HOLLARS v. ROADHOUSE HOST, LLC et al
Filing
31
ORDER - John Garrett Hollars alleges that on the morning of February 7, 2016, a coworker raped him. At some point following the alleged incident, Mr. Hollars' employer - Roadhouse Host LLC, a franchise of Texas Roadhouse Development Corporati on (hereinafter, "Texas Roadhouse") - terminated his employment. For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Hollars' Motion to Amend, 24 , is GRANTED and Texas Roadhouse's Motion to Dismiss, 20 , is GRANTED in part, as follows: The Moti on is GRANTED as to any state law claims that accrued prior to February 10, 2018, and such claims are DISMISSED with prejudice; and The Motion is GRANTED as to Mr. Hollars' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which is DISM ISSED without prejudice. Any future statement of claims filed by Mr. Hollars or served on opposing counsel pursuant to the Case Management Plan shall be in accordance with the Court's findings herein. [See Filing No. 27 .] (SEE ORDER). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 8/2/2018. (APD)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JOHN GARRETT HOLLARS,
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Plaintiff,
v.
ROADHOUSE HOST, LLC,
JOHN BRYANT,
Defendants.
No. 1:18-cv-01142-JMS-DML
ORDER
John Garrett Hollars alleges that on the morning of February 7, 2016, a coworker raped
him. At some point following the alleged incident, Mr. Hollars’ employer – Roadhouse Host LLC,
a franchise of Texas Roadhouse Development Corporation (hereinafter, “Texas Roadhouse”) –
terminated his employment.
Mr. Hollars brought suit against Texas Roadhouse in Madison Circuit Court, alleging
sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as several
state law causes of action. [Filing No. 1-1.] On April 13, 2018, Texas Roadhouse removed Mr.
Hollars’ suit to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, with supplemental
jurisdiction over Mr. Hollars’ state law claims. [Filing No. 1.] Shortly after Mr. Hollars amended
his Complaint, [Filing No. 18], Texas Roadhouse filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss pertaining to
Mr. Hollars’ state law claims. [Filing No. 20.] Mr. Hollars filed both a response and an Alternative
Motion to Amend his Amended Complaint, [Filing No. 24]. Both Motions are now ripe for the
Court’s review. [Filing No. 20; Filing No. 24.]
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I.
MOTION TO AMEND
As an initial matter, the Court will consider Mr. Hollars’ Motion to Amend. [Filing No.
24.] In his brief in support of his Motion to Amend, Mr. Hollars states that the currently-operative
Complaint only included one of six paragraphs from his Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) Charge of Discrimination in this matter. [Filing No. 25 at 2.] He states
that his proposed amendments would “add allegations relating to the paragraphs presented in the
EEOC Charge,” that he believes “will cure any remaining defects in [his] amended pleading.”
[Filing No. 25 at 7-8.] He argues that Texas Roadhouse would not be prejudiced by the amendment
because the case “is in its initial stages.” [Filing No. 25 at 8.] In addition, Mr. Hollars points out
that Texas Roadhouse is already aware of the allegations he seeks to add because it has already
cited to the allegations contained in his EEOC Charge. [Filing No. 25 at 8.]
In response, Texas Roadhouse argues that Mr. Hollars’ proposed amendment is “futile” as
it will not cure any of the defects in the Complaint. [Filing No. 29 at 3.]
My. Hollars’ reply does not address this issue, but merely states that the Court should allow
him to amend his Complaint. [Filing No. 30 at 4.]
Generally, a motion for leave to amend a complaint is evaluated under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 2011). Rule 15
provides that “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or
the court’s leave,” which should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit has called this standard “generous.” Arrigo v. Link, 836 F.3d 787,
797 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 734 (7th Cir. 2014)).
However, “a district court has broad discretion to deny leave to amend where there is undue delay,
bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants,
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or where the amendment would be futile.” U.S. v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 706-07 (7th
Cir. 2015) (quotation and citations omitted). Only where a plaintiff seeks to amend a complaint
after the deadline set in the case management plan has passed do courts apply a heightened
pleading standard, under which “the moving party must show good cause.” Arrigo, 836 F.3d at
797 (quotation and citation omitted).
In this case, the deadline to move to amend the pleadings is September 13, 2018. [Filing
No. 27 at 3.] Therefore, Mr. Hollars need not show good cause in order to amend his complaint.
Texas Roadhouse has only argued that amendment would be futile. After reviewing Mr. Hollars’
proposed Second Amended Complaint, however, the Court finds that it alleges significantly more
details than the Amended Complaint, including the date of Mr. Hollars’ termination and allegations
that he reported sexual harassment to Texas Roadhouse. [Filing No. 18; Filing No. 24-1.]
