JENKINS v. BUTTS

Filing 8

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT - The petition of James Jenkins for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding identified as No. NCF 17-05-0102. For the reasons explai ned in this Entry, Mr. Jenkins's habeas petition must be denied. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there was no constitution al infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Mr. Jenkins to the relief he seeks. Accordingly, Mr. Jenkins's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. Copy to petitioner via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 8/1/2018.(APD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JAMES JENKINS,
Petitioner,
v.
KEITH BUTTS Warden,
Respondent.

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No. 1:17-cv-03952-JMS-MJD

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
The petition of James Jenkins for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary
proceeding identified as No. NCF 17-05-0102. For the reasons explained in this Entry, Mr.
Jenkins’s habeas petition must be denied.
A.

Overview

Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits, Cochran v. Buss,
381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process.

The due process

requirement is satisfied with the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited
opportunity to present evidence to an impartial decision-maker, a written statement articulating the
reasons for the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and “some evidence in the record”
to support the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir.
2003); Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).

B.

The Disciplinary Hearing

On May 16, 2017, S. Miller wrote a Conduct Report charging Mr. Jenkins with a violation
of B-200, being a habitual conduct rule violator. The Conduct Report states:
On the above date and time, while processing conduct reports, I, S. Miller became
aware that offender Jenkins, James 105817 is in violation of a code 200 Habitual
Rule Violator. He has been found or plead[ed] guilty to five related or unrelated
class C conduct offenses in a period of six months or less according to OIS.
Offender has been made aware of this conduct report.
Dkt. 7-1. Attached to the Conduct Report was a printout from the Offender Information System
that listed the following offenses:
Date
05/16/2017
04/26/2017
03/13/2017
01/13/2017
01/09/2017
01/09/2017

Offense
C-350: Lying or providing false statement
C-366: Being in an unauthorized area
C-304: Disfigurement
C-352: Interfering with count
C-352: Interfering with count
C-366: Being in an unauthorized area

Disposition
Privilege
Written Reprimand; Privilege
Privilege
Written Reprimand
Privilege
Written Reprimand

Dkt. 7-2.
Mr. Jenkins was notified of the charge on May 17, 2017, when he received the Screening
Report. Dkt. 7-3. He pleaded guilty to the charge, did not wish to have a lay advocate, and did
not request any witnesses or physical evidence. Id.
The prison disciplinary hearing was held on May 18, 2017. According to the notes from
the hearing, Mr. Jenkins pleaded guilty and stated, “I am guilty.” Dkt. 7-4. Based on the staff
reports, Mr. Jenkins’s statement, and the physical evidence of the OIS printout, the hearing officer
found Mr. Jenkins guilty of B-200, being a habitual conduct rule violator. The sanctions imposed
included ninety days of earned credit time deprivation and a credit class demotion from I to II.

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Mr. Jenkins appealed to the Facility Head and the Indiana Department of Correction
(IDOC) Final Reviewing Authority, both of which were denied. He then brought this petition for
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
C.

Analysis

In his petition, Mr. Jenkins challenges his prison disciplinary conviction on two grounds
that can be summarized into one ground: the underlying conduct reports from January 11 and May
10, 2017 were written by an officer in retaliation for Mr. Jenkins’s filing of a grievance, which
violates IDOC policy. Dkt. 1 at 3. The respondent argues that Mr. Jenkins’s claims are not
cognizable because he cannot challenge the validity of his underlying class C offenses, and the
Seventh Circuit has repeatedly rejected the notion that an otherwise lawful disciplinary proceeding
comporting with due process requirements is rendered invalid by a subjective retaliatory motive
of the reporting officer. See dkt. 7 at 5. Mr. Jenkins did not file a reply, and the time to do so has
passed.
Here, habeas relief is not available to Mr. Jenkins for three reasons. First, Mr. Jenkins may
not challenge here the validity of any of his prison disciplinary class C convictions. “It is the
custody itself that must violate the Constitution. Accordingly, prisoners who are not seeking
earlier or immediate release are not seeking habeas corpus relief.” Washington v. Smith, 564 F.3d
1350, 1350 (7th Cir. 2009). In other words, “a habeas corpus petition must attack the fact or
duration of one’s sentence; if it does not, it does not state a proper basis for relief.” Id. Typically,
in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, this means that in order to be considered “in
custody,” the petitioner must have been deprived of good-time credits, Cochran, 381 F.3d at 639,
or of credit-earning class, Montgomery, 262 F.3d at 644-45. When such a sanction is not imposed,
the prison disciplinary officials are “free to use any procedures it chooses, or no procedures at all.”

