RODRIGUEZ v. CORIZON HEALTH et al

Filing 4

Entry Granting In Forma Pauperis Status, Screening and Dismissing Complaint, and Directing Plaintiff to Show Cause - The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, [dkt. 2], is granted. Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of seven dollars and eight cents ($7.08), which must be paid to the clerk no later than June 12, 2017. The claim against Corizon is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (b)(1).T he claim against Dr. Ipple is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The Court has found no viable section 1983 claim in the complaint. It is dismissed. Plaintiff shall have through June 12, 2017, in which to show cause why this action should not be dismissed and judgment consistent with this E ntry should not issue. The failure to show cause or file an amended complaint by the stated deadline may result in this action being dismissed and judgment entered without further notice. (See Entry.) Copy to Plaintiff via U.S. Mail. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 5/2/2017. (JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
PEDRO JAMES RODRIGUEZ,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CORIZON HEALTH,
BRUCE IPPLE,
Defendants.

No. 1:17-cv-01341-TWP-MPB

Entry Granting In Forma Pauperis Status,
Screening and Dismissing Complaint, and
Directing Plaintiff to Show Cause
Plaintiff Pedro James Rodriguez initiated this action on April 28, 2017, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The Court makes the following rulings.
I. In Forma Pauperis Status
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, [dkt. 2], is granted. Plaintiff is assessed
an initial partial filing fee of seven dollars and eight cents ($7.08), which must be paid to the clerk
no later than June 12, 2017.
II. Screening of the Complaint
A. Legal Standard
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must dismiss a complaint or any claim within
a complaint that “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. To
satisfy the notice-pleading standard of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint
must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”
which is sufficient to provide the defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and its basis. Erickson
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v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) and quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The purpose of this requirement is “to give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also
Wade v. Hopper, 993 F.2d 1246, 1249 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that the main purpose of Rule 8 is
rooted in fair notice: a complaint “must be presented with intelligibility sufficient for a court or
opposing party to understand whether a valid claim is alleged and if so what it is.”) (internal
quotation omitted)). The complaint “‘must actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief,
by providing allegations that raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Windy City Metal
Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., 536 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008)).
Pro se complaints are construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008). Liberal
construction means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on
which the party could prevail, it should do so.
B.

Analysis

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s complaint is unsigned. Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper
must be signed . . . by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.” See also Lewis v. Lenc–
Smith Mfg. Co., 784 F.2d 829, 831 (7th Cir. 1986). Should plaintiff wish to proceed with this
action, in light of the remainder of this Entry, he shall ensure that any amended complaint he elects
to file is signed.

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Corizon Health and Doctor Bruce Ipple are the named defendants. Plaintiff seeks monetary
damages for pain and suffering and to have his finger “properly [looked] at and [fixed].” Plaintiff
alleges that the defendants violated his medical rights because they knew he broke his finger on
October 28, 2015, yet he still had pain and stiffness in his finger as recently as July 21, 2016.
Dr. Ipple’s role in treating plaintiff’s injury is very briefly described, but no specific allegations
are made against Corizon. Section 1983 liability cannot be premised on vicarious liability.
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2009). The claim against Corizon
is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
(b)(1).
Plaintiff’s sole allegation against Dr. Ipple is that Dr. Ipple saw him on June 28, 2016, and
“sent [an] email requesting suggestion[s] about my finger.” There are no allegations that Dr. Ipple
refused to treat plaintiff’s pain or was otherwise deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical
needs. The claim against Dr. Ipple is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
While there are other individuals named in the complaint’s statement of claim section, they
are not identified as defendants and no specific allegations are made against them. The complaint
alleges that plaintiff’s hand was x-rayed and placed in a cast and he subsequently received
occupational therapy for displacement. The Court has employed a liberal interpretation of the pro
se complaint, but is unable to identify a viable section 1983 claim against any of the persons
plaintiff mentions. The treatment plaintiff pleads he received was not “so blatantly inappropriate
as to evidence intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate” his condition. Snipes v.
DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir.1996) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the complaint

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is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
III. Opportunity to Show Cause
The Court has found no viable section 1983 claim in the complaint. It is dismissed. Plaintiff
shall have through June 12, 2017, in which to show cause why this action should not be dismissed
and judgment consistent with this Entry should not issue. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
722 F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Without at least an opportunity to amend or to respond to
an order to show cause, an IFP applicant’s case could be tossed out of court without giving the
applicant any timely notice or opportunity to be heard to clarify, contest, or simply request leave
to amend.”). The failure to show cause or file an amended complaint by the stated deadline may
result in this action being dismissed and judgment entered without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 5/2/2017

Distribution:
Pedro James Rodriguez
119933
New Castle - CF
New Castle Correctional Facility - Inmate Mail/Parcels
1000 Van Nuys Road
New Castle, IN 47362

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