6 TRUSTS INDIANA, LLC v. CAROLINA LOGISTICS SERVICES, LLC

Filing 33

ORDER - This matter is before the Court on a Motion filed by Plaintiff 6 Trusts Indiana, LLC ("6 Trusts") to Strike a Demand for Attorneys' Fees from Defendant Carolina Logistics Services, LLC's ("CLS") Counterclaim. [ Filing No. 26 .] 6 Trusts' Motion to Strike is now fully briefed and is ripe for the Court's consideration. For the foregoing reasons, 6 Trusts' Motion to Strike, 26 , is GRANTED and CLS' demand for attorneys' fees is st ricken. This Order addresses the lack of any basis for recovery of fees should CLS prevail on the counterclaim, and should not be construed to prevent either party from seeking recovery of attorney fees where otherwise authorized by law. (SEE ORDER). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 2/15/2018. (APD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
6 TRUSTS INDIANA, LLC,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLINA LOGISTICS SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant.

No. 1:17-cv-04212-JMS-MPB

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Motion filed by Plaintiff 6 Trusts Indiana, LLC (“6
Trusts”) to Strike a Demand for Attorneys’ Fees from Defendant Carolina Logistics Services,
LLC’s (“CLS”) Counterclaim. [Filing No. 26.] 6 Trusts’ Motion to Strike is now fully briefed
and is ripe for the Court’s consideration.
I.
DISCUSSION
On August 1, 2017, 6 Trusts brought suit against CLS in Hamilton Superior Court alleging
damages arising out of a lease agreement. [Filing No. 1-1 at 4.] CLS filed a counterclaim alleging
breach of contract and requesting attorneys’ fees and costs. [Filing No. 1-4 at 9.] 6 Trusts then
filed a Motion to Strike CLS’ demand for attorneys’ fees. [Filing No. 26.]
On November 13, 2017, CLS removed this matter to federal court, alleging jurisdiction on
the basis of diversity of citizenship. [Filing No. 1.] At the time of removal, 6 Trusts’ Motion to
Strike remained pending.
In its Motion to Strike, 6 Trusts argues that “pursuant to Indiana law, each party is
responsible for its own attorney’s fees, unless a contract or statute provides otherwise,” and that

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CLS’ Counterclaim fails to allege any such contractual or statutory basis. [Filing No. 26 at 2.] To
the contrary, 6 Trusts alleges that the applicable lease agreement does not provide that CLS shall
be entitled to recover attorneys’ fees from 6 Trusts, but instead provides that in the event of default,
CLS “shall be liable for and hereby agrees to pay any and all expenses, including but not limited
to attorney fees incurred by” 6 Trusts. [Filing No. 27 at 2.]
In response, CLS argues that striking its demand for attorneys’ fees “would be improper,
particularly at this early stage of the litigation.” [Filing No. 8 at 2.] CLS argues that it is not
required to cite a basis for attorneys’ fees, [Filing No. 8 at 3], and that 6 Trusts has failed to allege
how it will be prejudiced by keeping the demand for attorneys’ fees in the case, [Filing No. 8 at
4].
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that the court “may strike from a pleading
an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” The
court may either strike on its own or on a motion by a party, and it has “considerable discretion”
in striking any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. Delta Consulting Grp.,
Inc. v. R. Randle Const., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009).
CLS cites several cases in support of its argument that striking a demand for attorneys’ fees
is not proper at the outset of a case; however, those cases are distinguishable from this case. For
example Rodriquez v. Long involved a prayer for attorneys’ fees that were available in the event
that the opposing party’s “denials of liability or affirmative defenses are frivolous, unreasonable,
or groundless.” 2009 WL 2253195, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 2009). Similarly, Sanyo Laser Prod.,
Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. involved a bad faith claim. 2003 WL 23101793 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 7,
2003). In denying a Motion to Strike a claim for attorneys’ fees, the Sanyo Court specifically
noted that Indiana law allows for such fees “to a party forced into litigation due to another’s bad

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faith.” Id. at *6 (citing Ind. Code § 34–52–1–1(b)). In this case, however, CLS does not allege in
its Answer and Counterclaim that 6 Trusts’ claims are frivolous, unreasonable, groundless, or
made in bad faith.

Rather, CLS merely states that 6 Trusts “mischaracterizes the Lease

Agreement.” [Filing No. 1-4 at 4.] Accordingly, CLS has neither alleged nor shown that an award
of attorneys’ fees is possible under the circumstances present in Rodriquez and Sanyo.1
CLS also cites McKinely v. Rapid Global Business Solutions, Inc., in support of its
argument that courts should not require more than is mandated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. [Filing No. 8
at 2 (citing 2017 WL 2555731 (June 13, 2017)).] But McKinley, too, is inapposite to the facts of
this case in that it applies specifically to affirmative defenses and is silent on the issue of attorneys’
fees.
Instead, this Court finds persuasive the reasoning in United Leasing, Inc. v. Balboa Capital
Corp., which dealt with an allegation of entitlement to attorneys’ fees pursuant to a contract which
did not provide for either party to recover such fees. 2017 WL 3674926 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 25, 2017).
The Court dismissed the claim for attorneys’ fees because, regardless of whether other claims
survived the motion to dismiss, neither party was entitled to attorneys’ fees under the contract. Id.
at *4. Similarly, CLS does not allege that the lease agreement at issue in this case entitles it to
attorneys’ fees in its brief in opposition to the Motion to Strike. As such, in order to “remove
unnecessary clutter from the case,” Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294
(7th Cir. 1989), and finding “no future development or occurrence in this matter” that will merit
the award of attorneys’ fees, Hasse Const. Co. v. v. Gary Sanitary Dist. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2008 WL

Similarly, Ind. Code § 34–52–1–1(b) does not provide grounds for CLS’ request for attorneys’
fees. See generally Landmark Legacy, LP v. Runkle, 81 N.E.3d 1107, 1113-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)
(setting forth grounds under which Indiana’s “General Recovery Rule” allows for an award of
attorney’s fees).
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2169000, at *8 (N.D. Ind. May 23, 2008), the Court exercises its discretion to strike CLS’ claim
for attorneys’ fees from the Counterclaim.

II.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, 6 Trusts’ Motion to Strike, [26], is GRANTED and CLS’
demand for attorneys’ fees is stricken. This Order addresses the lack of any basis for recovery of
fees should CLS prevail on the counterclaim, and should not be construed to prevent either party
from seeking recovery of attorney fees where otherwise authorized by law.

Date: 2/15/2018

Distribution via EFC only to all counsel of record.

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