Therefore, it is not apparent from the face of the proposed Second Amended Complaint that
amendment would be futile. Accordingly, Mr. Hollars’ Motion to Amend, [Filing No. 24], is
GRANTED, and his proposed Second Amended Complaint is the operative Complaint in the case.
The Court now turns to Texas Roadhouse’s Partial Motion to Dismiss, which the Court
will treat as applying to Mr. Hollars’ Second Amended Complaint. [Filing No. 20.]
II.
MOTION TO DISMISS
A.
Legal Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim that does not state a right to
relief. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint provide the defendant with
“fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In reviewing
the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pled facts as true and draw all
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permissible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Active Disposal Inc. v. City of Darien, 635
F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2011). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss asks whether the complaint
“contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The
Court will not accept legal conclusions or conclusory allegations as sufficient to state a claim for
relief. See McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011). Factual allegations
must plausibly state an entitlement to relief “to a degree that rises above the speculative level.”
Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012). This plausibility determination is “a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Id.
B.
Background
The following are the factual allegations in the Complaint, which the Court must accept as
true at this time:
Mr. Hollars and John Bryant were both employed by the Texas Roadhouse in Anderson,
Indiana. [Filing No. 24-1 at 2.] Mr. Hollars began his employment with Texas Roadhouse in
October 2015. [Filing No. 24-1 at 2.] In November 2015, Mr. Bryant began sexually harassing
Mr. Hollars. [Filing No. 24-1 at 2.] Mr. Hollars reported the harassment to Texas Roadhouse.
[Filing No. 24-1 at 2.] Between November 2015 and February 10, 2016, Mr. Bryant continued to
sexually harass Mr. Hollars, and each time this occurred Mr. Hollars reported the harassment to
Texas Roadhouse. [Filing No. 24-1 at 2.] Initially, Texas Roadhouse scheduled Mr. Bryant to
work at locations other than Mr. Hollars’ employment location and scheduled the two to work at
different times. [Filing No. 24-1 at 2.]
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In the early morning hours of February 7, 2016, Mr. Bryant anally raped Mr. Hollars.
[Filing No. 24-1 at 3.] Mr. Bryant is HIV positive. [Filing No. 24-1 at 3.] Mr. Hollars was drunk
at the time of this incident. [Filing No. 24-1 at 3.] Later that day, Mr. Hollars went to Community
Hospital of Anderson and notified medical staff that he believed he had been raped by Mr. Bryant
and that Mr. Bryant was HIV positive. 1 [Filing No. 24-1 at 3.]
On February 10, 2016, Texas Roadhouse terminated Mr. Hollars’ employment. [Filing
No. 24-1 at 2.]
On April 14, 2016, Mr. Hollars filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that Texas
Roadhouse discriminated against him by failing to respond to his complaints of being sexually
harassed by Mr. Bryant based on race, color, and sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. [Filing No. 24-1 at 1.]
On February 12, 2018,2 Mr. Hollars brought suit against Texas Roadhouse in Madison
Circuit Court, alleging that he was entitled to damages for infliction of emotional distress, sexual
harassment, failure to maintain a safe work environment, sexual battery, and battery. [Filing No.
1-1 at 5.] On April 13, 2018, Texas Roadhouse removed Mr. Hollars’ suit to this Court on the
basis of federal question jurisdiction, alleging supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Hollars’ nonfederal claims. [Filing No. 1.] In the operative Complaint, Mr. Hollars alleges that he “is entitled
to damages for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Intentional Infliction of Emotional
In his Complaint, Mr. Hollars states that “[o]n February 11, 2016, [Mr. Hollars] received the
results of the test.” [Filing No. 24-1 at 3.] He does not specify what the test was for, nor does he
indicate the outcome of the test. On a motion to dismiss, this Court must “accept as true all relevant
facts alleged” in the Amended Complaint. Grzan v. Charter Hosp. of Nw. Indiana, 104 F.3d 116,
118 (7th Cir. 1997). The Court does not include this statement in its recitation of the facts as it
cannot discern any relevant facts from Mr. Hollars’ statement that he received unknown results
from an unidentified test.
2 February 10, 2018 was a Saturday.
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Distress, Failure to Maintain a Safe Work Environment, and Negligent Retention” as well as
damages “pursuant to Title VII.” [Filing No. 24-1 at 3.]
On May 23, 2018, Texas Roadhouse filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss pertaining to Mr.
Hollars’ state law claims, which is now ripe for the Court’s review. [Filing No. 20.]
C.
Discussion
Texas Roadhouse makes two arguments in support of its Motion to Dismiss, each of which
the Court considers in turn.
