BROOKS v. CITY OF CARMEL et al

Filing 53

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 32 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (Filing No. 32 ), is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Defendants are granted summary judgment on Broo ks' Title II ADA claim, Fourth Amendment claim, and the March 2016 battery claim. Summary judgment is denied as to Brooks' First Amendment claim, and that claim may proceed against Haney and Carmel. However, Haney is entitled to qualifie d immunity against Brooks' First Amendment claim, so he cannot be held liable for civil damages on that claim. Summary judgment is also denied as to Brooks' May 2017 state law battery claim. (See Order.) Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 9/15/2020. (NAD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
GARY W. BROOKS,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CITY OF CARMEL and DOUGLAS C. HANEY, )
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 1:18-cv-00613-TWP-TAB

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 by Defendants City of Carmel ("Carmel") and Douglas C.
Haney ("Haney") (collectively, "Defendants") (Filing No. 32). Plaintiff Gary W. Brooks
("Brooks") initiated this lawsuit, bringing claims for violation of Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), violation of First and Fourth Amendment rights, and battery. The
Defendants seek summary judgment, asserting the evidence does not support Brooks' claims and
qualified immunity protects Haney against the claims. For the following reasons, the Court grants
in part and denies in part the Defendants' Motion.
I.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are not necessarily objectively true, but as required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56, the facts are presented in the light most favorable to Brooks as the non-moving
party. See Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Plaintiff Brooks is over 60 years old and is a resident of Carmel, Hamilton County, Indiana.
He suffered a brain aneurism in 1995, which required emergency surgery. Brooks experienced

memory loss as a result of the injury and, since that time, has had difficulty forming new memories.
He has difficulty performing daily tasks because of his memory problems. Brooks lives with his
girlfriend of twenty years, who helps him get by. He receives social security disability benefits for
financial support (Filing No. 43-2 at 1).
Because Brooks has trouble forming new memories, when he does anything that he thinks
is important to remember, he will record himself with a Sony video recording camera. The camera
is old and large, so he carries it on top of a clipboard, and he uses the clipboard to take notes for
himself to remember. It is impractical for Brooks to record all his activities, so he does not record,
for example, trips to the bank and pharmacy because they provide receipts of the transactions.
However, Brooks typically records any personal business that he conducts with government
officials. When he uses his camera to record his interactions, the camera is plainly visible. Id. at
1–2.
Defendant Carmel is a city within Hamilton County, Indiana. Defendant Haney is an
employee of Carmel as its "in-house" counsel. Haney represents Carmel in all its legal affairs. He
does not have the authority to arrest people (Filing No. 34-3 at 3, 43). Certain offices within the
Carmel government have a policy that prohibits recording or photographing in the private areas of
the office. The Department of Community Services ("DOCS") and the Law Department are two
offices that have such a policy. Written notices are posted in the offices, and any individual who
enters those offices with video or audio equipment is advised orally of the policy by Carmel
employees. The Law Department office has had this policy in place before Haney came to work
for Carmel in 1997. When Haney became the chief legal officer, he continued the policy because
the office contains confidential and privileged documents, and confidential communications with
clients occur on a regular basis in the office. Id. at 5–10.

2

If an individual is violating the recording policy while in an office, they are asked to stop
violating the policy or to leave the office. They are told to leave the office and return to the hallway
where recording is permitted. The policy of not permitting recording within certain departments
of the executive branch of Carmel is limited to the inner offices and work areas of these
departments, including the Law Department and DOCS. The policy does not extend to the
hallways or other common spaces within Carmel's City Hall or to the various public meetings that
are held in designated rooms within City Hall. If an individual has a need to record a
communication with a Carmel official or employee, such a communication would be permitted to
take place outside the inner offices and employee work areas of these executive departments such
as in the hallways, common spaces, and designated conference and meeting rooms located
throughout City Hall. Id. at 13–14; Filing No. 34-4 at 1–2.
As a resident of Carmel, Brooks occasionally needs to visit Carmel's city offices to conduct
personal business. Since 2012, Carmel city officials have told Brooks that he cannot record in the
city offices, and they usually do not help him and ask him to leave. On some occasions, they have
threatened to call the police, and on other occasions, nothing is said to Brooks and he quickly
conducts his business and leaves (Filing No. 43-2 at 3).
On March 4, 2016, Brooks came to the DOCS in Carmel's City Hall to discuss a trailer on
his property in Carmel. Brooks does not remember who he spoke to that day or the purpose of his
visit other than it involved something about a trailer on his property. At his deposition, Brooks
could not remember if he talked with Haney that day. He has no memory of anything that happened
during his visit other than what is on his video recording (Filing No. 34-1 at 5–9).
Prior to entering City Hall, Brooks started his video recording and then walked into the
building. He found his way to the DOCS office and stated that he was looking for the "head man"

3

of the DOCS or Brent Liggett. He indicated that he needed to discuss a trailer on his property.
After interacting with two female employees for approximately two minutes, one of the female
employees realized that Brooks was recording and asked him to stop. Brooks refused to stop
recording and explained that he had a memory disability and needed to continue recording to have
a record of his interactions with Carmel officials. The female employee who asked him to stop
recording got up from her desk and walked out of the DOCS office (Filing No. 37, Video
Recording of March 4, 2016 Visit to DOCS).
The DOCS female employee then went to the Law Department office and asked Haney to
help with a disturbance in her office. She explained that a man was recording into the office and
would not stop. They had pushed the emergency button for the police to assist, but the police had
not arrived. Haney went to the DOCS office to try to diffuse the situation. When Haney entered
the office, he saw Brooks standing by the sign that read "No Recording," and Brooks appeared
upset with a red face (Filing No. 34-3 at 23–25).
Haney approached Brooks and stated that if he had problems with his memory, Brooks
should write down his questions and the questions would be answered in writing. Haney directed
Brooks to turn off the video recording. He informed Brooks that he was not allowed to record into
the private areas of the DOCS. Brooks responded again that he has a memory disability, and
Haney repeated that Brooks could write and submit his questions, and Carmel would respond in
writing as an accommodation for the disability. Haney then asked Brooks multiple times if he had
a disability with writing, however, Brooks did not respond to the question. Haney again directed
Brooks to turn off the recording, and Brooks refused. Haney then walked around the office counter
to stand directly in front of Brooks to block his recording into the private area of DOCS and to put

