LANE v. INDIANAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Filing 25

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - This matter is before the Court on Defendant Indianapolis Public Schools' ("IPS") Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim ("Motion to Dismiss"). [Filing No. 12 .] IPS se eks dismissal of Plaintiff Toni Yvonne Lane's Complaint, [Filing No. 1 ], which was filed pro se, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the Court denies in part and grants in part IPS' Motio n to Dismiss. Because Ms. Lane conceded in her Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss that Ms. Lane is not seeking any relief under Title VII, [Filing No. 24 at 3], IPS' Motion to Dismiss with respect to Ms. Lane' ;s Title VII claims is GRANTED. The Court will only address IPS' arguments relating to the sufficiency of Ms. Lane's ADA claim. For the reasons stated herein, IPS' Motion to Dismiss with respect to Ms. Lane's ADA claim, [Filing No. 12 ], is DENIED. For the foregoing reasons, IPS' Motion to Dismiss [12.] is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Ms. Lane is hereby ordered to file an Amended Complaint by February 15, 2018. Defendant need only file a responsive pleading to the Amended Complaint. (See Order). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 2/1/2018. (APD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
TONI YVONNE LANE,
Plaintiff,
v.
INDIANAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant.

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No. 1:17-cv-03320-JMS-MJD

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Indianapolis Public Schools’ (“IPS”) Motion
to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (“Motion to Dismiss”). [Filing No. 12.] IPS seeks dismissal
of Plaintiff Toni Yvonne Lane’s Complaint, [Filing No. 1], which was filed pro se, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the Court denies in part
and grants in part IPS’ Motion to Dismiss.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2)). “Specific facts are not necessary, the statement need only ‘give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson,
551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
A motion to dismiss asks whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In reviewing the sufficiency of a
complaint, the Court must accept all well-pled facts as true and draw all permissible inferences in

favor of the plaintiff. See Active Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir.
2011). The Court will not accept legal conclusions or conclusory allegations as sufficient to state
a claim for relief. See McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011). Factual
allegations must plausibly state an entitlement to relief “to a degree that rises above the speculative
level.” Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012). This plausibility determination is “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. When a plaintiff “pleads [itself] out of court by making allegations sufficient
to defeat the suit,” dismissal under Rule 12 is appropriate. Vincent v. City Colleges of Chicago,
485 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 2007). A copy of any written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading
is considered to be part of the pleading and may be considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss
without converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment. Burke v. 401 N. Wabash
Venture, LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(c)).
Complaints filed by pro se litigants “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. “A
trial court is obligated to liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings.” Parker v. Four
Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 845 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The Court notes
that Ms. Lane is now represented by counsel.
II.
BACKGROUND
The following allegations are taken from Ms. Lane’s Complaint, which she hand-filed pro
se, and are accepted as true for purposes of deciding the pending motion, consistent with the
applicable standard of review. [Filing No. 1.] The Court also considers the documents attached
to Ms. Lane’s Complaint, [Filing No. 1-1, Filing No. 1-2], which are part of the Complaint for all
purposes and may be considered by the Court in ruling on the Motion to Dismiss without
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converting it to one for summary judgment. Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2002)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (c)).
On August 30, 2017, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued
Ms. Lane her Dismissal and Notice of Suit Rights. [Filing No. 1-1.] On September 19, 2017, Ms.
Lane filed an Employment Discrimination Complaint (“Complaint”) against IPS pursuant to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12101. [Filing No. 1 at 1-2.] She also the following issues: (1) reduction in hourly
wages; (2) tampering with evidence; (3) suspending [her] and not another attendant; and (4) not
honoring union policies. [Filing No. 1 at 2.] In her prayer for relief, Ms. Lane stated, “Also for
violating the ADA law and if my civil rights were violated and tampering with evidence as
wrongful termination.” [Filing No. 1 at 3.]
In addition to her Complaint, Ms. Lane submitted numerous employment records, which
will be presented in chronological order. [Filing No. 1-2.]
On a February 11, 2015 IPS “Employee’s Request for Accommodation” form, Ms. Lane
indicated that she had an issue with her rotator cuff that limited her mobility in her right shoulder.
[Filing No. 1-2 at 13.]
On an “ADA Physician’s Statement” dated August 11, 2016, Ms. Lane’s doctor 1 stated
that Ms. Lane had “systemic lupus with kidney disease [and] chronic asthma” and determined that
she should remain in an “airconditioned [sic] environment to limit fluid loss from sweating and
prevent dehydration and breathing difficulties.” [Filing No. 1-2 at 21.]
On an August 12, 2016 Section 504/ADA Request for Accommodation,” stating that she
exhibited breathing issues and requested “air conditioning on the bus.” [Filing No. 1-2 at 11.] An

