GRASSE v. MELLINGER et al

Filing 53

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Amber Grasse alleges that she missed two doses of her prescription medication while incarcerated in the Madison County Jail, causing her to suffer a miscarriage. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Dkt. 39 . Final judgment will issue by separate entry (SEE ORDER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION). Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 9/28/2020. (DWH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
AMBER GRASSE,

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Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT MELLINGER Sheriff,
JENNIFER SIMMONS COMMANDER,
TYLER JUGG COMMANDER,
Defendants.

No. 1:18-cv-00021-JPH-MJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Amber Grasse alleges that she missed two doses of her prescription
medication while incarcerated in the Madison County Jail, causing her to
suffer a miscarriage. She has sued the Madison County Sheriff and two of his
employees for denial of adequate medical care and violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Rehabilitation Act ("RA"). Dkt. 1-2.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment. Dkt. [39]. For the reasons
that follow, that motion is GRANTED.
I.
Facts and Background
Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule
56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence "in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's
favor." Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
On November 28, 2015, Madison County sheriff deputies arrested Ms.
Grasse at her home. Dkt. 42-1 at 1–2. She arrived at the Madison County Jail
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(the "Jail") just after midnight. Dkt. 40-1 at 3–4 (Grasse Dep. at 92–93). At the
time, Ms. Grasse was taking prescribed anticoagulant injections twice a day
because she was pregnant. Dkt. 42-1 at 1. She had not yet taken her second
injection when she was arrested. Id. at 2.
Before arriving at the Jail, Ms. Grasse asked an arresting officer if she
could have her injection, explaining that she believed she would suffer a
miscarriage if she didn't take it. Id. at 2–3. The officer—who is not a defendant
in this case—told her that she "would have to talk to Medical" when she arrived
at the jail. Dkt. 40-1 at 3 (Grasse Dep. at 92). At the jail, Ms. Grasse told the
book-in officer that she was pregnant, was taking anticoagulant injections, and
"needed to talk to Medical." Id. at 5 (Grasse Dep. at 96). She again explained
that she believed she would suffer a miscarriage without the injections. Dkt.
42-1 at 3. The officer—who also is not a defendant in this case—did not let her
have the injection and told her that medical staff would not be at the jail until
morning. Dkt. 40-1 at 5 (Grasse Dep. at 96).
Ms. Grasse spent about 11 hours at the Jail and was released just after
11:00 a.m. Id. at 4 (Grasse Dep. at 93). During that time, she tried to follow
up with officers to ask them for medical care, but they would not respond.
Dkt. 42-1 at 4; id. at 6–7 (Grasse Dep. at 99–100). Those officers also are not
defendants in this case. Ms. Grasse did not speak to medical staff or receive
her injections while at the Jail. Dkt. 42-1 at 4. She missed two injections—
one for the evening of November 28 and one for the morning of November 29—
and the following month suffered a miscarriage. Id.
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At the time Ms. Grasse was at the Jail, medical staff were on-site from
7:00 a.m. through 11:00 p.m. every day. Dkt. 40-2 at 2. If an inmate needed
medical care, an appointment would be made; if it were an emergency, Jail
policy required officers to contact medical staff. Id. at 2–3. The medical staff
would evaluate the situation and "give direction to Jail personnel accordingly."
Id. at 3. All Jail personnel were trained on these policies. Id.
Ms. Grasse brings claims against Defendants for constitutional and
statutory violations related to the lack of medical care she received at the Jail.
Dkt. 1-2; dkt. 30. Defendants have moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 39.
II.
Applicable Law
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party must
inform the court "of the basis for its motion" and specify evidence
demonstrating "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets this
burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and identify
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d at
584 (citation omitted).

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III.
Analysis
A.

