ESTATE OF ANDRE ALEXANDER GREEN, DECEASED v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. 36 , is GRANTED. Final judgment will issue in a separate entry (SEE ORDER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION). Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 11/13/2019. (DWH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
ESTATE OF ANDRE ALEXANDER GREEN )
Deceased,
)
)
Plaintiff,
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)
v.
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CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS Indiana and
)
several unknown members of the
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Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
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Department,
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MARC KLONNE,
)
ADAM MENGERINK,
)
VINCENT STEWART,
)
)
Defendants.
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No. 1:17-cv-02673-JPH-TAB
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Andre Green was fatally shot after an armed carjacking as he attempted
to elude capture by Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”)
officers. Mr. Green’s estate contends that the officers used excessive force.
Defendants—the City of Indianapolis and Officers Marc Klonne, Adam
Mengerink, and Vincent Stewart—have moved for summary judgment. Dkt.
[36]. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity and the city is not subject
to municipal liability so that motion is GRANTED.
I.
Facts and Background
A. Mr. Green’s encounter with IMPD officers
Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule
56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence “in the light most favorable to
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the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party’s
favor.” Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
The Court notes some factual disputes.
Shortly after 10:00 p.m. on August 9, 2015, IMPD officers received a
dispatch about an armed carjacking with two suspects, one who fired four
shots at a group of people. Dkt. 37-1; dkt. 37-2; dkt. 44-2 at 5 (Stewart Dep.
at 31). That dispatch included a description of the two unidentified juvenile
suspects, license plate information, and the type of car taken—a red 2013
Nissan Altima. Dkt. 37-1; dkt. 44-2 at 5 (Stewart Dep. at 31).
Andre Green, who was fifteen years old, was driving that car, with
another juvenile in the passenger’s seat. Dkt. 37-11 at 20–21, 41 (Klonne Dep.
at 57–58, 94); dkt. 44-3 at 6 (Mengerink Dep. at 18); dkt. 44-9 at 2. Soon,
about five marked police cars were tailing the Nissan as Mr. Green drove at a
normal speed. Dkt. 44-2 at 9 (Stewart Dep. at 40); dkt. 44-3 at 9 (Mengerink
Dep. at 25). Eventually, he turned onto a dead-end street. Dkt. 44-4 at 6
(Klonne Dep. at 43). Five officers drove after the Nissan: Adam Mengerink,
Cory Heiny, Vincent Stewart, Marc Klonne, and Lorie Phillips. See dkt. 37-8 at
13 (Mengerink Dep. at 25).
The IMPD officers arranged their cars in a “tactical V formation,” which is
intended to stop a suspect vehicle while leaving distance between it and
officers. Dkt. 37-11 at 14–15 (Klonne Dep. at 44–45); dkt. 44-3 at 10
(Mengerink Dep. at 28). This formation left no room for the red Nissan to fit
through. Dkt. 44-3 at 12–13 (Mengerink Dep. at 33–34). The Nissan stopped
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and the passenger jumped out and fled. Dkt. 44-3 at 13–14 (Mengerink Dep.
at 34–35); dkt. 37-11 at 20–21 (Klonne Dep. at 57–58). Officer Heiny chased
the escaping passenger. Dkt. 37-12 at 15 (Stewart Dep. at 44).
Mr. Green then turned the car around and drove toward the police
vehicles. Dkt. 37-8 at 26, 31–32 (Mengerink Dep. at 38, 43–44); dkt. 37-11 at
29 (Klonne Dep. at 66). The parties dispute what happened next. Defendants
contend that Mr. Green drove into Officer Phillips’s car, backed into Officer
Heiny’s car, then revved the Nissan’s engine and accelerated quickly forward
into Officer Phillips’s car again. Dkt. 37-8 at 35–37 (Mengerink Dep. at 47–49);
dkt. 37-11 at 22–16 (Klonne Dep. at 59–63). Mr. Green’s estate argues that Mr.
