COYLE v. ZATECKY

Filing 22

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability - For the reasons explained in this Entry, the petition of Robert Coyle for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed with prejudice . In addition, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue. "[H]abeas corpus has its own peculiar set of hurdles a petitioner must clear before his claim is properly presented to the district court." Coyle has en countered the hurdle produced by the 1-year statute of limitations, but "[s]tatutes of limitations for collateral relief in federal court are part of the [AEDPA]." He has not shown the existence of circumstances permitting him to overcom e this hurdle and hence is not entitled to the relief he seeks. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus is therefore denied without a decision being made as to the merits of his claims. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. Pursuan t to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing ' 2254 Proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. ' 2253(c), the Court finds that Coyle has failed to show that reasonable jurists would find it "debatable whether [this Court] was correct in its procedural ruling." The Court therefore denies a certificate of appealability. (See Entry). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 8/16/2017.(APD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

ROBERT E. COYLE,
Petitioner,
v.
DUSHAN ZATECKY,
Respondent.

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No. 1:17-cv-01302-JMS-DML

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability
For the reasons explained in this Entry, the petition of Robert Coyle for a writ of habeas
corpus must be denied and the action dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the Court finds that a
certificate of appealability should not issue.
I. Background
An Indiana jury convicted Coyle in 2007 of Dealing in Cocaine or Narcotic Drug, for which
he was sentenced to a term of 20 years. This sentence is to be served consecutive to a 45-year
sentence for conspiracy to commit murder. See Coyle v. State, 69 N.E.3d 958 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016).
Coyle filed an action for post-conviction relief on October 13, 2011, and the post-conviction relief
action remained pending in the state courts until March 23, 2017. Applying the prison mailbox
rule, this action was then filed on April 25, 2017.
The State of Indiana, through Coyle’s custodian, has opposed Coley’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus by arguing that the petition was not timely filed.

II. Discussion
In an attempt to “curb delays, to prevent ‘retrials’ on federal habeas, and to give effect to
state convictions to the extent possible under law,” Congress, as part of the Anti-terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), revised several of the statutes governing federal
habeas relief. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). One such provision provides:
a state prisoner has one year to file a federal petition for habeas corpus relief,
starting from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”
Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1831 (2012)(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)); see also
Gladney v. Pollard, 799 F.3d 889, 894 (7th Cir. 2015).
Coyle was sentenced for the drug offense on October 15, 2007. He had 30 days in which
to initiate a direct appeal. He did not do so. Thus, his conviction became final on November 14,
2007. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012) (“[T]he judgment becomes final . . . when
the time for pursuing direct review . . . expires.”).
Coyle therefore had one year, through November 13, 2008, in which to file a federal
petition for writ of habeas corpus. He did not do so, waiting instead until April 25, 2017 in which
to do so. By that date, 1,064 days had elapsed after the statute of limitations had expired. Although
a properly filed action for post-conviction relief was filed on October 13, 2011, the statute of
limitations had already expired before that date. Accordingly, no statutory tolling occurred under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Gladney, 799 F.3d at 893 (noting the petitioner’s habeas petition was
untimely when his first state post-conviction petition was filed after the one-year limitations period
had expired); Teas v. Endicott, 494 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2007)(the fact that the state courts
entertained a collateral attack on prisoner’s conviction more than one year after the expiration of

the one year time limit does not “re-start” the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d));
Fernandez v. Sternes, 227 F.3d 977, 978-79 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that it is illogical to toll a
limitations period that has already passed). The filing of Coyle’s petition for post-conviction relief
therefore has no effect on the computation of the statute of limitations and does not rescue Coyle’s
habeas petition from being woefully untimely.
Coyle argues in opposition to the foregoing that the circumstances of his confinement
rendered it difficult for him to acquire the knowledge to properly pursue his habeas petition, but
this “describes most habeas corpus petitioners and thus by definition is not ‘extraordinary.’” Gray
v. Zatecky, No. 15-2482, 2017 WL 3274347, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 2, 2017). This knocks out
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Id. at *2 (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631
(2010)). And finally, the suggestion that his delay was the result of misadvice from his attorney,
who for strategic reasons thought it best to first conclude the challenge to Coyle’s conspiracy
conviction, offers him no relief for his tardiness because “[a]ttorney miscalculation is simply not
sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, particularly in the postconviction context where prisoners
have no constitutional right to counsel.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007).
III. Conclusion
“[H]abeas corpus has its own peculiar set of hurdles a petitioner must clear before his claim
is properly presented to the district court.” Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 14 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Coyle has encountered the hurdle produced
by the 1-year statute of limitations, but “[s]tatutes of limitations for collateral relief in federal court
are part of the [AEDPA].” Freeman v. Page, 208 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2000). He has not shown
the existence of circumstances permitting him to overcome this hurdle and hence is not entitled to

the relief he seeks. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus is therefore denied without a decision
being made as to the merits of his claims.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IV. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing

' 2254 Proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. ' 2253(c), the Court finds that Coyle has failed to show that
reasonable jurists would find it “debatable whether [this Court] was correct in its procedural
ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court therefore denies a certificate of
appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 8/16/2017

Distribution:
ROBERT E. COYLE
874321
PENDLETON - CF
PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
Chandra Hein
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
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