ARMADILLO HOLDINGS, LLC v. TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY OF AMERICA

Filing 40

ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER - This cause is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Transfer (Dkt. No. 17 ). The motion is fully briefed, and the Court, being duly advised, DENIES the Defendant's motion for the reasons set forth in this Entry. (See Entry). Signed by Judge William T. Lawrence on 10/9/2018. (APD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
ARMADILLO HOLDINGS, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TRAVELERS PROPERTY
CASUALTY COMPANY OF
AMERICA,
Defendant.

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) Cause No. 1:18-cv-532-WTL-MJD
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ENTRY ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO TRANSFER
This cause is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to Transfer (Dkt. No. 17). The
motion is fully briefed, and the Court, being duly advised, DENIES the Defendant’s motion for
the reasons set forth below.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff is a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Indiana, while
the Defendant is a Connecticut corporation with its principal place of business in Connecticut.
The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in Indiana against its insurer, the Defendant, asserting claims for
breach of contract, declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and bad faith, in connection with an
underlying personal injury action titled Garcia-Vega et al. v. Pero Margaretic, Texas Roadhouse
Holdings, LLC, Texas Roadhouse, Inc., & Armadillo Holdings, LLC, Cause No. 5:17-cv-06516,
which is currently pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California (the “Underlying Action”). The Underlying Action arises out of a slip and fall
accident that occurred at a Texas Roadhouse restaurant located in Tracy, California, in which the

plaintiff in that action asserts claims against the Plaintiff, some of which arise under California
law.
II.

DISCUSSION

The Defendant asks this Court to transfer this matter to the Northern District of California
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) provides “for the convenience of the parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.” Transfer is appropriate under this section
where the moving party establishes that (1) venue is proper in the transferor district, (2) venue is
proper in the transferee district, and (3) the transfer will serve the convenience of the parties, the
convenience of the witnesses, and the interests of justice. See Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron
Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir. 1986). The first two of these prongs are undisputed, so only
the third will be considered.
While the third prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) directs the Court to consider the
convenience of the parties, the convenience of the witnesses, and the interests of justice, it does
not dictate the relative weight to be given to each factor. As a result, “the weighing of factors for
and against transfer necessarily involves a large degree of subtlety and latitude, and, therefore, is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Coffey, 796 F.2d at 219. The parties agree
that the Court is to consider (1) the convenience of the parties; (2) the convenience of the
witnesses; (3) the situs of material events and access to proof; and (4) the interests of justice.
The Defendant argues that transfer to California would be more convenient for both parties
because the Plaintiff has limited business activity in Indiana, and “[f]or Travelers, all of the
Travelers employees and representatives who were involved in the investigation and ongoing
defense of Armadillo in the [Underlying] Action are located in California.” Dkt. No. 18 at 6.

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The Plaintiff counters by arguing that its Indiana activities are not limited and that its preference
is entitled to deference. Furthermore, the Plaintiff notes that the Defendant “offers no
explanation, or evidence, regarding the scope and extent of [the Plaintiff’s] activities and ties to
Indiana.” Dkt. No. 23 at 4. The general rule is that “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” In re National Presto
Industries, Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Defendant has not shown that “the balance is strongly in [its] favor,” and therefore this factor
weighs in favor of the Plaintiff.
Next, the Defendant argues that a transfer would be more convenient for the witnesses
because “substantially all of the witnesses who may be interviewed or deposed regarding this
lawsuit are in California, including the parties to the [U]nderlying . . . Action, and Travelers
employees who were involved in the coverage determination at the heart of the dispute in this
lawsuit.” Dkt. No. 18 at 6. The Plaintiff counters by arguing that the Defendant has not met its
burden to show a transfer is warranted (1) because it has failed to establish the identity of such
relevant witnesses and (2) because Courts presume that the employers will be able to produce
their own employees to testify. The Court need not consider this second argument because
indeed the Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden regarding inconvenience to witnesses. See
Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that
the party requesting a transfer “was obligated to clearly specify the key witnesses to be called
and make at least a generalized statement of what their testimony would have included”). This
factor weighs in favor of the Plaintiff.
With regard to the site of the underlying events and material proof, the Defendant argues
that “[a]ll of the events and material evidence that concerns the [U]nderlying . . . Action are

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located in California, including the Texas Roadhouse restaurant where the alleged bodily injury
occurred, as well as the materials from [the Defendant’s] investigation of the claim and ongoing
defense of the lawsuit.” Dkt. No. 18 at 6. The Plaintiff counters by stressing that the issues
regarding the Underlying Action are not the same as those presented in this action. In the
Plaintiff’s own words “[w]hat [the Defendant] ignores is that the claims in this case involve the
breach of a contract of insurance negotiated and procured in Indiana for an Indiana-based
insured, bad faith conduct against an Indiana-based insured, and a request for declaratory relief
relating to the contract of insurance.” Dkt. No. 23 at 5. Furthermore, while the Plaintiff
acknowledges that some materials from the Defendant’s investigation of the Underlying Action
may be in California, the Defendant does not cite any such specific material, and the Plaintiff
argues that many of the relevant documents are likely computerized and thus easily transferable.
Thus, this factor weighs in the Plaintiff’s favor as well.
Finally, the Defendant argues that the interests of justice compel transfer of this lawsuit
to California. According to the Defendant:
The primary coverage dispute in this suit currently involves both: (a) the
insured’s claim to a right to independent counsel, which will be governed by
California law; (b) the interpretation of defense counsel’s duties and ethical
obligations under the tripartite relationship in California; (c) interpretation of
California’s Cumis counsel statutes . . . that addresses Armadillo’s right to
independent counsel; and (d) the scope of coverage for the landlord, which
requires interpretation of a California lease, which contains a California choice of
law provision. Moreover, the underlying suit alleges violations of various
California statutes, including the California Anti-Discrimination Act and
California Unruh Civil Rights Act, and issues of coverage under the Travelers
policy will require interpretation of the damages available under those California
statutes.
Dkt. No. 18 at 6-7. The Plaintiff, however, responds by noting that it “is very confident that
Indiana law applies to this dispute,” and that “[i]n any event, even in the unlikely event that
California law were applicable, [the Defendant] does not contend that the law is so complex or
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unsettled that this Court is unable to adjudicate the issues.” Dkt. No. 23 at 9. Recognizing that
the Defendant makes no such contention, the Court agrees with the Plaintiff and is confident in
this Court’s ability to apply California law as necessary. Therefore this factor, like all the others
considered by the Court, weighs in favor of the Plaintiff.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant’s motion to transfer, Dkt. No. 17, is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED: 10/9/18

Copies to all counsel of record via electronic notification

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