20 (citing Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d
911, 917 (7th Cir. 2017)). Without damages, Defendants contend, there is no
redressable injury and therefore no Article III standing. Id. at 16–18. Because
this issue is jurisdictional, the Court addresses it first. See Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990) (“[B]efore a federal court can consider the
merits of a legal claim, the person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the
court must establish the requisite standing to sue.”); see also Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cty. Sheriff's
Dep’t, 924 F.3d 375, 384 (7th Cir. 2019).
A. Standing and the redressable injury requirement
Under Article III of the Constitution, the “‘judicial Power of the United
States’ . . . extends only to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (quoting Art. III §§ 1, 2). “Standing to sue is a
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doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy.” Id.
at 1547. To have standing, a plaintiff must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact,
(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, (3) that is
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. at 1547; Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560. An injury is redressable only if a plaintiff’s injury still exists; if it
has been otherwise redressed, standing disappears. Hollingsworth v. Perry,
570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013) (recognizing that “the inquiry under Article III
changed” and plaintiffs lacked redressability after they won an injunction that
was not appealed).
The Seventh Circuit has addressed redressability in the context of
unlawful pretrial detention in a recent trilogy of cases. See Ewell v. Toney, 853
F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[A] section 1983 plaintiff may not receive
damages for time spent in custody, if that time was credited to a valid and
lawful sentence.”); Bridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“Bridewell cannot receive damages for time spent in custody on a valid
sentence.”); Ramos v. City of Chicago, 716 F.3d 1013, 1014 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“[A]ny presumption of damages is surely defeated in a case where all of the
time served is ultimately credited toward an unrelated weapons violation.”).
Ewell held that a “section 1983 plaintiff may not receive damages for
time spent in custody, if that time was credited to a valid and lawful sentence.”
853 F.3d at 917. There, the plaintiff was arrested and detained for over 48
hours without a judicial determination of probable cause and without charges
being filed. Id. Three years later, the state filed charges, and she was
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ultimately sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Id. at 916. The plaintiff sued
a district attorney and two detectives under Section 1983 for unlawful
detention. Id. at 915. The Seventh Circuit held that since the time in pretrial
detention was credited to a lawful sentence, she was not “entitled to seek
damages.” Id. at 917 (“Without a redressable injury, Ewell lacks Article III
standing to press this claim.”).
The holding in Ewell did not plow new ground. Indeed, in Ramos, the
plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action alleging constitutional violations after
being arrested for, charged with, and acquitted of residential burglary. 716
F.3d at 1014. At the time of that arrest, he had posted bond on pending
weapon charges. Id. at 1015. The bond was revoked when he was charged
with burglary, and he remained in custody until his acquittal on the burglary
charge. Id. He later pleaded guilty to one weapon charge, was sentenced to 3
years’ imprisonment, and received credit time for the days that he served from
his burglary arrest until the acquittal. Id. The plaintiff argued that damages
were presumed for the jail time, but the Seventh Circuit held that “any
presumption of damages is surely defeated” by his receiving credit time. Id. at
1020.
And in Bridewell, the plaintiff was arrested for murder while she was
already under indictment released on bail for drug charges. 730 F.3d at 675.
After 63 hours’ detention, the plaintiff was brought before a judge, who found
probable cause to hold her on the murder charge and revoked her bail on the
drug charges. Id. at 676. After three years in custody, the murder charge was
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dismissed, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to simple possession of cocaine, and she
was sentenced to “time served[.]” Id. at 675. She sued alleging unlawful
detention and, relying on Ramos, the Seventh Circuit concluded that because
the plaintiff received credit for the days spent in custody against her sentence
for the drug charge, she could not receive damages for the time spent in
custody. Id. at 677 (“Bridewell cannot receive damages for time spent in
custody on a valid sentence.”).
B. Plaintiffs lack standing because they have no redressable injury
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims are
foreclosed by Ewell because they received credit at sentencing for the time they
were detained. Dkt. 57 at 16–20. Without damages, Defendants contend,
there is no redressable injury and therefore no Article III standing. Id.
Plaintiffs respond that they have standing and can recover, at minimum,
nominal damages despite Ewell because they sued the defendants who were
responsible for their overlong detention. Dkt. 62 at 17–18. They also argue
that Ewell is factually distinguishable because the plaintiff there: (1) received a
judicial determination of probable cause and was denied bail; (2) was charged
with serious felonies; and (3) received credit against a definite term of
imprisonment that was not based on the time of pre-trial detention. Id. at 20.
1. Plaintiffs cannot recover damages for the time they spent
in custody
Plaintiffs seek monetary damages as compensation for their detention.
Dkt. 1-2 at 9, 23–24 (¶ 1). They do not dispute that they received credit for the

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time they were detained as part of the sentences imposed under their plea
agreements. See dkt. 56-6; dkt. 56-10. Even if Plaintiffs were held too long
without a probable cause hearing in violation of their Fourth Amendment
rights, that credit time alone bars Plaintiffs from recovering damages for the
time they spent in custody. 4 Ewell, 853 F.3d at 917 (“a section 1983 plaintiff
may not receive damages for time spent in custody, if that time was credited to
a valid and lawful sentence.”).
Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that Ewell allows nominal damages even
when compensatory damages are foreclosed. Dkt. 62 at 17–18. In Ewell the
court stated that “[e]ven if [the plaintiff] could show at least nominal damages,”
she did not sue the proper defendants for a Riverside claim. 853 F.3d at 918.
But Ewell did not hold that the plaintiffs could have otherwise succeeded with
a claim for nominal damages or create an exception to the rule that damages
may not be recovered where the time spent in detention is later credited to a
lawful and valid sentence. See id. Plaintiffs have not cited any cases holding
otherwise.
Plaintiffs’ claims are within Ewell’s scope, so they cannot recover
damages for the time they were detained. Without damages there is no
redressable injury, and without a redressable injury, Plaintiffs lack Article III

Plaintiffs seek damages only for their loss of liberty. See Dkt. 1-2 at 9, 12–14, 21 (¶¶ 1, 13,
17, 21, 24, 27, 30, 66–69); dkt. 64 at 1, 4–7, 12 (¶¶ 1, 12, 15, 19, 23, 26, 29, 56–59). The
Court therefore does not decide whether the outcome could be different in a case where the
plaintiff alleged that additional injuries—separate and distinct from the loss of liberty—were
caused by the constitutional violation.