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Montgomery, 262 F.3d at 644. The fact that a disciplinary conviction that did not itself implicate
a liberty interest is used to deprive the inmate of a liberty interest in a later proceeding does not
open the door to a federal challenge on the earlier conviction. See Wilson-El v. Finnan, 544 F.3d
762, 765 (7th Cir. 2008) (“the concern the Court expressed for finality, and its willingness to give
that concern priority even in the face of earlier convictions that may have been tainted by the Sixth
Amendment violation of ineffective assistance of counsel, suggest to us that the Court would frown
on any holding that opened the door in the present situation to collateral attacks on underlying
disciplinary convictions.”) Here, none of Mr. Jenkins’s class C convictions included the loss of
good-time credits or a demotion in credit-earning class, see dkt. 7-7, so Mr. Jenkins may not now
attempt to collaterally challenge his underlying class C convictions.
Second, he only asserts that these conduct reports were written in violation of IDOC policy
because they were in retaliation for his filing a grievance. Claims based on prison policy, such as
the one at issue here, are not cognizable and do not form a basis for habeas relief. See Keller v.
Donahue, 271 Fed. Appx. 531, 532 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting challenges to a prison disciplinary
proceeding because, “[i]nstead of addressing any potential constitutional defect, all of [the
petitioner’s] arguments relate to alleged departures from procedures outlined in the prison
handbook that have no bearing on his right to due process”); Rivera v. Davis, 50 Fed. Appx. 779,
780 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A prison’s noncompliance with its internal regulations has no constitutional
import—and nothing less warrants habeas corpus review.”); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.
62, 68 at n.2 (1991) (“[S]tate-law violations provide no basis for federal habeas review.”). This is
because prison policies, regulations, or guidelines do not constitute federal law; instead, they are
“primarily designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison . . . not . . . to
confer rights on inmates.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1995).

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Third, the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that federal habeas relief is not available so
long as Mr. Jenkins has been afforded the due process protections of Wolff and the “some
evidence” rule is met, even assuming retaliatory or fraudulent conduct on the part of prison
officials. See McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 1999) (“we have long held that
as long as procedural protections are constitutionally adequate, we will not overturn a disciplinary
decision solely because evidence indicates the claim was fraudulent.”); see also McKinney v.
Meese, 831 F.2d 728, 733 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Once the prisoner has been afforded those [Wolff]
protections, our role as the reviewing court is limited to determining whether there was sufficient
evidence to support the … decision.”). Here, Mr. Jenkins has not alleged his Wolff due process
rights were violated, and there is “some evidence,” through the Conduct Report and OIS printout,
supporting the determination that Mr. Jenkins is a habitual conduct rule violator. Indeed, he
pleaded guilty to the charge. Dkt. 7-4.
Thus, habeas relief is not available to Mr. Jenkins.
D.

Conclusion

“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge,
disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there
was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Mr. Jenkins to the relief he seeks.
Accordingly, Mr. Jenkins’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action
dismissed.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 8/1/2018

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Distribution:
JAMES JENKINS
105817
NEW CASTLE - CF
NEW CASTLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
1000 Van Nuys Road
NEW CASTLE, IN 47362
Aaron T. Craft
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]

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