EMRIT v. LAWSON

Filing 4

Entry Granting In Forma Pauperis Status, Dismissing Action, And Directing Entry of Final Judgment - The plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, dkt. 2 , is granted. Notwithstanding this ruling, the plaintiff still owes the $350 .00 filing fee. Plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit brings this action against Connie Lawson, the Secretary of State of Indiana, and the Democratic Party of Indiana. He alleges that his constitutional rights were denied when the defendants refused to pl ace him on the ballot for the primary and general presidential election in 2016. He alleges that the claim is not moot because he has decided to run again for President of the United States in 2020 as a Democratic candidate. He brings an equal pro tection and substantive due process claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and alleges that the defendants violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause inherent from Article IV, Section 2, Clause I, of the United States Constitution (Co mity Clause). He also alleges state law claims of negligence and breach of contract. The claim for damages against Connie Lawson in her official capacity as Secretary of State of Indiana is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mr. Emrit's constitutional claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mr. Emrit's Title VII claim is dismissed as patently frivolous. Mr. Emrit's claims of ADA violations are dismissed as patently frivolous. Mr. Emrit's negligence claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Any breach of contract claim is dismissed as frivolous. Mr. Emrit's claims for injunctive relief a re dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. While under most circumstances, the Court would allow a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to attempt to cure deficiencies in the complaint before dismissing the action, see Luavano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th Cir. 2013), this case filed by this plaintiff is an exception to that rule. His 18 page complaint is thorough and nothing he could allege in support of his election ballot claims would change the outcome. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. Copy to plaintiff via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 10/19/2017. (APD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
RONALD SATISH EMRIT,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CONNIE LAWSON Secretary of State of Indiana )
& Democratic Party of Indiana,
)
)
Defendant.
)

No. 1:17-cv-03624-JMS-TAB

Entry Granting In Forma Pauperis Status, Dismissing Action,
And Directing Entry of Final Judgment
I. In Forma Pauperis
The plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, dkt. [2], is granted.
Notwithstanding this ruling, the plaintiff still owes the $350.00 filing fee. “All [28 U.S.C.] §
1915 has ever done is excuse pre-payment of the docket fees; a litigant remains liable for them,
and for other costs, although poverty may make collection impossible.” Abdul-Wadood v.
Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1996).
II. Screening of Complaint
Plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit brings this action against Connie Lawson, the Secretary of
State of Indiana, and the Democratic Party of Indiana. He alleges that his constitutional rights
were denied when the defendants refused to place him on the ballot for the primary and general
presidential election in 2016. He alleges that the claim is not moot because he has decided to run
again for President of the United States in 2020 as a Democratic candidate. He brings an equal
protection and substantive due process claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
alleges that the defendants violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause inherent from Article

IV, Section 2, Clause I, of the United States Constitution (Comity Clause). He also alleges state
law claims of negligence and breach of contract.
The complaint is subject to the screening requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This
statute directs the Court to dismiss a complaint or claim within a complaint if it is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
Mr. Emrit alleges that he is an indigent, disabled, over 35 years of age, African-American
resident of Nevada (although his current mailing address is in Florida). He brings this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Dkt. 1, p. 15. He also alleges diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Mr. Emrit alleges that he “was told by several secretaries of state that in order to get
placed on the ballot in the primary or general election, he would have had to get a minimum
number of petitions signed from the constituents of each jurisdiction in which he wanted to run
for president in the general election (as an independent candidate).” Dkt. 1, p. 4, ¶ 18. He
allegedly obtained a candidate ID number and registered with the Federal Election Commission.
He was represented by a Political Acton Committee but not by any “Super PAC.” He received no
donations from any person or entity. He seeks 45 million dollars in compensatory and punitive
damages and injunctive relief in the form of ordering the defendants to place him on the ballot
for the primary and general election in Indiana in 2020.
The claim for damages against Connie Lawson in her official capacity as Secretary of
State of Indiana is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
because official capacity claims against state employees “are treated as suits against the states

themselves,” Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2011), and such claims for money
damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 716 (7th
Cir. 2011).
Indiana law, Ind. Code § 3-8-3-1, requires a candidate of a major political party for
nomination for the office of President of the United States to file a declaration of candidacy with
the election division or secretary of state, along with a petition signed by at least 4,500 voters of
the state, meeting certain specifications. Ind. Code § 3-8-3-2. Every state has these types of
ballot access laws.
Mr. Emrit alleges that there is no compelling government objective in requiring him to
obtain a minimum number of signatures to be placed on the ballot for this state and that,
therefore, his equal protection rights have been violated by that requirement. Mr. Emrit’s claim
in this regard fails. Mr. Emrit does not challenge the number of petitions or any other specific
requirement other than he apparently disagrees with having to submit any petitions because he
believes there is no good reason for the requirement. To the contrary, “the Constitution …
confers upon the states broad authority to regulate the conduct of elections.” Tripp v. Scholz, No.
16-3469, 2017 WL 4456913, *4 (7th Cir. Oct. 6, 2017) (internal quotation omitted). “It is wellsettled that [t]he impact of candidate eligibility requirements on voters implicates basic
constitutional rights to associate politically with like-minded voters and to cast a meaningful
vote.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “Such rights, however, are not absolute.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted). “The Supreme Court has further opined that, in addition to constitutional law,
‘[c]ommon sense…compels the conclusion that government must play an active role in
structuring elections.’” Id. (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992)). “‘[A]s a
practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and

honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.””
Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
“‘[N]ot all restrictions … on candidates’ eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionallysuspect burdens.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)). “‘[T]he mere
fact that a State’s system ‘creates barriers … tending to limit the field of candidates from which
voters might choose…does not of itself compel close scrutiny.’” Id. (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S.
at 433). “There is no litmus test for measuring the severity of a burden that a state law imposes.”
Id. (internal quotation omitted). Any burden “must be justified by relevant and legitimate state
interests sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Mr. Emrit’s allegation that there is no compelling governmental justification for the
requirement that prospective candidates must file a certain number of petitions signed by voters
of the state along with a declaration of candidacy is frivolous. As noted by the Supreme Court, it
is not only constitutional but it makes common sense that the government must put in place a
structure for elections. The Supreme Court has upheld challenges to signature requirements, even
those equaling 5% of the eligible voting base. See Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 789
(1974) (“Demanding signatures equal in number of 3% or 5% of the vote in the last election is
not invalid on its face…”); Jennness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 438 (1971) (“[W]e cannot say that
Georgia’s 5% petition requirement violates the Constitution.”). Mr. Emrit’s constitutional claims
are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Mr. Emrit’s Title VII claim, as described on page 11 of his complaint, invokes antidiscrimination provisions based on employment. Mr. Emrit is not employed by anyone, much
less by the State of Indiana. This claim is dismissed as patently frivolous.

Mr. Emrit further alleges that he has bipolar, schizoaffective, obsessive compulsive, and
post-traumatic stress disorders and that by excluding him from the 2016 (and perhaps 2020)
elections, the defendants have violated his rights under the ADA. This claim is dismissed as
patently frivolous because the ADA has no provisions which bar the application of election
requirements on disabled individuals.
The defendants breached no duty in relation to Mr. Emrit. Rather, to the extent they took
any action against or in relation to him, which is not even alleged in this complaint, they were
upholding the law and imposing the same requirements that apply to all prospective candidates
for elected office. Absent a duty, there can be no breach and no negligence. See Walters v. JS
Aviation, Inc., 81 N.E.3d 1160, 1163 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (the elements of a negligence claim
include a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury caused
by the breach). Therefore, the negligence claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
Similarly, there was no contract between the parties. Any breach of contract claim is
dismissed as frivolous.
For the above reasons, Mr. Emrit’s claims for injunctive relief, ordering the defendants to
place him on the ballot for the 2020 election without obtaining and timely filing the required
signatures, is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
III. Conclusion
This action is patently frivolous and therefore subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint, containing as
it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.”).

The Court takes judicial notice that Mr. Emrit has a long history of filing pro se frivolous
litigation in other districts and has been barred from filing in several of them. See e.g., Emrit v.
Marion County Housing Authority, 3:16-cv-1854-BR, 2017 WL 743882, *4 (D. Ore. Feb. 23,
2017) (“Plaintiff has filed complaints in numerous other districts in which he brings claims that
are nearly identical to those in the Complaint that Plaintiff filed in this Court.”); Emrit v.
Continuum Legal, 1:16-cv-1424-JCC-MSN, 2017 WL 2622368, *2 (E.D.Va. Jan. 31, 2017)
(“Plaintiff is a serial pro se litigant who is subject to pre-filing injunctions in at least two
courts.”); Emrit v. Sec. of State, 16-610, 2017 WL 3209449 (D.R.I. Jan. 9, 2017) (noting that
plaintiff has been declared a “vexatious filer” in the District of Nevada and enjoined from further
filings without leave of that court). The Court also notes that Mr. Emrit has filed the same claims
as the ones brought here in various districts against Secretaries of States and Democratic state
parties. While this is the first action filed by Mr. Emrit in this district, the Court will not hesitate
to impose a filing bar sanction if he proceeds to file any additional frivolous cases in this Court.
While under most circumstances, the Court would allow a pro se plaintiff an opportunity
to attempt to cure deficiencies in the complaint before dismissing the action, see Luavano v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th Cir. 2013), this case filed by this plaintiff
is an exception to that rule. His 18 page complaint is thorough and nothing he could allege in
support of his election ballot claims would change the outcome.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 10/19/2017

Distribution:
RONALD SATISH EMRIT
6655 38th Lane East
Sarasota, FL 34243