Green drove forward slowly into Officer Phillips’s car only once. Dkt. 44 at 8–
10; dkt. 44-2 at 10–12 (Stewart Dep. at 49–51).
As Mr. Green drove toward Officer Phillips’s car, three officers opened
fire. They were concerned for Officer Phillips’s safety because they didn’t know
where she was. Dkt. 37-8 at 26, 32, 35, 38–39, 41 (Mengerink Dep. at 38, 44,
47, 50–51, 53); dkt. 37-11 at 22, 28, 32, 40–42 (Klonne Dep. at 59, 65, 69, 93–
95); dkt. 37-12 at 20, 32, 34–35 (Stewart Dep. at 49, 61, 63–64). Officer
Mengerink fired eight shots through the Nissan’s passenger window until he
couldn’t see the driver any more. Dkt. 37-8 at 7, 41–44 (Mengerink Dep. at 17,
53–56). Officer Stewart fired seven shots through either the passenger window
or through the front windshield. Dkt. 37-12 at 24, 26–27 (Stewart Dep. at 53,
55–56); dkt. 37-8 at 44–45 (Mengerink Dep. at 17, 56–57). Officer Klonne fired
five shots through the front windshield. Dkt. 37-11 at 7–8 (Klonne Dep. at 34–
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35). Broken glass from the Nissan’s driver’s side door was on the ground
where the Nissan stopped against Officer Phillips’s car. Dkt. 44-2 at 13
(Stewart Dep. at 54); dkt. 44-7.
Mr. Green opened his car door and collapsed to the pavement. Dkt. 3712 at 37–38 (Stewart Dep. at 67–68). Officers Phillips and Stewart approached
Mr. Green and found a handgun next to or underneath him. Dkt. 37-12 at 40–
43 (Stewart Dep. at 69–72); dkt. 37-13 at 7 (Phillips Dep. at 66). Mr. Green
died immediately or within minutes from several gunshot wounds, one of which
was to the right side of his back. See dkt. 44-9 at 4–5; dkt. 37-12 at 41
(Stewart Dep. at 70).
B. Mr. Harmening’s report
The estate’s expert, William Harmening, prepared a report analyzing the
facts. Dkt. 44 at 9–11. Mr. Harmening has been a law enforcement officer for
about 36 years and is the program coordinator for Washington University in St.
Louis’s forensic-psychology program. Dkt. 44-8 at 3.
Based on that report, the estate contends that the Nissan slow-rolled into
Officer Phillips’s car with no acceleration, causing no damage. Dkt. 44 at 9–10.
The report is also the basis for the estate’s argument that Mr. Green was shot
in the back after the Nissan stopped and after Officer Stewart ran to its driver’s
side. Id. The report also says that it’s “reasonable to conclude” that the final
shot must have come after Mr. Green started exiting the vehicle. Dkt. 44-8 at
9.
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C. Procedural history
Mr. Green’s estate filed this action alleging excessive force against the
individual officers and that the City of Indianapolis is liable under Monell for its
officers’ constitutional violation. Dkt. 1. Defendants have moved for summary
judgment. Dkt. 36.
II.
Applicable Law
A. Summary judgment
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party must
inform the court “of the basis for its motion” and specify evidence
demonstrating “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets this
burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and identify
“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Zerante, 555 F.3d at 584 (citation
omitted).
B. Qualified immunity
“[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their
conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
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of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct.
305, 308 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). This
“clearly established” standard ensures “that officials can ‘reasonably . . .
anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.’” Reichle v.
Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 646 (1987)). Qualified immunity thus “balances two important interests—
the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officers from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’’ Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
The “difficult part” of the qualified-immunity test is “identifying the level
of generality at which the constitutional right must be clearly established.”
Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 2013). A “high level of
generality” is not appropriate; instead, the question is “whether the law was
clear in relation to the specific facts confronting the public official when he
acted.” Id. “Such specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment
context,” because “it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the
relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation
the officer confronts.’’ Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quotation and citation
omitted).
