DAVIS v. BERRYHILL

Filing 19

ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION - The Court AFFIRMS the ALJ's decision denying the Plaintiff benefits. Final judgment will issue by separate entry. (See Entry). Signed by Judge James Patrick Hanlon on 5/18/2020.(JDH)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
LORRAINE D. 1,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration,
Defendant.

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No. 1:18-cv-01944-JPH-TAB

ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION
Plaintiff Lorraine D. seeks judicial review of the Social Security
Administration's decision denying her petition for Disability Insurance Benefits
and Supplemental Security Income. She argues that the ALJ's decision is
unsupported by substantial evidence because, in determining her Residual
Functional Capacity ("RFC"), the ALJ: (1) gave too little weight to her treating
physician's opinion, and (2) cherry-picked medical evidence from an evaluating
psychologist's opinion. See dkt. 14 at 11–17. For the reasons that follow, the
decision is AFFIRMED.
I.
Facts and Background
Plaintiff was 42 years old at the alleged onset date of her disability. Dkt.
8-3 at 2. She had completed twelfth grade and worked in the past as a

To protect the privacy interests of claimants for Social Security benefits, consistent
with the recommendation of the Court Administration and Case Management
Committee of the Administrative Office of the United States courts, the Southern
District of Indiana has opted to use only the first name and last initial of nongovernmental parties in its Social Security judicial review opinions.
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babysitter and in retail. Dkt. 8-6 at 15. In 2014 and 2015, Plaintiff was
evaluated and found to have chronic knee and back pain, anxiety, depression,
and arthritis. Dkt. 8-7 at 3, 7, 44. Those conditions caused limitations in
sitting, standing, walking, lifting, memory, and attention. Id. at 3, 10, 45; dkt.
8-9 at 25.
Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental
Security Income in November 2014 with an alleged onset date in March 2014.
Dkt. 8-3 at 3; dkt. 8-2 at 12. Plaintiff's application was initially denied on
January 22, 2015, dkt. 8-4 at 2, and on reconsideration on August 31, 2015,
dkt. 8-4 at 14. Administrative Law Judge Gladys Whitfield held a hearing in
May 2017, dkt. 8-2 at 39, and the next month issued a decision denying
Plaintiff's claims, dkt. 8-2 at 12–25. The Appeals Council denied review in
June 2018. Dkt. 8-2 at 2–7. Later that month, Plaintiff brought this action
asking the Court to review the denial of benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Dkt.
1.
In her decision, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation in 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Dkt. 8-2
at 12–25. Specifically, the ALJ found that:
•

At Step One, Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 2
since the alleged onset date. Dkt. 8-2 at 15.

•

At Step Two, she had "the following severe impairments: obesity,
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, inflammatory

2 Substantial gainful activity is defined as work activity that is both substantial
(involving significant physical or mental activities) and gainful (usually done for pay or
profit, whether or not a profit is realized). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a).

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arthritis/osteoarthritis of the left knee, patella tendonitis of the left knee,
chondromalacia of the left knee, diverticulitis/gastritis, essential
hypertension, dysthymic disorder, depression, anxiety, and
posttraumatic stress disorder." Dkt. 8-2 at 15.
•

At Step Three, she did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the
listed impairments. Dkt. 8-2 at 16.

•

After Step Three but before Step Four, she had the RFC "to perform light
work . . . except she can lift/carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10
pounds frequently; she can sit for up to six hours and can stand/walk
up to six hours, each in an eight-hour workday; she should have the
option to alternate positions for one to two minutes every 30 minutes;
she can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but she can occasionally
balance, stoop, crouch, crawl, kneel, and climb ramps or stairs; she
should avoid commercial driving; she is limited to simple, routine and
repetitive tasks; she should not be required to perform fast-paced
production, tandem tasks, or teamwork; she can have occasional
interaction with the public, co-workers, and supervisors." Dkt. 8-2 at
18.

•

At Step Four, Plaintiff "is unable to perform any past relevant work."
Dkt. 8-2 at 22.

