IGOU v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al

Filing 69

ORDER - Plaintiff Lance Igou is a 29-year old inmate at the New Castle Correctional Facility. [Filing No. 1 at 1.] In his Complaint, Mr. Igou alleges that while incarcerated, he has been denied treatment for an eye condition, resulting in perman ent vision impairment and the potential loss of his eye. [Filing No. 1 at 4-10.] He raises four claims in this matter: (1) violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of t he Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under the standard articulated in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (3) violation of Indiana Constitution Article 1, Section 16; and (4) negligence. [Filing No. 1 at 10-13.] Mr. Igou requests an injunction requiring treatment of his eye, damages, attorneys' fees, and any other relief that may be just and proper. [Filing No. 1 at 13-14.] Defendants H anna Winningham, Megan Miller, and Corizon, LLC (collectively "Defendants") have moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).1 [Filing No. 33 .] That Motion is currently ripe for the Court' ;s review. For the reasons described above, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count III, 33 , but only to the extent that Count III seeks monetary damages. In any other way, the claim stated in Count III remains pending in this case. No partial final judgment shall issue. (See Order). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 2/23/2018. (APD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
LANCE IGOU,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
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INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, )
NEW CASTLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
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THE GEO GROUP, INC.,
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WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
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WEXFORD OF INDIANA, LLC,
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CORIZON HEALTH, INC.,
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NIKKI TAFOYA in her individual and official
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capacity,
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HANNA WINNINGHAM in her individual and
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official capacity,
)
MEGAN MILLER in her individual and official
)
capacity,
)
DOES 1-20 in their individual and official
)
capacities,
)
)
Defendants.
)

No. 1:17-cv-02910-JMS-MPB

ORDER
Plaintiff Lance Igou is a 29-year old inmate at the New Castle Correctional Facility. [Filing
No. 1 at 1.] In his Complaint, Mr. Igou alleges that while incarcerated, he has been denied
treatment for an eye condition, resulting in permanent vision impairment and the potential loss of
his eye. [Filing No. 1 at 4-10.] He raises four claims in this matter: (1) violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under the
standard articulated in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (3)
violation of Indiana Constitution Article 1, Section 16; and (4) negligence. [Filing No. 1 at 10-

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13.] Mr. Igou requests an injunction requiring treatment of his eye, damages, attorneys’ fees, and
any other relief that may be just and proper. [Filing No. 1 at 13-14.]
Defendants Hanna Winningham, Megan Miller, and Corizon, LLC (collectively
“Defendants”) have moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c). 1 [Filing No. 33.] That Motion is currently ripe for the Court’s review.
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for judgment on the pleadings brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c) is governed by the same standard that applies to a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1581 (7th Cir. 1991). A “court may consider
only matters presented in the pleadings and must view the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Nat’l Fid. Life Ins. Co. v. Karaganis, 811 F. 2d 357, 358 (7th Cir. 1987)
(citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 785 F. 2d 174, 177 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1986)).
The Court should “take all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiffs’ pleadings to be true, and
[should] view the facts and inferences to be drawn from those allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs.” Republic Steel Corp., 785 F. 2d at 177 n. 2. However, “a court is ‘not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
“The documents a court may consider under Rule 12(c) include the complaint, the answer,
and any written exhibits attached as exhibits [to either].” N. Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows,

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After that Motion was filed, Mr. Igou and Defendants Indiana Department of Corrections, New
Castle Correctional Facility, Nikki Tafoya, and Wexford Health Services, Inc. stipulated to the
dismissal without prejudice of all claims against them. [Filing No. 66; Filing No. 68 (Court’s order
dismissing those defendants without prejudice).] Therefore, while Defendant Wexford of Indiana
also joined in the 12(c) motion, it has subsequently been dismissed as a defendant.
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Inc., 163 F. 3d 452, 452 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 10(c)). “A motion for judgment on
the pleadings may be granted only if the moving party clearly establishes that no material issue of
fact remains to be resolved and that [the moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Karaganis, 811 F. 2d at 358 (citing Flora v. Home Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n, 685 F. 2d
209, 211 (7th Cir. 1982)).
II.
DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss Count III of the Complaint, the Indiana constitutional claim,
“to the extent [that] it seeks the recovery of damages.” 2 [Filing No. 34 at 3.] Defendants argue
that no Indiana court has recognized a private right of action for monetary damages under the
Indiana Constitution. [Filing No. 34 at 2.] Mr. Igou responds that he is not seeking monetary
damages regarding Count III—he points out that his Complaint lists all of his claims, and then in
a separate section, generally lists all of his requested relief. [Filing No. 35 at 3.] Mr. Igou argues
that injunctive relief is available under the Indiana Constitution, and therefore Count III remains
actionable. [Filing No. 35.] Defendants did not file a reply.
In short, Mr. Igou and Defendants appear to agree that monetary damages are not available
for Count III, and Mr. Igou confirms that he is not seeking monetary damages pursuant to that
claim. Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Igou’s Complaint makes any such claim, the Court grants
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count III, but only as to any claim for monetary damages on that
Count.

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Defendants’ Motion does not specify that they seek dismissal only insofar as Mr. Igou is claiming
money damages on Count III, [Filing No. 33], but their briefing does, [Filing No. 34 at 3]. The
Court construes the Motion consistently with the briefing.
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III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons described above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Count III, [33], but only to the extent that Count III seeks monetary damages. In any other way,
the claim stated in Count III remains pending in this case.
No partial final judgment shall issue.

Date: 2/23/2018

Distribution via ECF only to all counsel of record.

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