In excessive force cases, “the result depends very much on the facts of
each case,’’ so officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless precedent
‘‘squarely governs” the case at hand. Id. at 309 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen,
543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004)). While a case directly on point is not required,
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“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate.” Id. at 308.
III.
Analysis
A. Mr. Harmening’s report
Defendants argue that Mr. Harmening’s report is inadmissible because it
was not timely disclosed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2),
because Mr. Harmening lacks the specialized knowledge required to form his
opinions under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and because the report is
speculative and contradicted by record evidence. Dkt. 48 at 9–17. Mr. Green’s
estate responds that the expert-disclosure deadline was “arguably” extended,
and Mr. Harmening has submitted an affidavit responding to Defendants’ other
arguments. Dkt 52 at 1–2; dkt. 52-1.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) requires expert disclosures “at
the times and in the sequence that the court orders.” The “sanction for failing
to comply” is that “the party is not allowed to use that information or witness
to supply evidence on a motion . . . unless the failure was substantially
justified or is harmless.” United States v. Z Investment Props., LLC, 921 F.3d
696, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)).
Here, Mr. Green’s estate disclosed Mr. Harmening’s report on November
21, 2018. Dkt. 48–3. The deadline to do so was September 7, 2018. Dkt. 11
at 3. The estate argues that the deadline was “arguably” extended to November
19, 2018, because the non-expert-discovery and dispositive-motion deadlines
were extended. Dkt. 52 at 1–2 (citing dkt. 33; dkt. 35). But those extensions
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did not reference or extend the expert-disclosure deadline, which is set out as a
specific date in a separate paragraph of the Case Management Plan. Dkt. 11 at
3. The report was thus disclosed 75 days late.
The late disclosure means that the report cannot be used to oppose
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment “unless the failure was
substantially justified or is harmless.” Z Investment, 921 F.3d at 699.
Exclusion is “automatic and mandatory,” so it is the estate’s burden to prove
that an exception applies. Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 641
(7th Cir. 2008). Mr. Green’s estate does not argue that either exception
applies, see dkt. 52, so the report is inadmissible.
But even if the expert report had been timely, it does not create a
genuine issue of material fact. “A witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” may testify to matters
within “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 702. Under this rule, experts may not offer expert testimony that is
outside their area of expertise. See Goodwin v. MTD Prods., Inc., 232 F.3d 600,
609 (7th Cir. 2000). Indeed, there is “no duty to respect expert opinions that
are given outside a witness’ field of expertise.” Schmidt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 970,
973 (7th Cir. 2000).
Mr. Harmening is a former law-enforcement officer and an expert in
Forensic Psychology. Dkt. 44-8 at 3. He describes this area of expertise as
“the intersection of the methods and techniques of psychology and the criminal
justice mission.” Dkt. 48-1 at 51 (Harmening Dep. at 51). His twenty-three8
page report offers some opinions that that appear to fit within this expertise,
such as his analysis of the psychological phenomena of “contagious shooting.”
Dkt. 44-8 at 15-16.
But Mr. Harmening’s report also opines on matters in which he is
admittedly not an expert. For example, he offers conclusions about which shell
casings were fired by which police officers, dkt. 44-8 at 12, but he testified that
“a ballistics expert . . . match[es] a particular bullet or casing or fragment to a
particular gun” and that he has “never tried to do that,” dkt. 48-1 at 51
(Harmening Dep. at 51). He also offers conclusions about the speed at which
Mr. Green’s vehicle was travelling and the velocity at which it hit Officer
Phillips’ car without establishing his expertise in these areas. Dkt. 44-8 at 1011. Finally, Mr. Harmening’s report admits that establishing whether Mr.
Green could have exited the Nissan after he was shot would require a medical
pathologist’s opinion. Dkt. 44-8 at 9.