•

At Step Five, considering Plaintiff's "age, education, work experience, and
[RFC], there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy" that she can perform. Dkt. 8-2 at 23.
II.
Applicable Law
"The Social Security Act authorizes payment of disability insurance

benefits . . . to individuals with disabilities." Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,
214 (2002). "The statutory definition of 'disability' has two parts." Id. at 217.
First, it requires an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity. Id.
And second, it requires a physical or mental impairment that explains the
inability and "has lasted or can be expected to last . . . not less than 12
months." Id. "The standard for disability claims under the Social Security Act
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is stringent." Williams-Overstreet v. Astrue, 364 F. App'x 271, 274 (7th Cir.
2010). "Even claimants with substantial impairments are not necessarily
entitled to benefits, which are paid for by taxes, including taxes paid by those
who work despite serious physical or mental impairments and for whom
working is difficult and painful." Id. at 274.
When an applicant seeks judicial review, the Court's role is limited to
ensuring that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ's decision. Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668
(7th Cir. 2004). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. In
evaluating the evidence, the Court gives the ALJ's credibility determinations
"considerable deference," overturning them only if they are "patently wrong."
Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006).
The ALJ must apply the five-step inquiry set forth in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v), evaluating in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the
claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's
impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed by the
[Commissioner]; (4) whether the claimant can perform her past
work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing work
in the national economy.
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). "If a claimant satisfies
steps one, two, and three, she will automatically be found disabled. If a
claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then she must satisfy step
four. Once step four is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that

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the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy." Knight v.
Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a
claimant's RFC by evaluating "all limitations that arise from medically
determinable impairments, even those that are not severe." Villano v. Astrue,
556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). In doing so, the ALJ "may not dismiss a
line of evidence contrary to the ruling." Id. The ALJ uses the RFC at Step Four
to determine whether the claimant can perform her own past relevant work
and, if not, at Step Five to determine whether the claimant can perform other
work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), (g). The burden of proof is on the claimant
for Steps One through Four, but shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five. See
Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.
If the ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence supports
the ALJ's decision, the Court must affirm the benefit denial. Barnett, 381 F.3d
at 668. When an ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, a
remand for further proceedings is typically appropriate. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v.
Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). An award of benefits "is
appropriate only where all factual issues have been resolved and the record can
yield but one supportable conclusion." Id. (citation omitted).
III.
Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence because, in determining her RFC between Step 3 and Step 4, the ALJ:

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(1) gave her treating physician's opinion too little weight, and (2) cherry-picked
medical evidence from an evaluating psychologist's opinion. See dkt. 14 at 11–
17.
A.

The ALJ's Evaluation of the Treating Physician's Opinion

Plaintiff argues that in determining her RFC, the ALJ did not properly
evaluate the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Woodall. Dkt. 14 at 11–15.
She contends that the ALJ was required to give his opinion increased weight,
but instead "broadly dismisse[d]" his conclusions about Plaintiff's abilities and
assumed that his opinion was "completed as an accommodation." Id. at 13.
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ reasonably gave the opinion little
weight and at least "minimally articulated" her reasons for doing so as
required. Dkt. 16 at 8–11.
Opinions from treating physicians "[g]enerally" receive "more weight." 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). 3 "An ALJ who chooses to reject a treating physician's
opinion must provide a sound explanation for the rejection." Jelinek v. Astrue,
662 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2011). And "[w]hen an ALJ decides to favor
another medical professional's opinion over that of a treating physician, the
ALJ must provide an account of what value the treating physician's opinion
merits." Id. "On judicial review, a court will uphold the Commissioner's

This regulation applies to claims filed before March 27, 2017, so it applies here. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527. It also requires ALJs to give a treating physician’s opinions
"controlling weight" if they are "well-supported by medically appropriate clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial
evidence in [the] record." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Plaintiff does not argue that Dr.
Woodall’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight. See dkt. 14 at 12–13.
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decision if the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and supported [her]
decision with substantial evidence." Id. The Court "limit[s] [its] review to the
reasons articulated by the ALJ in the written decision." Id.
Here, Dr. Woodall's opinion was that Plaintiff could not work because she
wasn't able to do any lifting, pushing, pulling, stooping, or bending, or any
prolonged walking, standing, sitting, or climbing:

