BROWN v. SUPERINTENDENT
Filing
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ENTRY DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT - Rojae Brown's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding identified as No. NCF 15-12-0260. For the reasons explained in this Entry, Mr. Brown's habeas petition must be denied. ***SEE ENTRY*** (Copy sent to Petitioner via U.S. Mail) Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 5/21/2018.(JDC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
ROJAE BROWN,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.
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No. 1:17-cv-02498-WTL-DML
ENTRY DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
Rojae Brown’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary
proceeding identified as No. NCF 15-12-0260. For the reasons explained in this Entry, Mr.
Brown’s habeas petition must be denied.
I. Overview
Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits, Cochran v. Buss,
381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process. The due process requirement
is satisfied with the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited opportunity to
present evidence to an impartial decision-maker, a written statement articulating the reasons for
the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and “some evidence in the record” to support
the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003);
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
II. The Disciplinary Proceeding
Mr. Brown’s petition concerns an incident that occurred at New Castle Correctional
Facility (NCCF) on December 20, 2015. On December 28, 2015, Internal Affairs Officer A.
Williams issued a Report of Conduct reading as follows:
The following Conduct Report has been issued to Offender Rojae Brown #988991
for violation of Adult Disciplinary Code Class B- 212 (Assault/Battery). On
12/20/15, Brown was identified on camera, by Lt. Harrison, as one offender
involved in assaulting another offender. Internal Affairs investigation finds: Brown
was seen entering the quiet room in F3 at the time the assault occurred and striking
the offender. The offender was notified of the conduct report.
Dkt. No. 8-1.
On May 9, 2017, Lieutenant L. Storms reviewed and prepared a written summary of
security video related to the incident. See Dkt. No. 8-6. Lieutenant Storms’s summary states that
video shows Mr. Brown entering the “quiet room.” Shortly thereafter, an incident appearing to be
a struggle or fight became visible. Roughly a minute later, an inmate exited the quiet room. Mr.
Brown then exited the quiet room and appeared to be carrying a long-sleeved shirt he was wearing
when he entered the quiet room. He proceeded to the bathroom, where he appeared to wash his
hands and clothing.
The respondent filed a copy of the security video with the Court ex parte, Dkt. No. 11, and
the Court finds Lieutenant Storms’s summary to be accurate. The Court observes that the quiet
room is difficult to see on the video. The individual the respondent has identified as Mr. Brown
can be seen entering the quiet room, activity can be seen in the quiet room’s doorway, and the
inmate who preceded Mr. Brown in exiting the quiet room appears to be injured.
Mr. Brown maintained that he did not assault the inmate but rather entered the quiet room
after the incident had already begun, attempted to break it up, and got blood on his hands and
clothing as a result. See Dkt. No. 8-5. Lieutenant Storms also served as the hearing officer in this
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disciplinary proceeding and found Mr. Brown guilty of aiding, abetting, attempting, or conspiring
to commit assault or battery. See id. Sanctions included time in disciplinary segregation, loss of
certain privileges, 90 days’ lost credit time, and demotion of one credit-earning class. See id.
Lieutenant Storms’s hearing report states that he found Mr. Brown guilty based on Officer
Williams’s conduct report, “video review,” and Mr. Brown’s statement in his own defense. See id.
III. Analysis
Mr. Brown raises three issues in his petition. For the reasons set forth below, none of these
issues provides a basis for habeas relief.
A.
Sufficiency of Video Evidence
Mr. Brown first challenges his disciplinary conviction on grounds that the security video
did not show him assaulting or battering an inmate. Mr. Brown also questions whether he can be
identified on the video at all given its poor quality and Lieutenant Storms’s statement that he
identified Mr. Brown “by his size and stature.” See Dkt. No. 8-6. According to Mr. Brown,
numerous inmates in his unit have similar physical features, and the video quality does not allow
him to be clearly identified. See Dkt. No. 2 at 2; Dkt. No. 17 at 3–4.
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are governed by the “some evidence”
standard. “[A] hearing officer’s decision need only rest on ‘some evidence’ logically supporting it
and demonstrating that the result is not arbitrary.” Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th Cir.
2016); see Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The some evidence standard
. . . is satisfied if there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by
the disciplinary board.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The “some evidence” standard is
much more lenient than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d
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978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record
that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56.
Video evidence shows that an inmate identified as Mr. Brown entered the quiet room, that
another inmate later exited that room with injuries, and that Mr. Brown followed him shortly
thereafter and washed his hands and clothing. Lieutenant Storms’s review of the video evidence
accurately captures these points. Mr. Brown admits that he entered the quiet room and got blood
on himself. As such, there is some evidence in the record supporting the conclusion that Mr. Brown
aided, abetted, attempted, or conspired to assault or batter the injured inmate.
Mr. Brown’s petition raises a potential inaccuracy in Officer Williams’s conduct report,
which states that Mr. Brown was seen “striking the offender.” Dkt. No. 8-1. To the extent the
conduct report conveys that the security video shows Mr. Brown striking an inmate, Mr. Brown’s
concern is understandable. Lieutenant Storms’s video summary does not assert the same
conclusion, and the Court does not find that the video shows the inmate identified as Mr. Brown
striking another inmate. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Storms prepared an accurate summary of the
video evidence and served as the hearing officer. As such, it appears clear that Lieutenant Storms
rendered his decision correctly understanding that Mr. Brown was not seen on video striking
another inmate. Additionally, because Mr. Brown was convicted of aiding, abetting, attempting,
or conspiring to assault or batter an inmate, the fact that he is not shown striking the inmate on
camera does not undermine the conviction.