Abandoned Claims

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the
individual-capacity claims against them and on Ms. Grasse's Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act claim. Dkt. 41 at 6–7, 20–21. Ms.
Grasse's response does not address those arguments, see dkt. 43, so she has
"abandoned the claim[s]," Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir.
2008). Defendants' motion for summary judgment on those claims is granted.
Ms. Grasse's only remaining claims are therefore her Section 1983 Monell
claims and her ADA and RA claim.
B.

Monell Liability Under Section 1983

Ms. Grasse's claim against the Madison County Sheriff in his official
policymaking capacity is a Monell municipal-liability claim. Miranda v. County
of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978)). A municipality cannot be held vicariously liable under
section 1983 for the actions of its agent or employee. Los Angeles Cty. v.
Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 35–36 (2010) (explaining Monell, 436 U.S. 658).
Rather, a municipality can be liable for only its own actions and corresponding
harm. Id.
"The critical question under Monell remains this: is the action about
which the plaintiff is complaining one of the institution itself, or is it merely one
untaken by a subordinate actor?" Glisson v. Ind. Dept. of Corr., 849 F.3d 372,

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381 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). An action is one of the "institution itself," id.,
when the municipality's "official policy, widespread custom, or action by an
official with policy-making authority was the 'moving force' behind [the]
constitutional injury," Dixon v. Cty. of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2016)
(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 658; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379
(1989)); see Humphries, 562 U.S. at 36 (reciting the "list of types of municipal
action" that can lead to liability).
The "stringent" and precise grounds for Monell liability are required by
section 1983. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402–404, 415
(1997); see Humphries, 562 U.S. at 36. Courts must apply "rigorous standards
of culpability and causation" to prevent municipal liability from collapsing into
respondeat superior liability, which section 1983 prohibits. Brown, 520 U.S. at
405, 415.
1.

Express Policy

Monell liability under an express-policy theory applies when "a policy
explicitly violates a constitutional right when enforced." Calhoun v. Ramsey,
408 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2005). In other words, the "policy in and of itself"
must cause constitutional violations. City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
822 (1985); accord J.K.J. v. Polk County, 960 F.3d 367, 377–78 (7th Cir. 2020)
(en banc).
The Sheriff argues that Ms. Grasse cannot establish Monell liability
because no express policy violated Ms. Grasse's constitutional rights. Dkt. 41
at 11–12. Ms. Grasse responds that the Sheriff's policy triggers Monell liability
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because she did not receive required immediate treatment and because medical
staff were not present on-site. Dkt. 43 at 14, 16.
Here, the Sheriff's policy is undisputed. See dkt. 43 at 7–8. At the time
of Ms. Grasse's detention, medical staff were at the jail from 7:00 a.m. through
11:00 p.m. every day. Dkt. 40-2 at 2. If at book-in an inmate "expressed or
demonstrated a need for medical care," a medical appointment would be
scheduled. Id. at 2. And if there was an emergency medical need, jail staff
would contact the medical providers immediately. Id. Similarly, if an inmate
needed care when no medical staff were on-site, jail officers would page the
medical providers, who would give direction to jail staff. Id. at 2–3.
The policy therefore provided an avenue for immediate care—if medical
providers were not on-site, jail staff were to contact them immediately and
follow their directions. Id. That is enough to defeat Monell liability under an
express-policy theory, because that policy "in and of itself" does not cause
constitutional violations. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822; accord J.K.J., 960 F.3d at
377–78. Indeed, there "can be little doubt that on its face" the policy is
constitutional because—if followed—it would have provided Ms. Grasse
immediate medical care if she identified an emergency need. Harris, 489 U.S.
at 386–87 (finding the same for a jail's policy to take inmates who need medical
care to a hospital). That is far different than, for example, an unconstitutional
"policy requiring jail staff to throw away all prescription medications without
implementing an appropriate mechanism for providing alternative treatment."
King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2012).
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Ortiz v. City of Chicago, which Ms. Grasse relies on, does not teach
otherwise. 656 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir. 2011). That case applied the duty to
"reasonably respond to medical complaints" under a policy "prohibiting
detainees from taking medicine in lockup unless . . . transported to [the]
hospital." Id. at 531. But Ortiz did not "comment on whether that policy is
wise as a general matter"—much less whether it is constitutional—and did not
address Monell liability. Id. Instead, it examined whether "each officer" acted
reasonably. Id. at 531–32. This case is the opposite, as Ms. Grasse pursues
Monell liability and not individual liability. Dkt. 43 at 14–18.
Because Ms. Grasse pursues only Monell liability, the Court does not
address whether jail staff followed the express policy, or whether Ms. Grasse's
constitutional rights were violated during her detention. Those questions are
separate from the express-policy theory that Ms. Grasse relies on. See dkt. 43
at 14–18; Glisson, 849 F.3d at 379 (Under Monell, the "critical question . . . is
whether a municipal . . . policy or custom gave rise to the harm (that is, caused
it), or if instead the harm resulted from the acts of the entity's agents.").
Moreover, Ms. Grasse does not argue that jail staff had a custom of violating
medical-care policies. See dkt. 43 at 14–18; Glisson, 849 F.3d at 379.
Because the Sheriff's express policy itself does not violate constitutional
rights when enforced, there is no triable issue of fact on whether the policy
injured Ms. Grasse. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment
on this Monell theory.