1. Statute of Limitations
First, Texas Roadhouse argues that Mr. Hollars’ state law claims are time-barred because
they were filed after the two year statute of limitations on claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligent supervision, and negligent retention. 3 [Filing No. 21 at 3.] Texas
Roadhouse argues that Mr. Hollars’ claims are based upon a rape that allegedly occurred on
February 7, 2016, but he did not file his original complaint until February 12, 2018. Texas
Roadhouse acknowledges that Mr. Hollars’ employment with Texas Roadhouse was terminated
on February 10, 2016, but contends that this “does nothing to support a negligent supervision or
retention claim related to [Mr.] Bryant’s alleged prior rape of him.” [Filing No. 21 at 3-4.]
In response, Mr. Hollars argues that his claims are not time-barred because they began to
accrue on February 10, 2016, [Filing No. 25 at 5], and they were filed by February 12, 2018 – the
last day to file such claims, [Filing No. 25 at 1]. Moreover, Mr. Hollars argues that his state law
3
At the time Texas Roadhouse filed its Partial Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Hollars had not alleged a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, this claim was added in the nowoperative Second Amended Complaint. [See Filing No. 24-1 at 3.] Given that the statutes of
limitation for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional
distress are the same, the Court will construe Texas Roadhouse’s arguments concerning the former
to also apply to the latter claim.
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causes of action regarding Texas Roadhouse’s “conduct between November 2015 through
February 10, 2016 are not time-barred, due to the doctrine of continuing wrong.” [Filing No. 25
at 1.] Specifically, Mr. Hollars argues that the doctrine of continuing wrong “defines when an act,
omission, or neglect took place” and, in this case, Texas Roadhouse’s “conduct took place from
November 2015, when [Mr. Hollars] was first sexually harassed by [Mr.] Bryant, through February
10, 2016,” when Texas Roadhouse terminated Mr. Hollars’ employment. [Filing No. 25 at 5-6.]
In its reply brief, Texas Roadhouse maintains its argument that Mr. Hollars’ state law
claims accrued on February 7, 2016. [Filing No. 29 at 1.] Texas Roadhouse further argues that
even if the doctrine of continuing wrong applies, the statute of limitations began to run as soon as
Mr. Hollars learned of the facts giving rise to a claim. [Filing No. 29 at 2.]
In his surreply, Mr. Hollars contends that Texas Roadhouse misstates his arguments.
[Filing No. 30 at 1.] He states that he “does not allege, at any point in his prior complaints or in
his proposed Second Amended Complaint, that [Texas Roadhouse’s] conduct is solely tied to, and
ended with, the events that took place on February 7, 2016.” [Filing No. 30 at 2.] Instead, Mr.
Hollars states that “the evidence will show” that he “was terminated only after vocalizing his
concerns about working with [Mr.] Bryant on February 10, 2016, given the circumstances
surrounding the prior sexual harassment occurrences and the February 7, 2016 rape incident,” and
that he pled allegations that Texas Roadhouse’s conduct continued after February 7, 2016. [Filing
No. 30 at 2-3.] In addition, Mr. Hollars contends that the continuing wrong doctrine applies to this
case because he “did not learn of facts leading to the discovery of the state law causes of action”
against Texas Roadhouse “until the events following the February 7, 2016 rape incident,”
including his termination on February 10, 2016. [Filing No. 30 at 3-4.]
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The Court notes at the outset that a statute of limitations argument is an affirmative defense,
which is ordinarily not appropriate for decision on a motion to dismiss. Donald v. Outlaw, 2018
WL 2463605, at *2 (N.D. Ind. May 31, 2018). “However, a statute of limitations defense may be
adjudicated on a motion to dismiss if the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything
necessary to satisfy the defense.” Id. at *2 (citing Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir.
2009)).
At issue are the four state law claims set forth in Mr. Hollars’ operative Second Amended
Complaint: “Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, Failure to Maintain a Safe Work Environment, and Negligent Retention,” [Filing No. 241 at 3], each of which is governed by a two-year statute of limitations. First, Mr. Hollars’ claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress are
both governed by Indiana’s statute of limitations for personal injury suits, which provides that such
an action “must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues.” Ind. Code
§ 34-11-2-4; Miller v. Danz, 36 N.E.3d 455, 457 (Ind. 2015) (applying the two-year statute of
limitations found in Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim);
Schuman v. Kobets, 716 N.E.2d 355, 356 (Ind. 1999) (applying the two-year statute of limitations
to a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim). Similarly, Mr. Hollars’ claims for failure to
maintain a safe work environment and negligent retention are governed by a two-year statute of
limitations. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-1 (providing that suits “relating to the terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment except actions based upon a written contract” must be brought “within
two (2) years of the date of the act or omission complained of”); see also Elwell v. First Baptist
Church of Hammond, Inc., 2016 WL 4920021, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 15, 2016) (applying a twoyear statute of limitations period for action involving negligent retention).