Moreover, several of the report’s central allegations do not align with
record evidence. There is no designated evidence that the Nissan slow-rolled
into Officer Phillips’s car, or that Officer Phillips’s car was undamaged. Dkt. 44
at 11; dkt. 48–5 (showing damage to Officer Phillips’s car). Nor is there
designated evidence to support the opinion that Mr. Green was fatally shot as
he exited the stopped Nissan after initial shots were fired. Dkt. 44 at 10–11;
dkt. 44-8 at 6–9, 11, 18. Relying on a shell casing found on the ground near
the driver’s side of the Nissan, the report concludes that the final shot was fired
by Officer Stewart after the vehicle stopped and Mr. Green started exiting the
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vehicle. Id. But Defendants’ ballistics expert determined that the casing did
not come from Officer Stewart’s gun, dkt. 48-4 at 2, and Mr. Harmening is not
a ballistics expert, dkt. 48-1 at 7 (Harmening Dep. at 51). See Goodwin, 232
F.3d at 609.
In total, the conclusions in the report that Mr. Harmening is qualified to
make—such as opinions about the psychology of the police officers—are not
material because, as explained below, the qualified-immunity analysis does not
turn on those conclusions. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). On the other hand, the conclusions unrelated to psychology—such
as the speed at which Mr. Green’s car was travelling and the origins of the
various shell casings—may be relevant to the qualified-immunity analysis. But
they are not within Mr. Harmening’s area of expertise or are unsupported by
designated evidence, so they are not considered. See Goodwin, 232 F.3d at
609.
In sum, Mr. Harmening’s report is inadmissible as untimely and nothing
in it creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Bourke v. Conger, 639 F.3d
344, 347 (7th Cir. 2011); Minasian v. Standard Chartered Bank, PLC, 109 F.3d
1212, 1216 (7th Cir. 1997).
B. Qualified immunity
To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff “must show both (1) that the
facts make out a constitutional violation, and (2) that the constitutional right
was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the official’s alleged misconduct.” Abbott
v. Sangamon Cty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 2013). Officers Mengerink,
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Stewart, and Klonne argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity under
either of those prongs because (1) they did not use more force than the
constitution allows and (2) no clearly established law prohibited them from
using deadly force in the circumstances they faced. Dkt. 38 at 30. 1
The Court exercises its discretion to begin with the second, “clearly
established law” prong of the qualified-immunity test. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at
236. Mr. Green’s estate argues against this approach, claiming that the first
prong governs here because officers can rarely be entitled to qualified immunity
when using excessive force. Dkt. 44 at 18 (relying on Lanigan v. Village of East
Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 1997)). But qualified immunity shields
officers who make “constitutionally deficient” decisions if they reasonably
misapprehend the law governing the circumstances. See Brosseau, 543 U.S. at
198. Presuming that qualified immunity rarely applies when officers violate the
constitution would inappropriately collapse the second prong into the first. See
Findlay v. Lendermon, 722 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The substantive
constitutional test . . . does not collapse into the qualified immunity test . . . .”).
Indeed, the second prong is “especially important” in the complex and varying
factual situations that occur in the excessive force context. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct.
at 308–09. The Court therefore does not address the first prong.
“Qualified immunity is an individual defense available to each individual defendant
in his individual capacity.” Estate of Williams by Rose v. Cline, 902 F.3d 643, 651 (7th
Cir. 2018). Here though, the Court considers the officers’ qualified-immunity defenses
together because Mr. Green’s estate considers them together, dkt. 44 at 16–23, and
because this is not a case in which “the facts relative to the alleged constitutional
violation differ from defendant to defendant,” Cline, 902 F.3d at 651.
1
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Officers Mengerink, Stewart, and Klonne argue that their actions did
not violate clearly established law. Dkt. 38 at 24–30. Mr. Green’s estate
responds first by citing the Fourth Amendment principles that “[a] police officer
may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead,” dkt.