4

himself between the DOCS employees and Brooks (Filing No. 37, Video Recording of March 4,
2016 Visit to DOCS; Filing No. 34-3 at 26–27).
When Haney walked from the office cubicle area to where Brooks was standing, he stood
in front of Brooks, close enough to block the camera lens, but he did not physically touch Brooks
(Filing No. 34-3 at 27). Haney stated, "Sir, I'd like you to turn off the camera." Brooks responded,
"Don't get that close to me. You don't have to get that close to me." Haney replied aggressively,
"You can turn off the camera." They repeated this back and forth to each other multiple times.
Brooks said, "Just back up a little bit. Why are you getting so close to me?" He then said, "You're
in my air space, and I don't feel comfortable." Haney repeatedly stated "turn off the camera", and
Brooks again explained that he had a memory disability. Haney repeated, "Write them down and
we'll give you written answers and then there's no problem; that's called a reasonable
accommodation." Brooks then stated, "Don't touch me," and Haney replied, "I'm not touching
you. Am I touching you?" Brooks did not respond and the two continued to argue about Brooks'
disability and Haney's accommodation. Brooks again stated, "You're getting too close to me," and
"there's an airspace around people that you probably shouldn't get in." Haney asked, "why," to
which Brooks replied, "because I don't like you being that close to me." After again discussing
Brooks' disability and Haney's proposed accommodation, Brooks left the office and returned to his
car (Filing No. 37, Video Recording of March 4, 2016 Visit to DOCS, 10:10 to 14:35).
Just over a year after this encounter, Brooks went to the Carmel Law Department to drop
off a public records request on May 18, 2017 (Filing No. 43-2 at 3). Brooks has no memory of
any details of what happened during this visit other than what is on his video recording (Filing No.
34-1 at 9–11). Brooks started his video recording before entering the Law Department office.
When he walked into the office, he was greeted and then was immediately asked if his video

5

recorder was on, to which he responded yes. He was told that he needed to turn off the recorder
or step outside. Brooks replied that he needed to drop off papers, and he was again told that he
needed to turn off the recorder or step outside. As this conversation occurred, Brooks recorded
the posted sign that explained recording was not allowed in the office because of confidentiality
concerns. After about twenty seconds of this exchange, Brooks began to explain that he has a
memory disability and needed to record his activities, and Haney emerged from his office (Filing
No. 37, Video Recording of May 18, 2017 Visit to Law Department).
Brooks stated that he needed to drop off his written records request, and Haney responded,
"You may". Brooks explained that he needed to obtain public records and wanted a signature on
the request receipt form. He asked if he could get a signed receipt, and Haney replied, "Not until
you leave with that camera." Brooks asserted that he was in a public place, and Haney explained
that the office was not a "public part of a public place." Id. at 0:40 to 1:01.
Haney stepped closer to Brooks to block him from continuing to record into the office
(Filing No. 34-3 at 37). Brooks asked again for a copy of the signed records request, and Haney
told him not until he turned off the video recording or left the office. Haney told Brooks he would
receive a signed copy after he turned off the recording or stepped outside the office. Brooks
repeated that he needed to record the interaction, and Haney instructed his coworker to call the
police. Haney pointed toward the door for Brooks to leave the office, opened the door to the office,
and exclaimed, loudly, "I'm not going to say it again"…."No"…"Get out!" When Brooks asked
again if he could get a copy of the papers, Haney angrily yelled, "Turn it off! Turn it off!" Haney
reached toward Brooks and the video camera as he told Brooks to turn it off. The video picture
flips upside down and around and Haney made physical contact with Brooks. (Filing No. 37,

6

Video Recording of May 18, 2017 Visit to Law Department, 1:09 to 1:42). Brooks then says
"Don't touch me, don't touch me! Id.
During his deposition, Haney was asked about any physical contact between himself and
Brooks. He explained,
At that point I was so close to him that . . . I could smell him. . . . He moves the
camera toward my face again and, reflexively, I block his forearm with my right
hand to get that -- get him away from me. I did touch his -- I didn't touch his hand.
I touched his lower forearm for about a second with an open palm. And then I
backed away, and he leans toward me again so I moved to block it. I don't think I
even touched him the second time, but that was about a second.
(Filing No. 34-3 at 39.)
When asked to describe the physical contact between Brooks and Haney, Brooks testified
during his deposition, "I can't tell you exactly what happened. It's on the videotape. But it's just
that's what happened." (Filing No. 34-1 at 11.) When asked for details, Brooks replied, "I don't
remember." Id. In his subsequently written declaration, Brooks explained, "Haney crossed the
partition to get to my side. He came right up to me and shoved me against a wall, hurting my
wrist." (Filing No. 43-2 at 4.) In Haney's affidavit, Haney asserts, "I never shoved Brooks against
a wall." (Filing No. 34-4 at 1.)
After the physical contact, Haney walked away and went back into his office. Brooks
repeated his request for a signed copy of his records request. Haney reemerged from his office
about twenty-five seconds later, and Brooks again asked for a copy of the papers. Brooks then
stated that Haney hurt his wrist "when you touched me." Brooks again explained he needed a
signed copy, and Haney stated that he would give him the signed copy when he turned off the
video recording. Brooks continued to record in the office and stated to Haney "you hurt my wrist
when you pushed me." Haney signed the records request and gave a copy to Brooks. Then Brooks
left the office (Filing No. 37, Video Recording of May 18, 2017 Visit to Law Department, 1:42 to

