COE v. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & COMPANY et al

Filing 29

ORDER denying 27 Motion FOR RECONSIDERATION, REQUEST FOR RECUSAL, AND MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF - SEE ORDER. Copy sent to Appellant via US Mail. Signed by Judge Richard L. Young on 10/19/2017. (JRB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
MICHELLE YVONNE COE,

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Appellant,
v.
J.P. MORGAN CHASE & COMPANY,
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.,
THE STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellees.

1:17-cv-01303-RLY-MJD

ENTRY ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, REQUEST
FOR RECUSAL, AND MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Appellant, Michelle Yvonne Coe, is no stranger to the judicial system—federal or
state. Proceeding pro se, she has persistently filed various motions in an attempt to
challenge an apparent adverse foreclosure action that occurred in state court. Before the
court is Appellant’s latest attempt, which she has stylized as a “Motion to Rescind Order
Denying Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, for the Recusal of Judge Richard Young
and for Emergency Injuctive [sic] relief.” For the reasons stated below, the court
DENIES the motion.
With respect to her request for emergency injunctive relief, Appellant continues to
be knocking on the wrong door. As was the case in its order issued on May 22, 2017, the
court does not have jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s challenges because she failed to
cure her deficient Notice of Appeal in a timely manner. (See Filing No. 7). Failure to
file a timely notice of appeal in compliance with Rule 8002 of the Bankruptcy Rules
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divests the court of jurisdiction. See In re Salem, 465 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 2006)
(citing In re Bond, 254 F.3d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 2001)).
Appellant also requests an order rescinding the court’s previous order denying her
request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Treating this request as a
motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), see Parker v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd.,
845 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 2017) (district court obligated to liberally construe pro se
pleadings), the court finds no reason to reconsider, much less reverse course from, its
earlier ruling finding Appellant’s appeal would not be taken in good faith. The court is
not aware of any newly discovered evidence or manifest error of law. See Bordelon v.
Chicago School Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000). Appellant’s
request is simply an attempt to reargue the merits, which is improper under Rule 59. See
Neal v. Newspaper Holdings, Inc., 349 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2003).
Lastly, Appellant seeks the recusal of the undersigned. Specifically, she argues:
It appears that the Appellant’s former employer TransAmerica and Judge
Richard Young have a relationship. TransAmerica is incorporated in the
state of Iowa and the Appellant filed a [sic] EEOC complaint against this
company recently and was given the right to sue. Judge Richard Young was
born in Davenport, Iowa and has a relationship with this company as it
appears on the face of this matter is [sic] doing them a favor by denying my
rights.
(Filing No. 27, Appellant’s Motion at 2). While the court is ever mindful of the
importance of preserving the impartiality of the judicial system, see Weddington v.
Zatecky, 721 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2013), the court is confident that Appellant’s

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allegations do not warrant recusal. 1 Mere conclusions of bias based on her frustrations
with the court’s rulings do not support a claim for recusal. See Eppley v. Iacovelli, No.
1:09-cv-386, 2009 WL 1033391, at *2-3 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2009). Appellant simply has
not shown any objectively reasonable animus or bias to overcome the presumption that
“judges rise above any potential biasing influences.” Tezak v. United States, 256 F.3d
702, 718 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Hiers, 594
Fed.Appx. 314, 316 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing cases).
For the reasons stated above, Appellant’s Motion is DENIED. (Filing No. 27).

SO ORDERED this 19th day of October 2017.

Distributed Electronically to Registered Counsel of Record.
Distributed via U.S. Mail:
Michelle Yvonne Coe
5429 Central Avenue #3
Indianapolis, IN 46220

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The court considers Appellant’s request as being made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 as opposed
to the other federal recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 144, because Appellant has not filed an affidavit
nor could she satisfy the certification of counsel requirement. See Eppley v. Iacovelli, No. 1:09cv-386, 2009 WL 1033391, at *1 n. 1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2009).

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