44 at 13, 18 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)), and that
“when feasible, some warning should be given before the use of deadly force,”
dkt. 44 at 19 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12). While true, these principles
are the type of “broad general proposition” that cannot overcome qualified
immunity. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308. As explained above, qualified immunity
can be overcome only by clearly established law governing the specific facts at
hand. Id. at 308–09.
Turning to the specific facts here, the Supreme Court’s 2004 Brosseau
decision is instructive. 543 U.S. 194. There, an officer pursued a suspect to a
Jeep, where the officer feared he would retrieve a weapon. Id. at 196. The
officer broke the driver’s side window with her handgun and hit the suspect on
the head, but he started the Jeep and began to drive away. Id. The officer shot
the suspect, striking him in the back, in part because she was afraid for other
officers who she believed were on foot in the immediate area. Id. at 196–97.
The Supreme Court held that qualified immunity applied because no case had
found a Fourth Amendment violation “when an officer shot a fleeing suspect
who presented a risk to others.” Id. at 200. Brosseau thus “makes plain” that
it was not clearly established at the time “that it was unconstitutional to shoot
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a fleeing driver to protect those whom his flight might endanger.” Plumhoff v.
Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014).
Here, all three officers who fired feared for Officer Phillips’s safety.
Officer Klonne did not know where Officer Phillips was during the encounter,
and he was concerned for her and for other officers. Dkt. 37-11 at 22, 28, 32,
40–42 (Klonne Dep. at 59, 65, 69, 93–95). Officer Stewart thought that Mr.
Green was using the Nissan as a weapon and feared for Officer Phillips’s safety
because he believed she was still in her vehicle. Dkt. 37-12 at 20, 32, 34–35
(Stewart Dep. at 49, 61, 63–64). Officer Mengerink knew that Officer Phillips
was not in her car, but she was no longer where he’d last seen her, so he was
afraid that the Nissan had struck her or was dragging her. Dkt. 37-8 at 26, 32,
35, 38–39, 41 (Mengerink Dep. at 38, 44, 47, 50–51, 53). 2 All three officers
also knew that an armed carjacking with shots fired had just occurred and that
the Nissan’s driver was one of the two suspects. Dkt. 37-11 at 11, 40–41
(Klonne Dep. at 41, 93–94); dkt. 37-12 at 13, 36 (Stewart Dep. at 42, 65); dkt.
37-8 at 10–11 (Mengerink Dep. at 22–23).
Mr. Green’s estate cites several cases that he argues govern the facts
here. See Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1990), Clash v. Beatty, 77
F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996); Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332 (7th Cir. 1997);
Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1993). 3 But those cases were decided
Officer Mengerink also feared for his own safety. Dkt. 37-8 at 41 (Mengerink Dep. at
53).
2
Mr. Green also cites Buchanan v. City of Milwaukee, 290 F. Supp. 2d 954 (E.D. Wis.
2003); Wallace v. Estate of Davies, 676 N.E.2d 422, 427–28 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997);
3
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before the events that gave rise to Brosseau. They therefore cannot alter
Brosseau’s qualified-immunity analysis or its conclusion that no clearly
established law shows “that it was unconstitutional to shoot a fleeing driver to
protect those whom his flight might endanger.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 779–80
(citing Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 200).
Moreover, none of those cases are factually similar to this one, and none
of them involve officers using deadly force to prevent injury to a third party. In
Titran, the plaintiff alleged that during booking, officers broke her wrist
wrestling her to the ground and then shocked her with a “cattle prod.” 893
F.2d at 145–46. In Clash, the plaintiff alleged that after he was handcuffed,
officers shoved him into a police car, injuring his knee. 77 F.3d at 1047. In
Palmquist, the plaintiff alleged that officers shot and killed a man who was
swinging a muffler pipe at them. 111 F.3d at 1334. And in Ellis, the plaintiff
alleged that after he a threw a bag at an officer and ran away, the officer shot
him in the back even though he “presented no immediate threat and was not
apparently armed.” 999 F.2d at 245–47. Each of those cases is too different to
squarely govern this one, as required to overcome qualified immunity.
Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309.
Craighead v. Lee, 399 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2005); and Porter v. City of Muncie, No. IP 981491-C H/G, 1999 WL 33117261 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 22, 1999). These cases are also
factually dissimilar and while they may shed light on Supreme Court and Seventh
Circuit precedent, they cannot clearly establish a right. See Estate of Escobedo v.
Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 782 (7th Cir. 2010) (decisions from other circuits must show “a
clear trend in the case law that the recognition of the right by a controlling precedent
was merely a matter of time”); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1995)
(“[D]istrict court decisions cannot clearly establish a constitutional right.”).
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Mr. Green’s estate also argues that Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d
230, 234 (7th Cir. 1993) “is strikingly similar to the facts here.” Dkt. 44 at 21.
There, police cornered a stolen taxi in a parking lot. Starks, 5 F.3d at 232.
The driver backed the taxi into a police car then pulled forward, only to be
blocked by a utility pole. Id. After the driver maneuvered the taxi again and
floored the accelerator, an officer jumped into the path of the moving taxi. Id.
Three officers opened fire. Id.
While many of those facts are similar to the facts here, Starks’s holding
turned on a critical issue not presented here: whether one of the officers had
jumped in front of the stolen car, leaving no chance for the driver to stop. Id.
at 233–34 (“The essential dispute, therefore, concerns whether [Officer] Black
moved from behind the pole before or after the cab started forward.”). In light
of that dispute, Starks held that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment by
“‘unreasonably creat[ing] an encounter’ in which an individual would be
‘unable to react in order to avoid presenting a deadly threat to [the officer].’”
Williams v. Ind. State Police Dept., 797 F.3d 468, 483 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Starks, 5 F.3d at 234). Here, there is no designated evidence showing, or any
argument claiming, that an officer created the situation that caused the officers
to fear for their own or other officers’ safety. Dkt. 44 at 21–22; cf. Soriano v.
Town of Cicero, 521 Fed. Appx. 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Starks
in part because no officer moved in front of the vehicle). But even if the facts
here were more similar, Starks predates Brosseau and the Seventh Circuit has
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since recognized a “lack of clarity in cases in this area.” Williams, 797 F.3d at
483.
Moreover, in Starks, “the plaintiffs conceded that if an officer was faced
with a fleeing felon driving toward him, the officer could justifiably shoot the
driver. In other words, if [Officer] Black had been in front of the vehicle before
the car started forward, all three officers could have fired and would be
protected by qualified immunity.” Starks, 5 F.3d at 233–34. Starks accepted
that concession, so it cannot clearly establish the opposite. See id.
Brosseau best summarizes Starks’s relation to this case. 543 U.S. at
201. There, the Supreme Court said that Starks did not squarely govern
Brosseau’s facts. Instead, the actions that the officer took out of concern for
other officers “fell in the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.”
Id. at 201 (quotation omitted). So Starks was not enough to “clearly establish”
a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. Since it wasn’t enough in Brosseau, it isn’t
enough here.
Moreover, neither Brosseau nor Starks (nor most of the other cases that
the estate cites) involved a violent crime leading to the police encounter, while
here the police dispatch reported a carjacking with shots fired. See Brosseau,
543 U.S. at 195–96; Starks, 5 F.3d at 232–33. That difference may have been
decisive in Starks—the Seventh Circuit noted that the case was “difficult” in
part because “the underlying crime was not accomplished violently.” Id. Here,
Mr. Green was suspected of having committed an armed carjacking with shots
fired. And once blockaded on a dead-end street, he tried to escape instead of
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stopping the Nissan or surrendering to officers. Based on these facts, the
officers reasonably recognized that Mr. Green presented serious danger. For
these reasons, Starks and the other cases that Mr. Green’s estate cites do not
squarely govern this case. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309.