7

6:42). After leaving the office, Brooks went to the emergency room to have his wrist examined
because it was hurting. His wrist was sprained but not fractured (Filing No. 43-2 at 4).
On March 1, 2018, Brooks filed his Complaint against the Defendants, asserting claims for
failing to accommodate his disability in violation of Title II of the ADA, violation of the First
Amendment right to self-expression, violation of the Fourth Amendment protection against
excessive force/unreasonable seizure, conspiracy to violate civil rights, and battery and intentional
infliction of emotional distress under Indiana state law. (Filing No. 1 at 4.)
In his Statement of Claims, Brooks explained, "Plaintiff does not intend to pursue his
claims against Defendants for a conspiracy to violate his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
That claim is withdrawn." (Filing No. 31 at 2.) And in his summary judgment response brief,
Brooks further explained, "Plaintiff intended to withdraw his claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress but failed to properly note this in his Statement of Claims." (Filing No. 42 at 4
n.1.) The Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on Brooks' remaining claims.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in
order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
provides that summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 489–90 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the court reviews "the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante, 555 F.3d at 584

8

(citation omitted). "However, inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture will
not defeat a summary judgment motion." Dorsey v. Morgan Stanley, 507 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir.
2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, "[a] party who bears the burden of
proof on a particular issue may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by
specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial."
Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490 (citation omitted). "The opposing party cannot meet this burden with
conclusory statements or speculation but only with appropriate citations to relevant admissible
evidence." Sink v. Knox County Hosp., 900 F. Supp. 1065, 1072 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citations
omitted).
"In much the same way that a court is not required to scour the record in search of evidence
to defeat a motion for summary judgment, nor is it permitted to conduct a paper trial on the merits
of [the] claim." Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). "[N]either the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts is sufficient to defeat a motion
for summary judgment." Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION

The Defendants present various arguments for summary judgment on Brooks' claims for
violation of Title II of the ADA, violation of First and Fourth Amendment rights, and battery. The
Court will address each claim separately.
A.

Title II ADA Claim Against Carmel
Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason

of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

9

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42
U.S.C. § 12132. Public entities "shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where
necessary to afford individuals with disabilities . . . an equal opportunity to participate in, and
enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity of a public entity." 28 C.F.R. §35.160(b)(1).
The Seventh Circuit recently has explained,
To prove a prima facie case of discrimination under Title II, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity or otherwise
subjected to discrimination by such an entity; and (3) that the denial or
discrimination was by reason of his disability. It is well established that a failure to
make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures can constitute
discrimination under Title II.
Lacy v. Cook Cty., 897 F.3d 847, 853 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
The Defendants argue that Brooks' allegation that Carmel's refusal to allow him to record
himself in public despite his disability violated Title II of the ADA fails, because Carmel has no
liability under the ADA in this case. The Defendants do not challenge Brooks' disability; rather,
they argue that Carmel's policy of not allowing video/audio recording within the offices of the Law
Department and DOCS does not deny Brooks the city's services, programs, or activities or
participation in such.
The ADA requires providing individuals with meaningful access, not necessarily identical
access, see United Spinal Ass'n v. Bd. of Elections, 882 F. Supp. 2d 615, 623–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Carmel contends it has provided or offered to provide Brooks with meaningful access to city
services. Carmel's recording policy does not bar Brooks from recording in the majority of City
Hall spaces including the hallways, other common spaces, or designated meeting rooms. If Brooks
or any other individual has a need to record a communication with a Carmel official or employee,

10

such a recorded communication would be permitted to take place outside the inner offices or work
areas of the departments such as in the hallway, common spaces, or a conference or meeting room.
The Defendants argue that meaningful access was presented to Brooks, and he was not
denied access to services. When Brooks visited the DOCS to discuss a trailer on his property,
rather than allowing him to video record in the office to preserve the communication, Haney
offered that Brooks could submit his questions in writing, and he would be given answers in
writing to preserve the communication. When Haney asked Brooks if he had a disability related
to writing, Brooks refused to respond.
Concerning Brooks' visit to the Law Department office to submit a public records request,
the Defendants assert the procedure to receive, document, and respond to public records requests
provides meaningful access to that city service without the need for Brooks to video record inside
Carmel's offices. When a records request is received, Carmel acknowledges the receipt of the
request in writing and then sends a follow-up letter again setting out the request and the substantive
response to the request. The Defendants point out that, on the particular records request form that
Brooks delivered to Carmel's Law Department on May 18, 2017, Brooks had indicated that he
wanted Carmel to correspond with him via mail to his residence in writing concerning the
request—the very procedure that Carmel had in place (Filing No. 34-7 at 1). The Defendants note
that Brooks had utilized this same procedure for a public records request in 2012 (Filing No. 34-6
at 1). In any event, the Defendants argue, Brooks fully received the city services he was seeking—
the opportunity to submit a public records request and to receive written confirmation of that
request (Filing No. 34-7). Because Brooks was not denied meaningful access to any city services,
the Defendants argue that his Title II ADA claim fails as a matter of law.
In response, Brooks argues that he was denied city services due to his disability. He notes,

