TORRES v. KNIGHT et al

Filing 6

Entry Granting In Forma Pauperis Status, Screening Complaint, Dismissing Defendant, and Directing Service of Process - Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, dkt. 5 , Is granted. He is assessed an initial partial filing fee of twenty-three dollars and seventy-seven cents ($23.77), which shall be paid to the clerk of the district court no later than June 26, 2017. The claims against the Superintendent are dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The c lerk is directed to terminate Superintendent Brian Knight as a defendant in this action. This is the only viable claim the Court is able to discern from the complaint. If plaintiff believes the Court has overlooked claims or defendants, he shal l have through June 27, 2017, in which to inform the Court of the omitted claims and/or defendants. The clerk is designated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process to defendants (1) C.A. Penfold, (2) Paul Prulhiere, and (3) Lt. R oach in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process shall consist of the complaint (dkt. 1 ), applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service of Summons), and this Entry. Copy to Plaintiff via U.S. Mail. Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 5/30/2017. (JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
RAFAEL R. TORRES,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRIAN KNIGHT, C.A. PENFOLD,
PAUL PRULHIERE, ROACH LT.,
Defendants.

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No. 1:17-cv-01522-TWP-DML

Entry Granting In Forma Pauperis Status,
Screening Complaint, Dismissing Defendant, and
Directing Service of Process
I. In Forma Pauperis Status
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, dkt. [5], is granted. He is
assessed an initial partial filing fee of twenty-three dollars and seventy-seven cents ($23.77), which
shall be paid to the clerk of the district court no later than June 26, 2017. Notwithstanding this
ruling, plaintiff remains liable for the entire filing fee. “All [28 U.S.C.] § 1915 has ever done is
excuse pre-payment of the docket fees; a litigant remains liable for them, and for other costs,
although poverty may make collection impossible.” Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1025
(7th Cir. 1996).
II. Screening of the Complaint
A.

Legal Standard

The complaint is subject to the screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This statute
directs that the court shall dismiss a complaint or any claim within a complaint which “(1) is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. To satisfy the notice-

pleading standard of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must provide a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” which is
sufficient to provide the defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and its basis. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
and quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Wade v. Hopper, 993 F.2d 1246, 1249 (7th Cir. 1993)
(noting that the main purpose of Rule 8 is rooted in fair notice: a complaint “must be presented
with intelligibility sufficient for a court or opposing party to understand whether a valid claim is
alleged and if so what it is.”) (quotation omitted)). The complaint “must actually suggest that the
plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations that raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., 536 F.3d
663, 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008)).
The Court construes pro se pleadings liberally, and holds pro se pleadings to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n.2
(7th Cir. 2008).
B.

Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff, an Indiana inmate, asserts that while incarcerated in the Plainfield Correctional
Facility he told defendants that his life would be in danger if he was housed with inmates of a
certain housing unit. He contends that he was unfairly labelled as a “snitch” by the defendants, and
that when he was moved against his will to the other housing unit, he was seriously assaulted by
other inmates. Liberally construed, the complaint pleads facts asserting that defendants C.A.
Penfold, Paul Prulhiere, and Lt. Roach were informed of the imminent danger to plaintiff, yet
forced his move regardless, and failed to protect plaintiff. Plaintiff suffered injuries and continues
to experience headaches as a result of the assault.

To state an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, plaintiff must allege facts from
which a court could conclude that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm, and that the
defendants knew of and disregarded that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994);
Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). A tangible threat to safety or well-being must
be plead. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777 (7th Cir. 2008); Billman v. Indiana Dep't of
Corrections, 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting distinction between actual and feared
exposure). A substantial risk of serious harm is one in which the risk is “so great” that it is “almost
certain to materialize if nothing is done.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 911 (7th Cir. 2005).
This action shall proceed as plead against C.A. Penfold, Paul Prulhiere, and Lt. Roach. The
complaint also names Brian Knight, the Superintendent of the prison, and alleges that
Superintendent Knight’s “administration was put on notice” of the danger to plaintiff. No other
personal involvement is plead. Because liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be vicariously based
or asserted under a respondeat superior theory, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted as to Superintendent Knight. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 593-94 (7th Cir.
2009) (“Section 1983 does not establish a system of vicarious responsibility. Liability depends on
each defendant’s knowledge and actions, not on the knowledge or actions of persons they
supervise.) The claims against the Superintendent are dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
III. Summary
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim shall proceed against defendants
C.A. Penfold, Paul Prulhiere, and Lt. Roach. The claims against Superintendent Brian Knight are
dismissed. The clerk is directed to terminate Superintendent Brian Knight as a defendant in this
action. This is the only viable claim the Court is able to discern from the complaint. If plaintiff

believes the Court has overlooked claims or defendants, he shall have through June 27, 2017, in
which to inform the Court of the omitted claims and/or defendants.
IV. Service of Process
The clerk is designated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process to defendants
(1) C.A. Penfold, (2) Paul Prulhiere, and (3) Lt. Roach in the manner specified by Rule 4(d).
Process shall consist of the complaint (dkt. 1), applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request
for Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service of Summons), and this Entry.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 5/30/2017

Distribution:
Rafael R. Torres
144059
Miami Correctional Facility
Inmate Mail/Parcels
3038 West 850 South
Bunker Hill, IN 46914

By Electronic Service:
C.A. Penfold, Pendleton Correctional Facility
Paul Prulhiere, Pendleton Correctional Facility
Lt. Roach, Pendleton Correctional Facility
Indiana Department of Correction