DIXON v. EMERSON

Filing 9

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Directing Entry of Final Judgment - The petition of David J. Dixon for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding identified as No. STP-18-02-0136. For the reasons expla ined in this Order, Mr. Dixon's habeas petition must be denied. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there was no constitutiona l infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Mr. Dixon to the relief he seeks. Accordingly, Mr. Dixon's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Order shall now issue. (See Order). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 7/26/2018.(APD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
DAVID J. DIXON STP-18-02-0136,
Petitioner,
v.
EMERSON,
Respondent.

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No. 1:18-cv-00912-JMS-MPB

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Directing Entry of Final Judgment
The petition of David J. Dixon for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary
proceeding identified as No. STP-18-02-0136. For the reasons explained in this Order, Mr.
Dixon’s habeas petition must be denied.
A.

Overview

Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits, Cochran v. Buss,
381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process.

The due process

requirement is satisfied with the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited
opportunity to present evidence to an impartial decision-maker, a written statement articulating the
reasons for the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and “some evidence in the record”
to support the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir.
2003); Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).

B.

The Disciplinary Proceeding

On February 15, 2018, Sgt. R. Patton wrote a Conduct Report charging Mr. Dixon with B220 1, unauthorized financial transaction. Dkt. 8-1. The Conduct Report states:
On February 14, 2018 at approximately 3:15 P.M., I Sgt. Patton received
information that Offender David Dixon IDOC#111218 was using the phone PIN
assigned to Offender Larry Hazel IDOC# 250638. Upon reviewing the calls, Dixon
calls a phone number on 1/12/2018 that is also on his own phone list. He states to
a female, “Hi. Larry owes me money. I’ma have him put money on the phone, but
if you wanna talk now, you’ll prolyl have to do it.” End of report.
Id. Sgt. Patton also prepared a report with a transcript of the conversation that indicated that the
call was made from 317-732-5411 and lasted one minute. Dkt. 8-2. A reverse lookup report
identified the number as being associated with Alexis Hines. Dkt. 8-3.
Mr. Dixon was notified of the charge on February 15, 2018, when he received the Screening
Report. Dkt. 8-4. He pleaded not guilty to the charge, did not wish to have a lay advocate, and
did not request any witnesses or any physical evidence. Id. He also waived his right to 24 hours’
advance notice before the disciplinary hearing. Id. Mr. Dixon signed the Screening Report. Id.
The prison disciplinary hearing was held on February 15, 2018. According to the notes
from the hearing, Mr. Dixon stated, “[t]he number is not on my phone list.” Dkt. 8-5. Based on
the staff reports, the hearing officer found Mr. Dixon guilty of B-220, unauthorized financial
transaction. The sanctions imposed included one day of earned-credit-time deprivation and a
credit class demotion from C to D. Id.
Mr. Dixon appealed to the Facility Head and the Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC)
Final Reviewing Authority, both of which were denied. He then brought this petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

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The Conduct Report incorrectly lists the offense as code number 202, but the rest of the
documents correctly identify B-220 as the offense.
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C.

Analysis

Mr. Dixon’s habeas petition challenges his prison disciplinary conviction on two grounds:
(1) he was denied evidence and (2) he was denied a lay advocate. See dkt. 2. The respondent
construes Mr. Dixon’s habeas petition to also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Dkt. 8 at
5. The respondent argues that Mr. Dixon was not denied due process and there is “some evidence”
to support his conviction. Id. at 5-10. Mr. Dixon has not filed a reply, and time to do so has
passed.
1.

Denial of Evidence

Mr. Dixon asserts his request for the phone list and camera footage, but that his request for
evidence was denied. Dkt. 2 at 4. He alleges that “# 317-531-7201” is not on either his or Mr.
Hazel’s phone list. Id.
Due process requires “prison officials to disclose all material exculpatory evidence,” unless
that evidence “would unduly threaten institutional concerns.” Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847
(7th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In the prison disciplinary context, “the
purpose of the [this] rule is to insure that the disciplinary board considers all of the evidence
relevant to guilt or innocence and to enable the prisoner to present his or her best defense.” Id.
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Evidence is exculpatory if it undermines or contradicts
the finding of guilt, see id., and it is material if disclosing it creates a “reasonable probability” of
a different result, Toliver v. McCaughtry, 539 F.3d 766, 780-81 (7th Cir. 2008).
As an initial matter, Mr. Dixon did not request any physical evidence in this disciplinary
matter. Mr. Dixon was given an opportunity to request evidence when he was screened on
February 15, 2018, but he declined to request any evidence or call any witnesses. See dkt. 8-4.

