ASHLOCK v. SUPERINTENDENT
Filing
15
Entry Granting Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Directing Entry of Final Judgment - The petition of Christopher Ashlock for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding identified as No. IYC 17-06-0066 in which he was c onvicted of violating B-215, Unauthorized Possession of Property. For the reasons explained in this Entry, Mr. Ashlock's habeas petition must be granted. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 6/26/2018. (JDC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER ASHLOCK,
Petitioner,
v.
STAN KNIGHT, Warden,
Plainfield Correctional Facility, 1
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 1:17-cv-03498-JMS-MJD
Entry Granting Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and Directing Entry of Final Judgment
The petition of Christopher Ashlock for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison
disciplinary proceeding identified as No. IYC 17-06-0066 in which he was convicted of violating
B-215, Unauthorized Possession of Property. For the reasons explained in this Entry, Mr.
Ashlock’s habeas petition must be granted.
A.
Overview
Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits, Cochran v. Buss,
381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process. The due process requirement
is satisfied with the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited opportunity to
present evidence to an impartial decision-maker, a written statement articulating the reasons for
the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and “some evidence in the record” to support
1
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), the petitioner’s custodian, Warden Stan Knight, is properly substituted
as the respondent. Effective July 1, 2017, Senate Enrolled Act 387 changed the title of the heads of Indiana
penal facilities and correctional institutions from “superintendent” to “warden.” See Pub. L. No. 67-2017,
§§ 1–20, 2017 Ind. Acts 241, 241–52. The clerk is directed to update the docket accordingly.
the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003);
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
B.
The Disciplinary Proceeding
The discipline challenged in the petition occurred when Ashlock was housed at the
Plainfield Facility. The report of conduct stated:
On 6/8/17 at approximately 1:22pm I, Sgt. Faudree was approached by Ofc. Gagnon
stating that offender Ashlock, Christopher #137863 had given him a [one-page]
typed letter requesting witness(es) and evidence for case # IYC 17-06-0046
Unauthorized Possession of Personal Information-247B. Offenders at this facility
have access to the Law Library, but must be on the Law Library call out. Offender
Ashlock was screened for this case on 6/7/17 at approximately 1:15pm. The Law
Library is over at 3:00pm and offender Ashlocak was not on the Law Library call
out for 6/7/17. I checked the morning call out for the Law Library on 6/8/17 and
offender Aslock was not on that call out either. Therefore Offender Ashlock could
have not typed this letter in the Law Library and was not charged for the copies made
of the letter.
Dkt. 10-1. The one-page letter at issue stated:
2
Dkt. 10-3.
On June 8, 2017, Ashlock was charged in case IYC-06-0066 with offense B-0215,
Possession or Theft of State Property. B-0215 makes “Unauthorized possession, destruction,
alteration, damage to, or theft of State property or property belonging to another” an offense. IDOC
Adult Disciplinary Process, Appendix I, (available at https://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_6-1-2015(1).pdf) (last visited June 25, 2018)).
On June 10, 2017, Ashlock received a copy of the conduct report. At the same time,
Ashlock received notice of his rights. Ashlock plead not guilty, requested a lay advocate, and said
he did not wish to call any witnesses or need any physical evidence.
The Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) held the disciplinary hearing on June 14, 2017.
3
Ashlock gave a statement that the hearing officer recorded as follows:
First copy is free according to law library.
Shannon made the copy for me. [H]e typed it up.
[A]dmits he was Guilty to taking offender pin and info for jpay use.
Call was made to Law Library. [O]ffender has to be present during the whole time to
get paper work.
Dkt. 10-3. 2 Offender Shannon gave a written statement admitting he created the document on
behalf of Ashlock. Shannon wrote:
I, Mark A. Shannon, #219451 do hereby state that I advised Christopher
Ashlock #137894 to present a witness/evidence request to the DHB to retrieve
documents to present in his defense regarding case number: IYC 17-06-0046.
I went to the law library and drafted the witness/evidence request and
provide it to Christopher Ashlock #137864 to be given to DHB for Requested
Witnesses or Evidence as required by ADP 02-04-101.
Dkt. 10-3.
The Disciplinary Hearing Officer (hereinafter referred to as “DHO Walker”) considered
the staff reports, the statement of the offender and the evidence from witnesses and found Ashlock
guilty. The sanctions imposed included a written reprimand (specifically “take care of things on
your own”), extra work duty, a loss of thirty (30) days of credit time, suspended, and the loss of
credit class, suspended. These sanctions were later imposed.
Mr. Ashlock appealed to Facility Head and the IDOC Final Reviewing Authority, both of
which were denied. He then brought this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.
2
This comment appears to include statements made by the hearing officer and not Mr. Ashlock. In addition,
it is unclear what relevance “taking offender pin and info for jpay” has to the facts of this case.
