RAYNE v. GANNON et al
Filing
183
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL FINAL JUDGMENT - Trooper Gannon's motion for entry of partial final judgment is GRANTED, dkt. 175 ; partial final judgment will issue in a separate entry. Sheriff Layton's motion for entry of partial final judgment is DENIED. Dkt. 171 (SEE ORDER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION). Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 12/8/2020. (DWH)
Case 1:18-cv-00076-JPH-DML Document 183 Filed 12/08/20 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 5624
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
SARAH RAYNE,
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)
)
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Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM GANNON in his individual
capacity,
JOHN LAYTON Sheriff, in his official
capacity, et al.
Defendants.
No. 1:18-cv-00076-JPH-DML
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL FINAL JUDGMENT
After the Court granted summary judgment to Defendants William
Gannon and John Layton, dkt. 169, they each moved for the entry of partial
final judgment in their favor under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), dkt.
[171]; dkt. [175]. For the reasons below, Trooper Gannon's motion is
GRANTED and Sheriff Layton's motion is DENIED.
I.
Facts and Background
The facts below are summarized from the Court's order granting
summary judgment to Sheriff Layton and Trooper Gannon. Dkt. 169.
On Friday, March 10, 2017, Trooper William Gannon found Ms. Rayne
standing on the shoulder of the interstate, shoeless and crying. Dkt. 118-47 at
17, 19 (Gannon Dep. at 17, 19). Trooper Gannon discovered that there was an
open warrant for her arrest, so he handcuffed her and took her to the Marion
County Jail (the "Jail"). Id. at 23, 26 (Gannon Dep. at 23, 26). On the way to
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the Jail, Ms. Rayne mentioned that her shoulder hurt. Id. at 27–29 (Gannon
Dep. at 27–29). Trooper Gannon asked her several times if she needed an
ambulance or wanted to go to the hospital, but she declined. Id. at 30–31
(Gannon Dep. at 30–31). He also asked her if she wanted him to handcuff her
with two linked sets of handcuffs, but she declined that offer as well. Id. at 30
(Gannon Dep. at 30).
When they arrived at the Jail, Trooper Gannon removed the handcuffs
and informed Jail staff that Ms. Rayne was complaining of shoulder pain. Id.
at 32, 42–43 (Gannon Dep. at 32, 42–43). He then left, knowing that the Jail
had medical staff onsite for evaluating inmates. Id.
Over the next three days, multiple nurses saw and examined Ms. Rayne.
See dkt. 169 at 3–10. She continued to complain of shoulder pain and was
given ibuprofen and scheduled for an x-ray for the following Monday, March
13. See id. Before the x-ray, however, Ms. Rayne was transferred to the
Marion County Community Corrections facility. See id. at 9. An employee
there noticed that Ms. Rayne's arm was swollen and red and called an
ambulance. See id. At the hospital, Ms. Rayne was diagnosed with and treated
for a serious MRSA infection. See id. at 10.
Ms. Rayne brought this lawsuit, alleging (1) unconstitutionally deficient
medical care and (2) that Sheriff Layton is liable under Monell because his jail
policies and failure to train jail employees caused her injuries. See id. at 12,
23. Defendants—Trooper Gannon, Sheriff Layton, and the Medical Defendants
at the jail—moved for summary judgment. See id. The Court granted
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summary judgment for Trooper Gannon and Sheriff Layton and granted in part
and denied in part summary judgment for the Medical Defendants. See id. at
28. Trooper Gannon and Sheriff Layton have moved for the entry of partial
final judgment in their favor under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Dkt.
[171]; dkt. [175].
II.
Applicable Law
"Generally, if an action involves either multiple parties or one party with
multiple claims," an order dismissing only some parties or claims is not "final"
and is therefore not appealable. Brown v. Columbia Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d
182, 186 (7th Cir. 2011). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), "however,
empowers a district court to direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more,
but fewer than all, claims or parties." Id. Such a partial final judgment may be
entered "only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for
delay." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
III.
Analysis
"A proper Rule 54(b) order requires the district court to make two
determinations: (1) that the order in question was truly a 'final judgment,' and
(2) that there is no just reason to delay the appeal of the claim that was 'finally'
decided." Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark Mall Corp., 644 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir.
2011).
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A. Trooper Gannon
Trooper Gannon argues that partial final judgment should enter because
the claim against him has been resolved and is distinct from the remaining
claims against the Medical Defendants. Dkt. 175. Ms. Rayne responds that
her claim against Trooper Gannon overlaps with the remaining claims because
she alleges that he "caused many of her injuries, including those . . . which
[Medical] Defendants subsequently failed to properly treat." Dkt. 177 at 2.
Here, Ms. Rayne's claim against Trooper Gannon has been "'finally'
decided," Gen. Ins., 644 F.3d at 379, because the summary judgment order
concluded that no reasonable jury could find that he "purposefully, knowingly,
or recklessly disregard[ed] any risk of harm to Ms. Rayne by taking her to the
Jail instead of forcing her to go to a hospital against her wishes," dkt. 169 at
22.