11

In the March 4, 2016 encounter Brooks attempted to speak with a zoning official,
Brent Liggett, regarding the trailer parked in his driveway but was unable to speak
to anyone in the department about his problem before Haney threw him out of the
office. Brooks received no services whatsoever in that encounter. . . . In the course
of the May 18, 2017 visit to the Law Department, Brooks [] ultimately was able to
submit his records request and obtain a receipt, but only after being physically
assaulted.
(Filing No. 42 at 6.) "That Brooks may have recorded himself unmolested on a few other visits
does not change the fact that the City refuses to serve Brooks if he records himself." Id.
Concerning the accommodation offered by Carmel that he could submit his questions in
writing and receive written responses, Brooks argues that such an accommodation might be
sufficient in some instances, but he has difficulty writing documents longer than short notes to
himself. He asserts that responding to written questions would not provide him with meaningful
access to city services because he lacks the ability to write out questions to a complex zoning
question. Brooks argues that written correspondence is rarely an adequate substitute for speaking
with somebody. The accommodation he seeks is a simple exception to Carmel's policy against
making recordings, which requires no expenditure of money, no additional personnel or
equipment, and no physical modifications. Confidentiality concerns can be addressed by requiring
Brooks to make an appointment ahead of time, and confidential documents can be put away before
his appointment. Brooks argues that Carmel has failed to provide him with meaningful access to
city services, so his Title II ADA claim should survive summary judgment.
The Court finds that Carmel is entitled to summary judgment on Brook's Title II ADA
claim. Carmel has not denied Brooks meaningful access to the city services it provides to all other
individuals. Brooks was able to submit his public records request on May 18, 2017, and he was
given a signed acknowledgement of his submitted request. Carmel followed its normal procedure
of sending Brooks a letter indicating that it had received his public records request. Carmel then

12

sent the follow-up letter with the substantive response to the request (Filing No. 34-7). Brooks
successfully had used this same procedure for obtaining public records in 2012. Brooks was not
denied access to the city service of submitting public records requests and receiving a response.
When Brooks asked to speak to the "head man" of the DOCS while video recording into
the office in violation of Carmel's policy, he was told that he could not video record in the office,
but he could submit written questions, and he would be given written answers. When he said that
he needed to video record the interaction to preserve the communication, he was told that the
written communications would serve as an accommodation for him to preserve the
communication. Brooks' post hoc argument that he has difficulty writing documents longer than
short notes to himself and he cannot write out questions for a complex zoning issue is belied by
the evidence in the record of his handwritten public records requests in 2012 and 2017 and his
admission that he can read and write. Importantly, when Haney was offering an accommodation
to Brooks, he specifically asked whether Brooks had a disability related to writing. Brooks did not
answer Haney's repeated questions about his writing abilities, thereby thwarting any efforts to
make an accommodation related to writing if such an accommodation was necessary.
Carmel's offered accommodation to accept written questions from Brooks and to provide
written answers served as a reasonable accommodation for Brooks' memory disability and would
have preserved the communications as desired by Brooks. This provided Brooks with meaningful
access to the city services he was seeking. The practice of allowing individuals to video or audio
record in public spaces throughout City Hall provided another reasonable accommodation that
would have given Brooks meaningful access to the services he was seeking. Therefore, the Court
concludes that the designated evidence shows Carmel did not deny Brooks access to city services
due to his disability, and summary judgment in favor of Carmel is appropriate on the ADA claim.

13

The Defendants make the additional argument that Carmel cannot be liable for damages
because the evidence shows it did not act with "deliberate indifference." However, in light of the
Court's determination above, the Court declines to address this secondary argument.
B.

First Amendment Claim Against Carmel and Haney
The Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Brooks' First

Amendment claim because he was not engaged in protected speech when video recording his
interactions with Carmel city officials, and there was no violation of the right to free expression.
The Defendants acknowledge that the "First Amendment protects the right to gather information
about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of
public interest. See Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir.1994)." (Filing No. 33 at
20.) They assert, "[h]owever, what is missing from Brooks' First Amendment claim is the public
interest or public concern requirement which justifies the First Amendment protection." Id.
In order to have First Amendment protection, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he had a
message to be communicated and an audience to receive the message regardless of the medium in
which the message is to be expressed. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 515 U.S. 557, 568–69
(1995). "It is well established that in order to be protected under the First Amendment, images
must communicate some idea." Porat v. Lincoln Towers Cmty. Ass'n, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4333, at *13–17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2005) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)).
The Defendants argue,
Here, Brooks wasn't recording his interactions with Doug Haney or other City
officials for the purpose of recording events of public interest or concern like a
citizen may do when they record a public meeting or record a police officer making
an arrest. Rather, Brooks sought to record communications with City officials on
matters uniquely pertinent to only him, a public records request for an accident in
which he was involved or witnessed and a matter concerning a trailer parked on his
girlfriend's property. He has admitted that he sought to record his communications
with City officials for his own use. He had no message to communicate and no

14

audience to receive that message. The City Defendants are entitled to summary
judgement [sic] on Plaintiff's First Amendment claim.
(Filing No. 33 at 21–22.)
The Defendants additionally argue that Haney is entitled to qualified immunity against any
First Amendment claim because Brooks cannot show that a constitutional right existed, at the time
of the incident, to videotape his interactions with Carmel city officials for purely personal reasons.
To overcome qualified immunity, Brooks must show there was a clearly-established constitutional
right (defined with appropriate specificity) at the time of the incident, see Hernandez v. Foster,
657 F.3d 463, 473–74 (7th Cir. 2011), and the Defendants argue Brooks cannot do so. Thus,
qualified immunity protects Haney against the First Amendment claim.
Brooks responds that restricting the use of audio and video recording devices suppresses
speech just as effectively as restricting the dissemination of the resulting recording. He asserts that
audio/video recordings are media of expression commonly used for the preservation and
dissemination of information; they are included within the speech and free press guarantees of the
First Amendment. Brooks argues that the act of making recordings is necessarily included in the
First Amendment's guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate
the recording. In support of his argument, Brooks points to the Seventh Circuit's decision in ACLU
v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012), where the court protected a First Amendment right to
record police officers performing their official duties in public places.
Brooks argues that there is no Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit precedent requiring the
dissemination of the recording to an audience in order to receive First Amendment protection. But
even still, Brooks told the Carmel city employees during his March 2016 encounter that sometimes
city officials do not accurately remember his actions, so he needed to record them. This concern
came from an earlier experience with a Carmel police officer who gave Brooks a ticket, and when