4
C.
Analysis
Mr. Ashlock argues that he is entitled to relief because he was denied a fair and impartial
hearing officer, his conviction violates the doctrine of ex post facto, the evidence is insufficient to
establish his guilt, and Indiana Department of Correction’s policies were not followed. Because
the record lacks some evidence that logically supports a finding of unauthorized possession of
property, Mr. Ashlock is entitled to relief.
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are governed by the “some evidence”
standard. “[A] hearing officer’s decision need only rest on ‘some evidence’ logically supporting
it and demonstrating that the result is not arbitrary.” Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th
Cir. 2016); see Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The some evidence
standard . . . is satisfied if there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion
reached by the disciplinary board.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The “some evidence”
standard is much more lenient than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Moffat v. Broyles,
288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in
the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at
455-56.
The Adult Disciplinary Code Section B-215 is titled “Unauthorized Possession of
Property” and is defined as:
Unauthorized possession, destruction, alteration, damage to, or theft of State
property or property belonging to another.
5
See Indiana Department of Correction Adult Disciplinary Process, Appendix I: Offenses, available
at
http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_6-1-2015(1).pdf.
(last
visited June 25, 2018).
In order to convict Mr. Ashlock of a B-215 charge under these facts, it must be shown that
he possessed State property or property belonging to another. In support, the respondent argues
that a guilty finding was appropriate because Mr. Ashlock received the document from Mr.
Shannon (another offender) and they should have known they were circumventing the Department
of Correction’s regulations on library use and costs.
The Court cannot trace the path of the respondent’s reasoning in this instance. Whether Mr.
Shannon did something wrong in creating the document and providing it to Mr. Ashlock is not the
issue in this case. There is no basis to conclude that there is anything wrong with Mr. Ashlock
talking about a disciplinary hearing with another inmate. Nor is there any basis to conclude that
accepting a single piece of paper from another inmate for one’s own use in a disciplinary
proceeding constitutes possession of the property of another. Simply put, it is undisputed that the
paper in question belonged to Mr. Ashlock, not the State or Mr. Shannon. This is true even if Mr.
Shannon obtained it in violation of law library rules.
The respondent argues that this case is like Rich v. Brown, 2017 WL 3397902 (S.D. Indiana
2017). In that case inmate Rich took an unopened package of cotton pads from one work area to
another without approval and attempted to pass them off to another inmate. But unlike here, the
property at issue in Rich was state property.
6
Next the respondent references Burton v. Davis, 41 Fed. Appx. 841 (7th Cir. 2002), where
the inmate was denied relief for giving mouse-traps or soup packets he found in the facility to
another offender. But that case does not support the respondent’s position. In that case, inmate
Burton was not found “guilty of ‘unauthorized possession of property’ but instead found guilty of
‘giving or accepting’ something of value without proper authorization. . . .” Id. at 843.
Finally, the respondent references Norington v. Superintendent, 2016 WL 6395603 (N.D.
Ind. Oct. 28, 2016). In this case inmate Norington requested and received nine bound copies of
documents based on the false representation that they were legal materials necessary for a court
filing. They were not. Ms. Norington’s conviction for unauthorized possession of property was
upheld. In this case, there is no suggestion that Mr. Ashlock made a false representation to obtain
copies to which he was not entitled.
Again, it is possible that inmate Shannon violated prison rules, but the fact that Mr. Ashlock
accepted a one-page piece of paper from another inmate related to his ongoing disciplinary hearing
that he passed along to an officer for the purpose of pursuing his constitutional rights is simply not
evidence of the unauthorized possession or theft of State property or property belonging to another.
Accordingly, the “some evidence” standard required in disciplinary cases is not met here.
The Court is further troubled by the suggestion that the disciplinary hearing officer called
his supervisor who also wrote the conduct report during the middle of the hearing to inquire
whether the hearing officer should dismiss the case or proceed to a guilty verdict. If true, this
would be direct evidence of partiality. Equally confusing is the custodian’s statement that, “In this
case the conversation was on the record to see whether the case should proceed.” Dkt. 10 at p. 8.
7
The Court was not able to identify this conversation in the record. Thus, what actually occurred is
not clear. Further briefing on this issue, however, is not necessary given the lack of evidence to
support the conviction.
D.
Conclusion
“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. Because there was insufficient evidence of Mr. Ashlock’s
guilt, the disciplinary finding of guilt was arbitrary and that finding and the sanctions imposed
must be VACATED AND RESCINDED. Accordingly, Mr. Ashlock’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is GRANTED.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 6/26/2018
Distribution:
CHRISTOPHER ASHLOCK
137864
PLAINFIELD - CF
PLAINFIELD CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
Katherine A. Cornelius
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
katherine.cornelius@atg.in.gov
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?