Dkt. 8-9 at 35; see dkt. 8-2 at 20. The ALJ gave "little weight" to this opinion
for two reasons. Dkt. 8-2 at 20. First, because it "include[d] only conclusions
regarding functional limitations without any rationale for those conclusions,"
so it "appear[ed] to have been completed as an accommodation" for Plaintiff.
Id. And second, it was not clear that Dr. Woodall was familiar with the relevant
definition of "disability," so the ALJ found it "possible that the doctor was
referring solely to an inability to perform [Plaintiff's] past work." Id. at 20–21.
Plaintiff attacks the ALJ's first reason by contending that Dr. Woodall's
opinion was supported by his treating notes and by the record as a whole,
including medical records from other doctors. Dkt. 14 at 13. In support, she
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cites records showing that Dr. Woodall referred her for treatment of several
conditions. Dkt. 8-8 at 17 (noting a motorcycle accident, arthritis, and chronic
lower back pain), 20–27, 60–63 (noting a cardiac history, diverticulitis, lower
back pain, rheumatoid arthritis, and arthritis); dkt. 8-9 at 11–23, 56 (noting
acute renal failure, prerenal azotemia, acute gastroenteritis, hypertension,
arthritis, chronic low back pain, left knee pain, anxiety, and depression); dkt.
8-10 at 5, 21–23, 30 (noting diarrhea, severe acute gastritis, and anxiety). But
Plaintiff merely cites those records; she does not explain how they support Dr.
Woodall's opinion or what conclusions the ALJ should have drawn from them.
Dkt. 14 at 13. And while those records confirm Plaintiff's medical conditions—
which the ALJ recognized, dkt. 8-2 at 15—they do not say that those
conditions limit her in ways that would prevent her from working.
Because those records do not support Dr. Woodall's opinion, they also do
not undermine the ALJ's conclusion that the opinion "appear[ed] to have been
completed as an accommodation" for Plaintiff. Dkt. 8-2 at 20. Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ erred because no regulation allowed her to draw such a
conclusion. Dkt. 14 at 13–14. But ALJs may reject treating physicians'
opinions if they give a "sound explanation" for doing so. Jelinek, 662 F.3d at
811. The ALJ did so here by following the treating-physician regulation and
explaining that Dr. Woodall's opinion was "without any rationale for [its]
conclusions." Dkt. 8-2 at 20; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) ("The better an
explanation a source provides for a medical opinion, the more weight we will
give that medical opinion").
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Moreover, ALJs may make credibility determinations, which will be
reversed only if they are "patently wrong." Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435
(7th Cir. 2000). The ALJ here made such a determination, recognizing that "it
is not unheard of that a personal physician 'might have been leaning over
backwards to support the application for disability benefits.'" Schenk v.
Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 702 (7th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff does not address the ALJ's second reason for giving Dr.
Woodall's opinion little weight—that it wasn't clear that he was familiar with
the relevant definition of "disability," so it was "possible that [he] was referring
solely to an inability to perform [Plaintiff's] past work." Dkt. 8-2 at 20–21. This
bolsters the ALJs first reason for giving Dr. Woodall's opinion little weight. The
opinion is not tied to any regulation or social security definitions, does not
incorporate any medical records, and provides no context to clarify the scope of
the opinion that Plaintiff couldn't work. See dkt. 8-9 at 35.
In short, the ALJ gave the required "sound explanation" for giving Dr.
Woodall's opinion little weight. Jelinek, 662 F.3d at 811. There is no reversible
error in the ALJ's evaluation of the treating physician's opinion.
B. The ALJ's Evaluation of Dr. Halmi's Opinion
In determining Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ evaluated Dr. Halmi's
psychological opinion. Dkt. 8-2 at 21. The ALJ summarized Dr. Halmi's
conclusion as Plaintiff having "the capacity to understand, remember, and
carry out simple instructions" but also "some limitations in concentration,
social interaction, and adaptation." Id. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's
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summation is a misrepresentation, and that the ALJ cherry-picked facts from
Dr. Halmi's opinion in determining Plaintiff's RFC. Dkt. 14 at 15–16. The
Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly summarized and accounted for
Dr. Halmi's opinion. Dkt. 16 at 11–12.
The ALJ must "adequately discuss[ ]" the issues, building a "logical
bridge from the evidence to [her] conclusion." Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351,
362 (7th Cir. 2013). "It is not enough to address mere portions of a doctor's
report." Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009). But the ALJ is not
required to perform "a complete written evaluation of every piece of evidence,"
or "discuss every snippet of information from the medical records that might be
inconsistent with the rest of the objective medical evidence." Pepper, 712 F.3d
at 362–63.
Plaintiff claims that several findings from Dr. Halmi's opinion were "not
properly represented" in the ALJ's evaluation. Dkt. 14 at 17. Those findings
are that:
•