15

disputing the ticket in city court, the officer told a different story, so Brooks showed his recorded
video, which helped him prevail in court (Filing No. 43-2 at 2). Brooks argues his "intended
audience is anyone to whom he would need to establish the truth should City officials
mischaracterize his actions," and furthermore, "[i]t is a matter of public interest when public
officials engage in any kind of misconduct. Such misconduct would include Doug Haney's
physical assault of Brooks—a fact that few would likely believe had Brooks not recorded it."
(Filing No. 42 at 9–10.) Brooks argues he has a right to record public officials on public property,
so his First Amendment claim is not subject to summary judgment.
Brooks asserts that Haney is not entitled to qualified immunity because the law was clearly
established at the time of the incidents that citizens may make recordings of the actions of
government officials performing their duties in public places as stated in ACLU v. Alvarez, 679
F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). Furthermore, Brooks seeks an injunction prohibiting the Defendants
from interfering with his right to record himself in the publicly accessible areas of city offices, and
the doctrine of qualified immunity does not apply to Brooks' claim for injunctive relief. NeelyBey Tarik-El v. Conley, 912 F.3d 989, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019).
In reply, the Defendants assert that Brooks has mischaracterized their "argument as only
supported by the fact that Brooks never disseminated or broadcast his videos of personal
encounters with City officials and that no Seventh Circuit or Supreme Court [decisions] require
dissemination." (Filing No. 46 at 12.) However, the Defendants explain, their "actual argument is
that Brooks was not engaged in expressive speech when he came to Carmel City offices to record
his communication with City officials, so he could review and remember those conversations in
the future, and there is plenty of case law support for that concept." Id. In Porat, the plaintiff's
First Amendment claim failed because his photography was a personal "hobby" intended for

16

"aesthetic and recreational" purposes. Porat, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4333, at *15. In Larsen v.
Fort Wayne Police Dep't, 825 F. Supp. 2d 965, 979–80 (N.D. Ind. 2010), the plaintiff's First
Amendment claim failed because his desire to video record his daughter's school choir
performance was for purely personal purposes and, thus, was not protected speech.
The Defendants argue,
Brooks did not make a recording of the activity of public officials at Carmel City
offices to communicate some idea but rather as a hedge against what he perceives
as a history of City officials lying about his activities. Brooks wanted the videos to
defend himself against future civil citations or other sanctions levied by Carmel
City officials. . . . Brooks sought to record communications with City officials on
matters uniquely pertinent and of interest only [to] him. There is no audience for
such recordings. The City Defendants are entitled to summary judgement on
Plaintiff's First Amendment claim.
(Filing No. 46 at 13.)
Viewing the designated evidence in the light most favorable to Brooks as the non-moving
party, as the Court must do when reviewing a summary judgment motion, see Zerante, 555 F.3d
at 584, the Court concludes that summary judgment is not appropriate on the First Amendment
claim. The Defendants argue that to support the claim there must be a message to be communicated
and an audience to receive the message, and a recording for purely personal use is not expressive
speech. However, there is evidence in the record that Brooks informed Carmel employees that his
recordings were used to document communications between himself and Carmel officials because
sometimes people forget how events play out, and these recordings could be used later to
communicate the recorded messages to other Carmel officials, such as a city judge. These
recordings carry a message that can be communicated to an audience (however small that audience
may be).
Additionally, there is no evidence that suggests Brooks recorded these interactions for
purely personal purposes. The evidence does not suggest that Brooks recorded the videos as a

17

personal hobby, made the videos for personal aesthetic or recreational purposes, or later watched
his recordings for his own personal, private entertainment. Rather, the evidence viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party suggests that Brooks recorded the videos to preserve a
message to communicate to other city officials if needed.
The Defendants rely upon the court's decision in Larsen, yet the court there explained legal
principles that cut against the issuance of summary judgment. The court stated, "The First
Amendment is not implicated because a person uses a camera, but rather, when that camera is used
'as a means of engaging in protected expressive conduct,' or, less commonly, to 'gather information
about what public officials do on public property.'" Larsen, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 979 (internal
citations omitted). In that case, "Larsen [did] not argue that he was attempting to express or
communicate an idea through his proposed videography of the show choir invitational or that he
was gathering information about what public officials do on public property." Id. However, in this
case, Brooks argues that he was gathering information about what public officials do on public
property. His First Amendment claim is not subject to summary judgment.
Regarding Haney's claim to qualified immunity, in making this determination, the Court
considers whether the facts demonstrate a constitutional violation and whether the constitutional
right was clearly established at the time of the violation. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–
32, 236 (2009). If either part is missing, qualified immunity will protect the government official
from liability for civil damages. Id. at 231.
The Supreme Court has "repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly
established law at a high level of generality," and the Seventh Circuit has long held
that "the test for immunity should be whether the law was clear in relation to the
specific facts confronting the public official when he acted."
Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). To show that
a government official's conduct violated a clearly established right "do[es] not require a case

18

directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
In this case, the constitutional question falls short to avoid qualified immunity. Brooks
relies on ACLU v. Alvarez for the general proposition that citizens may make recordings of the
actions of government officials performing their duties in public places, but the Court concludes
that this defines the right at too high a level of generality. The Alvarez decision was made in the
context of recording police officers performing their official duties in public places to promote
police accountability. But in this case, Haney is not a police officer; rather, he is a government
employee who was enforcing a city policy prohibiting recording within the inner offices of
Carmel's city hall. "The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
640 (1987). The contours of Brooks' claimed right—to video record his private interactions with
city officials within private city offices that have "no recording" signs posted—are not sufficiently
established or clear to allow Haney to understand that he was violating Brooks' constitutional
rights. Thus, Haney is entitled to qualified immunity against Brooks' First Amendment claim, and
he cannot be held liable for civil damages.
C.