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It is unclear what the doctor’s name is from the signature.
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accommodation form dated August 19, 2016 stated that IPS would temporarily assign Ms. Lane
“to an air conditioned bus while the regular scheduled attendant is assigned to light duty.” [Filing
No. 1-2 at 12.] The document requested “detail about what a tolerable temperature is for Ms. Lane
from the doctor.” [Filing No. 1-2 at 12.] It was signed by Ms. Lane’s supervisor, a human
resources representative, and an “ADA Coordinator.” [Filing No. 1-2 at 12.]
According to an August 19, 2016 “Conference Report” on “Employee’s Request for
Accommodation,” it was specifically noted that Ms. Lane, a bus attendant, required an “air
conditioned bus due to Lupus and asthma.” [Filing No. 1-2 at 22.]
Ms. Lane submitted a letter from Dr. Tamika Dawson dated April 13, 2017, which stated,
“Tony Lane is a patient of mine [and] presents today for follow-up of multiple issues. She has
severe asthma and was told she needed to know exactly what degree the bus needed to be and it
needs to be at 70º.” [Filing No. 1-2 at 5.]
On May 2, 2017, Ms. Lane filed her Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) with the EEOC,
alleging that IPS was failing to accommodate her disability. 2 [Filing No. 13-1.] In the Charge,
Ms. Lane noted that she filed a previous charge against IPS, Charge 470-2016-02686, for failure
to accommodate her disabilities. [Filing No. 13-1.] Ms. Lane claimed that IPS was well-aware of
her disabilities and need for accommodation and, following her doctor’s recommendation that she
cannot be in an environment with the temperature above seventy degrees, “finally provided an air
conditioned bus for [Ms. Lane] to ride” last year. [Filing No. 13-1.] She stated that in April 2017,
“there were at least 8 days in which the ambient temperature was 70 degrees or more” and that she

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Ms. Lane did not attach her Charge with her Complaint. IPS, however, attached the Charge with
its Motion to Dismiss. Because the Charge is central to Ms. Lane’s Complaint, it may be
considered by the Court without converting the Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment. Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 729 (7th Cir. 2014).
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communicated her need for an accommodation to at least four people who did not respond to her
request. [Filing No. 13-1.] This resulted in Ms. Lane taking several days off work because the
weather was too hot. [Filing No. 13-1.] Ms. Lane’s Charge concluded that “[IPS] has air
conditioned buses available, but refuses to accommodate [Ms. Lane].” [Filing No. 13-1.]
In a letter dated May 3, 2017, Dr. Dawson stated that “[Ms. Lane] has medical conditions
which can worsen with dehydration. She should be accommodated in an air-conditioned bus if the
outside temperature is over 70 degrees F.” [Filing No. 1-2 at 6.] Ms. Lane also submitted a May
3, 2017 letter from her rheumatologist echoing similar concerns and stating that Ms. Lane needed
an air-conditioned bus if the outside temperature is above 70 degrees. [Filing No. 1-2 at 7.]
In a May 18, 2017 “Progressive Discipline Notice,” IPS submitted a recommendation of
termination of Ms. Lane’s employment for violating IPS’ policy against hitting students. [Filing
No. 1-2 at 27.] IPS alleged that on May 8, 2017, Ms. Lane punched a student in the arm in order
to wake him up. [Filing No. 1-2 at 27.] Ms. Lane responded that she did not violate IPS’ policy
and also noted that “Mr. Collins wasn’t fired for hitting a child, he was put on another bus.” [Filing
No. 1-2 at 27.]