There is also no just reason for delaying the entry of judgment. The facts
relevant to Trooper Gannon's liability ended when Ms. Rayne arrived at the
Jail. See dkt. 169 at 3. After that point, Ms. Rayne was only under the
Medical Defendants' care. See id. Because of that clear break between Trooper
Gannon's actions and the Medical Defendants' actions, this claim is "truly
separate and distinct from those that remain pending," "having minimal factual
overlap." Lottie v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 408 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2005). The
overlap that Ms. Rayne alleges—that Trooper Gannon exacerbated the injuries
that the Medical Defendants "failed to properly treat," dkt. 177 at 2—is at most
the type of "slight" overlap that does not prevent a partial final judgment.
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Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp., 118 F.3d 1157, 1162 (7th Cir.
1997) (overlap "limited to the bare bones of the relationship between" parties "is
not fatal" to a partial final judgment).
Partial final judgment for Trooper Gannon is therefore appropriate.
B. Sheriff Layton
Sheriff Layton argues that partial final judgment should enter because
the claim against him is unrelated to the claims against the Medical
Defendants. Dkt. 171. Ms. Rayne responds that the claims overlap because
her Monell claim against Sheriff Layton involves policies and training relevant
to the medical care at issue for the claims against the Medical Defendants.
Dkt. 172 at 2–3.
For a partial final judgment to be appropriate, the claim against Sheriff
Layton must be "separate" from the claims against the Medical Defendants.
Marseilles Hydro Power, LLC v. Marseilles Land & Water Co., 518 F.3d 459, 464
(7th Cir. 2008). "At a minimum, claims cannot be separate unless separate
recovery is possible," so "mere variations of legal theory do not constitute
separate claims." Id. "The scope of Rule 54(b) must therefore be confined to
situations where one of multiple claims is fully adjudicated—to spare the court
of appeals from having to keep relearning the facts of a case on successive
appeals." Id.
That standard is not met here. Sheriff Layton was granted summary
judgment on Ms. Rayne's Monell claims that his policies and failure to train his
employees caused her injuries. See dkt. 169 at 24–28. For the remaining
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claims against the Medical Defendants, a jury must decide whether the medical
care that Ms. Rayne received at the Marion County Jail was unconstitutionally
deficient and, if so, whether she is entitled to damages. See dkt. 169 at 20. If
she is not entitled to damages from the Medical Defendants, then she would
have no damages to recover from Sheriff Layton on her Monell liability claims,
regardless of whether he could otherwise be liable based on his policies or
training. See Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., 630 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir.
2010) (There can be no Monell liability "when there is no underlying
constitutional violation by a[n] . . . employee."). That interrelation undermines
Sheriff Layton's argument that "the outcome of Plaintiff's claims against the
Nurse Defendants is irrelevant to the outcome of her claims against the
Sheriff." Dkt. 173 at 3.
In short, an appeal of Ms. Rayne's Monell claim against Sheriff Layton
"might be undercut by the resolution of a factual dispute not yet decided by the
district court." VDF FutureCeuticals, Inc. v. Stiefel Labs., Inc., 792 F.3d 842,
845 (7th Cir. 2015); see Marseilles, 518 F.3d at 464 (claims relying on "different
legal theories aimed at the same recovery" are not separable under Rule 54(b)).
That is "exactly the type of judicial inefficiency that makes Rule 54(b) partial
final judgment improper." Peerless Network, Inc. v. MCI Comm'ns Servs., Inc.,
917 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 2019); accord Domanus v. Locke Lord LLP, 847 F.3d
469, 477 (7th Cir. 2017) ("It is not enough to resolve something that is
designated as a separate claim, if other aspects of the case involve the same
underlying subject matter.").
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Partial final judgment for Sheriff Layton is therefore inappropriate.
IV.
Conclusion
Trooper Gannon's motion for entry of partial final judgment is
GRANTED, dkt. [175]; partial final judgment will issue in a separate entry.
Sheriff Layton's motion for entry of partial final judgment is DENIED. Dkt.
[171].
SO ORDERED.
Date: 12/8/2020
Distribution:
Brandon Carothers
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
bcarothers@atg.in.gov
Andrea Lynn Ciobanu
CIOBANU LAW, PC
aciobanu@ciobanulaw.com
Carol A. Dillon
BLEEKE DILLON CRANDALL, P.C.
carol@bleekedilloncrandall.com
Christopher Andrew Farrington
BLEEKE DILLON CRANDALL ATTORNEYS
drew@bleekedilloncrandall.com
Tara Lynn Gerber
City of Indianapolis
tara.gerber@indy.gov
Gustavo Angel Jimenez
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
gustavo.jimenez@atg.in.gov
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