Fourth Amendment Claim Against Haney
In his Complaint, Brooks alleges that "Haney's attempts to remove Brooks from City

offices by physical force constitute excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment." (Filing
No. 1 at 4.) The Defendants argue that this claim against Haney fails because the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to Haney in the factual context of this case, Haney did not seize
Brooks, and Haney is entitled to qualified immunity.

19

The Defendants argue that the Fourth Amendment primarily applies in the context of law
enforcement to prevent police from searching private places without a warrant or exigent
circumstances and from seizing suspected criminals unreasonably. "[T]he principal concern of [the
Fourth] Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is with intrusions on
privacy in the course of criminal investigations." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42
(1977). The Defendants assert that the Fourth Amendment's expansion into non-law enforcement
activities has been limited to government conduct motivated by investigatory or administrative
purposes such as when "the government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws
or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards." Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
312–13 (1978) (Fourth Amendment applies to OSHA inspectors); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 334–35 (1985) (Fourth Amendment applies to search by a school administrator in
the school setting); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (Fourth Amendment
applies to municipal health and safety inspector).
The Defendants point the Court's attention to the recent case of Marotz v. City & Cty. of
S.F., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26076 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015). There, a citizen filed a Section 1983
suit against the City of San Francisco, its city attorney's office, its city attorney, and its city attorney
investigator under the Fourth Amendment, contending that the attorney investigator physically
removed him from the reception area of the city's law department. The district court in Marotz
dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim because the city attorney investigator was not pursuing an
investigative or administrative purpose; rather, the confrontation was motivated by personal malice
or frustration. Marotz, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26076, at *16–17. The Defendants argue that the
same result is warranted in this case. Haney was not involved in any criminal or civil investigation
when interacting with Brooks, so the Fourth Amendment does not apply in this case.

20

The Defendants further argue that, even if the Fourth Amendment did apply, Haney did
not violate it because he did not seize Haney. There must be physical force and a show of authority,
and the individual must submit to the show of authority. The state actor must restrain the freedom
of the individual to walk away. In this case, Haney did not show authority, and Brooks did not
submit to any show of authority. Haney did not acquire physical control over Brooks; rather,
Haney tried to get Brooks to leave the city offices, and any physical contact between the two was
inadvertent. Therefore, the Defendants assert, Haney did not seize Brooks. The Defendants
additionally argue that qualified immunity protects Haney against Brooks' Fourth Amendment
claim because Brooks cannot demonstrate that the constitutional right to be free from an
unreasonable seizure existed in the factual setting present in this case.
Brooks responds that Haney physically assaulted him when he visited the Carmel city
offices, and the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
government officials. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528. Brooks argues that there is no criminal statute
that prohibits recording in city offices, but Haney thought law enforcement was necessary because
he called the police when Brooks was recording in the city offices, and when the police did not
immediately arrive, Haney did himself what he wanted the police to do, which was enforce the
policy against recording. Thus, Brooks argues, the Fourth Amendment applies to Haney's conduct.
Furthermore, Brooks argues, Haney did exert physical force against him and did exert a
show of authority. Brooks left the DOCS office because of Haney's show of authority, and Haney
pushed Brooks against the wall in the Law Department office. Brooks argues this constitutes a
seizure as there was a restraint on his movement.
Concerning Haney's claim to qualified immunity, Brooks responds,

21

With regard to the Fourth Amendment, Haney's conduct is so egregious that no
reasonable person could believe that it would not violate clearly established rights.
There is no universe in which it is appropriate for a city attorney to shove a 59year-old disabled man into a wall in order to prevent him from recording himself
in City Hall.
(Filing No. 42 at 13.)
After reviewing the designated evidence, the parties' arguments, and the case law, the Court
concludes that summary judgment is warranted on Brooks' Fourth Amendment claim. The
Defendants' arguments are well taken. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals' liberty and
privacy interests and primarily applies in the context of law enforcement to prevent police from
searching private places without a warrant or without exigent circumstances and from seizing
suspected criminals unreasonably. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673 n.42. The limited expansion of
Fourth Amendment protections to non-police situations involve government conduct motivated by
investigatory or administrative purposes. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 312–13. The designated evidence
indicates that Haney was not engaged in any law enforcement activity or any criminal or civil
investigatory or administrative activity when he interacted with Brooks. Therefore, the protections
of the Fourth Amendment do not apply to the factual circumstances of this case.
Furthermore, this case is nearly identical to the case of Marotz, where any physical contact
between Haney and Brooks was motivated by fear or frustration rather than to further some civil
or criminal investigative purpose for Carmel. Although Marotz is not binding precedent, the same
result is warranted—the Fourth Amendment does not apply. Additionally, Haney did not seize
Brooks within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because there is no evidence that Haney
intended to or did acquire physical control over Brooks when any physical contact occurred.
Haney was not trying to keep Brooks in the city offices; rather, he wanted him to leave the city
offices. Brooks' movement was not restrained, and he always was free to leave and move about.

22

Brooks was not seized. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment to Haney on Brooks'
Fourth Amendment claim.
D.