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In determining when a personal injury suit accrued, the Indiana Supreme Court has stated:
Under Indiana’s discovery rule, a cause of action accrues, and the limitation period
begins to run, when a claimant knows or in the exercise of ordinary diligence should
have known of the injury. The determination of when a cause of action accrues is
generally a question of law. For an action to accrue, it is not necessary that the full
extent of the damage be known or even ascertainable, but only that some
ascertainable damage has occurred.
Cooper Indus., LLC v. City of S. Bend, 899 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (Ind. 2009). The Seventh Circuit,
applying Indiana law, applied this same standard to cases related to employment brought under §
34-11-2-1. See Jean v. Dugan, 20 F.3d 255, 265-66 (7th Cir. 1994).
Mr. Hollars does not dispute that his claims are time-barred if they accrued on or before
February 9, 2016. Instead, the crux of his argument is that the continuing wrong theory applies to
his case, such that his claims accrued on February 10, 2016, and were therefore timely brought on
February 12, 2018 under Indiana Trial Rule 6.
“The doctrine of continuing wrong is not an equitable doctrine; it is simply a legal concept
used to define when an act, omission or neglect took place.” Havens v. Ritchey, 582 N.E.2d 792,
795 (Ind. 1991). The Indiana Court of Appeals has explained that the “continuing wrong theory
has been asserted primarily in medical malpractice cases. Where the plaintiff’s harm results from
a course of treatment, the argument is sometimes successful. However, where the plaintiff’s harm
results from an isolated act, the argument is rejected.” C & E Corp. v. Ramco Indus., Inc., 717
N.E.2d 642, 644 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (internal citations omitted). As the Seventh Circuit recently
recognized, Indiana’s continuing-wrong doctrine does not toll the statute of limitations “if the
plaintiff obtains information that should lead to the discovery of the cause of action.” Pain Ctr. of
SE Indiana LLC v. Origin Healthcare Sols. LLC, 893 F.3d 454, 463 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Snyder
v. Town of Yorktown, 20 N.E.3d 545, 551 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); C & E Corp., 717 N.E.2d at 645)).
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In this case, Mr. Hollars had actual knowledge of his potential causes of action prior to
February 10, 2016. He claims, for example, that Mr. Bryant began sexually harassing him in
November 2015. [Filing No. 24-1 at 2.] At the moment the harassment began, Mr. Hollars knew
that some damage had occurred. See Hayes v. Multiband EC Corp., 2014 WL 1340679, at *2
(S.D. Ind. Apr. 4, 2014) (holding that the statute of limitations for damages arising out of a burglary
began to run when the burglary occurred because the victim “indisputably knew that some damage
had occurred to her” and that she “did not need to know beyond a doubt” that the burglar victimized
her). The same logic applies to the rape that Mr. Hollars alleges occurred on February 7, 2018.
As of that date, he had all of the information he needed to know that an actionable injury had
occurred. To the extent that Mr. Hollars claims emotional distress after his alleged rape, “this only
goes toward the issue of his damages,” not claim accrual. Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 592
(7th Cir. 2013) (holding that the continuing wrong doctrine did not apply to an intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim for false arrest and that any emotional distress that plaintiff experienced
after the accrual goes to the issue of damages); see also Jean, 20 F.3d at 266 (holding that where
a plaintiff had an “understanding that some damage had occurred” but “may not have appreciated
the full consequences” of defendant’s actions until later, Indiana’s two year statute of limitations
began to run as of the earlier date, and the full consequences of defendant’s actions were perhaps
“relevant to the extent of the damages,” but not to claim accrual).
In determining when Mr. Hollars’ claims accrued, the Indiana Court of Appeals’ decision
in Konkle v. Henson is instructive. 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). In Konkle, the plaintiff
had been sexually molested by a minister of her church since she was seven years old. Id. at 452.
The basis for the plaintiff’s claim was the church’s negligent supervision and retention of the
minister. Id. at 452. The plaintiff argued that the church’s actions were a continuing wrong, “thus
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tolling the statute of limitations until the last act.” Id. at 458. The Indiana Court of Appeals
rejected the plaintiff’s continuing wrong theory and held that each time the plaintiff was
inappropriately touched, “she was injured by the Church Defendants’ breach of duty, and a new
cause of action arose.” Id. at 459. Accordingly, the Court held that any claims for actions that
occurred two or more years before the plaintiff filed her complaint were barred by the statute of
limitations. Id. at 459.
