BENNETT v. KNIGHT

Filing 15

ORDER Denying Petition for Writ for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Directing Entry of Final Judgment. (See Order). Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 5/2/2018.(MAC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
MAURICE BENNETT,
Petitioner,
v.
WENDY KNIGHT,
Respondent.

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No. 1:17-cv-02834-TWP-DML

Entry Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Directing Entry of Final Judgment
The petition of Maurice Bennett for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary
proceeding identified as No. CIC 17-04-138. For the reasons explained in this Entry, Mr. Bennett’s
habeas petition must be denied.
A.

Overview

Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits, Cochran v. Buss,
381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process. The due process requirement
is satisfied with the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited opportunity to
present evidence to an impartial decision-maker, a written statement articulating the reasons for
the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and “some evidence in the record” to support
the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003);
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).

B.

The Disciplinary Proceeding

On April 12, 2017, Correctional Officer E. Boner wrote a Conduct Report charging Mr.
Bennett with use or possession of a cellular phone. The Conduct Report states:
On 04/12/2017 at approx.. 8:10 AM, I Officer E. Boner conducting [sic] a
shakedown of Offender Bennett, Maurice #974997 18B-3D. Upon entering cell 183D, I noticed Offender Bennett on the bottom bunk and hesitant to stand up. I
ordered Offender Bennett to exit his bed and quit moving around, he then recovered
to my possession a reading light that had been altered to be used as a cellular phone
charger. Once Offender Bennett had been stripped out, I Officer Boner along with
Officer J. Matlock escorted the Offender to D unit Control area. I Officer Boner
then ordered Offender Bennett to submit to mechanical restraints, at which he
complied. Once in restraints I then lifted Offender Bennett’s shirt up and search []
his medical colostomy bag, I then recovered a black AT&T phone approximately 3
½ inches long, along with two packages of an unknown substance, appearing to be
narcotics.
Dkt. 13-1.
Photos were taken of the cell phone and Mr. Bennett received a notice of confiscated
property form. Dkt. 13-1, p. 6.
Mr. Bennett was notified of the charge on April 15, 2017, when he received the Screening
Report. He pled not guilty to the charge, did not request a lay advocate, did not request any
witnesses, and did not request any physical evidence. Dkt. 13-2.
The disciplinary hearing was held on April 18, 2017. Mr. Bennet provided the following
statement: “Nothing to say.” Based on the staff reports, the offender’s statement, and physical
evidence (pictures of the cellular phone), the hearing officer found Mr. Bennett guilty of
possession of a cellular device. The sanctions imposed included: a written reprimand, 206 days
earned credit-time deprivation, and a demotion from credit class 2 to credit class 3. 1

1

Mr. Bennett’s credit time deprivation was later reduced to 180 days in accordance with Indiana
Department of Correction policy for a Class A disciplinary violation. Thus, Mr. Bennett’s
argument that a deprivation of 206 days exceeded the maximum allowable is moot and will not be
considered by the Court. Dkt. 13-8.

Mr. Bennett appealed to the Facility Head and his appeal was denied. He appealed to the
Indiana Department of Correction Final Reviewing Authority and his appeal was denied. Mr.
Bennett then brought this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
C.

Analysis

In his petition, Mr. Bennett lists three grounds on which he challenges his prison
disciplinary conviction: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support a guilty finding; 2) he was
denied evidence; and, 3) the response to his appeal was not timely.
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Mr. Bennett challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Although not cogent, Mr. Bennett
seems to argue that he would not have been able to hide a cell phone in his colostomy bag because
it is clear and is fit securely to his intestines.
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are governed by the “some evidence”
standard. “[A] hearing officer’s decision need only rest on ‘some evidence’ logically supporting it
and demonstrating that the result is not arbitrary.” Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th Cir.
2016); see Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The some evidence standard
. . . is satisfied if there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by
the disciplinary board.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The “some evidence” standard is
much more lenient than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d
978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record
that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56.
During a search of Mr. Bennett’s cell, Officer Boner found a reading light that had been
altered to be used as a cellular phone charger. Officer Boner then searched Mr. Bennett’s person
and found a cellular telephone hidden in the area of his colostomy bag. This evidence is sufficient

to satisfy the “some evidence” standard. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. No relief is warranted on
this basis.
2. Denial of Evidence
Here, Mr. Bennett argues that he was denied evidence. Specifically, he alleges that he
requested witnesses, a review of camera evidence, the evidence card, and did not waive his right
to 24-hour notice prior to the hearing. He argues that he was not provided any of the evidence he
requested.
As an initial manner, Mr. Bennett was notified of the charges in this disciplinary action of
April 15, 2017, and the hearing occurred three days later on April 18, 2017. Thus, a claim that his
rights under Wolff with respect to advance written notice of the charges were violated is without
merit.
A prisoner has a limited right to present witnesses and evidence in his defense, consistent
with correctional goals and safety. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. A hearing officer has considerable
discretion with respect to witness and evidence requests, and may deny requests that threaten
institutional safety or are irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary. Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660,
666 (7th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, due process only requires access to witnesses and evidence that
are exculpatory. Rasheed–Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). “Exculpatory” in
this context means evidence that “directly undermines the reliability of the evidence in the record
pointing to [the prisoner’s] guilt.” Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1996).
Mr. Bennett alleges that he was denied all of the evidence he requested. However, his
argument fails to identify any prejudice that occurred as a result. The denial of the right to present
evidence will be considered harmless unless the prisoner shows that the evidence could have aided

his defense. See Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011); Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660,
666 (7th Cir. 2003). No relief is warranted on this basis.
3. Violation of IDOC Policy
Mr. Bennett argues that the Superintendent violated IDOC Policy because she waited
beyond the time frame set forth in the Policy to respond to his appeal. The claim that prison
authorities failed to follow various policies before and during the challenged disciplinary
proceeding are summarily dismissed as insufficient to support the relief sought by the petitioner.
See Keller v. Donahue, 2008 WL 822255, 271 Fed.Appx. 531, 532 (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 2008) (in a
habeas action, an inmate “has no cognizable claim arising from the prison’s application of its
regulations.”); Hester v. McBride, 966 F. Supp. 765, 774-75 (N.D.Ind. 1997) (violations of the
Indiana Adult Disciplinary Policy Procedures do not state a claim for federal habeas relief). In
conducting habeas review, “a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991).
No relief is warranted on this basis.
D.

Conclusion

“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge,
disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there
was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Mr. Bennett to the relief he seeks.
Accordingly, Mr. Bennett’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action
dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 5/2/2018

Distribution:
MAURICE BENNETT
974997
WABASH VALLEY - CF
WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
Marjorie H. Lawyer-Smith
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]