State Law Battery Claim Against Haney
Lastly, Brooks very briefly alleges in his Complaint that "Haney's actions constitute battery

. . . under Indiana law." (Filing No. 1 at 4.) The Defendants explain,
One is liable for the tort of battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with the person of the other or third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other
directly or indirectly results.
Singh v. Lyday, 889 N.E.2d 342, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). The Defendants acknowledge there was physical contact between Haney and Brooks on
May 18, 2017, but they deny any contact between the two on March 4, 2016.
They assert that there is no evidence Haney intended to cause harmful or offensive contact
with Brooks. Battery is an intentional tort that requires an intent to cause harmful or offensive
contact with the plaintiff. Mullins v. Parkview Hosp., Inc., 865 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. 2007). The
Defendants argue there is no evidence that Haney intended to cause harm to Brooks at the Law
Department office on May 18, 2017. Haney and Brooks came into physical contact when Haney
was trying to draw Brooks out of the office and into the public hallway. The Defendants assert
that the physical contact occurred when Brooks raised the camera toward Haney, and Haney
reflexively moved his hand to block the forearm of Brooks. They argue this touching was
inadvertent, and, under the circumstances of Brooks' visit to the Law Department and Brooks'
history with Carmel, there is no evidence to conclude that Haney intended a harmful or offensive
contact when he and Brooks touched briefly. Thus, the Defendants argue, the battery claim is
subject to summary judgment.

23

Brooks responds that factual disputes preclude entry of summary judgment on the battery
claim. He argues that Haney battered him twice: first on March 4, 2016, by getting in Brooks' face
and pushing him backwards out of the office, and again on May 18, 2017, by shoving him against
a wall. Brooks asserts that assault occurs when a person acts intending to cause an imminent
apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with another person, Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d
790, 794 (Ind. 2008), and even a slight touching can be the basis of a battery action under Indiana
law. Lessley v. City of Madison, 654 F. Supp. 2d 877, 914 (S.D. Ind. 2009).
Brooks argues that the video recording of the March 2016 incident shows Haney getting
so close to Brooks that Haney's face fills the entire screen, and Brooks contends that while doing
so, Haney's stomach touched him. This occurs while Haney is ordering Brooks to leave the office,
and it is clear from the video that Haney intended to physically intimidate Brooks into exiting the
office. Brooks argues that the video of the May 2017 incident shows Haney moving rapidly across
the partition that separates the employees' cubicles from the public area of the office and moving
toward Brooks while ordering him to get out. Brooks contends that Haney does not walk by him
in order to lure him out the door; he argues the only plausible interpretation of Haney's actions in
the video is that he was attempting to force him to stop recording or to shove him out the door,
causing him to hit the wall instead. Brooks concludes, "Summary judgment is inappropriate on
the battery claim due to the disputed interpretation of Haney's intent based on the video evidence."
(Filing No. 42 at 14.)
The Defendants reply,
With respect to the March 4, 2016 incident, the only admissible evidence is
Haney's testimony that the two did not physically touch and what is shown on the
video. Defendants acknowledge that the video demonstrates [the] two parties were
in close quarters, but it does not show a touching and does create a triable issue in
light of Haney's testimony that a touching did not occur. Thus, the Defendants are

24

entitled to summary judgment on a civil battery claim related to the March 4, 2016
incident because there was no touching.
(Filing No. 46 at 19.)
The Defendants further reply,
As to the May 18, 2017 incident at the Law Department, the only admissible
evidence is the description of the incident by Haney and what is shown on the video.
Plaintiff was not thrown against the wall. Battery is not committed through
negligence or inadvertence. Battery is an intentional tort and requires the intent to
cause a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff. Mullins v. Parkview Hosp.,
Inc., 865 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind.2007). Haney and Brooks came into physical contact
but that contact occurred as Haney was attempting to exit the Law Department for
the purpose of drawing Brooks into the hallway where recording was permitted and
to get Brooks away from his staff. In their Opening Brief, Defendants designated
evidence that Haney was advised before this incident that Brooks had made a
statement deemed threatening to City employees. Plaintiff does not challenge that
evidence.
Thus, in [the] circumstances then present, the drawing of Brooks into the
hallway away from his staff was important. The physical contact occurred when
Brooks raised the camera toward Haney and Haney reflexively moved his hand to
block the forearm of Brooks when Brooks raised the camera toward him when the
two were in close quarters in the tiny entryway to the Law Department. This
touching was inadvertent and under the circumstances of Brooks' visit to the Law
Department and Brooks' history with the City, there is no evidence to conclude that
Haney intended a harmful or offensive contact when he and Brooks touched briefly.
Id. at 19–20.
The Court first notes that Brooks' lawsuit is premised on his inability to form memories
and remember events from the past. At his deposition, Brooks testified that he has no memory of
anything that happened during his visits to Carmel's City Hall on March 4, 2016 and May 18, 2017,
and he can only rely on what is shown in his video recordings (Filing No. 34-1 at 5–11). When
asked during his deposition to describe the physical contact between him and Haney during the
May 2017 incident, Brooks testified, "I can't tell you exactly what happened. It's on the videotape.
But it's just that's what happened." Id. at 11. When asked for details, Brooks replied, "I don't
remember." Id. Then in his subsequently written declaration, Brooks explained, "On review of the