On May 19, 2017, Superintendent Lewis Ferebee concurred with the

recommendation to terminate Ms. Lane’s employment. [Filing No. 1-2 at 26.]
Ms. Lane submitted a “Request for An Appeal” with the Indiana Department of Workforce
Development dated June 5, 2017. [Filing No. 1-2 at 8.] In the request, Ms. Lane protested her
termination, stating that she only “woke up the child aggressively.” [Filing No. 1-2 at 8.] Ms.
Lane noted that she had a case with the EEOC, but was not sure if the two incidents were related.
[Filing No. 1-2 at 8.] 3

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Finding no facts to establish otherwise, the Court assumes that Ms. Lane’s termination and her
ADA claim are distinct.
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III.
DISCUSSION
IPS moves to dismiss both of the claims in Ms. Lane’s Complaint. IPS argues that Ms.
Lane’s Title VII claim should be dismissed because she failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies prior to filing suit. [Filing No. 13 at 1.] IPS further argues that Ms. Lane’s ADA claim
must be dismissed because it was not sufficiently pleaded. [Filing No. 13 at 1.] Because Ms. Lane
conceded in her Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss that Ms. Lane is not
seeking any relief under Title VII, [Filing No. 24 at 3], IPS’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Ms.
Lane’s Title VII claims is GRANTED. The Court will only address IPS’ arguments relating to
the sufficiency of Ms. Lane’s ADA claim.
When a plaintiff alleges a violation of the ADA, she must allege that she “is disabled within
the meaning of the Act, is nevertheless qualified to perform the essential functions of the job either
with or without reasonable accommodation, and has suffered an adverse employment action
because of this disability.” Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 2015).
IPS argues that Ms. Lane’s Complaint fails to allege the essential elements of her ADA
claim, and therefore it must fail. [Filing No. 13 at 3-4.] The Court disagrees. In seeking dismissal,
IPS fails to consider the information submitted with Ms. Lane’s Complaint, which are considered
by the Court to be a part of her complaint. Tierney, 304 F.3d at 738.
Ms. Lane submitted documentation that she had systemic lupus with kidney disease as well
as asthma, which required her to work in an air-conditioned environment to prevent fluid loss and
dehydration. [Filing No. 1-2 at 21.] IPS specifically acknowledged that Ms. Lane required an
“air conditioned bus due to Lupus and asthma.” [Filing No. 1-2 at 22.] She further submitted
medical documentation relating to the temperature that she could work in to accommodate her
disability. [Filing No. 1-2 at 5.] In her Charge, Ms. Lane noted that IPS finally accommodated
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her abilities in 2016, presumably by providing her with air-conditioned bus, but claimed that IPS
failed to provide her an air-conditioned bus in April 2017. [Filing No. 13-1.] Specifically, Ms.
Lane claims that she informed four individual of her need for an accommodation, but was ignored
and had to take several days off of work because the weather was too hot. [Filing No. 13-1.]
Provided these facts, and given the Court’s relaxed standards for pro se pleadings,
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, Ms. Lane has adequately pleaded a claim under the ADA through the
information submitted. Accordingly, IPS’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Ms. Lane’s ADA
claim, [Filing No. 12], is DENIED.
However, Ms. Lane’s counsel spent considerable effort in parsing Ms. Lane’s claims in her
response to the motion to dismiss. In the interest of clarity going forward, the Court directs Ms.
Lane, now represented by counsel, to file an Amended Complaint to establish the precise claims
being pursued by Ms. Lane, through counsel in this case.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IPS’ Motion to Dismiss [12.] is DENIED in part and
GRANTED in part. Ms. Lane is hereby ordered to file an Amended Complaint by February 15,
2018. Defendant need only file a responsive pleading to the Amended Complaint.

Date: 2/1/2018

Distribution via ECF only to all counsel of record

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