Mr. Brown’s arguments concerning the video’s quality and its ability to identify him are
immaterial. Mr. Brown admits that he entered the quiet room during the incident. See Dkt. No. 85. Whether a person watching the video could clearly identify the person walking into and out of
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the quiet room as Mr. Brown is moot if Mr. Brown admits that he walked into the quiet room
during the incident.
Finally, the Court notes Mr. Brown’s statement that he believes his identification on the
video was “racially charged.” Dkt. No. 2 at 2; Dkt. No.17 at 4. The Court does not understand Mr.
Brown to be asserting that he was charged and convicted due to race-based prejudice or to be
challenging the impartiality of his hearing officer. Rather, the Court understands that Mr. Brown
is simply arguing that, given the large number of African American men in his unit, it would be
difficult to identify him with any certainty on a low-quality security video. See Dkt. No. 2 at 2
(“There are a lot of short, tatted African-Americans at NCCF. How can he know for beyond a
reasonable doubt that it was in fact me?”); Dkt. No. 17 at 4 (“How can I positively be identified as
the alleged perpetrator when there were more African-Americans than just me in the pod when
this incident allegedly occurred?”). As discussed above, this issue is irrelevant in view of Mr.
Brown’s admission that he entered the quiet room during the incident.
B.
Absence of Evidence of Injuries
Mr. Brown argues that his conviction is based on insufficient evidence because he was not
found to have any injuries consistent with his participation in an assault or battery (such as red or
swollen hands) following the incident. See Dkt. No. 2 at 2; Dkt. No. 17 at 4. But there is sufficient
evidence to support Mr. Brown’s conviction for aiding, abetting, attempting, or conspiring to
assault or batter an inmate without evidence that he actually struck the inmate. An inmate commits
the offense of “Conspiracy/Attempting/Aiding or Abetting” by “aiding, commanding, inducing,
counseling, procuring or conspiring with another person” to commit another offense. See Ind.
Dep’t of Correction, Adult Disciplinary Process, App’x I, § 240 (June 1, 2015). The evidence
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discussed in Part III(A) of this entry is sufficient to support the conclusion that Mr. Brown
performed one or more of these actions, even without evidence that he actually struck the inmate.
C.
Denial of Evidence
Finally, Mr. Brown argues that he was wrongly denied the opportunity to review e-mails
from Lieutenant Harrison that were used as evidence to support his conviction. Dkt. No. 2 at 2;
Dkt. No. 17 at 5. The respondent has filed ex parte an e-mail from Lieutenant Harrison indicating
that he spoke to the injured inmate following the incident and that Mr. Brown “was named as [one]
of the several offenders that was possibly involved in the assault.” Dkt. No. 10 at 1. This e-mail
also states that Mr. Brown underwent a medical assessment following the incident and was not
found to have any injuries. Id.
Due process requires “prison officials to disclose all material exculpatory evidence,” unless
that evidence “would unduly threaten institutional concerns.” Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847
(7th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In the prison disciplinary context, “the
purpose of the [this] rule is to insure that the disciplinary board considers all of the evidence
relevant to guilt or innocence and to enable the prisoner to present his or her best defense.” Id.
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Evidence is exculpatory if it undermines or contradicts the
finding of guilty, see id., and it is material if disclosing it creates a “reasonable probability” of a
different result, Toliver v. McCaughtry, 539 F.3d 766, 780-81 (7th Cir. 2008). When prison
administrators believe a valid justification exists to withhold evidence, “‘due process requires that
the district court conduct an in camera review’ to assess whether the undisclosed [evidence] is
exculpatory.” Johnson v. Brown, 381 Fed. Appx. 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Piggie, 344
F.3d at 679).
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It is not clear that Lieutenant Storms considered e-mails from Lieutenant Harrison in
deciding Mr. Brown’s disciplinary case. See dkt. 8-5 (identifying conduct report, video review,
and Mr. Brown’s statement as bases for decision). Nevertheless, Lieutenant Harrison’s e-mail was
not exculpatory. It simply identifies Mr. Brown as an inmate who may have been involved in the
incident and documents that he was not found to be injured during a subsequent medical
examination. These statements do not undermine the conclusion that Mr. Brown aided, abetted,
attempted, or conspired to assault or batter an inmate. Because the e-mail was not exculpatory, Mr.
Brown was not denied due process when he was not permitted to review the e-mail.
IV. Conclusion
“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge,
disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there
was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Mr. Brown to the relief he seeks.
Accordingly, Mr. Brown’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action
dismissed. Judgment consistent with this entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 5/21/18
_______________________________
Hon. William T. Lawrence, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
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Distribution:
ROJAE BROWN
988991
NEW CASTLE - CF
NEW CASTLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
1000 Van Nuys Road
NEW CASTLE, IN 47362
Abigail T. Rom
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
abby.rom@atg.in.gov
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