Plaintiff could repeat two digits forward but not backward;

•

Plaintiff needed two tries to immediately repeat four words, and
scored "severely impaired" on a test that required her to repeat
them after five minutes;

•

Plaintiff's recall of remote personal dates and events was poor;

•

Plaintiff ended the examination before some assessments
because she was hysterical and crying uncontrollably;

•

Plaintiff's attention and concentration would cause significant
problems completing simple tasks for extended periods of time;
and
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•

Plaintiff's depression and anxiety would cause significant
problems interacting appropriately with coworkers, supervisors,
and the public, and would cause difficulty responding to changes
in her work routine.

Id. at 15–16.
But Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ ignored any of those findings.
See Myles, 582 F.3d at 678. Nor does she explain how those findings
contradict the ALJ's conclusions. See Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 699
(7th Cir. 2014). Instead, the ALJ's general summary accounts for Dr. Halmi's
specific findings. As the ALJ recognized, those findings add up to "some
deficits in short-term memory" and "some limitations in concentration, social
interaction, and adaptation." Dkt. 8-2 at 21.
Moreover, the ALJ acknowledged the limitations that Dr. Halmi found.
She noted Plaintiff's "moderate limitations" in understanding and remembering
information, and in interacting with others. Dkt. 8-2 at 17. And she
concluded that Plaintiff should not be required to perform tandem tasks or
teamwork, and should have only "occasional interaction with the public, coworkers, and supervisors." Id. at 18. So even if the ALJ had ignored Dr.
Halmi's findings that Plaintiff cites, they do not contradict the ALJ's
conclusions and therefore are not evidence of cherry-picking evidence. See
Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 431 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff

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did not show a lack of substantial evidence to support the conclusion when the
ALJ acknowledged plaintiff's agoraphobia and depression in the analysis). 4
In short, the ALJ built a logical bridge from the evidence to her
conclusions, so substantial evidence supports her decision. See Simila v.
Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 517 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he ALJ need not mention every
strand of evidence in her opinion, but only enough to build an accurate and
logical bridge from evidence to conclusion.").
IV.
Conclusion
The Court AFFIRMS the ALJ's decision denying the Plaintiff benefits.
Final judgment will issue by separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 5/18/2020

Distribution:
Christie O'Brien Tate
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
[e-mail]
Edward A. Wicklund
OLINSKY LAW GROUP
[e-mail]

Plaintiff briefly argues, without supporting citations to the record or to case law, that
the ALJ failed to incorporate the limitations that Dr. Halmi identified into her
hypothetical to the vocational expert. Dkt. 14 at 17. To the extent this argument
differs from Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ cherry-picked evidence from Dr. Hamli’s
opinion, it is waived. See Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2013).
4

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Julian Clifford Wierenga
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (Indianapolis)
[e-mail]

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