PARKER v. CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE et al
ENTRY - 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is granted because the Court finds that the plaintiff does not have the assets or means to pay the filing fee. The plaintiff shall have through March 28, 2018, in which to show cause why Judgment consistent with this Entry should not issue. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th Cir. 2013) ("Without at least an opportunity to amend or to respond to an order to show cause, an IFP applicant's case could be tossed out of court without giving the applicant any timely notice or opportunity to be heard to clarify, contest, or simply request leave to amend.") Signed by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt on 3/9/2018. (Copy mailed to Plaintiff) (MEJ)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE,
CAPITAL ONE, NA,
ONYX ACCEPTANCE CORP.,
JAMES J. MORRISSEY,
ANNA-KATRINA SARANTI CHRISTAKIS,
Entry Discussing Filing Fee, Dismissing Complaint and Directing Further Proceedings
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Brenda Parker’s (“Parker”) Motion for Leave
to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, dkt.  and for screening of her Complaint for Damages for Willful
Deprivation of Rights and Fraud upon the Courts, dkt .
I. Filing Fee
The plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying fees or costs, dkt , is
granted because the Court finds that the plaintiff does not have the assets or means to pay the
II. Screening of the Complaint
District courts have an obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints
before service on the defendants, and must dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. Dismissal under the in forma pauperis statute is an exercise of the Court’s discretion.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992). In determining whether the complaint states a claim,
the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To
survive dismissal under federal pleading standards,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few
words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has
happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403
(7th Cir.2010) (emphasis in original).
The underlying factual basis for this action allegedly began in May 2014, when the
plaintiff’s 2006 Ford Explorer was illegally repossessed. In response the plaintiff participated in
legal proceedings challenging this repossession. The complaint alleges in pertinent part:
Dkt. 1 at p. 3. The plaintiff further states that she has related claims pending in the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. The plaintiff asserts that “[a]ll Defendants conspired in all the proceedings from
filing dates through February 27, 2017, which led up to Plaintiff Parker filing this present action
to make Void, the Void Judgment [that] has caused a stain upon the judicial system. . . .”
The underlying May 2014 repossession claim may not be brought in this action because it
is barred by the statute of limitations. The complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Suits
under § 1983 use the statute of limitations and tolling rules that states employ for personal-injury
claims. In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. See Richards v.
Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code § 34–11–2–4. This action was filed on
March 5, 2018, more than three years after the expiration of Indiana’s 2-year statute of limitations.
“[D]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis of a limitations defense may be appropriate when
the plaintiff effectively pleads [himself] out of court by alleging facts that are sufficient to establish
the defense.” Hollander v. Brown, 457 F.3d 688, 691 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal citations
omitted); see also Koch v. Gregory, 536 Fed. Appx. 659 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that when the
language of the complaint plainly shows that the statute of limitations bars the suit, dismissal under
§ 1915A is appropriate); Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir.
In addition, this Court has no authority to dismiss, review, or otherwise interfere with the
state court case that the plaintiff believes has been mismanaged. See In re Campbell, 264 F.3d 730,
731 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing that as a general matter, federal courts lack authority to “control or
interfere with state court litigation”); Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 771–72 (7th Cir. 2002)
(“lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to conduct direct review of state court decisions.”).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine strips the district court of jurisdiction to involve itself in the
plaintiff’s attempt at an appeal of the state court decisions, notwithstanding her allegations that the
state court’s judgment runs afoul of the United States Constitution. See Brokaw v. Weaver, 305
F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2002)(“Simply put, the Rooker [v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)][District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.] Feldman[, 460 U.S. 462 (1983),] doctrine ‘precludes
lower federal court jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state court judgments . . . [because]
no matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be, the Supreme Court
of the United States is the only federal court that could have jurisdiction to review a state court
judgment.’ Thus, if a claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over the case.”) (internal citations and footnote omitted). Accordingly, claims
based on decisions made by other courts and court proceedings are dismissed for lack of
No viable claims over which this Court has jurisdiction have been identified. Accordingly,
the Complaint is dismissed.
III. Further Proceedings
The plaintiff shall have through March 28, 2018, in which to show cause why Judgment
consistent with this Entry should not issue. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014,
1022 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Without at least an opportunity to amend or to respond to an order to show
cause, an IFP applicant’s case could be tossed out of court without giving the applicant any timely
notice or opportunity to be heard to clarify, contest, or simply request leave to amend.”).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Indianapolis, IN 46260
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