Here, Mr. Hollars’ complaint admits that he knew or should have known that sexual
harassment had occurred prior to February 10, 2016. Therefore, the doctrine of continuing wrong
does not apply to this case. Mr. Hollars’ claims that accrued prior to February 10, 2016 are timebarred by the statute of limitations and are therefore dismissed with prejudice.
2. Failure to State a Claim
Texas Roadhouse also argues that Mr. Hollars has failed to state a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress with regard to his February 10, 2016 termination. [Filing No. 21
at 4.] Specifically, Texas Roadhouse argues that “[c]ourts are hesitant to find outrageous conduct
in simple termination cases like this one.” [Filing No. 21 at 4.] By contrast, Texas Roadhouse
contends that Mr. Hollars alleged “nothing more than a retaliatory discharged based upon
complaints of sexual harassment,” which does not qualify as intentional infliction of emotional
distress under Indiana law. [Filing No. 21 at 5.]
In addition, Mr. Hollars contends that he has stated a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress because he “reported repeated events of sexual harassment” to Texas
Roadhouse, and through Texas Roadhouse’s “reckless/intentional conduct and/or inaction, the
situation escalated during the period of three months, to the point where [Mr. Hollars] was raped
by his co-worker.” [Filing No. 25 at 6.] Thereafter, Mr. Hollars argues that Texas Roadhouse’s
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“reckless/intentional conduct and/or inaction continued through February 10, 2018.” [Filing No.
25 at 6.]
In its reply brief, Texas Roadhouse reiterates its argument that Mr. Hollars’ claims must
be based on the February 7, 2016 rape, and not the February 10, 2016 termination because
terminations generally do not support claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. [Filing
No. 29 at 2.] Further, to the extent that Mr. Hollars alleges negligent infliction of emotional
distress in the operative complaint, Texas Roadhouse argues that such a claim is insufficiently pled
under Indiana law because employment terminations do not cause the requisite “direct physical
impact required for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.” [Filing No. 29 at 3-4]
In his sur-reply, Mr. Hollars states that he pled allegations that Texas Roadhouse’s conduct
continued after February 7, 2016. [Filing No. 30 at 2-3.]
The parties’ arguments primarily concern whether employment actions may provide the
basis for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. However, the Court need not
consider such nuanced arguments because Mr. Hollars’ claim must be dismissed for a simpler
reason – it does not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Indiana law.
The Indiana Supreme Court has stated that the “definition of the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress is that ‘one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress....’” Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ind. 1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 46 (1965)). Here again, an Indiana Court of Appeals case is instructive in considering Mr.
Hollars’ claim. In Tucker v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Lafayette-In-Indiana, the Indiana Court
of Appeals considered a complaint brought by a plaintiff who alleged that an individual employed
by the Diocese repeatedly sexually abused her. 837 N.E.2d 596, 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The
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Court of Appeals held that the abuse itself “was extreme and outrageous” but that whether the
Diocese’ s actions or inactions were extreme and outrageous was a different question. The court
found that the plaintiff’s claims “allege, without more, that the Diocese’s intentional actions
constituted extreme and outrageous conduct” but “fails to allege . . . that it was the Diocese’s intent
to emotionally harm” her. Id. at 603. As such, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff
had failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress upon which relief could
be granted. Id. at 603.
The facts in Tucker are similar to this case, in that the defendant is an employer, not the
individual alleged to have committed sexual assault. Like the plaintiff in Tucker, Mr. Hollars
alleges without more that the employer at issue behaved intentionally. However, Mr. Hollars fails
to allege that Texas Roadhouse intended to emotionally harm him. Put another way, Mr. Hollars’
conclusory allegation fails to plausibly state an entitlement to relief “to a degree that rises above
the speculative level.” Munson, 673 F.3d at 633. As such, he has failed to state a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and that claim is, therefore, dismissed.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Hollars’ Motion to Amend, [24], is GRANTED and Texas
Roadhouse’s Motion to Dismiss, [20], is GRANTED in part, as follows:
the Motion is GRANTED as to any state law claims that accrued prior to February
10, 2018, and such claims are DISMISSED with prejudice; and
the Motion is GRANTED as to Mr. Hollars’ claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, which is DISMISSED without prejudice.
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Any future statement of claims filed by Mr. Hollars or served on opposing counsel pursuant
to the Case Management Plan shall be in accordance with the Court’s findings herein. [See Filing
No. 27.]
Date: 8/2/2018
Distribution via EFC only to all counsel of record.
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