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2.

Failure to Train

The Sheriff argues that no designated evidence shows a triable issue of
fact on Ms. Grasse's failure-to-train Monell theory. Dkt. 47 at 10–12. Ms.
Grasse contends that jail staff should have been trained to provide urgent
medical care, and that whether any training was adequate should be for a jury
to decide. Dkt. 43 at 18.
"In limited circumstances, a local government's decision not to train
certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens' rights may
rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of § 1983."
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). But failure to train is the "most
tenuous" Monell theory. Id. "A pattern of similar constitutional violations" is
"ordinarily necessary" to establish the claim. Id. at 62. A single incident can
be enough only when a "'highly predictable' constitutional danger"
demonstrates the "obvious need for specific legal training." Id. at 64–68.
Here, Ms. Grasse argues that the "need for medical care, including
urgent medical care, is certainly a 'recurring situation' for a county sheriff's
department." Id. at 18. But she has designated no evidence of similar
constitutional violations. See dkt. 43 at 2–9. There is therefore no triable issue
of fact about whether the Sheriff had a pattern of failing to provide
constitutionally sufficient medical care—"Monell claims require evidence, but
[Ms. Grasse] has offered none." Barnes v. City of Centralia, Ill., 943 F.3d 826,
832 (7th Cir. 2019).

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The Sheriff also cannot be liable under a failure-to-train theory based on
a single incident. The undisputed designated evidence shows that "[a]ll jail
personnel were trained" on the policy that emergency needs should be raised to
medical staff immediately, even if medical staff are not present at the time.
Dkt. 40-2 at 2–3. Ms. Grasse therefore has not shown that the Sheriff's
training was insufficient, much less that it shows a "conscious choice" to
provide constitutionally deficient medical care. Rice v. Correctional Med. Servs.,
675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir. 2012); see Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492
(7th Cir. 2007) ("A municipality will be held liable for the violation of an
individual's constitutional rights for failure to train its officers only when the
inadequacy in training amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of the
individuals with whom the officers come into contact.").
There is therefore no triable issue of fact on Ms. Grasse's failure-to-train
claim, and Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on this theory of
Monell liability. 1
C.

Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act

The ADA and RA generally prohibit public entities, including prisons,
from discriminating against disabled individuals. See Pennsylvania Dep't of
Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). "To prove a prima facie case
of discrimination," Ms. Grasse "must show: (1) that [s]he is a qualified
individual with a disability; (2) that [s]he was denied the benefits of the
Because Ms. Grasse cannot establish Monell liability for the reasons above, the Court
does not address Defendants' qualified-immunity argument or whether the standard
for medical care is deliberate indifference or objective reasonableness.