25

recording of the [March 2016] incident, . . . Haney comes up to me and gets so close to me that his
stomach touched me until I backed away. Haney walked forward, forcing me to walk backward,
until I was backed out of the office." (Filing No. 43-2 at 3.) "On review of the recording [of the
May 2017 incident], . . . Haney crossed the partition to get to my side. He came right up to me and
shoved me against a wall, hurting my wrist." Id. at 4.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4) states, "An affidavit or declaration used to support
or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible
in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated."
Brooks is not competent to testify about the facts alleged in his declaration as he testified under
oath that he does not remember the events of the past; thus, he has no personal knowledge of the
facts and can only speculate as to what occurred. Furthermore, Brooks would be capable of only
providing—as he did in his declaration—his own characterization of the video evidence, but this
too is improper to establish facts because it is simply his opinion about the facts shown in the
video. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 903 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633 (N.D. Ill. 2012) ("[A] party's
own characterization of evidence is not permitted in a Local Rule 56.1 statement. . . . The actual
evidence is the video footage itself, not [a party's] characterization of it."). Therefore, the Court
will not consider Brooks' characterization of the video evidence as an alternative version of the
facts of the events that occurred in March 2016 and May 2017.
Regarding the March 2016 incident, the designated evidence shows that when Haney
walked in front of Brooks, he stood close enough to block the camera lens, but he did not physically
touch Brooks (Filing No. 34-3 at 27). Haney stated, "Sir, I'd like you to turn off the camera."
Brooks responded, "Don't get that close to me. You don't have to get that close to me." Haney
replied, "You can turn off the camera." They repeated this back and forth to each other multiple

26

times. Brooks said, "Just back up a little bit. Why are you getting so close to me?" He then said,
"You're in my air space, and I don't feel comfortable," and "don't touch me," and Haney replied,
"I'm not touching you. Am I touching you?" Brooks did not respond but rather the two men
continued to argue about Brooks' disability and Haney's accommodation. Brooks again stated,
"You're getting too close to me," and "there's an airspace around people that you probably shouldn't
get in." Haney asked, "why," to which Brooks replied, "because I don't like you being that close
to me." After again discussing Brooks' disability and Haney's proposed accommodation, Brooks
left the office and returned to his car (Filing No. 37, Video Recording of March 4, 2016 Visit to
DOCS, 10:10 to 14:35). While the evidence shows that Haney and Brooks were very close to each
other, it does not show physical touching. Therefore, Brooks' battery claim for the March 2016
incident fails. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Haney on this claim.
Regarding the May 2017 incident, the designated evidence shows that Brooks entered the
Law Department office and had about a twenty-second conversation with an employee about
turning off his video recording. Haney then emerged from his office. Brooks explained that he
needed to drop off a records request, and Haney responded, "You may." Brooks further explained
that he needed to obtain public records and wanted a signature on the request receipt form. He
asked if he could get a signed receipt, and Haney replied, "Not until you leave with that camera."
Brooks responded that he was in a public place, and Haney explained that the office was not a
"public part of a public place." (Filing No. 37, Video Recording of May 18, 2017 Visit to Law
Department, 0:40 to 1:01.)
Haney testified that he stepped closer to Brooks to block him from continuing to record
into the office (Filing No. 34-3 at 37). Brooks asked again for a copy of the signed records request,
and Haney told him not until he turned off the video recording or left the office. Haney stated that

27

Brooks would receive a signed copy after he turned off the recording or stepped outside the office.
Brooks repeated that he needed to record the interaction, and Haney instructed his coworker to call
the police. Haney pointed toward the door for Brooks to leave the office, opened the door to the
office, and yelled aggressively, "I'm not going to say it again!"…"No!"…"Get out!" When Brooks
asked again if he could get a copy of the papers, Haney forcefully yelled, "Turn it off! Turn it off!"
Rather than waiting for a law enforcement officer to arrive, Haney approached Brooks, reached
toward Brooks and the video camera as he yelled at Brooks to turn it off, and he made physical
contact, resulting in Brooks suffering pain to his wrist. During the altercation, the video camera
is turning from side to side. After this physical contact, Haney walked away and went back into
his office (Filing No. 37, Video Recording of May 18, 2017 Visit to Law Department, 1:09 to
1:47).
Haney testified about the physical contact between himself and Brooks:
At that point I was so close to him that . . . I could smell him. . . . He moves the
camera toward my face again and, reflexively, I block his forearm with my right
hand to get that -- get him away from me. I did touch his -- I didn't touch his hand.
I touched his lower forearm for about a second with an open palm. And then I
backed away, and he leans toward me again so I moved to block it. I don't think I
even touched him the second time, but that was about a second.
(Filing No. 34-3 at 39.)
Battery is an intentional tort that requires an intent to cause harmful or offensive contact
with the plaintiff. There must be more than just the physical contact. Mullins, 865 N.E.2d 608.
Brooks argues that summary judgment is not warranted on the battery claim because of a disputed
interpretation of Haney's intent based on the video evidence. Brooks points to the video as
evidence of Haney's intent. His argument that Haney rapidly moved across the office and came
right up to him and shoved him against a wall is not confirmed by the video. However, the video
evidence shows Haney speaking angrily with Brooks for approximately one minute, and trying to

28

get him to turn off the video recording or leave the office. After Brooks refused to turn off the
video recording, Haney approached Brooks and reached toward Brooks and his video camera as
he yells for Brooks to turn it off, and Haney made physical contact. The video shows that Haney
is the aggressor who approaches Brooks. The parties' disagreement about whether Haney intended
to cause harmful or offensive contact when he touched Brooks is a disputed issue of material fact.
Therefore, summary judgment is denied on the battery claim for the May 2017 incident.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (Filing No. 32),
is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Defendants are granted summary judgment on
Brooks' Title II ADA claim, Fourth Amendment claim, and the March 2016 battery claim.
Summary judgment is denied as to Brooks' First Amendment claim, and that claim may proceed
against Haney and Carmel. However, Haney is entitled to qualified immunity against Brooks' First
Amendment claim, so he cannot be held liable for civil damages on that claim. Summary judgment
is also denied as to Brooks' May 2017 state law battery claim.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 9/15/2020
DISTRIBUTION:
Paul Thomas Belch
TRAVELERS STAFF COUNSEL
[e-mail]
John R. Maley
BARNES & THORNBURG, LLP
[e-mail]
Jeffrey S. McQuary
BROWN TOMPKINS LORY
[e-mail]

29