WOODCOCK v. SUPERINTENDENT NEW CASTLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Filing 6

Entry and ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (Disciplinary). The petitioner's motion for leave to proceed in forma paueris [dkt. 2 ] is granted. The assessment of an initial partial filing fee is not feasible at this time. The petitioner's motion for a ppointment of counsel [dkt. 3 ] is denied. The motion for production of documents [dkt. 4 ] is denied. The petitioner's custodian is directed to answer the allegations of the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and in doing so shall show cause why the relief sought by the petitioner should not be granted insofar as the petitioner challenges the deprivation of a recognized liberty interest affecting the fact or the duration of his confinement. This shall be done within forty-five (45) days after the date this Entry is signed. The petitioner shall have twenty (20) days after service of such answer or return to order to show cause on him in which to reply. (See Entry.) Copy to Petitioner via U.S. Mail. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 5/1/2017.(JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

CARL W. WOODCOCK,

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Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT NEW CASTLE
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
Respondent.

No. 1:17-cv-01266-TWP-DKL

Entry and Order to Show Cause - Discipline Case
I.
The petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in forma paueris [dkt. 2] is granted. The
assessment of an initial partial filing fee is not feasible at this time.
II.
The petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel [dkt. 3] is denied. The reasons for the
denial of this motion are: 1) the petitioner is literate and seems fully aware of the disciplinary
proceedings challenged in this case; 2) although an order to show cause is being issued, the
respondent has not yet filed an answer to the petition, meaning that the court and the petitioner do
not yet know whether, and to what extent or on what basis, his claims for relief are contested here;
and 3) this court’s review is narrow, limited to determining whether the procedural requirements
of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974), were provided and whether the
conduct board’s decision was supported by “some evidence.” See Superintendent of Walpole v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985). These are not circumstances in which it is in the interest of justice to

appoint counsel for the petitioner. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) (“Whenever . . . the court
determines that the interests of justice so require, representation may be provided for any
financially eligible person who . . . is seeking relief under section 2241, 2254, or 2255 of title 28.”).
III.
The petitioner’s motion for discovery has been considered. Rule 6(a) of the Rules
Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, allows habeas corpus petitioners to conduct civil
discovery “if, and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion and for good cause
shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise.” See Bracy v. Bramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997)
(“A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled to discovery as
a matter of ordinary course”). In order to be entitled to discovery, a petitioner must make specific
factual allegations that demonstrate that there is good reason to believe that the petitioner may,
through discovery, be able to garner sufficient evidence to entitle him to relief. See id. at 908-09.
Discovery will not be authorized at this time. The information sought through discovery
(i.e., his criminal and juvenile records, list of all disciplinary records he has been convicted of
since 2003, record of disciplinary infractions committed in each medium and maximum security
facility in Indiana since 2006, four Department of Correction Policies, New Castle Correctional
Facility policies and procedures related to the use of the “Nark” test) is well outside the scope of
what can be reviewed in this action. The materials just referenced (and those listed in the motion)
are calculated to approximate witness-like confrontation and cross-examination of the prison
worker who authored the conduct report and of the results of the chemical test which were relied
on in evaluating the evidence. The petitioner has no right to cross-examine witnesses in this
context, Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1976)); see also Brown-Bey v. United States, 720 F.2d 467,

469 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses in the context of a prison
disciplinary proceeding are matters left to the sound discretion of prison officials.”), and he may
not accomplish indirectly what he cannot accomplish directly. The motion for production of
documents [dkt. 4] is denied.
IV.
The petitioner’s custodian is directed to answer the allegations of the petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, and in doing so shall show cause why the relief sought by the petitioner
should not be granted insofar as the petitioner challenges the deprivation of a recognized liberty
interest affecting the fact or the duration of his confinement. This shall be done within forty-five
(45) days after the date this Entry is signed. The petitioner shall have twenty (20) days after service
of such answer or return to order to show cause on him in which to reply.
A copy of this Entry and Order to Show Cause shall be sent to the Indiana Attorney General
through a Notice of Electronic Filing (“NEF”) generated by the court’s CM/ECF case management
system. The Indiana Attorney General has previously been provided with a copy of the habeas
petition itself.
The court notes that the fact that the petitioner’s habeas petition was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction by the state court has no impact on this litigation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 5/1/2017
Distribution:
CARL W. WOODCOCK
135027
NEW CASTLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
1000 Van Nuys Road
NEW CASTLE, IN 47362 Pendleton, IN 46064