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standing. Ewell, 853 F.3d at 917 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–62 (“[w]ithout
a redressable injury, [they lack] Article III standing to press this claim.”)). 5
2. Ewell controls even though some facts are different
Plaintiffs argue that Ewell is not controlling because this case is factually
distinguishable. Dkt. 62 at 20. First, they contend that the judge in Ewell
found probable cause and denied bail, whereas here the judge never made
probable cause determinations. Dkt. 62 at 15–16. In Ewell, the question was
“whether Ewell is entitled to damages for time spent in custody that was fully
credited to her state sentence.” 853 F.3d at 917. One reason the plaintiff
could not show damages was that the judge ultimately found probable cause
and denied bail. Id. at 918. But that does not undermine the holding that the
plaintiff’s “time in custody was later credited to a criminal sentence on another
charge, [so] she could not receive damages for the time she spent in custody
after her arrest.” Id.
The Ewell court could have narrowed or qualified Bridewell’s holding—
that “Bridewell cannot receive damages for time spent in custody on a valid
sentence”, 730 F.3d at 675—but it didn’t. Instead, it held, “a section 1983
plaintiff may not receive damages for time spent in custody, if that time was
credited to a valid and lawful sentence.” Id. at 917. Therefore, whether
probable cause determinations were made here—a factual issue that the Court
need not decide—does not matter because under Ewell, the receipt of credit

Because Plaintiffs lack standing, the Court does not address their arguments that Defendants
had no policy or procedure for releasing arrestees that were nearing or above the 48-hour limit
of detention without a judicial determination of probable cause dkt. 45 at 10; dkt. 48 at 10.

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time alone bars Plaintiffs from receiving damages for their time spent in
custody.
Plaintiffs next distinguish Ewell and Bridewell on the basis that unlike
the plaintiffs in those cases, Plaintiffs here were charged with non-violent
misdemeanors. Dkt. 62 at 16. Plaintiffs contend that “a more stringent
standard applies to the acceptable length of pre-trial confinement” in such
cases. Id. (citing Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2004);
Bergren v. City of Milwaukee, 811 F.2d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 1987); Moore v.
Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1350–51 (7th Cir. 1985)). But the
stringency of the standard goes to whether there was a violation, not whether a
plaintiff can recover damages. Moreover, nothing in Ewell suggests that its
holding is limited to cases involving serious felonies or does not apply to cases
involving non-violent misdemeanors.
Last, Plaintiffs attempt to take this case out of Ewell’s scope by arguing
that their plea agreements were “time served” pleas. Dkt. 62 at 19. They argue
that they were sentenced to time served but should have only been detained for
48 hours or less. Id. at 20. Therefore, the amount of time they were detained
beyond 48 hours exceeded what was called for in a “time served” plea
agreement and was illegal. Id. But Plaintiffs’ argument is not supported by
designated evidence.
The plea agreements were more specific than simply crediting “time
served.” See dkt. 56-5; dkt. 56-9. Each plea agreement called for a sentence of
365 days’ jail time. Id. Mr. Caric received 8 days’ credit for the time he was
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detained. Dkt. 56-5; 6. While the remaining 349 days of jail time was
suspended, he still had to serve those days on probation. Id. And the
suspended jail time was contingent upon his successful completion of
probation. Id. Similarly, Mr. Cummings received 9 days’ credit for the time he
was detained. Dkt. 56-9; 10. Like with Mr. Caric, the balance of Mr.
Cummings’ jail sentence—348 days—was suspended but had to be served on
probation. Id. Under the plea agreements, then, Plaintiffs were not sentenced
to an uncertain “time served,” but to a specific term with specific amounts of
time spent in pretrial detention credited to that term.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not designate any evidence that the judge
would still have sentenced them to time served if the time served had been 48
hours or less. Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir.
2003) (“[S]ummary judgment is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in a lawsuit,
when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of
fact to accept its version of events.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Plaintiffs do not contest that their pretrial detention was credited towards
their sentences. See dkt. 56-6; dkt. 56-10. Under Ewell, a “section 1983
plaintiff may not receive damages for time spent in custody, if that time was
credited to a valid and lawful sentence.” 853 F.3d at 917; Bridewell, 730 F.3d
at 677; Ramos, 716 F.3d at 1020. The crediting is what eliminates the
damages. See Ewell, 853 F.3d at 917; Bridewell, 730 F.3d at 677; Ramos, 716
F.3d at 1020.
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Plaintiffs may not recover damages for time spent in custody that was
credited toward a lawful and valid sentence. Thus, they have no redressable
injury and lack Article III standing. Defendants are therefore entitled to
summary judgment. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64, 78.
IV.
Conclusion
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dkt. [55], is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment, dkt. [44]; dkt. [47], are DENIED.
Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint, dkt. [64], is DENIED as moot
because its allegations do not affect whether Plaintiffs received credit time or
what damages are sought. Final judgment will issue in a separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 4/30/2020

Distribution:
Andrew J. Upchurch
OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL
[e-mail]
D. Lance Wittry
WITTRY LAW OFFICE
[e-mail]

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