Mr. Green’s estate notes that the officers fired twenty shots and that Mr.
Green was struck five times. Dkt. 44 at 8, 14. But when all shots are fired in
one quick volley, the number of shots fired does not affect the qualifiedimmunity analysis. See Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 777. The decision to use deadly
force is the weightiest of decisions. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 10 (“The
intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched.”). When
deadly force is justified, “the officers need not stop shooting until the threat
has ended.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 777. Here, there is no evidence that any
shots were fired after the initial volley.
Officers Mengerink, Stewart, and Klonne are entitled to qualified
immunity. 4
C. Monell liability
A municipality cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for
the actions of its agent or employee. Los Angeles Cty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S.
29, 35–36 (2010) (explaining Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978)). Rather, a municipality can be liable only for its own actions and
corresponding harm. Id. “The critical question under Monell remains this: is
Because the officers are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court does not address
their argument that they were added as defendants too late under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c). See dkt. 38 at 32–35.
4
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the action about which the plaintiff is complaining one of the institution itself,
or is it merely one untaken by a subordinate actor?” Glisson v. Ind. Dept. of
Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 381 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). An action is one of the
“institution itself,” id., when the municipality’s “official policy, widespread
custom, or action by an official with policy-making authority was the ‘moving
force’ behind [the] constitutional injury,” Dixon v. Cty. of Cook, 819 F.3d 343,
348 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 658; City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 379 (1989)); see Humphries, 562 U.S. at 36 (reciting the “list of types
of municipal action” that can lead to liability).
These “stringent” and precise grounds for Monell liability are required by
section 1983. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402–404, 415
(1997); see Humphries, 562 U.S. at 36. Courts must apply “rigorous standards
of culpability and causation” to prevent municipal liability from collapsing into
respondeat superior liability, which section 1983 prohibits. Brown, 520 U.S. at
405, 415.
The City of Indianapolis argues that municipal liability cannot apply
because any deprivation of Mr. Green’s constitutional rights was not caused by
(1) its express policies, (2) its implicit policies or custom, or (3) a person with
final policymaking authority. Dkt. 38 at 31. Mr. Green’s estate responds by
arguing only that the city has “a widespread practice of not disciplining its
officers involved in the use of deadly force” as evidenced by the fact that “IMPD
did not discipline Klonne, Mengerink, or Stewart for their use of force on
August 9, 2015.” Dkt. 44 at 25.
18
Showing an implicit policy or custom through a widespread practice
requires evidence showing more than a “random event.” Thomas v. Cook Cty.
Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010). Yet Mr. Green’s estate has
not designated evidence of any prior similar incidents, as required for Monell
liability. See Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303 (recognizing that “even three” incidents
cannot support Monell liability); Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th
Cir. 2005). Instead, the estate cites only the events that gave rise to this case.
That is not enough to support municipal liability. Daniel v. Cook County, 833
F.3d 728, 735 (7th Cir. 2016) (“To prove an official policy, custom, or practice
within the meaning of Monell, Daniel must show more than the deficiencies
specific to his own experience, of course.”). The City of Indianapolis is entitled
to summary judgment on the Monell claim.
IV.
Conclusion
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dkt. [36], is GRANTED.
Final judgment will issue in a separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 11/13/2019
Distribution:
Andrew R. Duncan
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS, LLP
ard@rucklaw.com
19
Grant E. Helms
OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL
grant.helms@indy.gov
Jamon Rahi Hicks
DOUGLAS HICKS LAW
jamon@douglashickslaw.com
John F. Kautzman
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS, LLP
jfk@rucklaw.com
Trent A. McCain
MCCAIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
Trent@McCain.Law
Edward J. Merchant
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS, LLP
ejm@rucklaw.com
Andrew J. Upchurch
OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL
andrew.upchurch@indy.gov
20
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