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The hearing report also reflects that he did not request any evidence during the hearing – his only
statement only relates to the sufficiency of the evidence. See dkt. 8-5.
Even if prison officials unjustifiably deny a timely evidentiary request, federal habeas relief
is available only if the denial resulted in prejudice (i.e., was not harmless). Jones, 637 F.3d at
847–48; see also Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197–98 (2015). Mr. Dixon fails to explain
what the camera footage would have shown. Moreover, Mr. Dixon argues that the phone list was
necessary evidence because the phone number “317-531-7201” is not either his or Mr. Hazel’s
phone list. However, Sgt. Patton noted that the conversation was from phone number “317-7325411.” Thus, the phone list would not have been exculpatory. Thus, Mr. Dixon was not prejudiced
by any alleged denial. Accordingly, Mr. Dixon is not entitled to habeas relief on the ground of
denial of evidence.
2.

Lay Advocate

Mr. Dixon alleges he was denied a lay advocate. Dkt. 2 at 4. However, he does not allege
that he ever requested a lay advocate. The respondent argues that Mr. Dixon failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies on this ground. Dkt. 8 at 5-6. While it appears the respondent is correct,
the Court will nevertheless address the merits of his claim.
“[D]ue process d[oes] not require that the prisoner be appointed a lay advocate, unless ‘an
illiterate inmate is involved . . . or where the complexity of the issue makes it unlikely that the
inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension
of the case.’” Miller v. Duckworth, 963 F.2d 1002, 1004 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S.
at 570); see also Wilson-El v. Finnan, 263 Fed. Appx. 503, 506 (7th Cir. 2008).
As an initial matter, Mr. Dixon did not request a lay advocate in this disciplinary matter.
Mr. Dixon was given an opportunity to do so when he was screened on February 15, 2018, but he

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specifically declined to have a lay advocate. See dkt. 8-4. Moreover, Mr. Dixon does not argue
that he is illiterate or that the issues in these cases were so complex as to require a lay advocate.
Rather, he has fully briefed the issues on his own, demonstrating his literacy, and the charge in the
disciplinary hearing was not complex – he had a phone conversation that discussed an
unauthorized financial transaction. Accordingly, there is no due process violation and habeas relief
is not available to Mr. Dixon on this ground.
3.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are governed by the “some evidence”
standard. “[A] hearing officer’s decision need only rest on ‘some evidence’ logically supporting
it and demonstrating that the result is not arbitrary.” Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th
Cir. 2016); see Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The some evidence
standard . . . is satisfied if there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion
reached by the disciplinary board.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The “some evidence”
standard is much more lenient than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Moffat v. Broyles,
288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in
the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at
455-56.
Adult Disciplinary Code Section B-220, is entitled “Engaging in Unauthorized Financial
Transaction,” and is defined as: “[e]ngaging in or possessing materials used for unauthorized
financial transactions. This includes, but is not limited to, the use or possession of identifying
information of credit cards, debit cards, or any other card used to complete a financial transaction.”
Indiana Department of Correction Adult Disciplinary Process, Appendix I: Offenses, available at
http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_6-1-2015(1).pdf. Here, Sgt.

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Patton recorded a phone conversation from Mr. Dixon using the phone PIN assigned to another
inmate, Larry Hazel. Mr. Dixon states that Mr. Hazel owes him money, so he had Mr. Hazel “put
money on the phone.” Dkt. 8-1. This is “some evidence,” under Ellison, that Mr. Dixon engaged
in an unauthorized financial transaction.
D.

Conclusion

“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge,
disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there
was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Mr. Dixon to the relief he seeks.
Accordingly, Mr. Dixon’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action
dismissed.
Judgment consistent with this Order shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 7/26/2018

Distribution:
DAVID J. DIXON
111218
PENDLETON - CF
PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
Frances Hale Barrow
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
[e-mail]

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