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services, programs, programs, or activities of a public entity or otherwise
subjected to discrimination by such an entity; and (3) that the denial or
discrimination was 'by reason of' [her] disability." Lacy v. Cook County, Ill., 897
F.3d 847, 853 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation and quotations omitted). 2
Defendants argue that Ms. Grasse has not designated evidence
supporting the third element—that her medical care was delayed or denied
because of a disability. Dkt. 47 at 13–14. Ms. Grasse contends that a
reasonable jury could find that she was denied care based on her disability
because Defendants can provide medical care to inmates but did not provide
care to her. Dkt. 43 at 24.
It is not enough that Ms. Grasse was disabled and did not receive
medical care. Rowling v. Ill. Dept. of Corrections, No. 3:16-cv-459-NJR-MAB,
2019 WL 3628741 at *5 (S.D. Ill. May 10, 2019) (quoting Bryant v. Madigan, 84
F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The ADA does not create a remedy for medical
malpractice.")). Instead, to succeed on her claim, she must "show[ ]that the
reason for [her] deprivation is [her] disability." See Wisc. Comm. Servs., Inc. v.
City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 753 (7th Cir. 2006). However, Ms. Grasse
has not designated evidence to support a reasonable inference that she did not
receive medical care because of her disability.
Ms. Grasse points only to the Jail's medical-care policy which, as
explained above, allowed inmates to receive emergency medical care even when

The same analysis governs the ADA and RA, so the Court considers them together.
See Jaros v. Ill. Dept. of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667, 671–71 (7th Cir. 2012).
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no medical staff were on-site. Dkt. 43 at 22. But that policy cannot create a
triable issue of fact. Nothing in the policy, when enforced consistently, would
delay or deny treatment for inmates with disabilities as compared to other
inmates. See Wisc. Comm. Servs., 465 F.3d at 753. And Ms. Grasse has not
designated any evidence that the policy was enforced inconsistently—much
less inconsistently in a way that denied her care based on her disability. See
id.; accord Beaver v. Melotte, No. 08-C-187, 2008 WL 4610317 at *1 (E.D. Wisc.
Oct. 15, 2008) ("The ADA does not protect against every injury suffered by
disabled persons—it merely guards against injuries they suffer because they
are disabled.").
Corbin v. Indiana, which Ms. Grasse relies on, does not hold otherwise.
No. 3:16-cv-602-PPS/MGG, 2018 WL 1920711 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 23, 2018).
There, the court held that an ADA and RA claim survived a motion for
judgment on the pleadings based on allegations that the plaintiff was placed in
solitary confinement "only because of his disability," preventing him from
accessing mental health services. Id. at *4. At that judgment-on-the-pleadings
stage, allegations were enough. Here, on summary judgment, evidence of
causation is required, and Ms. Grasse has provided none. See Sommerfield v.
City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that on summary
judgment, "conclusory statements not grounded in specific facts are not
enough" and the "parties are required to put their evidentiary cards on the
table").

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A reasonable jury therefore could not find that Ms. Grasse was denied
medical care because of a disability, so Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on this claim. 3
IV.
Conclusion
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Dkt. [39].
Final judgment will issue by separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 9/28/2020

Distribution:
Paul Thomas Belch
TRAVELERS STAFF COUNSEL
[e-mail]
Robert Francis Dolack
TRAVELERS STAFF COUNSEL OFFICE (Indianapolis)
[e-mail]
Christopher Carson Myers
CHRISTOPHER C. MYERS & ASSOCIATES
[e-mail]

Because no reasonable jury could find that Ms. Grasse was denied medical care
because of a disability, the Court does not address whether Ms. Grasse had a
disability and OVERRULES as moot Defendants' objections to portions of Ms.
Grasse's designated evidences. Dkt. 47 at 3–5. For the same reason, the Court does
not address whether Ms. Grasse could receive compensatory damages under the ADA
or RA.
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