ANDERSON v. DILLON LEGAL GROUP, P.C. et al

Filing 30

ENTRY ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES - For the reasons set forth above, the motion for attorney fees is GRANTED to the following extent: Plaintiff is awarded fees in the amount of $4,980.00. ***SEE ENTRY*** Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 6/26/2018. (JDC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
CHRISTA ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DILLON LEGAL GROUP, P.C., et al.,
Defendants.

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) Cause No. 1:17-cv-1848-WTL-DML
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ENTRY ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
This cause is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s timely motion for attorney fees following
her acceptance of an offer of judgment in this case. The motion is fully briefed and the Court,
being duly advised, GRANTS the motion for the reasons set forth below.
The offer of judgment provided for “reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded by the
Court.” Dkt. No. 10-1. In her original motion, the Plaintiff seeks an award of fees in the amount
of $5,372.00, which represents 13.6 hours at $395.00 per hour for her attorney, Robert Duff. In
her reply brief, she seeks fees for an additional 4.8 hours of work related to the motion for fees,
for a total of $7,268.00.1
In determining the appropriate amount of a fee award under a fee-shifting statute, “the
district court generally begins the fee calculation by computing a “lodestar”: the product of the
hours reasonably expended on the case multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Montanez v.
Simon, 755 F.3d 547, 553 (7th Cir. 2014). “Although the lodestar yields a presumptively
reasonable fee, the court may nevertheless adjust the fee based on factors not included in the
computation.” Id.

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The Plaintiff inexplicably seeks an award of costs of $1,317.76 at the end of her reply
brief. This is not mentioned anywhere else and appears to be a mistake, as the Plaintiff already
has been awarded her costs of $400.00. No additional costs are awarded.

In this case, the Defendants argue that the fee award should be adjusted to $2,000.00
because Plaintiff’s counsel failed to contact the Defendants regarding the possibility of
settlement prior to filing suit. The Court disagrees that a wholesale reduction of the fee award
based solely on the failure to make a pre-suit demand is appropriate. Nor is the Defendants’
argument that the lodestar amount should be reduced “in proportion to the amount of damages
recovered” well-taken; as the Plaintiff correctly notes, the Seventh Circuit “has repeatedly
rejected the notion that the fees must be calculated proportionally to damages[, and t]he principle
applies equally to purported disproportionality between the relief requested and that received.”
Estate of Enoch ex rel. Enoch v. Tienor, 570 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2009). Thus, “[i]n cases
which involve more than a nominal award, we have rejected the notion that the fee award should
be reduced because the damages were smaller than a plaintiff originally sought or that the fee
award might, in fact, be more than the plaintiff's recovery.” Id.
The Defendants next argue that the hourly rate of $395.00 sought by the Plaintiff is too
high for the work performed in this case. The Court agrees.
We have defined a reasonable hourly rate as one that is derived from the market
rate for the services rendered. We presume that an attorney’s actual billing rate for
similar litigation is appropriate to use as the market rate. The fee applicant bears
the burden of producing satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own
affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the
community.
Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 639 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
While Duff has submitted evidence that $395.00 is the hourly rate he charges his clients who pay
him for his work (as opposed to those whose fees are paid by a defendant), only one of the
examples he gives involves an FDCPA case. Duff has pointed to no case in which he (or any
lawyer of similar experience) was actually awarded $395.00 per hour by a judge in this district
for an FDCPA case. Further, while Duff avers that he has “twenty-two years of litigation
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experience and seventeen years of experience litigating consumer law cases,” Dkt. No. 20-1 at 2
¶ 7, it appears that he has been regularly litigating FDCPA cases since the end of 2008, which is
less than ten years ago. Cf. Gastineau v. Wright, 592 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that that
case—in which Duff appeared in June 2007—was only Duff’s second FDCPA case and that his
first case resulted in default judgment). Thus, while the Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit from
attorney Irwin Levine in which he opines that $395.00 is a reasonable hourly rate “in matters of
this nature” given Duff’s “seasoning and experience,” it appears that that opinion is based on
Duff’s seventeen years of experience in consumer law, not his ten years of experience regularly
litigating FDCPA cases.
The Court finds that a reasonable hourly rate in this legal market in a relatively
straightforward FDCPA case, like this one,2 for an attorney with Duff’s level of experience with
FDCPA cases is $300.00. This is comparable to recent awards made in this district. See, e.g.,
Reynolds v. EOS CCA, 2016 WL 6876575 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 22, 2016) and Reed v. EOS CCA,
2016 WL 6876573 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 22, 2016) (awarding $275 hourly rate for attorney John
Steinkamp, who has represented plaintiffs in over 700 FDCPA cases since 2009); Swike v. Med-1
Sols., LLC, No. 1:17-CV-1503-JMS-MPB, 2018 WL 2126520, at *1 (S.D. Ind. May 9, 2018)
(awarding $295 hourly rate in FDCPA case for associate practicing since 2010).
Next, the Defendants take issue with several of the entries in Duff’s billing records.
While the Court disagrees with the Defendants’ characterization of certain tasks as
administrative, the Court has carefully reviewed the records and finds that several entries should

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The fact that the legal issues involved in this case were not particularly complex is
relevant to the fee award calculation, as the Court “has the flexibility to adjust [the lodestar]
figure to reflect various factors including the complexity of the legal issues involved . . . .”
Gastineau v. Wright, 592 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir. 2010).
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be disallowed or reduced. First, Duff billed .9 hour for drafting and filing the first amended
complaint. The Court will disallow this time, inasmuch as there does not appear to be any reason
why the allegations added to in the amended complaint could not have been included in the
original complaint, which had been filed only fifteen days earlier. Second, Duff billed .4 hour
for drafting a representation agreement. In light of Duff’s experience in these types of cases, the
Court finds that to be an excessive amount of time, inasmuch as the task almost certainly
involved simply editing Duff’s standard agreement. The Court reduces that entry to .2 hour.
Fourth, Duff billed .2 hour for preparing and filing his notice of appearance; .1 hour was
sufficient time for that task. Fifth, Duff billed .2 hours to “receive and study order setting initial
pretrial conference.” That order was three pages long, including the caption and signature block;
.1 hour was sufficient time for reviewing it. Finally, the Court disallows the .5 hour billed by
Duff for seeking an extension of time to file his reply in support of the instant motion.
Accordingly, the Court will reduce the hours compensated by 1.8 hours.
For the reasons set forth above, the motion for attorney fees is GRANTED to the
following extent: Plaintiff is awarded fees in the amount of $4,980.00.3
SO ORDERED: 6/26/18
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Copies to all counsel of record via electronic notification

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13.6 hours (sought in original motion) + 4.8 additional hours (sought in reply) = 18.4
hours – 1.8 hours (disallowed by Court) = 16.6 hours x $300.00 = $4,980.00.
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